Rule 56 Clarified: Unverified Complaints and Unsworn Prison Grievances Are Not Competent Summary-Judgment Evidence; Non-Assertive Commands Are Non-Hearsay

Case: Jamar L. Travillion v. John E. Wetzel, et al.

Court: United States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit (non-precedential)

Panel: Judges Phipps, Freeman, and Chung (opinion by Judge Chung)

Filed: April 1, 2025

Introduction

In this non-precedential decision, the Third Circuit affirmed summary judgment against inmate-plaintiff Jamar L. Travillion on Eighth Amendment and First Amendment claims arising out of alleged excessive force, deliberate indifference to medical needs, and retaliatory destruction of legal materials during a cell search. The appeal centrally turned on what kinds of materials count as competent evidence at summary judgment under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 56, how hearsay operates at that stage, and the substantive burdens governing First Amendment retaliation in the prison context and conspiracy claims under 42 U.S.C. § 1985(3).

The Court’s opinion performs three important clarifications for civil-rights litigants and district courts in the Third Circuit:

• Allegations in an unverified complaint and statements in unsworn prison grievances are not competent summary-judgment evidence when offered for the truth of the matters asserted; they cannot defeat a properly supported motion for summary judgment.
• Those same unsworn statements may nonetheless be introduced by the opposing party as admissions under Federal Rule of Evidence 801(d)(2).
• Commands or instructions (e.g., “tear up Travillion’s legal papers”) are not hearsay because they are not assertions capable of truth or falsity; and hearsay at summary judgment can be considered if the proponent explains how it would be admissible at trial (e.g., through witness testimony).

Despite finding the district court erred in excluding one piece of affidavit-based evidence on hearsay grounds, the Third Circuit affirmed because the error did not create a genuine dispute of material fact. Specifically, defendants carried their Rauser burden to show that a routine, range-wide contraband search supplied a legitimate penological reason for searching Travillion’s cell independent of any protected conduct, and plaintiff offered no competent evidence of pretext or unusual treatment in his search.

Summary of the Opinion

• Unverified complaint and unsworn grievances: The district court correctly refused to treat the allegations in Travillion’s unverified complaint and his unsworn prison grievances as competent evidence to oppose summary judgment. The Court rejected the argument that Rule 56(c)(1)(A)’s references to “documents” or “other materials” allow litigants to rely on unsworn factual assertions for their truth.
• Admissions by an opposing party: The district court permissibly allowed defendants to use certain statements by Travillion in his complaint and grievances as admissions, and Travillion did not challenge this use on appeal.
• Hearsay and the Patterson statement: The district court erred in rejecting as hearsay an affidavit reporting that an officer instructed others to damage Travillion’s legal papers. That instruction is a non-assertive command (not hearsay) and could be presented at trial via the declarant-witness (Patterson). However, the error was harmless because, even considering the statement, no reasonable jury could find for Travillion on his First Amendment retaliation claim given the unrebutted evidence of a routine cell search and lack of competent evidence of differential treatment or destruction.
• Eighth Amendment deliberate indifference: Even if Travillion’s medical needs were serious, he did not present competent evidence that the named officers subjectively believed care was necessary and deliberately refused it.
• Section 1985(3) conspiracy: The claim failed for lack of evidence of race-based or class-based discriminatory animus, as required for § 1985(3).

Analysis

Precedents Cited and Their Role in the Decision

• Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317 (1986): Establishes the summary-judgment framework. A nonmovant must set forth specific facts showing a genuine issue for trial once the movant points to the absence of evidence. Also supports the principle that hearsay can be considered at summary judgment if it can be reduced to admissible form at trial.
• Barefoot Architect, Inc. v. Bunge, 632 F.3d 822 (3d Cir. 2011): Recites the Rule 56 standard—nonmovant’s evidence is credited and inferences drawn in his favor, but summary judgment is proper absent sufficient evidence for a reasonable jury verdict.
• Tripoli Co. v. Wella Corp., 425 F.2d 932 (3d Cir. 1970): Unverified complaint allegations, when not admitted by the opposing party, are insufficient to create a triable fact issue.
• United States ex rel. Doe v. Heart Solutions, PC, 923 F.3d 308 (3d Cir. 2019): Unsworn statements not given under penalty of perjury are generally inadequate to create a factual dispute at summary judgment.
• Adickes v. S.H. Kress & Co., 398 U.S. 144 (1970) (n.17): Reinforces that unsworn statements cannot carry a nonmovant’s burden at summary judgment.
• Woloszyn v. County of Lawrence, 396 F.3d 314 (3d Cir. 2005): Similar rule: unsworn materials are not competent evidence for summary judgment purposes.
• Fowle v. C & C Cola, 868 F.2d 59 (3d Cir. 1989): An unsworn expert report cannot be considered at summary judgment; it must be sworn or otherwise admissible.
• Fraternal Order of Police, Lodge 1 v. City of Camden, 842 F.3d 231 (3d Cir. 2016): Hearsay can be considered at summary judgment if the proponent shows it can be presented in admissible form at trial.
• Smith v. City of Allentown, 589 F.3d 684 (3d Cir. 2009): Inadmissible hearsay may not be considered on summary judgment; dovetails with the Fraternal Order of Police caveat.
• United States v. Reilly, 33 F.3d 1396 (3d Cir. 1994): Commands/instructions are not hearsay because they are not assertions with truth value.
• United States v. Hoffecker, 530 F.3d 137 (3d Cir. 2008): Rule of completeness (Fed. R. Evid. 106) does not open the door to unrelated or non-explanatory portions of a statement.
• Rauser v. Horn, 241 F.3d 330 (3d Cir. 2001): Governs prisoner First Amendment retaliation claims: (1) protected conduct; (2) adverse action; (3) causal link; but defendants may prevail by proving they would have taken the same action for reasons reasonably related to a legitimate penological interest.
• Ridgewood Bd. of Educ. v. N.E. ex rel. M.E., 172 F.3d 238 (3d Cir. 1999): Speculation and conclusory allegations do not create a triable issue; a nonmovant must set forth specific facts.
• Lauren W. ex rel. Jean W. v. DeFlaminis, 480 F.3d 259 (3d Cir. 2007), and Port Auth. of N.Y. & N.J. v. Affiliated FM Ins. Co., 311 F.3d 226 (3d Cir. 2002): A court may accept as true uncontradicted affidavits when the nonmovant provides no competent contrary evidence.
• Montgomery v. Pinchak, 294 F.3d 492 (3d Cir. 2002), and Durmer v. O’Carroll, 991 F.2d 64 (3d Cir. 1993): Deliberate indifference requires evidence that defendants knew of and disregarded an excessive risk; mere evidence of serious injury or later medical testing does not establish subjective deliberate indifference by the named officer-defendants.
• Farber v. City of Paterson, 440 F.3d 131 (3d Cir. 2006), citing Griffin v. Breckenridge, 403 U.S. 88 (1971): § 1985(3) requires race-based or class-based, invidiously discriminatory animus.
• Disabled in Action of Pa. v. SEPTA, 539 F.3d 199 (3d Cir. 2008): Canon against superfluity; used here to reject a reading of Rule 56 that would render 56(c)(4)’s oath/penalty-of-perjury requirement meaningless.
• Nicini v. Morra, 212 F.3d 798 (3d Cir. 2000): Appellate court may affirm on any ground supported by the record.

Legal Reasoning

1) Competency of Summary-Judgment Evidence: Unverified and Unsworn Materials

The Court reaffirmed a consistent Third Circuit line: an unverified complaint’s factual allegations do not, by themselves, defeat summary judgment unless admitted by the opposing party. Likewise, a prisoner’s grievances—if they are unsworn and not made under penalty of perjury—cannot be invoked for the truth of their assertions.

Travillion tried to leverage Rule 56(c)(1)(A)’s allowance for “documents” and “other materials.” The Court rejected that argument, explaining that Rule 56 must be read holistically with 56(c)(4), which requires that affidavits/declarations be made on personal knowledge, set out admissible facts, and be sworn or declared under penalty of perjury. Accepting Travillion’s reading would allow litigants to sidestep 56(c)(4) simply by labeling unsworn assertions “documents,” rendering 56(c)(4) superfluous—contrary to interpretive principles.

Still, the Court endorsed the district court’s distinction: defendants may use a party-opponent’s statements found in those documents as admissions under Rule 801(d)(2). The asymmetry is doctrinally grounded. A party’s own out-of-court statements are non-hearsay as admissions when offered by the opponent, but the proponent cannot smuggle in other self-serving assertions from the same unsworn document unless Rule 106’s completeness doctrine requires it—and Travillion did not argue completeness as to any specific passage.

2) Hearsay at Summary Judgment and the “Instruction” Exception

The district court excluded Travillion’s affidavit recounting inmate Sam Patterson’s statement that an officer told another to destroy Travillion’s legal papers. The Third Circuit held this was error for two reasons:

• Admissible form at trial: The nonmovant explained the statement could be presented at trial through Patterson’s own testimony. Under Fraternal Order of Police and Celotex, that suffices to consider it at summary judgment.
• Non-hearsay nature of commands: The content—an instruction to “tear up” legal papers—is a command, not a factual assertion, and therefore not hearsay under Reilly.

However, the Court deemed the error harmless. Even crediting the Patterson statement, the undisputed record showed a range-wide, routine contraband search covering cells 401–450, supervised by lieutenants, which satisfied the defendants’ Rauser burden to show they would have taken the same action for legitimate penological reasons. Travillion pointed to no competent evidence that his cell was searched more invasively than others or that destruction actually occurred, and speculation cannot create a triable issue (Ridgewood).

3) Eighth Amendment Claims

On the deliberate-indifference claim, Travillion cited his medical records and X-ray referral to show “serious and urgent” need. The Court accepted arguendo the seriousness of his injuries but emphasized the element plaintiff failed to establish: that the named officers recognized and consciously disregarded a substantial risk or need for care. Without competent evidence that Lose or Burns subjectively believed treatment was required and nevertheless refused it, the claim fails (Montgomery; Durmer).

As to the alleged assault by closing the cell door, the opinion does not dwell on the merits, because Travillion’s evidentiary submissions (unverified complaint, unsworn grievances) were not competent to create a genuine dispute, and the defense affidavits went uncontroverted. In that circumstance, the district court could credit defendants’ sworn accounts (DeFlaminis; Port Authority).

4) Section 1985(3) Conspiracy

The Court reiterated that § 1985(3) requires proof of race- or class-based, invidiously discriminatory animus as the engine of the conspiracy (Farber; Griffin). Travillion did not supply competent evidence of such animus, and he did not dispute the district court’s characterization of his claim as arising under § 1985(3). Summary judgment was therefore proper.

Impact and Practical Implications

Although non-precedential, the opinion offers practical, persuasive guidance for litigants and courts in the Third Circuit:

• Rule 56 discipline for civil-rights cases: Prisoner-plaintiffs (and civil-rights plaintiffs more generally) must ensure their factual showings at summary judgment are competent: affidavits or declarations must be sworn or made under penalty of perjury (28 U.S.C. § 1746). Relying on unverified pleadings or unsworn grievances for the truth of their assertions will not suffice.
• Admissions asymmetry: Defendants may use plaintiffs’ statements in complaints/grievances as admissions; plaintiffs cannot use their own unsworn statements for their truth unless admitted by the other side or necessary for completeness under Rule 106.
• Hearsay strategy: Nonmovants can survive summary judgment with hearsay if they can show the evidence will be admissible at trial. Identify the live witnesses (e.g., inmate-witnesses like Patterson), secure declarations under penalty of perjury, or plan to take depositions. Also recognize non-assertive verbal acts (instructions, questions, threats) are not hearsay.
• Retaliation claims and the Rauser defense: Where defendants show a legitimate penological reason (e.g., a scheduled, range-wide contraband sweep), plaintiffs must marshal competent comparator or pretext evidence—such as proof that their cell was treated unusually or that property was destroyed—in admissible form. Mere suspicion or unsworn allegations will not carry the day.
• Eighth Amendment proof: Demonstrating a serious medical need is not enough; plaintiffs must connect the need to the named officer’s subjective awareness and deliberate refusal. Medical records showing treatment occurred (e.g., X-rays) often undercut the indifference element unless evidence shows particular defendants blocked care they knew was necessary.
• § 1985(3) filter: Conspiracy claims premised on retaliation for grievances, without race/class-based animus, will fail under § 1985(3) in this Circuit.

Complex Concepts Simplified

• Verified Complaint: A complaint signed under oath or penalty of perjury. Its factual allegations can function like affidavit testimony at summary judgment. An ordinary, unverified complaint does not.
• Unsworn Prison Grievances: Internal prison forms or narratives not sworn under penalty of perjury. They are “documents,” but their embedded assertions are not competent evidence for their truth at summary judgment, unless independently admissible.
• Rule 56(c)(1)(A) vs. 56(c)(4): You may cite affidavits, declarations, documents, or other materials at summary judgment, but affidavits/declarations must comply with 56(c)(4): personal knowledge, admissible facts, and oath/penalty-of-perjury. You cannot circumvent 56(c)(4) by re-labeling an unsworn narrative as a “document.”
• Admissions (FRE 801(d)(2)): A party’s own statements, when offered by the opposing party, are not hearsay. This is why defendants can use a plaintiff’s prior statements even if unsworn.
• Rule of Completeness (FRE 106): Lets a party require introduction of additional parts of a statement only if needed to explain or avoid misleading the admitted portions; it does not open the door to all remaining self-serving statements.
• Hearsay at Summary Judgment: Inadmissible hearsay is generally disregarded. But if you can show how the content will be presented in admissible form at trial (e.g., live witness testimony), a court may consider it at summary judgment.
• Non-Hearsay Commands: Orders or instructions are not assertions capable of being true or false; they’re not hearsay.
• Rauser Burden-Shifting (Prison Retaliation): If the plaintiff shows protected conduct, adverse action, and causation, defendants can still win by proving they would have taken the same action for a legitimate penological reason (e.g., a routine search). The plaintiff must then show pretext.
• Deliberate Indifference: Requires showing the officer knew of and disregarded an excessive risk to health or safety—not merely that the plaintiff was injured or later received treatment.
• § 1985(3) Animus Requirement: The conspiracy must be driven by race- or class-based discriminatory animus; retaliation alone, without such animus, is not enough.

What Would Have Changed the Outcome?

• Sworn evidentiary submissions: A verified complaint or § 1746 declaration by Travillion, plus an affidavit or declaration from Patterson (or Patterson’s deposition), could have provided competent evidence of retaliatory motive and differential treatment.
• Comparator evidence and pretext: Sworn statements or records showing that other cells were searched superficially while Travillion’s was “torn apart,” photographs, property-inventory forms, or testimony from multiple inmates could have created a triable dispute overcoming the Rauser defense.
• Deliberate indifference specifics: Evidence tying particular defendants to knowledge of a serious medical need and to a knowing refusal or obstruction of care would have strengthened the Eighth Amendment claim.
• § 1985(3) animus: Competent evidence of race-based or class-based animus (beyond conclusory assertions) would have been necessary to sustain the conspiracy theory in this Circuit.

Conclusion

Travillion v. Wetzel reinforces rigorous evidentiary discipline at the summary-judgment stage. It underscores that unverified complaints and unsworn grievances cannot substitute for sworn, admissible factual showings—though they may arm an opponent with admissions. The decision also clarifies a subtle evidentiary point: commands are non-assertive and therefore not hearsay, and hearsay can be considered at summary judgment if it will be admissible at trial. On the merits, the opinion illustrates the potency of the Rauser defense in prison-retaliation cases grounded in routine penological operations, and it reiterates the demanding, subjective nature of Eighth Amendment deliberate-indifference claims, as well as the animus requirement for § 1985(3).

While non-precedential, the opinion is a practical roadmap for litigants: verify your facts under penalty of perjury, secure witness declarations or depositions, and develop specific, comparative proof of pretext. Absent such competent evidence, even a colorable narrative of wrongdoing will not survive Rule 56.