Procedural Finality and Categorical Exemptions in Florida Capital Cases: Commentary on Frank A. Walls v. State of Florida & Walls v. Secretary, Department of Corrections (Fla. 2025)

Procedural Finality and Categorical Exemptions in Florida Capital Cases:
Commentary on Frank A. Walls v. State of Florida & Walls v. Secretary, Department of Corrections (Fla. 2025)

I. Introduction

This 2025 decision of the Supreme Court of Florida, issued in the consolidated cases Frank A. Walls v. State of Florida (No. SC2025-1915) and Frank A. Walls v. Secretary, Department of Corrections (No. SC2025-1917), arrives in the final stages of a capital case that has been litigated for nearly four decades. With an execution date set for December 18, 2025, Frank A. Walls—sentenced to death for the 1987 murder of Ann Peterson—sought:

  • Successive postconviction relief under Florida Rule of Criminal Procedure 3.851,
  • A writ of habeas corpus, and
  • A stay of execution.

The opinion is significant not because it creates dramatically new doctrine, but because it consolidates and reinforces a line of recent Florida cases that emphasize:

  • Strict enforcement of procedural bars (time limits and successive-motion rules) in capital postconviction proceedings, even as to claims of intellectual disability;
  • Refusal to extend U.S. Supreme Court categorical Eighth Amendment protections (e.g., Roper v. Simmons and Atkins v. Virginia) beyond their current scope, given Florida’s “conformity clause” (art. I, § 17, Fla. Const.);
  • Continued rejection of “death row delay” claims under the Eighth Amendment; and
  • Use of habeas corpus and the “manifest injustice” exception only in the narrowest circumstances.

Justice Labarga dissented, reiterating his disagreement with Phillips v. State, which held that Hall v. Florida (refining the standard for intellectual disability) does not apply retroactively. The majority, however, applies Phillips and related cases without hesitation, underscoring the Court’s current commitment to finality in Florida capital litigation.

II. Factual and Procedural Background

A. The Crimes and Original Proceedings

In July 1987, Edward Alger and Ann Peterson were found murdered in their Okaloosa County home. The evidence, including Walls’s own confession, showed:

  • Walls entered the victims’ home intending to commit a burglary.
  • He woke the victims by knocking over a fan.
  • He forced Peterson to tie up Alger and then restrained Peterson himself.
  • When Alger broke free and attacked, Walls cut Alger’s throat and shot him multiple times in the head.
  • Walls then shot Peterson twice in the head after partially undressing her and forcing her face into a pillow, while she screamed and begged about Alger.

In the first trial, the jury convicted Walls of felony murder for Alger and both premeditated and felony murder for Peterson. They recommended death only for Peterson’s murder. The trial court imposed the death penalty for Peterson and life for Alger. The Florida Supreme Court reversed the initial judgment and sentence due to a due process violation (Walls I, 580 So. 2d 131 (Fla. 1991)).

On retrial, the guilt-phase evidence again centered on physical evidence and Walls’s recorded confession; Walls presented no guilt-phase defense. The jury again convicted him as charged. In the penalty phase, the defense emphasized:

  • History of emotional and behavioral problems,
  • Possible brain damage and dysfunction,
  • Low IQ and intellectual functioning at about age 12–13, and
  • Cooperation with law enforcement and positive family relationships.

The jury, nonetheless, unanimously recommended death for Peterson’s murder. The trial judge found:

  • Six aggravating factors, including prior violent felony, murder in course of a burglary/kidnapping, pecuniary gain, avoid arrest, heinous, atrocious, or cruel (HAC), and cold, calculated, and premeditated (CCP); and
  • Nine mitigating factors, including youth (19 years old), lack of significant prior criminal history, emotional handicaps, low IQ, and cooperation.

The court rejected statutory mental health mitigators, found aggravation outweighed mitigation, and imposed a death sentence. The Florida Supreme Court affirmed the conviction and sentence in 1994 (Walls II, 641 So. 2d 381 (Fla. 1994); later summarized in Walls III, 926 So. 2d 1156 (Fla. 2006)), and the U.S. Supreme Court denied certiorari in 1995.

B. Long-Running Postconviction and Federal Litigation

Over the next nearly 30 years, Walls pursued multiple rounds of state and federal collateral review:

  1. Initial Rule 3.851 motion (filed 1997, amended 1997 & 2001):
    Raised multiple ineffectiveness, trial error, and constitutional claims, including an early version of an intellectual-disability (“mental retardation”) claim. The circuit court denied relief; the Florida Supreme Court affirmed most rulings but allowed Walls to file a separate motion under newly adopted Rule 3.203 to litigate intellectual disability as a bar to execution (Walls III).
  2. Federal habeas corpus (28 U.S.C. § 2254):
    Walls’ federal petition was denied by the Northern District of Florida (Walls v. McNeil), affirmed by the Eleventh Circuit (Walls v. Buss, 658 F.3d 1274 (11th Cir. 2011)), and certiorari was denied in 2012.
  3. First successive state motion (Rule 3.203/3.851 – Atkins claim):
    Walls litigated intellectual disability under Florida’s implementing procedures for Atkins v. Virginia, 536 U.S. 304 (2002). After an evidentiary hearing, the circuit court rejected his claim; the Florida Supreme Court affirmed, finding no evidentiary support for intellectual disability (Walls IV, table decision).
  4. Second successive motion (Hall-based intellectual-disability claim):
    After Hall v. Florida, 572 U.S. 701 (2014), Walls argued that Atkins and Hall precluded his death sentence based on his IQ scores. Initially, the Florida Supreme Court held Hall applied retroactively and remanded for a new evidentiary hearing (Walls V, 213 So. 3d 340 (Fla. 2016)). But after Phillips v. State, 299 So. 3d 1013 (Fla. 2020), which receded from Walls V and held Hall was not retroactive, the circuit court relied on Phillips and again rejected Walls’ intellectual-disability claim on both procedural and substantive grounds. The Florida Supreme Court affirmed (Walls VII, 361 So. 3d 231 (Fla. 2023)), and certiorari was denied in 2023.
  5. Third successive motion (Hurst claim):
    Walls sought relief under Hurst v. Florida, 577 U.S. 92 (2016). The Florida Supreme Court denied relief, holding Hurst did not apply retroactively to Walls’ already-final sentence (Walls VI, 238 So. 3d 96 (Fla. 2018)), and certiorari was denied later in 2018.

C. The 2025 Death Warrant and Current Proceedings

On November 18, 2025, Governor DeSantis signed a death warrant scheduling Walls’s execution for December 18, 2025. In response, Walls filed:

  • A fourth successive Rule 3.851 motion raising three claims:
    1. His death sentence is unconstitutional because he is intellectually disabled.
    2. His execution is barred because he was 19 at the time of the crime and should benefit from an extension of Roper v. Simmons to offenders under 21.
    3. The 37-year delay on death row constitutes cruel and unusual punishment under the Eighth Amendment.
  • A motion for a stay of execution.
  • A separate petition for writ of habeas corpus arguing that due process entitled him to application of Hall standards to his Atkins claim.

The circuit court held a Huff hearing (a procedural hearing to determine whether an evidentiary hearing is required) on December 1, 2025, denied an evidentiary hearing, and on December 3, 2025, summarily denied the motion and the requested stay. Walls appealed and simultaneously pursued habeas relief. The Florida Supreme Court affirmed the summary denial, denied habeas, and refused a stay.

III. Summary of the 2025 Opinion

The Florida Supreme Court’s per curiam opinion does the following:

  1. Affirms the summary denial of Walls’s successive Rule 3.851 motion:
    • Intellectual disability claim: Procedurally barred because it had already been litigated and rejected; even if not barred, it fails on the merits because Hall does not apply retroactively under Phillips.
    • Age-based categorical exemption claim (19-year-old offender): Procedurally time-barred, not supported by newly discovered evidence, and substantively foreclosed by prior Florida precedent and the constitutional conformity clause (art. I, § 17, Fla. Const.).
    • Death-row delay claim (37 years): Untimely and, in any event, foreclosed by long-standing Florida precedent rejecting such claims as facially invalid.
  2. Denies habeas corpus relief:
    • Walls’s argument that due process gave him a vested right to Hall-based intellectual-disability standards is procedurally barred because it was already or could have been litigated.
    • On the merits, the Court finds no due process violation and no “manifest injustice” warranting habeas relief.
  3. Denies a stay of execution:
    • A stay is warranted only where there are substantial grounds for relief; because all claims fail procedurally and on the merits, no stay is granted.
  4. Notes dissent:
    • Justice Labarga dissents based solely on his prior dissent in Phillips, maintaining that Hall should apply retroactively. He thus would not affirm the denial of postconviction relief.

IV. Detailed Analysis

A. Standards of Review and Procedural Framework

Two procedural frameworks are central to this decision:

  1. Summary denial of successive Rule 3.851 motions
    Under Rule 3.851(f)(5)(B) and (h)(6), a court may summarily deny a capital postconviction motion “[i]f the motion, files, and records in the case conclusively show that the movant is entitled to no relief.” The Supreme Court:
    • Accepts the defendant’s factual allegations as true unless conclusively refuted by the record (Tompkins v. State, 994 So. 2d 1072, 1081 (Fla. 2008)).
    • Requires the defendant to establish a prima facie case based on a legally valid claim; mere conclusory allegations are insufficient (Franqui v. State, 59 So. 3d 82, 96 (Fla. 2011)).
    • Reviews the decision to deny an evidentiary hearing de novo as a pure question of law (Marek v. State, 8 So. 3d 1123, 1127 (Fla. 2009)).
  2. Time limits and successive-motion bars in Rule 3.851
    Rule 3.851(d)(1) generally requires capital postconviction claims to be filed within one year after the judgment and sentence becomes final. Rule 3.851(e)(2) bars untimely or repetitive claims absent narrow exceptions (e.g., newly discovered evidence or a newly established fundamental constitutional right that applies retroactively). The Court reiterates settled law that:
    • Claims previously raised and rejected cannot be relitigated in successive motions (Hendrix v. State, 136 So. 3d 1122, 1125 (Fla. 2014); Van Poyck v. State, 116 So. 3d 347, 362 (Fla. 2013)).

These procedural rules are the backbone of the Court’s rejection of Walls’s 2025 claims.

B. Intellectual Disability Claim and the Retroactivity of Hall

1. Prior Litigation of Walls’s Intellectual-Disability Claims

Walls’s case presents an unusually layered history of intellectual-disability litigation:

  • Early postconviction proceedings raised mental-health issues and argued intellectual deficits as mitigation.
  • A dedicated Atkins-based intellectual-disability claim was litigated under Rule 3.203 and rejected after an evidentiary hearing; the Florida Supreme Court affirmed (Walls IV).
  • In his Hall-based second successive motion, the Court initially held Hall retroactive (Walls V), but later, after Phillips, the Court held Hall is not retroactive and affirmed denial of relief both procedurally and substantively (Walls VII).

The 2025 motion again relies on an intellectual-disability theory, now framed against the backdrop of Hall and alleged due process principles.

2. Procedural Bar: Repetitive Litigation of Intellectual Disability

The Court holds that Walls’s intellectual-disability claim is procedurally barred because it has already been raised and rejected:

“Walls has already raised and been denied relief on this claim. … As a result, the claim is procedurally barred.”

The Court cites:

  • Barwick v. State, 361 So. 3d 785, 793 (Fla. 2023) (similar claim procedurally barred where prior versions had been raised), and
  • Hendrix and Van Poyck (successive relitigation barred).

Critically, Walls argued that procedural bars should not apply to intellectual-disability claims, given the constitutional prohibition on executing the intellectually disabled. The Court expressly rejects this argument, reaffirming prior holdings:

  • Pittman v. State, 417 So. 3d 287, 292 (Fla. 2025) (recognizing that “we have regularly applied procedural bars to exemption-from-execution claims”).
  • Dillbeck v. State, 357 So. 3d 94, 100 (Fla. 2023); Carroll v. State, 114 So. 3d 883, 886 (Fla. 2013) (applying procedural bars to similar claims).

This is the core doctrinal point on this issue: even claims that, if meritorious, would constitutionally bar execution (e.g., Atkins claims) remain subject to Florida’s one-year limit and bar on repetitive motions.

3. Substantive Merits: Non-Retroactivity of Hall

Even assuming no procedural bar, the Court holds the claim fails on the merits. The argument depends on applying Hall retroactively to Walls’s case. Hall invalidated Florida’s former rigid IQ cutoff (70) in evaluating intellectual disability for capital defendants.

But Phillips v. State (2020) expressly held that Hall is not retroactive under Florida’s standard retroactivity test. The Court quotes and relies on this:

“Phillips forecloses application of Hall to Walls, and Walls has not given us reason to reconsider that holding.”

The Court also rejects Walls’s broader claim that adhering to Phillips leads to arbitrary and capricious application of the death penalty. In Pittman, the Court had already concluded that the Florida death penalty scheme remains constitutionally sound despite the non-retroactive status of Hall.

4. Significance

This portion of the opinion:

  • Reaffirms that intellectual-disability claims are fully subject to procedural default rules.
  • Reaffirms the binding force of Phillips (no retroactivity of Hall) despite continuing disagreement by at least one justice (Labarga).
  • Signals that, absent an intervening U.S. Supreme Court decision, Florida will not reopen death sentences finalized before Hall based on evolving diagnostic standards.

C. Age-Based Categorical Exemption (Extension of Roper) and the Conformity Clause

1. The Claim and Its Scientific Framing

Walls’s second claim sought categorical Eighth Amendment immunity from execution because he was 19 at the time of the offense. He relied on:

  • Modern developmental neuroscience suggesting that individuals aged 18–22 are functionally similar to juveniles under 18 in terms of brain development, impulsivity, and risk assessment; and
  • Scholarly and judicial trends in other jurisdictions considering (or adopting) 21 as a threshold for heightened protection.

He argued Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551 (2005)—which barred execution of offenders who were under 18 at the time of their offense—should be extended to encompass those who were under 21.

2. Procedural Bar: Timeliness and “Newly Discovered Evidence”

The Court first rejects this claim as untimely under Rule 3.851(d), emphasizing:

  • Walls’s conviction and sentence became final decades ago.
  • He must fit this claim into a recognized exception—most plausibly “newly discovered evidence.”
  • He fails to show that the scientific evidence or expert opinions on brain development are in fact “newly discovered” as that term is used in Florida postconviction law.

The Court draws on a line of cases rejecting similar attempts to characterize evolving scientific literature as newly discovered evidence:

  • Sliney v. State, 362 So. 3d 186, 188–89 (Fla. 2023) (updated intellectual disability manuals did not qualify as newly discovered evidence).
  • Barwick, 361 So. 3d at 793, citing Foster v. State, 258 So. 3d 1248, 1253 (Fla. 2018).
  • Gudinas v. State, 412 So. 3d 701, 711 (Fla. 2025), noting extensive literature on brain development beyond age 18 had been “well known in the public domain for decades, and even before Roper was decided.”

Walls attempted to distinguish his evidence by offering a November 18, 2025 declaration from Dr. Laurence Steinberg, asserting that there is now a more complete and unified scientific “consensus.” But the Court characterizes this as similar to evidence it has rejected in other recent cases (e.g., Sparre v. State, No. SC2024-1512, 2025 WL 3481670 (Fla. Dec. 4, 2025)), because:

  • The underlying empirical data have been available for years.
  • A new expert synthesis or more explicit statement of consensus does not reset the clock for postconviction purposes.

Likewise, “recent judicial decisions in other states” adopting higher age thresholds do not qualify as newly discovered evidence; they are legal developments in other jurisdictions, not new factual discoveries in Walls’s case.

3. Substantive Merits: No Authority to Extend Roper

Even if the claim were timely, the Court unequivocally rejects it on the merits, relying on:

  • Its own repeated precedent refusing to extend Roper to offenders older than 18.
    The Court cites Gudinas, which itself collected cases where the Florida Supreme Court has rejected such claims.
  • Florida’s constitutional “conformity clause” (art. I, § 17, Fla. Const.), which requires Florida courts to interpret Florida’s prohibition on cruel and unusual punishment “in conformity with decisions of the United States Supreme Court” on the Eighth Amendment.

Because the U.S. Supreme Court has—so far—set the categorical juvenile execution bar at age 18, Florida courts conclude they lack authority to move that line to 21, regardless of modern neuroscience or other state courts’ decisions.

4. Attack on the Conformity Clause

Recognizing this obstacle, Walls argued that article I, section 17 itself is unconstitutional because it prevents Florida courts from adequately protecting against cruel and unusual punishment. The Court rejects this broad constitutional challenge, drawing again on Gudinas:

“[N]either the Eighth nor Fourteenth Amendments require states to expand the protections afforded by the Eighth Amendment or to interpret their own corresponding state constitutional prohibitions … in a more expansive manner than the Supreme Court has interpreted the federal prohibition.”

In other words, Florida must meet the federal minimum protections, but nothing in federal law forces it to provide greater protections under state constitutional law. Adopting a conformity clause is permissible as a matter of state constitutional design.

The Court also declines to treat political statements or legislative proposals relating to the death penalty as diminishing or modifying the judiciary’s obligation to follow the state constitution’s conformity directive.

5. Significance

This portion of the opinion:

  • Reaffirms that Florida’s courts will not recognize a categorical exemption from the death penalty for 18–20-year-old offenders unless and until the U.S. Supreme Court itself changes federal Eighth Amendment law.
  • Illustrates how the conformity clause channels Florida’s Eighth Amendment jurisprudence, limiting room for state-level doctrinal innovation, even in light of evolving science and out-of-state authority.
  • Signals that developmental-neuroscience-based challenges will have little traction in Florida absent a clear, retroactive U.S. Supreme Court rule or truly case-specific newly discovered evidence.

D. Long Delay on Death Row as Cruel and Unusual Punishment

1. The Claim

Walls argued that the 37-year delay between crime and execution renders his death sentence cruel and unusual, especially when combined with the harsh conditions of death row and the erosion of penological justifications (deterrence, retribution, etc.) over such a long time.

2. Procedural Timeliness

The Court notes that Walls offers only a conclusory statement that the facts supporting this claim “could not have been raised” earlier. That is plainly insufficient to overcome Rule 3.851(d)’s time bar. Even so, the Court proceeds to the merits.

3. Substantive Merits

On the merits, the Court emphasizes:

  • Its own long-standing precedent that prolonged time on death row does not, by itself, violate the Eighth Amendment.
    The Court quotes Booker v. State, 969 So. 2d 186, 200 (Fla. 2007):
    “No federal or state court has accepted the argument that a prolonged stay on death row constitutes cruel and unusual punishment.”
  • Its recent death-warrant cases, each rejecting similar claims:
    • Owen v. State, 364 So. 3d 1017, 1027 (Fla. 2023) (37-year delay not cruel and unusual).
    • Dillbeck, 357 So. 3d at 103 (30 years on death row; such claims “facially invalid”).
    • Gaskin v. State, 361 So. 3d 300, 308 (Fla. 2023) (rejecting more-than-three-decade death-row-delay claim).
    • James v. State, 404 So. 3d 317, 325 (Fla. 2025), reiterating that no court has accepted this theory.

The Court thus finds nothing materially different about Walls’s claim; it adheres to a clear-line rule that delay, even decades long, does not constitute a constitutional bar to execution.

4. Significance

This part of the opinion:

  • Confirms Florida’s strong stance that “death row delay” claims are categorically non-meritorious under current Eighth Amendment precedent.
  • Suggests that only a significant shift in U.S. Supreme Court law could cause reconsideration of this line of cases.
  • Makes clear that delay—often attributable in part to defense efforts to seek collateral review—does not penalize the State by barring ultimate execution.

E. Habeas Corpus, Due Process, and “Manifest Injustice”

1. The Habeas Claim

In his separate habeas petition, Walls advanced a unified claim with subparts: that he is entitled to have his Atkins intellectual-disability claim evaluated under Hall standards, and that it would violate due process to apply Phillips to retract that benefit after the Florida Supreme Court originally granted him a Hall-based evidentiary hearing in Walls V and the U.S. Supreme Court denied certiorari on the State’s petition.

In essence, Walls argued:

  • The 2016 mandate in Walls V, combined with denial of certiorari, conferred a “right” to Hall-based procedures.
  • To later apply Phillips and refuse Hall retroactivity is a due process violation and a manifest injustice.

2. Procedural Bar

The Court disposes of the habeas petition primarily on procedural grounds:

  • Walls had previously raised a due process argument for retroactive application of Hall, and the Court rejected it in Walls VII (explicitly noted in fn. 5 of that decision).
  • Habeas corpus cannot be used to relitigate previously resolved claims or to raise claims that “could have been, should have been, or were” already raised in postconviction proceedings (Gaskin, 361 So. 3d at 309; Knight v. State, 923 So. 2d 387, 395 (Fla. 2005)).
  • The Court cites Jones v. State, 419 So. 3d 619, 629 (Fla. 2025), where a habeas intellectual-disability claim was denied on this basis.

3. Merits: Okafor, Due Process, and Manifest Injustice

On the merits, the Court addresses several points:

  • State v. Okafor not controlling:
    Okafor dealt with when a prior mandate vacating a death sentence becomes final, affecting the application of new law. The Court explains that its earlier mandate ordering a new Hall hearing did not vacate Walls’s death sentence, so Okafor is inapposite (Thompson v. State, 341 So. 3d 303, 306 (Fla. 2022)).
  • Due process satisfied:
    Due process requires notice and an opportunity to be heard (Asay v. State, 210 So. 3d 1, 27 (Fla. 2016); Huff), not any particular outcome. Walls:
    • Had multiple opportunities to litigate intellectual disability (both under Atkins and after Hall was decided).
    • Had a full opportunity to respond to Phillips on remand and on appeal.
    • Simply failed to meet the procedural and substantive standards.
    The Court cites Pittman and Bates v. State, 416 So. 3d 312 (Fla. 2025), as recent examples where due process was found satisfied despite time-barred mental-state claims.
  • No “manifest injustice” exception:
    The Court rejects Walls’s argument that failure to apply Hall retroactively creates manifest injustice that would justify bypassing procedural bars. Citing cases like Bates, Owen, and Dillbeck, the Court reiterates that:
    • Manifest injustice is reserved for truly extraordinary circumstances.
    • Where the defendant has previously litigated similar claims and had full process, and where the Court deems its prior precedent correct (Phillips), there is no manifest injustice in refusing further collateral relief.

4. Significance

The habeas portion of the opinion:

  • Strengthens the message that habeas corpus cannot operate as a perpetual second layer of collateral review to relitigate state postconviction decisions.
  • Clarifies that “vesting” arguments based on a prior, now-overruled decision (Walls V) do not yield a due process right to avoid the subsequent, controlling precedent (Phillips).
  • Reinforces a narrow conception of the “manifest injustice” exception in Florida capital cases.

F. Denial of Stay of Execution

The Court concludes by denying Walls’s motion for a stay of execution. Citing Dillbeck and Davis v. State, 142 So. 3d 867, 873–74 (Fla. 2014), the standard is:

“[A] stay of execution on a successive motion for postconviction relief is warranted only where there are substantial grounds upon which relief might be granted.”

Having concluded that all of Walls’s claims are either procedurally barred or substantively foreclosed by established precedent, the Court finds no such grounds and denies the stay. The mandate issues immediately, and the Court will not entertain rehearing.

V. Complex Concepts Simplified

A. “Procedural Bar” in Postconviction Proceedings

A “procedural bar” means that a court refuses to reach the substance of a claim because the defendant did not comply with procedural rules—such as:

  • Filing deadlines (time bars).
  • Prohibition on raising the same issue multiple times (successive-motion bar).
  • Failure to preserve an issue at trial or on direct appeal.

In this case, procedural bars prevented relitigation of:

  • Walls’s intellectual-disability claim;
  • His new age-based categorical claim under Roper; and
  • His due process-based habeas argument for Hall retroactivity.

B. “Newly Discovered Evidence”

To overcome the one-year time limit under Rule 3.851, a defendant can argue there is “newly discovered evidence.” But Florida courts apply a strict test:

  • The evidence must have been unknown and could not have been discovered earlier with due diligence.
  • It must be material enough that it would probably produce an acquittal or a lesser sentence if known at trial or in the penalty phase.

General advances in science, new literature, or new expert opinions synthesizing long-known data rarely qualify because the underlying information was already available. That is why the Court repeatedly rejects attempts to characterize new brain-development research or updated diagnostic manuals as “newly discovered.”

C. “Retroactivity” of New Constitutional Rules

When the U.S. Supreme Court announces a new rule (such as Hall), courts must decide whether it applies to cases already final (retroactive) or only to future and non-final cases (prospective). Florida applies a state-law retroactivity test that:

  • Looks at the purpose of the new rule, the extent of reliance on the old rule, and the effect on the administration of justice.
  • In Phillips, the Florida Supreme Court held that Hall does not apply retroactively, meaning inmates whose sentences became final before Hall generally cannot reopen their death sentences based on its new standard.

D. The “Conformity Clause” (Art. I, § 17, Fla. Const.)

Florida’s conformity clause requires that its state constitutional ban on “cruel and unusual punishment” be interpreted in conformity with U.S. Supreme Court Eighth Amendment decisions. This:

  • Prevents Florida courts from interpreting the state constitution as more protective than federal Eighth Amendment law.
  • Locks in federal doctrine as both the floor and ceiling for Florida’s cruel-and-unusual analysis.

Because Roper currently sets the line at age 18, Florida courts cannot, on their own, extend the categorical execution ban to 19-, 20-, or 21-year-old offenders.

E. “Atkins” and “Hall” Claims

  • Atkins v. Virginia (2002) held the Eighth Amendment prohibits execution of people with intellectual disability, but left states some latitude in defining and implementing that protection.
  • Hall v. Florida (2014) invalidated Florida’s then-existing strict IQ cutoff of 70, requiring courts to consider the standard error of measurement and other evidence of adaptive deficits.

In Florida, an “Atkins/Hall claim” is a challenge to the death sentence on the ground that the defendant is intellectually disabled and therefore constitutionally ineligible for execution.

F. “Manifest Injustice”

“Manifest injustice” is a narrow, equity-based concept. In theory, a court may depart from procedural rules (like bars on successive petitions) if enforcing them would result in an obvious and profound injustice—typically something akin to convicting an innocent person or executing someone in clear violation of binding constitutional rules.

Florida’s Supreme Court, especially in its recent death-warrant jurisprudence, has applied this concept sparingly. In Walls’s case, the Court finds no manifest injustice where:

  • He already had multiple opportunities to litigate mental-health and intellectual-disability issues;
  • The Court views its controlling precedent (Phillips, Pittman, etc.) as correctly decided; and
  • There is no new, dispositive factual development (such as a conclusive new diagnosis) that fundamentally changes the case.

VI. Precedents and Their Influence on the Decision

This opinion is heavily precedent-driven. Among the most pivotal:

  • Phillips v. State, 299 So. 3d 1013 (Fla. 2020):
    Held Hall is not retroactive and expressly receded from Walls V. This decision is the linchpin for rejecting Walls’s renewed intellectual-disability claim.
  • Pittman v. State, 417 So. 3d 287 (Fla. 2025):
    Emphasizes that procedural bars apply fully to exemption-from-execution claims, including intellectual disability, and rejects due-process-based attempts to circumvent those bars.
  • Gudinas v. State, 412 So. 3d 701 (Fla. 2025):
    Rejects extending Roper beyond age 18 and underscores that Florida courts lack authority under the conformity clause to expand Atkins/Roper protections beyond U.S. Supreme Court holdings.
  • Dillbeck v. State, Owen v. State, Gaskin v. State, and James v. State:
    These death-warrant cases form a cohesive body of law denying:
    • Delay-on-death-row Eighth Amendment claims, and
    • Late-stage exemptions based on new mental-health or brain-damage theories where earlier opportunities to litigate existed.
  • Asay v. State, Bates v. State, Knight v. State, and others:
    Provide the due-process and habeas framework, confirming that notice and an opportunity to be heard—not permanent entitlement to any given legal standard—satisfy due process, and that habeas cannot be used to relitigate or belatedly raise claims.

Collectively, these precedents drive the Walls decision; the Court is not innovating so much as consistently applying, and thereby strengthening, a doctrinal pattern emphasizing finality and deference to prior rulings.

VII. Impact and Broader Implications

A. For Florida Capital Defendants

This decision underscores several practical realities for capital defendants in Florida:

  • Little room for late-stage intellectual-disability litigation:
    Unless a defendant has a genuinely new, case-specific factual development (e.g., newly uncovered records, misdiagnosed conditions), courts will likely bar renewed intellectual-disability claims, especially those grounded in Hall.
  • Age-based categorical challenges are effectively foreclosed:
    Until and unless the U.S. Supreme Court extends Roper, individuals who were 18–20 at the time of their crimes cannot rely on age alone to categorically bar execution in Florida.
  • Death-row delay claims are non-starters:
    Walls’s case reaffirms that decades on death row will not, by itself, prevent execution under Florida or federal law as interpreted by Florida courts.

B. For Counsel Strategy in Capital Litigation

Defense counsel must:

  • Raise all plausible Eighth Amendment exemption claims (intellectual disability, mental illness, factual innocence, etc.) as early as possible, ideally in the first postconviction motion.
  • Develop and present comprehensive mental-health evidence at the initial penalty phase and in initial collateral proceedings to avoid procedural bars later.
  • Recognize that general scientific trends or new expert commentary, without genuinely new case-specific facts, will rarely overcome timeliness bars.

C. Constitutional Structure: The Role of the Conformity Clause

Florida’s conformity clause is central to the Court’s rejection of broader Eighth Amendment protections:

  • It channels the state’s cruel-and-unusual analysis through U.S. Supreme Court precedent, preventing state-based expansions of rights.
  • As a result, Florida may be less responsive than some other states to evolving standards of decency unless and until the U.S. Supreme Court itself acts.

D. The Continuing Dissent on Hall Retroactivity

Justice Labarga’s dissent, referencing his prior dissent in Phillips, signals an ongoing minority view on the Court that:

  • Hall should be applied retroactively, given the gravity of executing potentially intellectually disabled individuals under standards later deemed unconstitutional.
  • The interest in accuracy and humanity in capital punishment can, in some circumstances, outweigh finality.

But as of this decision, that view remains in the minority. The majority clearly treats Phillips as settled law.

VIII. Conclusion

The Florida Supreme Court’s 2025 decision in Frank A. Walls v. State of Florida and Walls v. Secretary, Department of Corrections is best understood as a consolidation and reaffirmation of existing doctrine rather than a radical departure. Its main contributions can be distilled as follows:

  • Procedural bars remain fully operative in capital cases, even for claims that—if meritorious—would categorically exempt a prisoner from execution (intellectual disability, age-based exemptions).
  • Hall is definitively non-retroactive in Florida; defendants whose sentences became final before Hall may not reopen their death sentences merely to benefit from its more protective intellectual-disability framework.
  • Florida will not extend Roper beyond age 18 on its own initiative due to the state constitutional conformity clause; any categorical exemption for 18–20-year-olds must come from the U.S. Supreme Court.
  • Long delays on death row do not constitute cruel and unusual punishment under current Florida and recognized federal precedent; such claims remain “facially invalid.”
  • Habeas corpus cannot serve as a vehicle to relitigate or circumvent prior postconviction decisions, and the “manifest injustice” safety valve is narrowly construed.

In practical terms, the opinion signals that Florida’s highest court will continue to emphasize finality and procedural regularity in capital cases, leaving substantial modernization of Eighth Amendment protections to the U.S. Supreme Court or to state constitutional amendment, rather than to judicial innovation at the state supreme court level.

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