State v. Cole: Waiver of Firearm Rights Through Consent Protective Orders & Limits on Consecutive Sentencing After Probation Revocation

1. Introduction

In State of Iowa v. Jordan Kevin Cole, No. 23-1391 (Iowa June 27 2025), the Iowa Supreme Court confronted two intertwined questions:

Does a criminal defendant waive his Second-Amendment and Iowa article I, §1A right to possess firearms by consenting to a domestic-violence protective order that expressly bars firearm possession?
May a sentencing court, when initially suspending concurrent prison terms and granting probation, predetermine that the sentences shall run consecutively if probation is later revoked?

Jordan Kevin Cole, having consented to a one-year protective order in March 2022, later pawned three firearms. He was convicted of two counts under Iowa Code §724.26(2)(a) (possession of firearms while subject to a qualifying protective order). On appeal he invoked the U.S. Constitution’s Second Amendment and Iowa’s newly adopted article I, §1A, and he challenged a provision in his written sentencing order that mandated consecutive sentences upon any future probation revocation.

2. Summary of the Judgment

Convictions affirmed. A 4–3 majority held that by voluntarily entering the consent protective order, Cole waived his state and federal constitutional gun-ownership rights for its one-year duration. Consequently, his subsequent firearm possession was lawfully criminalised under §724.26(2)(a).
Sentencing error corrected. The Court unanimously agreed that the district court lacked authority to declare, in advance, that Cole’s sentences “shall” run consecutively if probation is revoked. The case was remanded for entry of a corrected sentencing order consistent with Iowa Code §908.11(4) (which allows only the originally imposed, or a lesser, sentence after revocation).
Separate opinions.
- Chief Justice Christensen concurred, stressing public-safety concerns and the deadly link between domestic violence and firearms.
- Justice May, joined by Justices Oxley and McDermott, dissented. They argued (i) no valid waiver occurred, (ii) Rahimi requires an express finding of dangerousness before disarmament, and (iii) Cole’s convictions violate the Second Amendment.

3. Analysis

3.1 Precedents Cited

a. U.S. Supreme Court decisions

United States v. Rahimi, 602 U.S. 680 (2024) – upheld the federal analogue §922(g)(8) when the protective order included an express finding that the respondent posed a “credible threat.”
Johnson v. Zerbst, 304 U.S. 458 (1938) – foundational “knowing, voluntary, intelligent” waiver standard.
Class v. United States, 583 U.S. 174 (2018) – a guilty plea, by itself, does not waive a constitutional attack on the statute of conviction.
District of Columbia v. Heller, 554 U.S. 570 (2008); N.Y. State Rifle & Pistol Ass’n v. Bruen, 597 U.S. 1 (2022); McDonald v. City of Chicago, 561 U.S. 742 (2010) – core Second-Amendment jurisprudence framing the analytical methodology.

b. Iowa authority

State v. Kieffer, 17 N.W.3d 651 (Iowa 2025) – principle of constitutional-avoidance reiterated.
State v. Damme, 944 N.W.2d 98 (Iowa 2020); State v. Hess, 533 N.W.2d 525 (Iowa 1995) – sentencing error correction and oral-pronouncement controls.

c. Lower-court cases used to bolster the waiver theory

United States v. Reese, 627 F.3d 792 (10th Cir. 2010) (dictum that consenting to a protective order “arguably” waives firearm rights).
State v. Maietta, 134 A.3d 572 (Conn. 2016); Roman v. State, 571 S.W.3d 317 (Tex. App. 2018) – contractual probation terms can waive gun rights.
Recent circuit split post-Rahimi (e.g., Gordon 2025 (10th Cir.); Perez-Gallan 2024 (5th Cir.)) on whether a court may “imply” a dangerousness finding when (C)(ii) only is satisfied.

3.2 Legal Reasoning of the Majority

Waiver doctrine applied.
- Consent order explicitly forbade firearm possession “pursuant to §724.26(2)(a)” and warned of criminal penalties.
- Cole had notice, opportunity to be heard, and affirmatively agreed; this equals a knowing relinquishment of firearm rights for the order’s term.
- No precedent bars waiver of Second-Amendment rights; analogised to routine waivers of jury trial, counsel, search-and-seizure protections, etc.
Why the Court avoided merits review. Because waiver disposes of Cole’s constitutional claims, the Court applied the principle of judicial restraint and declined to decide the broader Second-Amendment question raised by §724.26(2)(a).
Sentencing correction.
- Under Iowa Code §908.11(4) the revocation court cannot increase punishment beyond the original concurrent sentences.
- Written order conflicted with oral pronouncement and exceeded statutory authority; remand for nunc pro tunc correction.

3.3 The Dissent’s Counter-Analysis

No knowing waiver. Record lacks any colloquy confirming Cole understood he was abandoning future constitutional challenges; Class suggests such silence cannot equal waiver.
Rahimi’s dangerousness requirement. Without an explicit judicial finding that Cole “poses a credible threat,” historical analogues (surety, going-armed laws) do not support disarmament.
Implied-finding doctrine rejected. Iowa’s chapter 236 allows consent orders “without a finding” of abuse; an unchecked box in the order disproves any implicit threat finding.
Second-class right concern. Treating firearm rights as waivable by mere silence risks “second-class” status for the Second Amendment.

3.4 Likely Impact

a. Iowa practice

Attorneys and judges will treat consent protective orders as carrying automatic waiver of firearm rights for criminal-law purposes; respondents must be warned explicitly.
Prosecutors may rely more heavily on §724.26(2)(a) where protective orders exist, even absent explicit findings of violence.
Sentencing courts cannot pre-commit to consecutive sentences post-revocation; training and probation orders must reflect §908.11(4).

b. National conversation

Opinion adds to emerging split on whether implied or express findings of dangerousness are constitutionally required under Rahimi.
Raises possibility of U.S. Supreme Court review to resolve waiver vs. merits tension and to clarify the reach of §922(g)(8)(C)(ii) analogues.

4. Complex Concepts Simplified

Protective Order by Consent – A civil order entered without litigation because the respondent stipulates to its terms; no adjudication of wrongdoing is required.
Waiver – The intentional, informed relinquishment of a known right. In criminal procedure, courts demand clarity that the defendant understood the right being surrendered.
Facial vs. As-Applied Challenge – A facial challenge attacks a statute in all circumstances; an as-applied challenge attacks its application to the challenger’s specific facts.
Nunc pro tunc Order – A corrective order that retroactively adjusts the written judgment to match what the court actually pronounced.
Concurrent vs. Consecutive Sentences – Concurrent run at the same time; consecutive run one after the other. After revocation, courts cannot impose a harsher structure than originally ordered.

5. Conclusion

State v. Cole establishes two pivotal precedents in Iowa:

A respondent’s voluntary consent to a chapter 236 protective order waives their state and federal constitutional right to possess firearms for the duration of that order, foreclosing subsequent Second-Amendment attacks on Iowa Code §724.26(2)(a).
Sentencing courts may not predetermine consecutive service of sentences upon future probation revocation; such determinations must await the revocation hearing and remain bounded by Iowa Code §908.11(4).

While the majority emphasises waiver and judicial economy, the dissent underscores procedural safeguards and the substantive requirement of a dangerousness finding after Rahimi. Practitioners should therefore:

Advise clients meticulously before they sign consent protective orders. A single signature can become dispositive in future felony prosecutions.
Craft sentencing recommendations and orders within statutory constraints, avoiding ultra-vires consecutive-sentence directives.

As lower courts nationwide grapple with the post-Bruen/Rahimi landscape, Iowa’s resolution that “waiver trumps merits” may invite further appellate scrutiny—particularly if future defendants echo the dissent’s concerns that consent orders, lacking explicit dangerousness findings, should not automatically strip fundamental constitutional rights.