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  • sub-s. (5) of Section 2 of the Defence of India Act 1939 with reference to sub-s. (1) of Section 49 of the Government of India Act, 1935.
  • Act, the U.P (Temporary) Control of Rent and Eviction (Amendment) Act, 1948, S. 10
  • Interpretation of Statutes, Edn. 8, p. 196. Section 10 of the amending Act
  • provisions of Section 201 of the Public Health Act, 1875,
  • Section 3 of the U.P Control and Eviction Act, 1947,
  • sub-s. (5) of Section 2 of the Defence of India Act,
  • SECTION 106 TRANSFER OF PROPERTY ACT 1882
  • Section 21 of the U.P General Clauses Act, 1904,
  • provisions of S. 3 of Act III[3] of 1947.
  • cl. (d) of S. 2 of Act III[3] of 1947
  • Control of Rent and Eviction Act
  • Diseases (Animals) Act, 1878,
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Citation Codes
Equivalent Citations
citation codes
Case Number
Advocates
Judges
Acts
  • sub-s. (5) of Section 2 of the Defence of India Act 1939 with reference to sub-s. (1) of Section 49 of the Government of India Act, 1935.
  • Act, the U.P (Temporary) Control of Rent and Eviction (Amendment) Act, 1948, S. 10
  • Interpretation of Statutes, Edn. 8, p. 196. Section 10 of the amending Act
  • provisions of Section 201 of the Public Health Act, 1875,
  • Section 3 of the U.P Control and Eviction Act, 1947,
  • sub-s. (5) of Section 2 of the Defence of India Act,
  • SECTION 106 TRANSFER OF PROPERTY ACT 1882
  • Section 21 of the U.P General Clauses Act, 1904,
  • provisions of S. 3 of Act III[3] of 1947.
  • cl. (d) of S. 2 of Act III[3] of 1947
  • Control of Rent and Eviction Act
  • Diseases (Animals) Act, 1878,
Smart Summary

Factual and Procedural Background

This is a second appeal from a judgment and decree of the District Judge of Lucknow which reversed in part the judgment and decree of the Munsif, North Lucknow. The Munsif had dismissed the respondent's suit against the appellant for arrears of rent and ejectment from a house. The lower appellate court decreed the respondent's suit for ejectment but dismissed it with respect to the claim for arrears of rent. The appellant is the tenant of the respondent in the house in dispute. The respondent produced evidence that he had given the appellant the fifteen days' notice required under Section 106 of the Transfer of Property Act, 1882, and that he had obtained permission from the Rent Control and Eviction Officer of Lucknow under Section 3 of the U.P. Control and Eviction Act, 1947, for institution of the suit. That permission was given on 28-4-1947. The appellant contended that the District Magistrate, Lucknow, revoked that permission by an order dated 24-7-1947 and that, on that ground and having regard to Section 3 of the Act, the suit was not maintainable. The second appeal raises only questions of law.

Legal Issues Presented

  1. Whether, having regard to Section 3 of the U.P. Control and Eviction Act, 1947, the subsequent cancellation by the District Magistrate of permission earlier granted by the Rent Control and Eviction Officer renders the respondent's suit for eviction and arrears of rent not maintainable.
  2. Whether Section 10 of the U.P. (Temporary) Control of Rent and Eviction (Amendment) Act, 1948 (which declares that no permission of the District Magistrate is or be deemed ever to have been necessary for filing of a suit for eviction against a tenant on any of the grounds mentioned in cls. (a) to (f) of Section 3) is ultra vires the U.P. Legislature.
  3. Whether the District Magistrate may delegate his powers under Section 3 of the Act to an officer (the Rent Control and Eviction Officer) and, if so, whether such delegation divests the District Magistrate of the power to perform the same functions or to cancel/review orders passed by the delegated officer.
  4. Whether the District Magistrate had authority under the Act to sit in appeal or revision and rescind an order previously passed by an officer authorised under the Act (i.e., whether the District Magistrate could lawfully cancel the Rent Control and Eviction Officer's order).

Arguments of the Parties

Appellant's Arguments

  • The appellant admitted tenancy but contended that the permission originally given by the Rent Control and Eviction Officer on 28-4-1947 was subsequently revoked by the District Magistrate by an order dated 24-7-1947; that revocation made the suit not maintainable with regard to Section 3 of the U.P. Control and Eviction Act, 1947.
  • The appellant further contended that no suit for eviction could be instituted except on one or more of the grounds mentioned in clauses (a) to (f) of Section 3 and, in any event, such suits required the previous permission of the District Magistrate; reliance was placed on the case of Bhagat Singh Bugga & Co. v. Mrs. Gangotri Devi (A.I.R. 1949 Oudh 11), which took the view that District Magistrate's permission was necessary even in relation to grounds (a)–(f).

Respondent's Position (as reflected in the opinion)

  • The respondent had given the fifteen days' notice required under Section 106 of the Transfer of Property Act and produced evidence that he had obtained the necessary permission from the Rent Control and Eviction Officer before instituting the suit; the permission was given on 28-4-1947 and that fact was not denied.
  • A cross-objection by the respondent was filed but not pressed at the hearing and consequently not pursued.

Table of Precedents Cited

Precedent Rule or Principle Cited For Application by the Court
Bhagat Singh Bugga & Co. v. Mrs. Gangotri Devi, A.I.R. 1949 Oudh 11 Held (single Judge of Oudh Chief Court) that the permission of the District Magistrate was necessary even for eviction suits founded on grounds (a)–(f) of Section 3. The Court disagreed with the view expressed in this case and did not follow it; the opinion states inability to agree with Bhagat Singh Bugga's view.
Gokaran Nath Yajnik v. Sheo Ram Upadhyaya, S.A. No. 636 of 1947 (Oudh Chief Court, unreported, d/- 11-9-1947) Held that permission of the District Magistrate is necessary only in cases not covered by clauses (a)–(f) of Section 3. The Court noted this contrasting view and observed that the Allahabad High Court in a later case had taken the same view as expressed in this unreported decision; the Court's reasoning aligns with this position as reinforced by the 1948 amendment.
Amar Nath (Objector) v. Chhotelal Durgaprasad (Decree-Holder), A.I.R. 1938 All. 593 (F.B) Quoted for the proposition regarding the functions of a legislature and the contention that a Legislature's functions are not merely to declare law but to enact provisions; used in argument challenging the validity of a declaratory amending provision. The Court held that Section 10 of the amending Act (declaratory in nature) could not be regarded as ultra vires and that Amar Nath's case did not intend to lay down a contrary rule; the Court relied on established authority (Maxwell) to uphold the legislative power to enact declaratory retrospective provisions.
Emperor v. Sibnath Banerji, A.I.R. 1945 P.C. 156 Interpreted sub-s. (5) of Section 2 of the Defence of India Act, 1939 (a specific statutory delegation) and observed that that sub-section effected a transfer of power with divestiture of responsibility in the delegating authority. The District Judge had relied on this case to contend that delegation divested the District Magistrate of the power to act; the Court distinguished it on the basis of the special language of the Defence of India Act and did not accept the District Judge's reliance on it for the present Act.
Huth v. Clarke, (1890) 25 Q.B.D. 391 General law on delegation: delegation does not necessarily imply a permanent divesting of power; the delegating authority retains capacity to act and delegation often creates an agency relationship rather than a complete transfer of power. The Court relied on Huth v. Clarke to hold that delegation to the Rent Control and Eviction Officer did not deprive the District Magistrate of the power to perform his functions under Section 3; the Court used this principle to conclude that the District Magistrate was not barred from acting because he had previously authorised the officer.

Court's Reasoning and Analysis

The Court proceeded through a sequence of legal determinations, all of which are set out in the opinion:

  1. The Court observed as facts that the appellant was admittedly the tenant, that the respondent had given the requisite notice under Section 106 of the Transfer of Property Act, and that the Rent Control and Eviction Officer had given permission for institution of the suit on 28-4-1947 — facts not denied.
  2. On the question whether suits on grounds (a)–(f) of Section 3 required the permission of the District Magistrate, the Court noted conflicting judicial views (Bhagat Singh Bugga v. Gangotri Devi versus an unreported Oudh Chief Court decision and a later Allahabad High Court view). The U.P. Legislature subsequently enacted Section 10 of the 1948 amending Act, declaring that no permission of the District Magistrate was or was to be deemed ever to have been necessary for filing a suit for eviction on any of the grounds in clauses (a)–(f) of Section 3. The appellant contended that Section 10 was ultra vires; the Court rejected that contention, holding that the power of a legislature to enact declaratory or retrospective provisions is recognised (citing Maxwell on Interpretation of Statutes) and that Amar Nath's case did not lay down a contrary rule. The Court therefore concluded Section 10 could not be regarded as ultra vires and declined to follow Bhagat Singh Bugga.
  3. The Court then turned to the effect of the cancellation by the District Magistrate of the Rent Control and Eviction Officer's permission. The District Judge had assumed (without deciding) that the Rent Control and Eviction Officer had been authorised by the District Magistrate and entertained doubt whether delegation left any power in the delegator. The Court examined Section 2(d) of the Act, which defines "District Magistrate" to include an officer authorised by the District Magistrate to perform any of his functions under the Act. The Court treated this language as empowering the District Magistrate to authorise officers to perform his functions and as not preventing the District Magistrate from performing those functions himself.
  4. The Court considered the District Judge's reliance on Emperor v. Sibnath Banerji (where a particular statutory provision effected a transfer divesting the delegator of responsibility) but found that case to be guided by special language in that statute and therefore not controlling here.
  5. Turning to general principles, the Court relied on Huth v. Clarke for the proposition that delegation ordinarily does not imply a permanent abdication of power; the delegator is not necessarily denuded of authority and delegation is akin to conferring an authority to act (agency-like) rather than transferring and extinguishing the delegator's power.
  6. The Court analyzed whether the District Magistrate could cancel an order made by the authorised officer. It considered Section 21 of the U.P. General Clauses Act, 1904 (power to add to, amend, vary or rescind notifications/orders "in the like manner"), and concluded that while the authorised officer could rescind his own order under that power, Section 21 could not be interpreted to permit the District Magistrate to rescind an order passed by the authorised officer. The power to add/amend/rescind must be exercised "in the like manner" — i.e., by the same authority — and the District Magistrate's action in cancelling the officer's order was regarded as appellate or revisional in nature.
  7. The Court held that the Control of Rent and Eviction Act contained no express statutory provision empowering any authority (including the District Magistrate) to sit in appeal or revision against an order passed by the "District Magistrate" under Section 3. Because the District Magistrate's cancellation was in the nature of revision/appellate action and there was no statutory authority for such a revisional power, the cancellation of the Rent Control and Eviction Officer's order of 28-4-1947 by the District Magistrate on 24-7-1947 was not authorised by the Act and was therefore ineffective.
  8. The Court further observed that Section 16 (which provides that no order made under the Act by the Provincial Government or the District Magistrate shall be called in question in any Court) did not apply to the District Magistrate's purported cancellation, since that cancellation could not be regarded as an order made under the Act.

Holding and Implications

Holding:

APPEAL DISMISSED

The Court dismissed the appellant's second appeal with costs and also dismissed the respondent's cross-objection (which was not pressed) with costs. The order staying execution of the decree was discharged.

Implications:

  • Direct effect on the parties: The District Judge's conclusion that the subsequent revocation by the District Magistrate of the Rent Control and Eviction Officer's permission (dated 28-4-1947) was without effect was affirmed; the appeal is dismissed and the cross-objection is dismissed. The stay on execution of the decree is discharged.
  • Statutory/administrative effect as stated in the opinion: the Court upheld the validity of the U.P. (Temporary) Control of Rent and Eviction (Amendment) Act, 1948, Section 10 (i.e., not ultra vires) insofar as it declares that no permission of the District Magistrate was or was to be deemed ever to have been necessary for filing a suit for eviction on the grounds in clauses (a)–(f) of Section 3.
  • On delegation: the Court held that delegation under the Act (as created by Section 2(d)) did not divest the District Magistrate of the power to perform functions under Section 3 and that there was no authority in the Act for the District Magistrate to exercise an appellate or revisional power to cancel an order of an officer authorised under Section 2(d).
  • Broader precedent: The Court expressed conclusions on statutory interpretation and delegation as applied in this case; the opinion did not purport to lay down rules beyond the case's facts other than its statutory interpretations and reliance on cited authorities. No statement in the opinion purports to establish a sweeping new precedent beyond the holdings applied to the facts before the Court.

Disposition recorded in the opinion: "The appeal and the cross-objection are both dismissed with costs. The appeal having been dismissed, the order staying the execution of the decree is discharged. Appeal dismissed."

    R.N. Seth v. Girja Shanker Srivastava

    Harish Chandra, J.:— This is a second appeal from the judgment and decree of the learned District Judge of Lucknow reversing in part the judgment and decree of the Mansif, North Lucknow, dismissing the respondent's suit against the appellant for arrears of rent and ejectment from a certain house. The lower appellate Court decreed the respondent's suit for ejectment but dismissed it with respect to the claim for arrears of rent. The appellant has come up in second appeal to this Court.

    2. The only questions that arise in this appeal are of law. Admittedly the appellant is the tenant of the respondent in the house in dispute. The respondent gave him the requisite fifteen days' notice as required under Section 106 of the Transfer of Property Act, 1882 and produced evidence of his having been given the necessary permission by the Rent Control and Eviction Officer of Lucknow under Section 3 of the U.P Control and Eviction Act, 1947, for the institution of the suit. The fact that such permission was given by the Rent Control and Eviction Officer of Lucknow on 28-4-1947, before the institution of the suit is not denied. The appellant's contention is that the permission given by the Rent Control and Eviction Officer was subsequently revoked by the District Magistrate, Lucknow, by an order dated 24-7-1947, and that the suit is, therefore, not maintainable, having regard to the provisions of S. 3 of Act III[3] of 1947. It will be noted that under that section no suit for ejectment except on one or more of the ground mentioned in cls. (a) to (f) of that section can be instituted without the permission of the District Magistrate. The appellant's further contention, however, is that no suit against a tenant for his eviction from any accommodation can be instituted except on one or more of the grounds mentioned in els. (a) to (f) of that section and that too with the previous permission of the District Magistrate. According to the findings of the Court below none of the grounds mentioned in els. (a) to (f) of this section exists in the present case and if this further contention of learned counsel for the appellant is accepted the suit is not maintainable. Reliance is placed on the case of Bhagat Singh Bugga & Co. v. Mrs. Gangotri Devi, A.I.R 1949 Oudh 11 decided by a single Judge of the Oudh Chief Court. In another unreported case of the Oudh Chief Court, Gokaran Nath Yajnik v. Sheo Ram Upadhyaya, S.A No. 636 of 1947, d/- 11-9-1947, however, a different view was taken and it was held that it was only in cases which were not covered by els. (a) to (f) of the section that the permission of the District Magistrate was necessary before the institution of a suit for the eviction of a tenant. The Allahabad High Court has in a later case taken the same view. It will be noted that subsequently the U.P Legislature passed an Act, the U.P (Temporary) Control of Rent and Eviction (Amendment) Act, 1948, S. 10 of which makes it clear that under s. 3 of the Act

    “no permission of the District Magistrate is or be deemed to ever have been necessary for filing of a suit for eviction against a tenant on any of the grounds mentioned in cls. (a) to (f) of the said section.”

    3. It is contended that this section is ultra vires the U.P Legislature and reliance is placed upon the case of Amar Nath…(Objector); v. Chhotelal Durgaprasad…(Decree-Holder)., A.I.R 1938 ALL. 593 (F.B), in which it was said that the functions of a Legislature are not to declare the law but to enact provisions of the law.” The power of the legislature to pass an Act of a declaratory nature with a retrospective operation is universally accepted: vide Maxwell on the Interpretation of Statutes, Edn. 8, p. 196. Section 10 of the amending Act cannot, therefore, be regarded as ultra vires the U.P Legislature and, in my view, in Amar nath's case there was no intention to lay down anything to the contrary. But as I have just pointed out the language used in S. 3 itself makes the intention quite clear. With all respect I am unable to agree with the view expressed in Bhagat Singh Bugga's case. The suit cannot, therefore, be said to have been improperly instituted on the ground mentioned above. What remains now to be considered is the effect of the cancellation by the District Magistrate of the order passed by the Rent Control and Eviction Officer on 28-4-1947. The learned District Judge was inclined to hold that there was nothing in the Act empowering the District Magistrate to delegate his functions under S. 3 of the Act to another officer, although in view of the fact that the point was not raised before him, he proceeded on the assumption that such power had in fact been conferred by the Act upon the District Magistrate. No doubt, there is no specific provision in the Act to that effect. But the term ‘District Magistrate’ is defined in S. 2(d) as follows:

    “‘District Magistrate’ includes an officer authorised by the District Magistrate to perform any of his functions under this Act.”

    4. No doubt, this is a somewhat unusual method of conferring a power upon the District Magistrate to delegate his authority with respect to any of his functions under the Act to another officer. But so long as the intention of the Legislature is clear, the form in which such intention is expressed is of no consequence and in view of the language used in S. 2(d) of the Act there can be no doubt that the District Magistrate has been empowered to authorise any officer to perform any of his functions under the Act. It is not denied that the Rent Control and Eviction Officer, Lucknow, was empowered by the District Magistrate, Lucknow, to perform his functions under S. 3 of the Act. The learned District Judge has taken the view that after delegating his functions under S. 3 of the Act to the Rent Control and Eviction Officer, the District Magistrate had no power left to perform any of his functions under that section. He has relied upon the case of Emperor v. Sibnath Banerji, A.I.R 1945 P.C 156. In that case their Lordships of the Judicial Committee were called upon to interpret sub-s. (5) of Section 2 of the Defence of India Act 1939 with reference to sub-s. (1) of Section 49 of the Government of India Act, 1935. They observe:

    “Their Lordships would also add, on this contention, that subs. (5) of S. 2 provides a means of delegation in the strict sense of the word, namely, a transfer of the power or duty to the officer or authority defined in the sub-section, with a corresponding divestiture of the Governor of any responsibility in the matter, whereas under S. 49(1) of the Act of 1935 the Governor remains responsible for the action of his subordinates taken in his name.”

    5. They were apparently guided by the special language used in sub-s. (5) of Section 2 of the Defence of India Act, which is reproduced below:

    “A provincial Government may by order direct that any power or duty which by rule under sub-s. (1) is conferred or imposed on the Provincial Government or which being by such rule conferred or imposed on the Central Government, has been directed under sub-s. (4) to be exercised or discharged by the Provincial Government shall, in such circumstances and under such conditions, if any, as may be specified in the direction, be exercised or discharged by any officer or authority, not being (except in the case of a Chief Commissioner's province) an officer or authority subordinate to the Central Government.”

    6. The general law in regard to such delegation of authority is, however, contained in Huth v. Clarke, (1890) 25 Q.B.D 391. That was a case under the Contagious Diseases (Animals) Act, 1878, under Sch. 6, cls. 5 and 6 of which a local authority may appoint an executive committee, which is to have all the powers of the local authority with certain exceptions, and the executive committee may appoint sub-committees and delegate to them all or any of the powers of the executive committee with or without restrictions, and may from time to time revoke or alter any such delegation. The duly-appointed executive committee of a county council made an order delegating to local sub-committees its powers under the Act and under certain Orders in Council, including the Rabies Order, 1887. Subsequently to such delegation the executive committee, without expressly revoking the delegation, issued certain regulations under the Rabies Order, 1887. The question was whether it had the authority to issue such regulations. The contention was that delegation implies a temporary abdication or denudation of power and that the powers so delegated cannot be resumed until the delegation has been specifically revoked. The Court held that “delegation,” as the word is generally used, does not imply a parting with powers by the person who grants the delegation, but points rather to the conferring of an authority to do things which otherwise that person would have to do himself. The following may be quoted from the judgment of Wills, J:

    “The case really turns on the meaning of the word ‘delegate,’ a word which has appeared on the statute-book for the last thirty years, occurring, as it does at least as far back as 24 & 25 Vict, c. 133, Sch part 2(6). Delegation, as the word is generally used, does not imply a parting with powers by the person who grants the delegation, but points rather to the conferring of an authority to do things which otherwise that person would have to do himself. The best illustration of the use of the word is afforded by the maxim, Delegatus non potest delegare, as to the meaning of which it is significant that it is dealt with in Broom's Legal Maxims under the law off contracts: it is never used by legal writers, so far as I am aware, as implying that the delegating person parts with his power in such a manner as to denude himself of his rights. If it is correct to use the word in the way in which it is used in the maxim, as generally understood, the word ‘delegate’ means little more than an agent. The notion, therefore, that the of the word ‘delegate’ implies that the executive committee parted with their own authority is misconceived. The provisions of Section 201 of the Public Health Act, 1875, which have been relied on for the appellant, are in my opinion as much against as for him, although there are certain words in the section which seem to shew that in that particular case the body to which the delegation was made was to be the only authority to exercise the power.”

    7. It would thus appear that the District Magistrate cannot, in the present case, be said to have deprived himself of the power to perform his functions under S. 3 of the Act after he had authorised the Rent Control and Eviction Officer to perform those functions.

    8. It is, however, argued that the Rent Control and Eviction Officer was in the nature of an agent and that the District Magistrate had the power to correct or amend any orders passed by him. But the Rent Control and Eviction Officer cannot be regarded as an agent of the District Magistrate in any sense. No doubt, in accordance with the judgment of Wills J. the word “delegate” means ‘little more than an agent.’ But he does not seem to have used the word ‘agent’ in any technical or legal sense and the language used-in cl. (d) of S. 2 of Act III[3] of 1947 does not contain in it any idea of agency. It defines the ‘District Magistrate’ as a term which includes an officer authorised by the District Magistrate to perform any of his functions under the Act. It would thus appear that the District Magistrate and the officer authorised by him to perform any of his functions under the Act have been placed on an equal footing and wherever the term ‘District Magistrate’ has been used in the Act it would include such officer also) and either of them would thus be able to perform the functions which have been assigned to the District Magistrate under the Act.

    9. The question, however, is whether the District Magistrate has or has not the power to cancel an order passed by such officer. Section 21 of the U.P General Clauses Act, 1904, provides that where

    “a power to issue notifications, orders, rule; or bye-laws is conferred, then that power includes a power, exercisable in the like manner and subject to the like sanction and conditions (in any), to add to, amend, vary, or rescind any notifications, orders, rules or bye-laws so issued.”

    10. Under this provision the Rent Control and Eviction Officer could presumably rescind the order which had been previously passed by him. But the provision contained in this section cannot be interpreted as authorising the District Magistrate to rescind any order previously passed by the Rent Control and Eviction Officer under the authority given to him under S. 2(d) of the Act. The power to add to, amend, vary or rescind is to be exercised “in the like manner”. The power exercised by the District Magistrate in cancelling the order previously passed by the Rent Control and Eviction Officer was in the nature of an appellate or revisional power which cannot be exercised in the absence of an express statutory enactment. No power is given under the Control of Rent and Eviction Act to any authority to sit in appeal or revision against an order passed by the “District Magistrate” under S. 3 of the Act and the District Magistrate could not, therefore, revise the order of the Rent Control and Eviction Officer passed on 28th April 1947. It is significant that Lord Coleridge C.J in his judgment in Huth v. Clarke, (1890) 25 Q.B.D 391 makes particular mention of the fact that when the executive committee issued certain regulations under the Rabies Order no regulations had in fact been issued by the sub-committee and that “no question of conflict of jurisdiction arises.”

    11. A perusal of the record shows that the District Magistrate cancelled the order of the Rent Control and Eviction Officer on an application made to him on behalf of the respondent in which he had specially requested him to revise the order previously passed by that Officer. In my view the order passed by the District Magistrate on 24th July 1947, was not authorised by the Act. Reference has been made to S. 16 of the Act which provides that no order made under the Act by the Provincial Government or the District Magistrate shall be called in question in any Court. But from what has been said above it would appear that the order passed by the District Magistrate on 24th July 1947, cannot be regarded as an order made under the Act and S. 16 will, therefore, not apply.

    12. I, therefore, agree with the conclusion arrived at by the learned District Judge that the subsequent revocation of the permission granted by the Rent Control and Eviction Officer on 28th April 1948, with respect to the institution of the suit by the respondent, by the District Magistrate is without effect.

    13. I would accordingly dismiss the appeal with costs.

    14. A cross-objection has also been filed on behalf of the respondent but it is not pressed and will also be dismissed with costs.

    Chandiramani J.:— I agree.

    15. By the Court.—The appeal and the cross-objection are both dismissed with costs. The appeal having been dismissed, the order staying the execution of the decree is discharged.

    B/K.S

    16. Appeal dismissed.

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    R.N. Seth v. Girja Shanker Srivastava
    (Mar 2, 1950)