P.L Bhargava, J.:— Shrimati Sarup Dei, the plaintiff-respondent, is the owner of a shop in village Dhanaura, pargana Hasanpur, in the district of Moradabad. On May 6, 1945, she had let out the shop to Ganga Prasad, the defendant-appellant, for one year on a yearly rental of Rs. 125. After the expiry of the term of the lease the shop was not vacated by the defendant. Accordingly, on August 9, 1946, the plaintiff instituted the suit, which has given rise to this appeal, for ejectment of the defendant from the shop. On March 29, 1947 the trial Court dismissed the suit for ejectment on the ground that it was barred in view of the provisions of Section 3 of the United Provinces (Temporary) Control of Rent and Eviction Act (No. 3 of 1947).

2. The plaintiff thereupon filed an application for review., on April 2, 1947. She pointed out that Act 3 of 1947 had not been made applicable to Dhanaura, where the shop was situate. As the suit was not, in fact, governed by the provisions of the said Act, the trial Court granted the application for review, set aside the dismissal of the suit and decreed the same. The defendant preferred an appeal which came up for hearing before the Civil Judge of Moradabad. That appeal was dismissed; hence this appeal.

3. Learned counsel for the appellant has, in the first place, contended that the application for review was not properly presented, in as-much as it was presented to the Munsarim of the Court, while, under Rule 2 of Order 47 of the Code of Civil Procedure, it should have been made to the Presiding Officer of the Court. In this connection reliance has been placed upon a decision of this Court in Munro v. The Cawnpore Municipal Board.1 I, however, see no force in this contention—firstly, because there is nothing on the record to show that the application was presented to the Munsarim.

4. On the other hand, the order sheet goes to show that the application was presented in Court and it was ordered to be put up in the presence of the counsel for the parties. The defendant filed an objection on the same day, viz., April 2, 1947. On the next day, the Court fixed a date for the disposal of the application.

5. Learned counsel for the appellant has pointed out that in the Court below it was admitted that the application for review was presented to the Munsarim, but there is no reference to any such admission in the judgment of the learned Civil Judge. It appears that the learned Judge proceeded to dispose of the argument advanced on behalf of the appellant in regard to the proper presentation of the application on the assumption that it had been presented in the office and not in Court.

6. Secondly, even if it were to be assumed that the application for review, which was addressed to the “Judge who passed the decree” was put up before him, through the official channel—the Munsarim and the Reader—it is not possible to hold that on that account the application was not properly presented. All that Rule 2 of Order 47 of the Code of Civil Procedure requires is that an application for review of a decree upon some ground other than the discovery of such new and important matter or evidence as is referred to in Rule 1 or the existence of a clerical or arithmetical mistake or error apparent on the face of the decree, shall be made only to and disposed of by the judge who passed it and not by his suecessor, except in cases where notice has been ordered to be issued by the Judge who passed the decree.

7. In Munro's case, no doubt, there is an observation at page 59 that

“the application should have been presented to the Judge and not to the Munsarim;”

but those observations were made in entirely different circumstances. In that case, an application for review had been presented to the Munsarim within 90 days of the decree. The application was insufficiently stamped. The Munsarim reported that the stamp on the application was insufficient. There was some dispute between the Government Pleader and the Munsarim as to whether or not the stamp was sufficient. In the meantime the period of ninety days expired. After the proper stamp duty had been paid a question arose whether there was a proper presentation within 90 days. It was pointed out that the application was not fit to be received within ninety days by reason of the deficiency of stamp and it was barred by limitation, under the circumstances, after ninety days.

8. In the next place, it has been argued on behalf of the appellant that no application for review could be entertained or granted to correct an “error of law.” Reliance has been placed on the following decisions; (1) Chajju Ram v. Neki;2 (2) Balkrishan v. Mt. Bundia;3 (3) Thakur Kishun Chand Singh v. Munshi Makund Sarup A.I.R 1938 All. 308 = A.L.J 347. and (4) Ranbir Prasad v. Sheobaran Singh.5

9. In Chajju Ram's case review of judgment was sought on the ground that the learned Judges ought not to have admitted the additional ground of appeal and that they were misled into holding that the facts found by them disentitled the plaintiffs to a decree. The review was granted by Judges who had not decided the appeal in the first instance. Their lordships of the Privy Council, while interpreting the words “any other sufficient reason” appearing in Order 47, Rule 1 of the Code of Civil Procedure, pointed out that they meant a reason sufficient on grounds at least analogous to those specified immediately previously.

10. In the next case of Balkrishna, the review was sought on the ground that, when the plaintiffs released a part of the property mortgaged from their claim, they were not entitled to put the entire burden of the mortgage debt on the other property. This was a new proposition of law, which was sought to be argued in review. The learned Judges, who decided that case, observed that the point of law, which was sought to be raised, was a point which could only be established after argument and reference to authorities, and that it was not a point which was apparent on the face of the record, nor was the point so simple as to carry conviction when stated.

11. In Thakur Kishun Chand Singh's case it was pointed out by this Court that an erroneous view of law on a debatable point or wrong exposition of the law or a wrong application of the law cannot be considered a mistake or an error apparent on the face of the record.

12. In the last case of Ranbir Prasad it was held that the fact that a different view on certain questions of law is possible is hardly any ground for review.

13. In this case, the trial Court, when it delivered its first judgment, overlooked the express provisions of Sub-section (2) of Section 1 of the U.P (Temporary) Control of Rent and Eviction Act, 1947, that the Act was applicable to Municipal and Cantonment Areas, to Notified Areas contiguous to such Areas and to accommodation situated within one mile of such Areas, and it could be made applicable by the Provincial Government to other areas by a notification issued in the official Gazette; and the fact that Dhanaura, which is a Notified Area, is not contiguous to any Municipal or Cantonment Area, and the Act had not till then been made applicable thereto. The omission was due to an oversight; and, as soon as the Court's attention was invited to the provisions aforesaid it became obvious that there was a mistake apparent on the face of the record, within the meaning of Rule 1 of Order 47 of the Code of Civil Procedure. It was not an error of the kind referred to in any of the authorities relied upon by the appellant's learned counsel. It was an error which was obviously due to an oversight and which the Court was entitled to correct upon an application for review, or even in exercise of its inherent powers. In Kamta Chaudhri v. Lal Chandra Mooh Pratap Bahadur Pal I.L.R 1945 All. 680 = A.L.J 223. it was pointed out that

“if the mistake is an obvious one due to failure to notice a particular section of an Act or part of such a section, it would be too much to say that the obvious error could not be corrected by the Court.”

14. In an earlier decision of this Court in Parmarath Gir v. Krishna Dayal Gir A.I.R 1933 All. 517 = A.L.J 1318. it was observed;

“For the revocation of an erroneous to no sufficient cause other than the irregularity of the order itself need be considered, and the Court has inherent power to rectify, its own errors inadvertently committed.”

15. In Mt. Jamna Kuer v. Lal Bahadur 1950 S.C.J 117. it has been held by the Federal Court that,

“When an error is found to be one apparent on the face of the record, whether it occurred by reason of the counsel's mistake or had crept in by reason of an oversight on the part of the Court is not a circumstance which could affect the exercise of jurisdiction of Court to review its decision……where the Court finds that a mistake has in fact crept into a judgment it would be appropriate for it to correct it on a petition for review rather than drive a party to an appeal to a higher Court.”

16. I, therefore, see no force in the second contention either.

17. Apart from the fact that there is no merit in the second contention, I may say that the order granting the application on the ground that there was an error apparent on the face of the record could not be objected to in appeal. Rule 7 of Order 47 of the Code allows an appeal against an order granting an application on the ground that the application was

(a) in contravention of the provisions of Rule 2.

(b) in contravention of the provisions of Rule 4; or

(c) after the expiration of the period of limitation prescribed therefor and without sufficient cause.

18. None of these conditions exists in the present case. In this connection I may refer to a decision of this Court in Ali Akbar v. Khurshed Ali I.L.R 27 All. 695. where an application for review of judgment had been granted for “any other sufficient reason” and the sufficiency or otherwise of the reason for granting it was not considered a ground of appeal within the meaning of Section 629 of the Code of Civil Procedure 1882, which corresponds to Rule 7 of Order 47 of the present Code.

19. Lastly, it has been pointed out by the appellant's learned counsel that during the pendency of this appeal, the U.P (Temporary) Control of Rent and Eviction Act, 1947, was mode applicable to Dhanaura and, as such, in view of the provisions of Sections 14 and 15 of the said Act, no decree for eviction can be passed Section 14 only lays down that

“No decree for the eviction of a tenant from any accommodation passed before the date of commencement of this Act shall, in so far as it relates to the eviction of such tenant, be executed against him as long as this Act remains in force, except on any of the grounds mentioned in Section 3.”

20. That stage has not yet reached and Section 14 has no bearing on the point raised by the learned counsel. Section 15 lays down:

“In all suits for eviction of a tenant from any accommodation pending on the date of the commencement of this Act, no decree for eviction shall be passed except on one or more of the grounds mentioned in Section 3.”

21. The section refers to suits which were pending on the date of the commencement of this Act, viz., October 1, 1946, and in which a decree for eviction had to be passed. The present suit was, no doubt, pending on October 1, 1946, but it was not governed by the said Act when the decree for eviction was passed. The fact that during the pendency of this appeal the provisions of the Act have been made applicable to Dhanaura cannot affect the decree for eviction which has already been passed. In my opinion, Section 15 of the Act cannot help the appellant. That Section 15 does not apply to cases of this nature has been held by this Court in a recent decision in Rup Lal v. Ram Swamp.10 For the reasons stated above, I see no force in this appeal and dismiss it with costs.

22. Appeal dismissed.