Short Orders, Broad Discretion: Eleventh Circuit Affirms Denial of Amendment 821 “Zero‑Point Offender” Reductions Based on § 3553(a) Factors

Introduction

In United States v. Jose Rogelio Nieto‑Molina, No. 25‑10359 (11th Cir. Oct. 9, 2025) (per curiam) (non‑published), the Eleventh Circuit affirmed a district court’s denial of a sentence reduction sought under 18 U.S.C. § 3582(c)(2) in light of Amendment 821 to the Sentencing Guidelines. Although both parties agreed that the defendant qualified as a “zero‑point offender” eligible for a two‑level reduction under U.S.S.G. § 4C1.1, the district court declined to reduce the sentence after weighing the 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a) factors.

The appeal raised a recurring issue in the wake of Amendment 821’s retroactivity: what level of explanation must a district court provide when denying a reduction to an admittedly eligible defendant, and what sorts of considerations may reasonably tip the balance against relief? The panel’s answer is pragmatic and deferential: a district court may summarily deny an otherwise eligible Amendment 821 motion when the record—such as the parties’ briefing—demonstrates consideration of the § 3553(a) factors, and when serious offense conduct and even limited post‑sentencing misconduct weigh against a reduction.

Case Background

The government charged Jose Rogelio Nieto‑Molina with a long‑running international cocaine conspiracy—21 U.S.C. §§ 959(a), 960(b)(1)(B), and 963—alleging that, from at least 2002 through 2015, he helped operate Colombian cocaine laboratories producing 800 to 1,200 kilograms per month, with at least 450 kilograms destined for importation into the United States. Following extradition from Colombia and a guilty plea, the district court in 2019 imposed a 168‑month sentence, the low end of the then‑applicable 168–210 month Guidelines range, followed by five years of supervised release. His criminal history score was zero (Criminal History Category I), and he faced a 10‑year mandatory minimum.

After the Sentencing Commission adopted Amendment 821 (effective Nov. 1, 2023) and made it retroactive, Nieto‑Molina—pro se—moved for a reduction under § 3582(c)(2), invoking U.S.S.G. § 4C1.1’s two‑level decrease for qualifying “zero‑point offenders.” The government conceded eligibility but opposed relief under § 3553(a), citing the scale and seriousness of the offense and a 2022 disciplinary infraction for possessing a cellphone and charger in prison. The district court denied the motion in a paperless order, referencing the motion, the government’s response, and § 3553(a). The defendant appealed.

Summary of the Opinion

The Eleventh Circuit affirmed. Applying the two‑step framework from Dillon v. United States, 560 U.S. 817 (2010), the court:

Accepted, as all parties did, that Amendment 821 lowered the defendant’s Guidelines range—from 168–210 months to 135–168 months—making him eligible at step one.
Upheld the district court’s step‑two exercise of discretion under § 3553(a), concluding there was no abuse of discretion in denying a reduction based on the seriousness of the offense and the defendant’s post‑sentencing misconduct (cellphone possession), even though he had only one infraction in six years and had pursued educational programming.

The panel emphasized that:

A district court need not discuss each § 3553(a) factor or all mitigating evidence in detail, and a short order can suffice if the record demonstrates consideration of the pertinent factors.
Post‑sentencing conduct—both rehabilitation and aggravating misconduct—is relevant and may be weighed.
The fact that the original sentence was at the low end of the pre‑amendment range does not entitle a defendant to an equivalent downward adjustment under the amended range. Here, the unchanged 168‑month sentence remains within the amended range (now its high end).
The same judge presided over the original sentencing and the reduction motion, which supports deference in the step‑two weighing.

Detailed Analysis

Precedents and Authorities Cited

Dillon v. United States, 560 U.S. 817 (2010): Establishes the two‑step process for § 3582(c)(2) motions. Step one asks whether the retroactive amendment lowers the applicable range; step two asks whether a reduction is warranted under § 3553(a). The panel faithfully applied this structure.
United States v. Lawson, 686 F.3d 1317 (11th Cir. 2012): Eligibility under § 3582(c)(2) is reviewed de novo. Here, eligibility was uncontested.
United States v. Caraballo‑Martinez, 866 F.3d 1233 (11th Cir. 2017): Confirms abuse‑of‑discretion review at step two and reiterates Dillon’s framework. The panel relied on this for the standard of review and scope of district court discretion.
United States v. Bravo, 203 F.3d 778 (11th Cir. 2000): Early Eleventh Circuit articulation of the two‑step § 3582(c)(2) inquiry, cited to support step‑one methodology.
United States v. Williams, 557 F.3d 1254 (11th Cir. 2009): Holds that courts need not recite each § 3553(a) factor, and may consider post‑sentencing conduct. The panel applied Williams to validate a succinct order and to recognize the relevance of prison conduct.
United States v. Eggersdorf, 126 F.3d 1318 (11th Cir. 1997): Affirms a “short” denial order where the record shows consideration of § 3553(a). Key to the panel’s conclusion that the paperless order sufficed.
United States v. Tinker, 14 F.4th 1234 (11th Cir. 2021) and United States v. Cook, 998 F.3d 1180 (11th Cir. 2021): In the compassionate‑release context, explain that an acknowledgment of consideration plus enough analysis to allow meaningful review is sufficient. The panel analogizes that principle to the § 3582(c)(2) context here.
United States v. Butler, 39 F.4th 1349 (11th Cir. 2022) and United States v. Irey, 612 F.3d 1160 (11th Cir. 2010) (en banc): Define abuse‑of‑discretion errors—failure to consider relevant factors, giving weight to irrelevant factors, or clear error in balancing. The panel found none of these.
Rasbury v. IRS (In re Rasbury), 24 F.3d 159 (11th Cir. 1994) and United States v. Kelly, 888 F.2d 732 (11th Cir. 1989): Emphasize the deferential “range of choice” afforded to trial courts under abuse‑of‑discretion review. This deference undergirds the affirmance.
Guevara v. Lafise Corp., 127 F.4th 824 (11th Cir. 2025): A recent articulation of abuse‑of‑discretion’s legal/ procedural/factual components. Cited to frame the standard.
United States v. Johnson, 877 F.3d 993 (11th Cir. 2017) and Gall v. United States, 552 U.S. 38 (2007): Require adequate explanation for meaningful appellate review. The court deemed that standard satisfied by reference to the parties’ briefing and § 3553(a).
United States v. Gonzalez, 550 F.3d 1319 (11th Cir. 2008): Notes that a within‑Guidelines sentence is ordinarily expected to be reasonable. The panel observed that the original 168‑month sentence remains within the amended range, reinforcing the reasonableness of denying a reduction.
United States v. $242,484.00, 389 F.3d 1149 (11th Cir. 2004) (en banc): Permits appellate courts to infer unstated but necessary findings from the record. Used here to assume the district court agreed with the parties about eligibility at step one despite not saying so explicitly.
Pepper v. United States, 562 U.S. 476 (2011): Establishes the relevance of post‑sentencing rehabilitation—and, by implication, aggravating misconduct—to § 3553(a) factors. The panel cites Pepper’s logic in noting that prison conduct can cut both ways.
United States v. Webb, 565 F.3d 789 (11th Cir. 2009) and Tannenbaum v. United States, 148 F.3d 1262 (11th Cir. 1998): Courts liberally construe pro se filings. The panel acknowledged this while still enforcing preservation norms.
United States v. Straub, 508 F.3d 1003 (11th Cir. 2007) and United States v. Dennis, 786 F.2d 1029 (11th Cir. 1986): Preservation of arguments requires raising them in the district court; new evidentiary material presented for the first time on appeal is generally not considered. The panel noted the defendant’s educational transcript was not presented below, though it stated affirmance would follow even if considered.

Legal Reasoning

Step One – Eligibility: The panel accepted that Amendment 821 retroactively lowered the defendant’s offense level under new § 4C1.1’s “zero‑point offender” provision, reducing the range from 168–210 to 135–168 months. This satisfied § 3582(c)(2)’s threshold requirement that the sentence be “based on” a subsequently lowered range.
Step Two – Discretion under § 3553(a): The district court denied a reduction in a brief order referencing the parties’ submissions and § 3553(a). The Eleventh Circuit found this sufficient because:
- The record already set out the salient § 3553(a) considerations: the sheer scale and duration of the drug conspiracy and the 2022 cellphone infraction while incarcerated.
- District courts are not required to enumerate each factor or respond point‑by‑point to mitigating evidence, and may give great weight to factors like offense seriousness and deterrence.
- Post‑sentencing conduct is a proper consideration; although the defendant’s educational programming was mitigating, the cellphone infraction could reasonably be viewed as aggravating due to safety and security concerns.
- The unchanged 168‑month sentence remains within the amended range. While not dispositive, that alignment reinforces the substantive reasonableness of the outcome.
- The same judge who imposed the original sentence ruled on the reduction motion, lending institutional familiarity to the § 3553(a) weighing.
Adequacy of Explanation: Citing Eggersdorf, Williams, Tinker, and Cook, the panel held that “short” orders are adequate when the record reflects that the court considered the relevant § 3553(a) factors, and the reasoning can be gleaned from the parties’ briefing and the order’s references.
Preservation: The defendant’s reliance on an educational transcript for the first time on appeal was not preserved under Eleventh Circuit law. Even if considered, the panel concluded the district court’s weighing was still within its discretion.

Impact and Practical Implications

Although unpublished and therefore not binding precedent, the decision consolidates several practical guideposts for Amendment 821 litigation in the Eleventh Circuit:

District courts retain broad discretion at Dillon step two. Eligibility does not compel relief; the heart of the inquiry is § 3553(a).
Short orders can be enough. A paperless or succinct order that references the briefs and § 3553(a) will be affirmed if the record permits meaningful appellate review. Practitioners should therefore ensure their written submissions comprehensively develop both mitigating and aggravating § 3553(a) considerations, anticipating that the order may simply incorporate those submissions by reference.
Post‑sentencing conduct matters—both ways. Single but significant disciplinary infractions (e.g., contraband cellphones) can carry real weight against a reduction, even with otherwise clean records. Conversely, rehabilitation should be documented thoroughly and presented to the district court in the first instance; withholding such materials until appeal risks forfeiture.
“Low‑end before” does not mean “low‑end after.” That a defendant originally received a low‑end sentence does not create an entitlement to the new low end after Amendment 821. Courts may leave sentences unchanged if § 3553(a) factors so counsel.
Within‑Guidelines stability. When the unchanged sentence remains within the amended range, appellate courts “ordinarily expect” reasonableness, which can make reversals of denials rarer absent clear misweighing or reliance on improper factors.
Same‑judge familiarity. Where the original sentencing judge decides the Amendment 821 motion, appellate deference can be especially strong given that judge’s knowledge of the record and context.

For defense counsel, the opinion underscores the importance of:

Filing complete, well‑supported mitigation packages at the district court level (certificates, programming records, disciplinary records, release plans),
Addressing any prison infractions head‑on (context, remediation, time since incident), and
Explaining why a reduction advances § 3553(a)’s aims despite eligibility already being conceded.

Complex Concepts Simplified

18 U.S.C. § 3582(c)(2): A statute allowing courts to reduce a prison sentence when the Sentencing Commission retroactively lowers the Guidelines range that applied at the original sentencing.
Amendment 821 (U.S.S.G. § 4C1.1): A 2023 Guidelines amendment adding a two‑level reduction for certain “zero‑point offenders”—defendants with no criminal history points who also meet additional criteria (for example, no violence or weapon involvement and other disqualifiers). It is retroactive via § 1B1.10.
Dillon two‑step framework: Step one asks whether the amendment lowers the applicable range; step two asks whether, and by how much, to reduce the sentence after considering § 3553(a) factors.
§ 3553(a) factors: Statutory considerations guiding sentencing, including the nature and seriousness of the offense, the defendant’s history and characteristics, the need for deterrence and respect for the law, protection of the public, and avoiding unwarranted disparities, among others.
Abuse‑of‑discretion review: A highly deferential standard. Appellate courts will affirm unless the district court ignored important factors, relied on improper ones, or made an unreasonable judgment about the balance. Legal errors and clearly erroneous factual findings also qualify, but deference is substantial.
Adequate explanation: District courts need not write lengthy opinions; it is enough if the order and record show the court considered the pertinent factors and provide enough basis for appellate review.
Post‑sentencing conduct: What a defendant does in prison—rehabilitative programming or disciplinary violations—can influence the § 3553(a) analysis either in favor of or against a reduction.

Conclusion

United States v. Nieto‑Molina reinforces a pragmatic, deferential approach to Amendment 821 motions in the Eleventh Circuit. Even for defendants whose eligibility is uncontested, district courts may deny reductions after weighing § 3553(a) factors, and they may do so in short orders that rely on the parties’ briefing and the record. Serious offense conduct and aggravating post‑sentencing behavior—here, a contraband cellphone infraction—can reasonably outweigh mitigating signs of rehabilitation. The fact that the unchanged sentence remains within the amended range further supports the denial.

The overarching lesson is clear: Amendment 821 opens the door to relief, but it does not guarantee it. The decisive question remains whether a reduced sentence is warranted under § 3553(a), as shown by a robust record developed in the district court. Defense practitioners should prepare accordingly; the government, for its part, can and will invoke both the gravity of the offense and any prison misconduct to argue that a reduction is not “sufficient, but not greater than necessary” to serve the purposes of sentencing.

Note: The opinion is marked “Not for Publication.” While non‑precedential, it offers persuasive guidance on how Eleventh Circuit panels are evaluating Amendment 821 denials and the sufficiency of district courts’ explanations under § 3582(c)(2).