Citation Codes

Equivalent Citations

citation codes

Case Number

Exn. Second Appeal No. 787 of 1948

Judges

Seth, J.

Acts

S. 3, U.P (Temporary) Control of sent and Eviction Act (III [3] of 1947).
U.P (Temporary) Control of Rent and Eviction Act (III [3] of 1947)
higher.3. Section 3, referred to in S. 14,

See more information ...

Smart Summary

Structured Summary of the Provided Opinion

Factual and Procedural Background

This is an appeal by the judgment-debtor (appellant) against a decree dated 31-10-1945 which entitled the decree-holder (respondent) to evict the appellant from a house unless the appellant vacated it by 31-12-1946. The underlying suit was instituted on 7-10-1944 with the permission of the District Magistrate.

The appellant failed to vacate by 31-12-1946, and the decree-holder put the decree in execution on 11-1-1947. Before the decree-holder could effect eviction, the U.P. (Temporary) Control of Rent and Eviction Act (III of 1947) came into force with retrospective effect from 1-10-1946. Section 14 of that Act restricts execution of eviction decrees passed before the Act's commencement, except where execution is sought on any of the grounds mentioned in section 3, subject to a proviso concerning payment of rent.

The executing Court overruled the appellant's statutory objection to execution under the new Act; the lower appellate Court upheld that ruling. The appellant sought second appeal to the present Court, repeating the objection that the decree could not be executed while the Act remained in force.

Legal Issues Presented

Whether the "permission of the District Magistrate" (which allowed institution of the suit before the Act) constitutes a "ground" mentioned in section 3 of the U.P. (Temporary) Control of Rent and Eviction Act such that section 14 permits execution of a decree passed before the commencement of the Act.
Whether a decree passed in a suit that was instituted with the District Magistrate's permission can be executed during the currency of the Act on the basis that the suit itself was permitted by the District Magistrate, even if execution itself is not said to have the District Magistrate's permission.
Whether, apart from the section 3/section 14 issue, the appellant has failed to comply with the proviso to section 14 (payment of "reasonable annual rent" or the rent payable before the decree) such that he cannot object to execution.

Arguments of the Parties

Appellant (Judgment-Debtor)

Contended that in view of section 14 of the U.P. (Temporary) Control of Rent and Eviction Act the decree cannot be executed while the Act remains in force.
Relied on the statutory prohibition in section 14 which restricts execution of pre-commencement eviction decrees except on grounds mentioned in section 3.

Respondent (Decree-Holder)

Contended that the permission of the District Magistrate is one of the grounds mentioned in section 3 and that the present execution is being pursued on that ground, so section 14's prohibition does not apply.
Argued alternatively that because the suit which produced the decree was instituted with the District Magistrate's permission, every decree passed in such a suit falls within section 14's exception.
Also contended that the appellant had not complied with the proviso to section 14 (payment of reasonable annual rent or prior rent), and thus could not object to execution on that basis.

Table of Precedents Cited

The provided opinion contains no citations of case law or other legal precedents.

No precedents were cited in the provided opinion.

Court's Reasoning and Analysis

The Court's analysis proceeded by close textual interpretation of sections 3, 14 and 15 of the U.P. (Temporary) Control of Rent and Eviction Act:

The Court observed that section 3 "relates to suits" and specifies the factual grounds on which a suit for eviction may be filed (the six items labelled (a) to (f)). Section 3 does not itself deal with execution of decrees.
Section 14 applies expressly to decrees for eviction passed before the Act's commencement and provides that such a decree "shall not be executed" while the Act remains in force except on any of the grounds mentioned in section 3. The Court held that the reference to "grounds mentioned in S. 3" must be read as referring to the grounds expressly enumerated in section 3 (paras (a) to (f)), not to other matters.
The Court concluded that the District Magistrate's permission — which operates to remove a statutory bar to commencing a suit — is not a "ground for eviction" in the sense of a factual cause of action (such as arrears of rent, substantial damage, subletting, denial of title, etc.). Permission is procedural: it removes a bar to institution of the suit but does not itself create the substantive facts that make a tenant liable to eviction.
Therefore, the District Magistrate's permission is not one of the grounds "mentioned in S. 3" for the purposes of section 14 and so cannot, by itself, justify execution of a pre-commencement eviction decree while the Act remains in force.
The Court further pointed out that even if one were to assume (contrary to the Court's primary conclusion) that District Magistrate permission could be treated as a ground contemplated by section 14, the decree-holder had not alleged or proved that execution of the decree was being carried out "with the permission of the District Magistrate." The decree-holder relied only on the fact that the suit had originally been instituted with permission; that, the Court held, is inadequate to satisfy section 14's condition (which requires that execution be sought on one of the section 3 grounds).
The Court compared section 14 (execution of decrees passed before the Act), section 15 (decrees in suits pending when the Act commenced), and section 3 (suits after the Act commenced), noting their similar language and deducing three consequences: (a) a suit instituted before the Act with the Magistrate's permission does not automatically justify a decree being passed merely because of that permission; (b) a decree passed before the Act in a suit instituted with permission is not executable merely because of that earlier permission unless execution itself is sought on a ground in section 3; and (c) a decree in a suit instituted after the Act may be executable because the suit itself was instituted under section 3 with permission.
The Court addressed the respondent's submission that this interpretation produced an anomalous distinction between permissions granted before and after the Act's commencement. The Court rejected the submission, noting it was unnecessary to discover the Legislature's exact motives; it offered a plausible reason (changed conditions between the times permissions were granted) and emphasized that courts are not to question legislative wisdom but must apply the statute as written.
The Court therefore concluded that the lower courts erred in rejecting the appellant's objection insofar as the rejection rested on the claim that execution was permitted because the suit had been instituted with the District Magistrate's permission.
The Court refrained from deciding finally the separate question whether the appellant had complied with the proviso to section 14 (payment of reasonable annual rent or the rent previously payable), because that issue had not been considered below and the respondent had raised it as a bar to the appellant's objection. The Court remanded the matter for consideration of that proviso.

Holding and Implications

Holding: APPEAL ALLOWED. The Court held that the permission of the District Magistrate to institute the suit is not a "ground" mentioned in section 3 of the U.P. (Temporary) Control of Rent and Eviction Act for the purposes of section 14, and that the lower courts erred in rejecting the appellant's objection to execution on that basis.

Immediate consequences and directions:

The decree of the lower appellate Court is set aside.
The case is remanded to the Court of first instance through the lower appellate Court with directions to dispose of the matter in the light of the observations made by this Court, including consideration of whether the appellant has complied with the proviso to section 14 (payment of rent as required by that proviso).
The parties shall bear their own costs of the appeal; other costs are left to the discretion of the Court below.

The opinion does not expressly discuss broader doctrinal consequences beyond the interpretation and the immediate effect on the parties; the Court did not state that it was declaring a binding precedent beyond the resolution of this appeal.

End of summary.

Show full summary ...

Chand Shankar Judgment-Debtor v. Bohre Sukh Lal Decree-Holder .

1. This is an appeal by the judgment-debtor to a decree passed against him on 31-10-1945 which entitles the decree-holder respondent to evict him (the judgment-debtor, appellant) from a house, by putting the decree in execution, if he (the judgment-debtor) fails to vacate it by 31-12-1946. The suit which re suited in the decree, was instituted on 7-10-1944, with the permission of the District Magistrate which was perhaps necessary to maintain the suit because of certain control orders, then in force.

2. The judgment-debtor failed to vacate the house by 31-12-1946, and so the decree-holder put the decree in execution on 11-1-1947. Before the decree-holder could succeed in evicting the judgment-debtor the U.P (Temporary) Control of Rent and Eviction Act (III [3] of 1947) came into force, with retrospective effect com 1-10-1946. Section 14 of the Act provides:

“No decree for the eviction of a tenant from any accommodation passed before the date of commencement of this Act shall, in so far as it relates to the eviction of such tenant, be executed against him as long as this Act remains in force, except on any of the grounds mentioned in S. 3:

Provided that the tenant agrees to pay to the land ‘reasonable annual rent’ or the rent payable by him before the passing of the decree, whichever is higher.”

3. Section 3, referred to in S. 14, reads thus:

“No suit shall, without the permission of the District Magistrate, be filed in any civil Court against a tenant for his eviction from any accommodation, except on one or more of the following grounds:—

(a) that the tenant has wilfully failed to make payment to the landlord of any arrears of rent within one month of the service upon him of a notice of demand from the landlord;

(b) that the tenant has wilfully caused or permitted to be caused substantial damage to the accommodation;

(c) that the tenant has, without the permission of the landlord, made or permitted to be made any such construction as, in the opinion of the Court, has materially altered the accommodation or is likely substantially to diminish its value;

(d) that the tenant has created a nuisance or has done any act which is inconsistent with the purpose for which he was admitted to the tenancy of the accommodation, or which is likely to affect adversely and substantially the landlord's interest therein;

(e) that the tenant has on or after 1-10-1946, sublet the whole or any portion of the accommodation without the permission of the landlord;

(f) that the tenant has renounced his character as such or denied the title of the landlord and the latter has not waived his right or condoned the conduct of the tenant.

Explanation: For the purposes of section (e) lodging a person in a hotel or a lodging house shall not be deemed to be sub-letting.”

4. Relying on these sections, the judgment-debtor objected to the execution of the decree against him, contending that it could not be executed so long as the Act remained in force. The executing Court overruled this contention and rejected the objection. The judgment-debtor then appealed to the lower appellate Court but without success. He has now come up to this Court in second appeal and has repeated the same objection to the execution of the decree.

5. Section 14 of the Act applies to the decree sought to be executed, for it is, admittedly, a decree for the eviction of a tenant from an accommodation and was passed before the commencement of the Act. It is, therefore, a decree which cannot be executed, while the Act remains in force, except on a ground mentioned in S. 3. Learned counsel for the decree holder-respondent, however, contends that the permission of the District Magistrate is one of the grounds mentioned in S. 3, that the decree is being executed on this ground and that, therefore, the prohibition contained in S. 14 does not apply to the present execution proceedings.

6. Section 3 of the Act relates to suits and has no concern with the execution of decrees. It does not mention the grounds on which a decree for the eviction of a tenant may be executed. It mentions those grounds only on which a suit for eviction is permitted to be filed. As such, S. 14 is capable of only one interpretation, namely, that it means that a decree for the eviction of a tenant shall not be executed except on a ground, which is mentioned in S. 3 as a ground for a suit for the eviction of a tenant. A mere reference to S. 3 will, however, show that the permission of the District Magistrate is not mentioned therein as a ground for a suit for the eviction of a tenant. The section makes a specific mention of grounds and sets them out in six paras lettered as (a) to (f). The permission of the District Magistrate is not included in these. So that even if it be possible to regard the permission of the District Magistrate to be, in its substance and reality, a ground for the eviction of a tenant, it is not possible to regard it to be a ground contemplated by s. 14, for that section refers only to what are mentioned as grounds in S. 3 and not to what may, by a process of reasoning, be determined to be grounds on which a suit is permitted to be filed by S. 3.

7. It is, however, not possible to regard the permission of the District Magistrate referred to in s. 3, even in its essence and reality, to be what is connoted by ‘a ground for the eviction of a tenant’. A landlord cannot maintain a suit for the eviction of a tenant without relying on Borne ground for eviction, such as a determination of the tenancy by efflux of time, by a denial of the landlord's title or by a breach of some condition. A ground on which a suit for the eviction of a tenant may be filed has reference to facts such as these, which form the basis of the right to evict and which provide the landlord with a cause of action for the suit. Permission of the District Magistrate is not such a fact and does not, therefore, constitute a ground on which a suit for the eviction of a tenant may be filed. It is obvious that a tenant does not become liable to eviction merely by reason of the permission of the District Magistrate. The permission only removes the bar to the institution of the suit, which exists only when the suit is filed on a ground not mentioned in the section and which does not exist when the suit is filed on a ground mentioned therein. It does not provide a ground for the suit.

8. For the reasons indicated above, I hold that the permission of the District Magistrate is not a ground mentioned in S. 3 of the Act and is, therefore, not a ground on which an application for the execution of a decree, such as is mentioned in s. 14 of the Act, may be maintained.

9. So far as this case is concerned the decree—bolder cannot succeed even if it be assumed that the permission of the District Magistrate is a ground contemplated by S. 14, for it is not even alleged, much less is it proved, that the decree is being executed with the permission of the District Magistrate. The contention on behalf of the decree-holder is that the suit, in which the decree sought to be executed was passed, was instituted with the permission of the District Magistrate and every decree passed in a suit permitted to be filed by S. 3 comes within the exception contained in S. 14, it has already been observed that properly interpreted S. 14 only means this, that a decree for the eviction of a tenant may be executed on all such grounds as are mentioned in S. 3 for filing suits for eviction, without the permission of the District Magistrate. I do not find it possible to construe S. 14 to mean that every decree passed before the commencement of the Act, in a suit which was instituted with permission of the District Magistrate or on a ground now mentioned in S. 3, comes within the exception contained in S. 14. The condition imposed by the section is not that the suit should have been filed on any of the grounds mentioned in S. 3 but that the decree should be sought to be executed on any one of those grounds. Thus, even if it be assumed that the permission of the District Magistrate is a ground recognised by S. 14, the objection of the judgment-debtor has to be upheld because the decree is not being executed with the permission of the District Magistrate.

10. The Act deals with three classes of cases relating to the eviction of a tenant from an accommodation. Section 3 provides for suits to be instituted after the commencement of the Act, S. 15 provides for suits, pending when the Act came into force; and S. 14 provides for suits, which had already been decided before the commencement of the Act and thus for the execution of the decrees passed in such suits. Section 15 employs language similar to that used in s. 3 and enacts:

“In all suits for eviction of a tenant from any accommodation pending on the date of the commencement of this Act, no decree for eviction shall be passed except on one or more of the grounds mentioned in section 3.”

11. The language of these two sections being similar, there seems to be no reason why they should not be similarly interpreted. The result of these sections, so interpreted, may be stated thus: (1) No decree shall be passed in a suit instituted before the commencement of the Act with the permission of the District Magistrate merely because it was instituted with the permission of the District Magistrate. (2) No decree passed before the commencement of the Act, in a suit instituted with the permission of the District Magistrate shall be executed merely because the suit was instituted with the permission of the District Magistrate or merely because the District Magistrate permits it to be executed. (3) But a decree passed in a suit instituted after the commencement of the Act, shall be executable merely because the suit was instituted with the permission of the District Magistrate.

12. The learned counsel for the decree-holder, therefore, contends that the interpretation placed by me on S. 14 of the Act leads to anomalous results, results that could not have been intended by the Legislature, and that there could be no possible reason why the Legislature should have intended that the permission of the District Magistrate granted after the commencement of the Act should be effective while the permission granted by the same officer before the commencement of the Act should be robbed of its efficiency. In other words, the contention of the learned counsel is, that there could be no possible reason for the legistature to make distinction between permissions granted before and after the commencement of the Act.

13. It is not necessary to discover the exact reason for the distinction to repel the contention of the learned counsel. It is enough to suggest some possible reason, for any possible reason is a sufficient answer to the contention that there could be no reason. The condition prevailing at the time when the Act came into force were different from those prevailing some time before the commencement of the Act. It may be presumed safely that in granting permissions District Magistrates might have been materially influenced by the conditions prevailing at the time when the permissions were granted. It is, therefore, likely that the Legislature thought that those permissions should not be acted upon but that they should be revised and that a tenant should not be evicted unless the District Magistrate permits him to be evicted, having regard to the conditions prevailing after the commencement of the Act. I do not say that this was the exact reason that prompted the Legislature to make the distinction. All that I say is that this is a possible reason and, as already observed, nothing more is needed to repel the contention of the learned counsel.

14. A better answer to the contention is that it is not the function of Courts to scan and scrutinise the wisdom and policy of the Legislature. Their task is to administer the law as they find it. So long as a distinction is found to exist according to the recognised rules of interpretation, it has to be recognised and effect has to be given to it. If any anomaly results there from the remedy lies with the Legislature.

15. For the reasons indicated above, I hold that the Courts below have erred in rejecting the objection of the judgment-debtor on the ground that the decree was being executed on a ground mentioned in S. 3, U.P (Temporary) Control of sent and Eviction Act (III [3] of 1947). I refrain from passing any final orders on the objection petition of the judgment-debtor, which was rejected by the Court below because the learned counsel for the decree holder contends that the judgment-debtor has not complied with the requirements of the proviso to s. 14 of the Act and that, therefore, he cannot object to the execution of the decree. This matter has not been considered by the Courts below because it was not necessary for them to do so in the view they took of the meaning of Ss. 3 and 14 of the Act. It should be considered now.

16. Accordingly, this appeal is allowed, the decree of the lower appellate Court is set aside and the case is remanded to the Court of first-instance through the lower appellate Court with the direction that it should be disposed of in the light of the observations made above. The parties shall bear their own costs of this appeal. Other costs shall be in the discretion of the? Court below.

K.S

17. Appeal allowed.

Chand Shankar Judgment-Debtor v. Bohre Sukh Lal Decree-Holder .

Structured Summary of the Provided Opinion

Factual and Procedural Background

Legal Issues Presented

Arguments of the Parties

Appellant (Judgment-Debtor)

Respondent (Decree-Holder)

Table of Precedents Cited

Court's Reasoning and Analysis

Holding and Implications

Chand Shankar Judgment-Debtor v. Bohre Sukh Lal Decree-Holder .

Comments