Introduction

Thompson v. Hebdon is a significant case decided by the U.S. Supreme Court on November 25, 2019. The case addresses the constitutionality of Alaska's campaign contribution limits, specifically whether these limits infringe upon the First Amendment rights of individuals to contribute to political candidates and groups.

The petitioners, Aaron Downing and Jim Crawford, challenged Alaska's statutory cap that restricts individual contributions to political candidates and election-oriented groups to $500 per year. After maximizing their permissible contributions in 2015, they sought to contribute more but were denied under Alaska law. This led them to sue members of the Alaska Public Offices Commission, asserting that such limitations violate their First Amendment rights.

Summary of the Judgment

The U.S. Supreme Court issued a per curiam opinion granting certiorari and vacating the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals' decision, remanding the case for further consideration. The Ninth Circuit had previously upheld Alaska's contribution limits, applying a standard that evaluates whether such limits further a sufficiently important state interest and are closely drawn to achieving that end.

In its analysis, the Ninth Circuit acknowledged the narrowing of permissible state interests in the wake of Citizens United v. FEC and McCutcheon v. FEC, emphasizing that combating actual quid pro quo corruption or its appearance remains a primary justification for contribution limits. However, the Ninth Circuit found that Alaska's limits were narrowly focused, allowed contributors to affiliate freely with candidates, and permitted candidates to accumulate sufficient resources for effective campaigns.

Nonetheless, the Supreme Court recognized that Alaska's laws exhibit several characteristics similar to Vermont's restrictive limits, which were previously invalidated under RANDALL v. SORRELL. In light of these similarities and the absence of a majority opinion in Randall to guide the lower court, the Supreme Court remanded the case for reconsideration in light of RANDALL v. SORRELL.

Analysis

Precedents Cited

The judgment extensively references key Supreme Court decisions that shape the framework for evaluating campaign finance laws:

• Citizens United v. Federal Election Commission (2010): This landmark decision held that corporate funding of independent political broadcasts in candidate elections cannot be limited under the First Amendment.
• McCutcheon v. Federal Election Commission (2014): This case struck down limits on the aggregate amount an individual could contribute to all candidates, parties, and political action committees combined, reinforcing the idea that contribution limits must serve a substantive government interest.
• RANDALL v. SORRELL (2006): In this case, the Court invalidated Vermont's per-election contribution limits due to their exceedingly low caps, which were deemed to infringe upon the First Amendment by restricting meaningful participation in the political process.
• Montana Right to Life Assn. v. Eddleman (2003): This decision elaborates on the standard that contribution limits must further a significant governmental interest and be narrowly tailored to achieve that end.

These precedents collectively inform the Court's assessment of whether Alaska's contribution limits are constitutionally permissible under the First Amendment.

Legal Reasoning

The Ninth Circuit applied a two-pronged test to evaluate the constitutionality of Alaska's contribution limits:

• Significant State Interest: The limits must advance a sufficiently important state interest, such as preventing corruption or its appearance.
• Narrow Tailoring: The restrictions must be closely drawn to further that interest without unnecessarily infringing on First Amendment rights.

The Ninth Circuit acknowledged the reduced scope for permissible state interests following Citizens United and McCutcheon, focusing primarily on combating corruption. They concluded that Alaska's limits served this interest by preventing excessive influence while allowing sufficient resources for effective campaigning.

However, the Supreme Court identified that Alaska's limits were unconstitutionally low, similar to those struck down in RANDALL v. SORRELL. By not providing higher contribution thresholds or adequately adjusting limits for inflation, Alaska's caps could unduly restrict political participation and competition.

The Supreme Court's decision to remand the case emphasizes the need to reassess Alaska's laws in light of Randall, where the Court recognized the dangers of overly restrictive contribution limits that hamper electoral fairness.

Impact

The remand of Thompson v. Hebdon has significant implications for campaign finance law, particularly in states with stringent contribution limits. The Supreme Court's emphasis on reevaluating Alaska's laws under Randall may lead to stricter scrutiny and potential invalidation of overly restrictive limits that impede First Amendment rights.

For future cases, this decision underscores the necessity for states to justify low contribution limits convincingly and to ensure that such limits are not so restrictive as to diminish democratic participation or electoral competitiveness. It also serves as a reminder that campaign finance regulations must balance the prevention of corruption with the protection of free speech rights.

Complex Concepts Simplified

Conclusion

Thompson v. Hebdon serves as a critical examination of the balance between regulating campaign contributions and safeguarding First Amendment freedoms. By remanding the case, the Supreme Court emphasizes the importance of reevaluating restrictive contribution limits to ensure they do not impede democratic participation or the viability of political campaigns.

The decision underscores the judiciary's role in maintaining the delicate equilibrium between preventing corruption and upholding free speech rights, signaling potential shifts in how campaign finance laws may be interpreted and applied in the future.