State v. Raymond: Experience-Based “General Education” Expert Testimony on Domestic-Violence Dynamics Is Admissible Without Daubert Factor Analysis Under RSA 516:29-a

Introduction

In State v. Raymond, 2025 N.H. 30 (N.H. July 15, 2025), the New Hampshire Supreme Court addressed whether an expert in intimate partner violence (IPV) could offer “general education” testimony—explaining the dynamics of abusive relationships and the counterintuitive behaviors of victims—without the trial court applying the Daubert factors codified in RSA 516:29-a, II(a). The defendant, Matthew Raymond, was convicted by a jury of multiple assaults, false imprisonment, and criminal mischief arising from a series of incidents in May and June 2022 involving his then-partner. On appeal, he argued that the IPV expert’s testimony was unreliable under RSA 516:29-a and that State v. Keller, 176 N.H. 730, 2024 N.H. 42 (2024), compelled reversal.

The Court affirmed. It held that experience-based, non-case-specific expert testimony designed to educate the jury on general principles—here, the progression of abusive relationships and why victims may delay reporting, recant, or remain with an abuser—can satisfy New Hampshire Rule of Evidence 702 and RSA 516:29-a without resort to the Daubert factors, where those factors are not “appropriate to the circumstances.” Keller was distinguished because the expert there applied a methodology to case-specific facts to opine on impairment, triggering a different reliability inquiry.

Summary of the Opinion

• The Court reaffirmed that the trial court’s admission of expert testimony is reviewed for an unsustainable exercise of discretion and that Rule 702 is interpreted liberally in favor of admissibility.
• Rule 702 permits experts qualified by “knowledge, skill, experience, training, or education” to testify, including in an “education” mode about general principles without applying them to case-specific facts.
• Where an expert offers general, experience-based education on IPV dynamics—and expressly does not opine on the facts of the case—Rule 702(b) and (c) can be satisfied by the expert’s extensive experience, training, and publications. Rule 702(d)’s requirement (reliable application to the facts) is not implicated because the testimony is not applied to case facts.
• RSA 516:29-a, I “restates” Rule 702’s reliability requirements; RSA 516:29-a, II(a) (Daubert factors) need be considered only “if appropriate to the circumstances.” For general, experience-based testimony, it was not appropriate to apply those factors. The trial court could instead consider “other factors” under RSA 516:29-a, II(b), such as the expert’s training, experience, and publications.
• Keller does not require reversal; it involved case-specific application and a methodology appropriately evaluated under Daubert, unlike the general education testimony in Raymond.
• The conviction was affirmed because the trial court acted within its discretion in admitting the IPV expert testimony.

Analysis

Precedents and Authorities Cited and Their Influence

• New Hampshire Rule of Evidence 702 and Federal Rule of Evidence 702:
  • The Court emphasized the near-identity between N.H. R. Ev. 702 and FRE 702 and relied on Advisory Committee Notes recognizing that “experience” alone can qualify an expert and ground reliable testimony, especially in fields where experience predominates.
  • The Court cited the Reporter’s Notes to N.H. R. Ev. 702 endorsing general educational expert testimony that does not culminate in a case-specific opinion.
• RSA 516:29-a (2021):
  • Section I mirrors Rule 702’s reliability criteria. Where Rule 702 is satisfied, Section I is satisfied.
  • Section II codifies Daubert’s four nonexclusive factors (testability, peer review/publication, error rate, and general acceptance). The Court reiterated, citing Baxter v. Temple, 157 N.H. 280 (2008), and Kumho Tire Co. v. Carmichael, 526 U.S. 137 (1999), that these factors apply only if appropriate to the circumstances and are not a mandatory checklist.
• Baker Valley Lumber v. Ingersoll-Rand, 148 N.H. 609 (2002):
  • Recognized New Hampshire’s adoption of Daubert-type considerations. Raymond situates Baker Valley within the flexible framework, emphasizing that Daubert is not invariably applicable.
• Baxter v. Temple, 157 N.H. 280 (2008):
  • Reiterated the flexible, context-sensitive application of Daubert factors. Raymond relies on Baxter to decline applying Daubert to general education testimony not grounded in experimental methodology.
• State v. Pelletier, 149 N.H. 243 (2003):
  • Upheld reliability of a physician’s expert testimony based on extensive experience with hundreds of child abuse evaluations. Raymond uses Pelletier to illustrate that experience supplying “sufficient facts or data” and “reliable principles and methods” can satisfy Rule 702 for practice-based fields.
• State v. Keller, 176 N.H. 730, 2024 N.H. 42 (2024):
  • Found error where a forensic toxicologist applied a methodology to the case to opine the defendant exhibited impairment consistent with certain drugs. The Court distinguished Keller because the IPV expert in Raymond did not apply principles to case facts and thus did not trigger the same Daubert-focused reliability analysis.
• Federal and sister-jurisdiction cases supporting experience-based general education testimony:
  • United States v. Halamek, 5 F.4th 1081 (9th Cir. 2021) (expert on grooming practices reliable based on thousands of interviews with child abuse victims).
  • United States v. LaVictor, 848 F.3d 428 (6th Cir. 2017) (allowing domestic-violence dynamics testimony lacking exhaustive statistical support but grounded in significant field experience).
  • United States ex rel. Miller v. Bill Harbert Int’l Constr., 608 F.3d 871 (D.C. Cir. 2010) (permitting general expert testimony about cartel economics without case-specific knowledge).
  • United States v. Simmons, 470 F.3d 1115 (5th Cir. 2006) (rape-victim behavior expert testimony admissible; Daubert factors applied flexibly in social sciences).
  • United States v. Alzanki, 54 F.3d 994 (1st Cir. 1995) (admitting testimony that alleged victim’s response was consistent with abuse victims generally, derived from research and extensive interactions).
  • State v. Salazar-Mercado, 325 P.3d 996 (Ariz. 2014) (upholding expert explanations of behaviors commonly exhibited by child sexual abuse victims).

Legal Reasoning

The Court began with the standard of review: whether the trial court unsustainably exercised its discretion in admitting the expert. It then set the doctrinal framework by aligning Rule 702 and RSA 516:29-a with the federal model and emphasizing the liberal thrust favoring admission of reliable, relevant expert testimony.

The State’s proffer was carefully cabined. Dr. Hampton did not review discovery, did not intend to discuss case facts, and proposed only to explain general principles: how abusive relationships progress and why victims may behave in ways jurors might find counterintuitive (e.g., delay reporting, remain with the abuser, minimize or recant). His foundation was extensive: decades of work with thousands of victims and offenders, graduate-level focus on IPV and sexual violence, batterers’ intervention programs, jail-based support groups, service on relevant committees, and a publication record including peer-reviewed work.

Against that backdrop, the Court held:

• Rule 702(a): The testimony would help the jury understand evidence and contextualize victim behavior—quintessentially helpful specialized knowledge.
• Rule 702(b)-(c): The testimony rested on “sufficient facts or data” and “reliable principles and methods” because Hampton’s personal, long-term, high-volume practice experience in IPV constitutes a valid empirical foundation in a practice-based field. New Hampshire precedent (Pelletier) and federal cases recognize experience as a legitimate reliability anchor.
• Rule 702(d): Not implicated because the expert did not apply principles to the case facts; he only educated jurors about general dynamics. The Court invoked federal commentary that some experts appropriately “educate the factfinder about general principles” without undertaking case-specific application.
• RSA 516:29-a:
  • Section I tracks Rule 702; satisfied for the same reasons.
  • Section II(a)’s Daubert factors apply only “if appropriate to the circumstances.” Because the testimony was experience-based general education rather than a scientific or technical method applied to case facts, it was not appropriate to apply those factors.
  • Section II(b) authorizes courts to consider “other factors.” The trial court permissibly relied on Hampton’s extensive training, experience, and publication record to find threshold reliability.

Finally, the Court distinguished Keller. There, the expert synthesized discovery, lab results, and collection data to offer a case-specific impairment opinion—precisely the sort of methodology for which Daubert factors are apt. Here, by contrast, the testimony remained general and experience-based, so the flexible Baxter/Kumho approach allowed the court to bypass Daubert’s technical factors and rely on experience as the reliability fulcrum.

Impact and Practical Implications

• Admission of IPV dynamics testimony:
  • Prosecutors in New Hampshire can more confidently offer experts to educate juries about common but counterintuitive victim behaviors in IPV cases, so long as experts avoid case-specific opinions.
  • Such testimony can contextualize delayed reporting, continued cohabitation, recantation, and other behaviors often exploited to attack credibility.
• Broader expert-admissibility doctrine:
  • Raymond clarifies a two-track gatekeeping framework:
    • General education, experience-based testimony: reliability may be established by experience, training, and literature; Daubert factors are optional and used only if appropriate.
    • Case-specific application testimony: reliability typically assessed under Daubert/Keller-style analysis, particularly where methods purport to be scientific/technical and are applied to the facts.
  • This approach aligns New Hampshire with federal circuits that accept practice-based social science expertise grounded primarily in experience.
• Trial management and limiting instructions:
  • To stay within Raymond’s safe harbor, trial courts should:
    • Hold pretrial hearings to define permissible topics.
    • Prohibit application of general principles to the specific victim or facts; avoid “consistent with” or credibility opinions.
    • Consider giving a limiting instruction explaining that the expert’s testimony provides general background only and should not be taken as proof that the alleged abuse occurred.
• Defense strategy:
  • Defendants should seek clear boundaries on scope, object to any drift toward case-specific application or vouching, request limiting instructions, and vigorously cross-examine on the generality of the principles and the variability of victim behaviors.
• Open questions and constraints:
  • Raymond does not authorize experts to opine on a particular victim’s credibility or whether a victim’s behavior is “consistent with” being abused—doing so would likely reengage Daubert/Keller concerns and risk impermissible vouching.
  • Rule 403 balancing still applies; if general testimony risks unfair prejudice or confusion, courts retain discretion to limit or exclude.

Complex Concepts Simplified

• General education expert testimony:
  • Expert testimony that teaches jurors general principles in a field (here, IPV dynamics) without applying those principles to the specific facts of the case. Think of it as context-setting, not case evaluation.
• Experience-based expertise:
  • Some fields (social sciences, clinical practice) rely heavily on accumulated professional experience rather than experimental data. Courts can deem such experience a reliable foundation when it is extensive, relevant, and systematically derived from practice.
• Rule 702 versus RSA 516:29-a:
  • Rule 702 is the court rule for expert testimony; RSA 516:29-a is the statute. They largely overlap. Both seek reliable, helpful expert evidence. RSA 516:29-a includes Daubert factors but says courts should use them only when appropriate.
• Daubert factors:
  • Four considerations often used to test scientific reliability: testability, peer review/publication, known or potential error rate, and general acceptance. They are flexible guidelines, not mandatory for every kind of expertise.
• Counterintuitive victim behavior:
  • Behaviors that laypeople may find surprising—such as staying with an abuser, delaying reporting, minimizing, or recanting—are common among IPV victims and can be illuminated by expert context.
• Gatekeeping:
  • The trial judge screens expert evidence for basic reliability and relevance but does not decide whether the expert is “correct.” Disputes about weight and credibility are for the jury.

Conclusion

State v. Raymond provides clear guidance for New Hampshire courts and practitioners: where an expert offers general education testimony grounded in substantial professional experience—without applying principles to case-specific facts—the trial court need not apply the Daubert factors codified in RSA 516:29-a, II(a). Reliability can be established by the expert’s experience, training, and publications under Rule 702 and RSA 516:29-a, II(b). The decision harmonizes New Hampshire practice with federal authority and carefully distinguishes Keller, reserving Daubert’s more demanding analysis for methodologies applied to the facts of the case.

As a result, juries in IPV prosecutions will more readily receive expert context to interpret victim behavior, while trial courts maintain robust control over scope to prevent credibility vouching or case-specific profiling. The ruling fortifies a flexible, experience-sensitive approach to expert admissibility in social-science and practice-based domains, emphasizing that the gatekeeping function is about ensuring reliability appropriate to the testimony’s nature—not imposing a one-size-fits-all scientific checklist.