Pre‑Condemnation Interference with an Auction and Depressed Bids Do Not Constitute a Taking: Detailed Commentary on Snyder v. Village of Luckey (6th Cir. 2025)

I. Introduction

This commentary analyzes the Sixth Circuit’s unpublished decision in Steve Snyder v. Village of Luckey, Ohio, No. 24‑3530 (6th Cir. Nov. 24, 2025), arising from a small Ohio village’s efforts to acquire a former quarry targeted for private development. The case sits at the intersection of eminent domain, regulatory takings, equal protection, and due process, and also raises recurring issues about Article III standing and post‑judgment relief under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 60(b).

The plaintiffs are:

• Tim and Steve Snyder, landowners who, through their LLC, T&S Agriventures, purchased and improved a former quarry property;
• T&S Agriventures, LLC, the holding entity for the land; and
• Beth Rose Real Estate and Auctions, LLC (“Rose”), the auctioneer contracted to market and sell the property.

The defendant is the Village of Luckey, Ohio. After the Snyders decided to auction the property in 2021, the Village moved to initiate eminent domain proceedings and engaged in a series of actions that, according to plaintiffs, scared off bidders and depressed the auction result. The property did not sell because the bidding did not reach the reserve price.

The plaintiffs brought a § 1983 action alleging:

• A Fifth Amendment Takings Clause violation;
• A Fourteenth Amendment Equal Protection “class‑of‑one” claim; and
• A Fourteenth Amendment substantive due process violation.

The district court dismissed the complaint under Rules 12(b)(1) and 12(b)(6) and later denied a motion to alter or amend the judgment under Rules 59(e) and 60(b). The Sixth Circuit (Judge Stranch, joined by Judge Gibbons) affirmed in full. Judge Clay issued a lengthy dissent that is as important as the majority for understanding the doctrinal stakes.

At its core, the case confronts this question: When, if ever, does government conduct that depresses bids at a pre‑condemnation auction, allegedly in bad faith to lower the eventual acquisition cost, amount to a compensable “taking” under the Fifth Amendment? The majority answers “not here,” drawing a firm line against converting pre‑condemnation value impacts and lost speculative profits into constitutional takings. The dissent, by contrast, sees a “deliberate course of conduct” indistinguishable in principle from the pre‑condemnation blight recognized as a taking in Amen v. City of Dearborn.

II. Summary of the Opinion

A. Majority Holding (Judge Stranch, joined by Judge Gibbons)

The Sixth Circuit’s majority opinion reaches multiple holdings:

1. Rose (the auctioneer) lacks Article III standing for a takings claim.
   Her lost commission is too speculative; she has no alleged possessory or lien‑like interest in the land, and reserve pricing makes it uncertain that she would ever have earned a commission even absent the Village’s conduct.
2. The Snyders fail to state a Takings Clause claim.
   
   • There is no direct appropriation: the Snyders still own the property and the Village has initiated ordinary condemnation mechanisms.
   • Per se regulatory takings (permanent physical invasion or total deprivation of economic value) do not apply; the property plainly retains substantial economic value (e.g., a $610,000 auction bid, nearly twice the purchase price).
   • Under the Penn Central framework, the Snyders’ allegations amount to nothing more than a temporary, pre‑condemnation depression in market value — something the Supreme Court has repeatedly held is not itself a taking.
   • Amen v. City of Dearborn is distinguished: there, a decade‑long campaign physically degraded properties and deliberately destroyed value without formally invoking eminent domain; here, the Village stated its intention to condemn and did not engage in comparable physical or long‑term destructive conduct.
3. The Snyders’ “class‑of‑one” Equal Protection claim fails.
   The complaint does not identify any similarly situated comparator property owner who received more favorable treatment; allegations that the Village treated the Snyders badly do not suffice for an equal protection theory.
4. The substantive due process claim is subsumed by the Takings Clause.
   Because the Fifth Amendment provides an explicit textual source of protection with respect to the alleged property injury, the plaintiffs cannot re‑package the same conduct as a freestanding substantive due process claim.
5. The district court did not abuse its discretion in denying relief under Rule 60(b)(2) or 60(b)(6).
   The “new” testimony from a later state‑court necessity hearing was known to plaintiffs months before the federal judgment, so it was not “newly discovered” evidence. Nor would it change the Rule 12(b)(6) analysis, because those motions assume the pleaded facts are true anyway.

The net result: the dismissal with prejudice of the § 1983 damages claims is affirmed, as is the denial of post‑judgment relief.

B. Dissent (Judge Clay)

Judge Clay’s dissent paints a sharply different picture:

• He views the Village’s actions as a bad‑faith, deliberate course of conduct to devalue the property and either force a sale at a reduced price or acquire it more cheaply through condemnation after value was artificially depressed.
• He concludes that the Village lacked any legitimate public purpose for its purported water‑works/park rationale, rendering the condemnation pretextual and constitutionally suspect.
• He reads Amen v. City of Dearborn as controlling, arguing that intentional governmental manipulation of property value for acquisition purposes — even over a shorter period and without physical degradation — can constitute a taking.
• He would also find standing for Rose, regarding her lost commission opportunity as a foreseeable consequence of the Village’s interference.
• Finally, he would grant relief from judgment under Rule 60(b), emphasizing the “extraordinary” nature of the Village’s conduct and the necessity of discovery to determine the true economic impact and legitimacy of the Village’s purported public purpose.

Thus, the panel is split not on the basic doctrines, but on the fact‑intensive question of whether the Snyders’ allegations cross the line from non‑compensable pre‑condemnation effects into a constitutionally cognizable taking.

III. Precedents and Doctrinal Framework

A. Standing and Injury‑in‑Fact

The majority applies standard Article III standing doctrine:

• Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife: plaintiffs bear the burden to allege a concrete, particularized injury that is fairly traceable to the defendant and likely redressable by a favorable decision.
• Spokeo, Inc. v. Robins: injury must be “real and not abstract” and must affect the plaintiff in a personal and individual way.
• TransUnion LLC v. Ramirez and Oklahoma v. United States: standing is not dispensed “in gross”; a plaintiff must demonstrate standing as to each claim.
• FDA v. Alliance for Hippocratic Medicine: traceability and redressability often travel together; if the alleged injury would still likely occur even with the requested relief, standing fails.

Applied to Rose, these cases underpin the conclusion that a lost expectancy of commission — absent an actual or lien‑based property interest and given the reserve price — is both too contingent and not fairly traceable/redressable for a takings theory.

B. Takings Clause Framework

The majority’s takings analysis is structured around settled Supreme Court doctrine:

• Lingle v. Chevron U.S.A.: the Takings Clause is not a general limit on government interference with property rights; it is a compensation requirement for otherwise lawful takings.
• Loretto v. Teleprompter Manhattan CATV Corp.: per se taking when there is a permanent physical occupation, however small.
• Lucas v. South Carolina Coastal Council: per se taking when regulation deprives the property of all economically beneficial use, an “extraordinary” situation.
• Penn Central Transportation Co. v. New York City: for other regulatory actions, apply a multi‑factor, ad hoc test considering:
  • economic impact of the regulation;
  • interference with reasonable investment‑backed expectations; and
  • the character of the governmental action.
• First English Evangelical Lutheran Church v. City of Los Angeles and Danforth v. United States: mere fluctuations in value during the process of governmental decisionmaking, absent extraordinary delay, are incidents of ownership and do not themselves amount to takings.
• Agins v. City of Tiburon: no taking is inflicted simply because the announcement of intended condemnation causes a decline in market value.
• Tahoe-Sierra Preservation Council, Inc. v. Tahoe Regional Planning Agency: the Court again emphasizes that temporary, planning‑related restrictions and value fluctuations, absent more, fall short of a taking.
• United States v. Reynolds and United States ex rel. TVA v. Powelson: the measure of just compensation is fair market value — what a willing buyer would pay a willing seller — not a guarantee of recouping investment or speculative profits.

The majority invokes this line of authority to cabin the Snyders’ theory: the Constitution does not guarantee that landowners can sell when and how they wish at their hoped‑for price, even if government actions complicate that plan.

C. Sixth Circuit Takings Precedent: Amen and Beyond

Two Sixth Circuit decisions loom large in the majority’s and dissent’s dueling analyses:

• Amen v. City of Dearborn, 718 F.2d 789 (6th Cir. 1983).
  
  • The City of Dearborn sought to redevelop a low‑income neighborhood but, rather than invoking condemnation, allegedly embarked on a ten‑year campaign to drive down values and force residents out: denying permits, demanding excessive repairs, allowing city‑owned homes to decay and be stripped, and making statements about fixed price ceilings.
  • The court held that this “deliberate course of conduct” caused such “substantial damage” that plaintiffs’ properties were effectively taken, even without formal condemnation.
  • The appraisals were themselves tainted because the comparables had been devalued by the City’s own conduct.
• Oberer Land Developers Ltd. v. Sugarcreek Township (unpublished, cited by the majority).
  The court emphasized that the Takings Clause does not guarantee developers a particular profit or return on investment; it guarantees only fair market value when a taking occurs.

The majority reads Amen as limited to extreme, long‑term, physically destructive conduct that substantially destroys property value without formal condemnation. The dissent reads Amen more broadly: any deliberate course of conduct by a government to manipulate property values downward for the purpose of acquisition can cross the line into a taking, even if it is shorter in duration and does not involve literal physical decay.

D. Equal Protection: Class‑of‑One

The Equal Protection aspects rest on:

• Village of Willowbrook v. Olech: a “class‑of‑one” claim requires showing intentional differential treatment from others similarly situated without a rational basis.
• Paterek v. Village of Armada and EJS Properties, LLC v. City of Toledo: in the Sixth Circuit, a class‑of‑one plaintiff must identify comparators with “relevant similarity” and show either no rational basis or animus/ill will.

Here, the majority underscores that the complaint never mentions any other property owner, let alone any similarly situated owner treated better. Allegations that the Village singled out the plaintiffs, without any comparator, cannot support a class‑of‑one claim.

E. Substantive Due Process versus Specific Constitutional Provisions

On substantive due process, the majority relies on:

• Albright v. Oliver and Johnson v. City of Cincinnati: where a specific constitutional provision addresses the challenged government conduct, that provision must supply the framework, not generalized substantive due process.
• Montgomery v. Carter County and Buckles v. Columbus Municipal Airport Authority: in the takings context, the Takings Clause displaces overlapping substantive due process claims about the same property injury.

Because the Snyders explicitly framed their injury as a property deprivation, they were required to proceed — successfully or not — under the Takings Clause. Having done so, they cannot restate the same harm as a substantive due process violation.

F. Post‑Judgment Relief: Rules 59(e) and 60(b)

The plaintiffs’ motion to alter or amend judgment invoked:

• Rule 59(e): allows alteration or amendment for clear error of law, newly discovered evidence, or an intervening change in law.
• Rule 60(b)(2): relief for “newly discovered evidence” that could not have been discovered with reasonable diligence before judgment.
• Rule 60(b)(6): extraordinary, catch‑all relief where equity demands it.

Citing cases like HDC, LLC v. City of Ann Arbor and Ford Motor Co. v. Mustangs Unlimited, Inc., the panel affirms the district court’s strict application:

• Evidence elicited months before judgment is not “newly discovered” if plaintiffs could have moved to amend or supplement their pleadings but chose not to.
• Even dramatic testimony confirming government misconduct does not matter at the Rule 12(b)(6) stage if the court already assumed the complaint’s factual allegations were true and still found no legal claim.
• Thus, Rule 60(b)(6) is not triggered merely because plaintiffs regret litigation decisions or seek a different weighing of already alleged facts.

IV. Legal Reasoning and Application

A. Rose’s Standing: When Is a Lost Commission a Takings Injury?

Rose, the auctioneer, alleged that the Village’s interference destroyed her ability to earn a commission on the sale of the Snyders’ land, and argued that this gave her standing to assert a takings claim. Her argument rested heavily on the Ohio case Wilson v. Trustee Union Township, where a buyer under a contingent purchase contract was allowed to challenge a zoning action as a taking.

The Sixth Circuit distinguishes Wilson on two grounds:

1. Nature of the interest.
   In Wilson, the plaintiff had a contingent right to acquire title to the land, subject to rezoning. That is a classic, albeit contingent, property interest. Rose, by contrast, is not a buyer; she has only a contractual right to a commission if a sale occurs. The complaint never alleges a lien, security interest, or any other property right in the land.
2. Speculative causation and redressability.
   The property was offered at auction subject to a reserve price. Even if the Village had done nothing, there is no guarantee that the reserving owners would have received a qualifying bid or that Rose would have earned a commission. Accordingly, it is not clear that a court order against the Village’s conduct would have resulted in a sale above the reserve. This undermines both traceability and redressability.

The majority also briefly notes that if Rose believed Ohio law conferred a broker’s lien or similar property interest, she failed to plead it. The case therefore sets an important practical boundary: for federal takings standing, mere expectancy interests in transaction proceeds (like commissions) do not suffice absent a pleaded, legally recognized property interest in the underlying real estate or proceeds.

B. The Snyders’ Takings Claim: Why Depressed Auction Bids Are Not a Taking Here

1. No per se regulatory taking

The Snyders argued that the Village’s conduct rendered their “sole and entire economic purpose” for the property — sale at the September 18, 2021 auction — unattainable, thus amounting to a per se taking under Lucas (total deprivation of economic use). The majority rejects this on the pleadings:

• The complaint does not actually allege that sale at that specific auction was the sole possible economic use; it rather alleges that improvements were made to “improve the marketability” for high‑end development.
• The property plainly retained significant economic value: the auction generated a $610,000 bid, nearly double the original purchase price. The only reason no sale occurred was the owners’ own decision to set a reserve.

Thus, the case is far from the “extraordinary circumstance” of total economic wipeout required for a Lucas per se taking.

2. No compensable regulatory taking under Penn Central

The Snyders also gestured at the Penn Central factors. The majority notes they do not develop a serious Penn Central argument and, more importantly, that even if they did, Supreme Court law forecloses takings claims based solely on:

• the government’s announcement of intent to condemn; and
• the resulting temporary decline in property value before or during condemnation proceedings.

Relying on First English, Agins, and Tahoe-Sierra, the majority characterizes the Snyders’ alleged injury as:

Absent “extraordinary delay” or more extreme conduct, such pre‑condemnation value fluctuations are “incidents of ownership.” The Village’s expression of interest and the “specter” of future eminent domain, even if they chill bidders, do not equate to a constitutional taking.

3. Distinguishing Amen v. City of Dearborn

This is the doctrinally most contentious part of the case. The dissent sees the Village’s alleged behavior as directly analogous to Amen: a deliberate strategy to devalue property to force or cheaply facilitate acquisition.

The majority acknowledges that the Village’s conduct is “troubling” and that officials should adhere to high ethical standards, but it draws several key distinctions from Amen:

1. Duration and severity.
   Amen involved a decade‑long campaign that:
   • denied permits or delayed them unreasonably;
   • imposed excessive maintenance demands;
   • told residents prices would be capped or decline;
   • allowed acquired properties to sit vacant and be stripped, physically degrading the neighborhood.
   The majority stresses that this led to “substantial damage” to the physical condition and fair market value of the properties.
2. Physical degradation versus transactional interference.
   In Amen, the City’s actions made the properties themselves less valuable, as houses and neighborhoods decayed. In Snyder, by contrast, the property’s physical and intrinsic economic attributes are untouched; only one particular sale event (the auction) is alleged to have been undermined.
3. Use (or avoidance) of condemnation powers.
   A major concern in Amen was that Dearborn deliberately avoided formal condemnation procedures, instead coercively driving down values to force private sales. Here, the Village openly commenced eminent domain proceedings, passed a resolution of appropriation, and made a formal offer. It did not try to sidestep condemnation; rather, its pre‑auction conduct was part of that process.
4. Measure of harm.
   The majority views the Snyders’ injury primarily as a lost opportunity to confirm a higher market value via private auction before condemnation — a testing mechanism, not itself a constitutional entitlement.

From this vantage, Amen remains a narrow, fact‑bound exception for extreme, long‑term pre‑condemnation blight; it does not convert every aggressive, even sharp‑elbowed, condemnation strategy into a taking.

C. Equal Protection: Lack of a Comparator

The Snyders framed their equal protection theory as a “class‑of‑one” claim, arguing that the Village intentionally targeted them and interfered with their property rights in a way it did not with others. The majority points out a fundamental pleading deficiency:

• The complaint never names or describes any other property owner in the Village, let alone similarly situated owners (e.g., other large development parcels, or comparable quarry sites).
• It alleges only that the Village interfered with “their” ability to sell the property — no comparative allegation is made.

Under Sixth Circuit precedent, although exact duplication of circumstances is not required, some “relevant similarity” must be pleaded between the plaintiff and a comparator. Without at least one comparator, a class‑of‑one theory collapses into a generalized grievance that the plaintiff was treated unfairly — which is not, standing alone, an equal protection violation.

D. Substantive Due Process: Displacement by the Takings Clause

The Snyders conceded on appeal that their substantive due process claim arises from the same nucleus of fact as their takings claim — i.e., interference with private property interests. The majority applies the well‑settled principle that when a specific textual amendment covers the conduct (here, the Fifth Amendment Takings Clause), plaintiffs may not circumvent its limitations by recasting the claim under the Due Process Clause.

As a result, even if the Village’s conduct were characterized as arbitrary, shocking, or in bad faith, the proper lens remains the Takings Clause. Because the court has already determined there is no taking on these facts, the due process claim fails as a matter of law.

E. Rule 60(b) and “Newly Discovered” Evidence

The plaintiffs attempted to use testimony from a state‑court necessity hearing, held while the federal motion to dismiss was pending, to reopen the case under Rule 60(b)(2) and (6). The testimony, largely from the mayor, allegedly showed:

• The Village had no firm plan, timeline, or funding for a water works project;
• The water’s suitability for drinking remained unknown over two years later;
• The Village did not seriously consider acquiring the property until hearing of the auction; and
• The “good faith” offer price was poorly substantiated.

The district court and the majority reject Rule 60(b) relief on two independent grounds:

1. Not “newly discovered.”
   Evidence is not newly discovered if plaintiffs had it months before final judgment and could have sought to amend, supplement, or extend briefing. Here, plaintiffs elicited the testimony in September 2023 but did not alert the court until after judgment in February 2024, despite obvious relevance. Rule 60(b)(2) requires reasonable diligence.
2. Not outcome‑determinative at the Rule 12(b)(6) stage.
   On a motion to dismiss, the court assumes all well‑pleaded factual allegations are true. The necessity hearing testimony, at most, strengthens those factual allegations (e.g., that the Village acted pretextually or without a true public need), but does not change the legal conclusion that — even if everything plaintiffs allege is true — no takings or other constitutional violation has been stated.

Consequently, Rule 60(b)(6)’s “extraordinary circumstances” threshold is not met; the testimony does not cure the fundamental doctrinal defects the majority identifies.

V. The Dissent’s Competing Vision

Judge Clay views the case through a markedly different lens, grounded in three central themes:

A. A Deliberate, Bad‑Faith Effort to Devalue the Property

The dissent accepts the Snyders’ allegations as indicating something far more than a typical announcement of intent to condemn. Judge Clay emphasizes:

• The Village had explicitly declined to buy the property in 2018 when the Snyders first offered it for sale.
• Only after learning of the planned 2021 auction did the Village abruptly move to initiate eminent domain and begin a sequence of obstructive acts.
• The Village:
  • insisted the auctioneer notify all bidders of the Village’s intention to appropriate the property;
  • sent representatives to the auction whose very presence and statements dissuaded bidding; and
  • erected “No Parking” signs and other barriers around the property on auction day, undermining access.
• A bidder poll showed that the vast majority, if not all, were deterred from bidding by the Village’s conduct.

From this, the dissent infers a unified strategy: prevent the market from revealing the property’s true value, then use the artificially depressed environment to acquire it for less.

B. Absence of a Legitimate Public Purpose

Judge Clay sees the record — particularly the necessity hearing testimony — as undermining any credible public‑use justification:

• The Village had no plan, funding, engineering work, or timeline for a water‑supply project two years after the alleged need arose.
• It had not meaningfully tested whether the water was potable or contaminated, nor had it addressed obvious concerns about adjacent industrial contamination.
• Ohio law restricts dual use of land taken for water works and parks; the Village never secured the required approval to deviate.
• The mayor admitted uncertainty about whether the Village even needed the property for a water system at all.

Relying on Kelo v. City of New London, the dissent emphasizes that even under Kelo’s deferential standard, eminent domain must not be pretextual. A seizure undertaken under the “mere pretext” of public use, while in fact advancing no legitimate public purpose, is unconstitutional. In the dissent’s view, this is such a case.

C. Extending Amen to Deliberate, Short‑Term Sabotage

The dissent reads Amen as standing for a broader proposition: whenever a public entity intentionally manipulates property values downward through a deliberate pattern of misconduct in order to force a sale or cheapen eventual condemnation, it has engaged in a constructive taking.

Judge Clay rejects the majority’s emphasis on:

• duration (years versus months); and
• physical degradation (dilapidated homes versus sabotaged auction and tainted appraisal).

He stresses that Amen does not, on its face, require years of conduct or physical decay as elements of a taking; the touchstone is substantial damage from a deliberate course of conduct. In his view:

• The Village’s targeted interference with the one crucial valuation event (the auction), coupled with an appraisal strategy built on post‑sabotage conditions, created substantial damage to the property’s economic value.
• Because the Village’s appraised value and offer came after its own conduct depressed perceived market demand, the appraisal process, like in Amen, was based upon factors which inherently produced an artificially low market value.

His bottom line: the plaintiffs have plausibly alleged a compensable taking sufficient to survive a motion to dismiss and proceed to discovery on the questions of fair market value, causation, and public purpose.

D. Standing for the Auctioneer

On the standing question, the dissent would allow Rose’s claim to proceed:

• He treats her lost commission opportunity as a foreseeable, concrete economic injury caused by the Village’s interference.
• He rejects the majority’s suggestion that the presence of a reserve renders her injury speculative, reasoning that the Village’s conduct “foreclosed” the chance of any normal auction outcome.
• He also warns that denying standing would effectively immunize governments from accountability when they intentionally sabotage private contracts or auctions through eminent‑domain threats.

E. Rule 60(b) and Extraordinary Circumstances

Finally, Judge Clay views the necessity hearing testimony as underscoring the extraordinary nature of the Village’s conduct, warranting relief from judgment. In his framing:

• This evidence strongly supports plaintiffs’ allegations of pretext, lack of public purpose, and deliberate value manipulation.
• Denying the opportunity to amend or reopen based on such evidence would risk entrenching a manifest injustice in a case involving basic constitutional property protections.

VI. Impact and Practical Implications

A. For Property Owners and Developers

The decision, especially the majority, sends a clear message to landowners facing pre‑condemnation actions:

• Pre‑condemnation drops in value, even if partly attributable to government announcements or conduct, will rarely support a federal takings claim.
• Lost opportunities to sell at a particular time or for a hoped‑for price — including failed auctions — are generally not constitutionally protected property interests.
• Remedies for perceived governmental overreach may need to be pursued in:
  • state eminent domain proceedings (where valuation can be contested); and
  • potential state‑law tort or statutory claims (e.g., abuse of process, statutory limits on eminent domain), rather than federal § 1983 suits.

For developers, the case reinforces that investment‑backed expectations are relevant but not determinative, and do not entitle them to judicial protection from aggressive but formally lawful condemnation strategies.

B. For Auctioneers, Brokers, and Other Contract Counterparties

The standing ruling is particularly important for intermediaries engaged in real‑estate transactions:

• Absent a specific, pleaded property interest recognized by law — such as a broker’s lien or equitable interest in the real estate — intermediaries generally cannot invoke the Takings Clause.
• Contractual rights to fees or commissions are economic expectancies, not property interests under the Takings Clause, and will often be too speculative to support standing.

In practice, brokers and auctioneers must either:

• seek protection under state contract or tort law; or
• structure their agreements to include more secure, legally recognized interests if they anticipate frequent interaction with governmental condemnations.

C. For Municipalities and Condemnation Counsel

For local governments, the opinion offers both comfort and caution:

• Comfort: Aggressive pre‑condemnation actions, even those that can be characterized as chilling private sales or depressing bids, will typically not expose the municipality to § 1983 takings liability, so long as:
  • formal eminent domain procedures are actually invoked;
  • there is no extreme, long‑term, or physically destructive “blight” campaign; and
  • fair market value is ultimately offered in the condemnation proceeding.
• Caution: The dissent, and the majority’s unease, highlight that:
  • blatantly pretextual or bad‑faith takings still present real constitutional risk, especially if conduct begins to resemble Amen’s long‑term pattern of coercion and physical decline;
  • state constitutions and statutes (e.g., limits on “public use,” special rules for water‑works land in Ohio) may impose stricter standards even when federal takings claims fail;
  • mismanaged public messaging, threatening letters, or obvious sabotage of private transactions can become powerful evidence in later valuation or public‑use challenges, even if not independently actionable as federal takings.

D. Doctrinal Clarification: The Narrow Path of Amen

One of the key precedential contributions of Snyder is the majority’s narrowing of Amen:

• Amen remains good law for extreme, long‑standing municipal campaigns that effectively destroy property value and bypass formal condemnation.
• But single‑event or short‑term interferences with particular sales, even if deliberate, are unlikely to be treated as constructive takings under Amen.
• This distinction may substantially limit the availability of “pre‑condemnation blight” takings claims in the Sixth Circuit, confining them to relatively rare fact patterns.

E. Civil Procedure and Litigation Strategy

The opinion also has notable civil‑procedure lessons:

• Pleading comparators is crucial for class‑of‑one equal protection claims. Vague assertions of being “singled out” will not survive.
• Substantive due process is a limited backstop. When a specific amendment applies, litigants should focus their efforts there; duplicative due process theories will be dismissed.
• Rule 60(b) is not a safety valve for overlooked evidence. Evidence developed during ongoing litigation must be timely presented, typically via motion to amend. Waiting until after an adverse judgment and then invoking “newly discovered” evidence is disfavored.

VII. Simplifying Key Legal Concepts

A. Takings Clause Basics

Takings Clause (Fifth Amendment): The government can take private property for public use, but must pay “just compensation,” usually fair market value.

• Direct taking: Government physically seizes or formally condemns property.
• Regulatory taking: Government regulations restrict how you can use your property so severely that it is “as if” the property were taken.

B. Per Se vs. Penn Central Takings

• Per se takings:
  • Permanent physical occupation (e.g., a law requiring you to allow a cable box on your building).
  • Total wipeout of value (a regulation leaves your land with no possible economic use).
• Penn Central takings:
  • Most cases fall here.
  • Court weighs:
    • How badly your property value is hurt;
    • Whether the regulation upended your reasonable investment plans; and
    • What kind of action the government took (normal regulation vs. targeted, unusual conduct).

C. Pre‑Condemnation Blight

Sometimes, when the government announces a project and plans to condemn land, property values drop before condemnation. That is often called “pre‑condemnation blight” in practice, though the majority does not use the term. Supreme Court cases generally say:

• Ordinary drops in value due to the looming project or planning process are not takings by themselves.
• Only in extreme situations, like Amen, where government goes beyond planning and intentionally destroys value through long‑term harassment or neglect, might a court find a constructive taking.

D. Class‑of‑One Equal Protection

Equal protection usually deals with discrimination against groups (race, gender, etc.). A “class‑of‑one” claim says:

• “The government picked on me as an individual, treating me worse than other people in the same situation, for no good reason.”

To make this claim, a plaintiff must:

• Identify at least one similarly situated person or entity who was treated better; and
• Show there was no rational reason — or that the motive was sheer hostility or spite.

In this case, the Snyders did not name any comparators; they only alleged that they were wronged. That is not enough for a class‑of‑one theory.

E. Substantive Due Process vs. Specific Rights

Substantive due process is a general protection against arbitrary, shocking government actions. But courts are cautious: when a specific right covers the issue (e.g., free speech, unreasonable search, takings), plaintiffs must use that specific right, not due process. Here, because the injury was about property being taken, the Takings Clause controlled.

F. Rule 60(b) and “New Evidence”

Rule 60(b) lets parties ask a court to reopen a judgment in limited situations:

• 60(b)(2): You found new evidence that you truly could not have found earlier, even with reasonable effort.
• 60(b)(6): There are extraordinary circumstances, and fairness demands that the judgment be revisited.

If the “new” evidence was actually in your hands before the court ruled, and you simply did not present it or seek to amend, it is usually not considered “newly discovered” for these purposes.

VIII. Conclusion

Snyder v. Village of Luckey is a significant, though unpublished, Sixth Circuit decision clarifying the limits of federal constitutional protection in the eminent domain context.

The majority opinion holds the line firmly on several points:

• Pre‑condemnation government conduct that depresses property value or undermines particular sale strategies, without more, is generally not a taking.
• Intermediaries like auctioneers, without a direct property interest, lack standing to bring takings claims based solely on lost commissions.
• “Class‑of‑one” equal protection claims require well‑pleaded comparators and cannot rest on unilateral assertions of unfair treatment.
• The Takings Clause occupies the field of property‑deprivation claims; overlapping substantive due process theories will be dismissed.
• Rule 60(b) relief demands both genuine novelty and legal materiality; it is not a mechanism to revisit strategic omissions or to relitigate legal conclusions about the sufficiency of pleaded facts.

The dissent, meanwhile, serves as a cautionary counterpoint, emphasizing that:

• Bad‑faith governmental strategies to manipulate property values, especially where public purpose is pretextual, may still be fertile ground for takings challenges in extreme cases;
• Amen v. City of Dearborn remains a potentially powerful, if narrow, precedent for pre‑condemnation blight; and
• Courts should be wary of allowing governments to exploit procedural doctrines to shield deliberate efforts to evade paying fair market value.

In the broader legal landscape, Snyder reaffirms that the principal forum for challenging valuation and the propriety of many condemnation‑related actions remains the state eminent domain process, not federal § 1983 litigation. For practitioners, the case underscores the importance of careful pleading, early use of amendment mechanisms when new evidence arises, and a realistic appraisal of what the Takings Clause — and Article III standing — will and will not support.