Introduction

In Johnson v. Jefferson Parish Sheriff, No. 24-30295 (5th Cir. Mar. 25, 2025) (per curiam) (unpublished), the United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit reversed a district court’s dismissal at the initial Prison Litigation Reform Act (PLRA) screening stage of a pro se pretrial detainee’s religious exercise claims. Plaintiff Damien Kentreal Johnson, a Rastafarian, alleged that the Jefferson Parish Sheriff’s Office (JPSO) punished him for refusing to cut his hair in accordance with his religious vow. According to Johnson, as a consequence of adhering to his faith, he was denied outdoor yard time, telephone access (including calls to family, friends, and potential assistance with his criminal case), and commissary purchases, and he was confined to an allegedly mold-infested unit.

Johnson sued under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 and the Religious Land Use and Institutionalized Persons Act (RLUIPA), seeking injunctive relief and damages. The district court dismissed the complaint with prejudice as frivolous and for failure to state a claim under 28 U.S.C. §§ 1915(e)(2)(B) and 1915A(b)(1). The Fifth Circuit reversed as to the official-capacity claims against Sheriff Joseph P. Lopinto, holding that Johnson plausibly alleged a “substantial burden” under RLUIPA and that dismissal under the First Amendment was premature because the government had not yet “put forward” any penological justification—particularly salient because pretrial detainees cannot be punished.

This decision clarifies two key points for initial screening of institutional religious exercise claims in the Fifth Circuit: (1) severe deprivations imposed because an inmate continues to practice his faith can constitute a substantial burden under RLUIPA even if the inmate persists in his religious conduct, and (2) courts may not hypothesize penological interests to sustain a restriction at screening; jail officials must articulate their reasons, and courts must account for the special status of pretrial detainees, who cannot be punished.

Summary of the Opinion

The Fifth Circuit reviewed de novo the district court’s dismissal. Construing the pro se complaint liberally and accepting the allegations as true, the court held:

• RLUIPA: Johnson plausibly alleged that JPSO imposed a “substantial burden” on his religious exercise by denying yard, phone, and commissary access, and confining him to a black-mold-infested dorm, as punishment for refusing to cut his hair in accordance with his Rastafarian vow. It was error to conclude there was no substantial burden merely because Johnson continued to honor his vow. The case should not have been dismissed before the government had an opportunity to justify the policy under RLUIPA’s stringent standard.
• First Amendment: Assuming Turner v. Safley applies, the district court erred by speculating that hygiene and security justified the haircut policy and the punitive deprivations. At the screening stage, it is the government’s burden to “put forward” its concerns; moreover, Johnson is a pretrial detainee, and the State may not punish pretrial detainees.
• Relief and parties: The court reversed as to the official-capacity claims against Sheriff Lopinto and remanded for further proceedings. It left undisturbed the dismissal of claims against JPSO (not a suable entity) and the individual-capacity claims against Sheriff Lopinto (no alleged causal link), as Johnson did not challenge those rulings on appeal. The court noted that injunctive relief may be moot if Johnson has been transferred or released, but damages claims can proceed against the political subdivision.

The panel expressed no view on the ultimate merits.

Analysis

Precedents Cited and Their Role

The opinion situates the case within a well-defined doctrinal framework:

• Screening and pleading standards:
  • Samford v. Dretke, 562 F.3d 674, 678 (5th Cir. 2009): De novo review of screening dismissals; a complaint is frivolous if it lacks any arguable basis in law or fact.
  • Carlucci v. Chapa, 884 F.3d 534, 537-38 (5th Cir. 2018): Liberal construction of pro se pleadings.
  • Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007): Plausibility standard for stating a claim.
• RLUIPA framework and substantial burden:
  • Holt v. Hobbs, 574 U.S. 352, 362 (2015): Burden-shifting under RLUIPA; once a substantial burden is shown, the government must demonstrate a compelling interest and least restrictive means.
  • Adkins v. Kaspar, 393 F.3d 559, 570 (5th Cir. 2004): A policy substantially burdens religion if it pressures an adherent to violate beliefs or forces a choice between following beliefs and enjoying a generally available, non-trivial benefit.
  • Moussazadeh v. Tex. Dep’t of Crim. Just., 703 F.3d 781, 794 (5th Cir. 2012): Requiring prisoners to pay for kosher meat substantially burdened religious exercise.
  • A.A. ex rel. Betenbaugh v. Needville ISD, 611 F.3d 248, 266 (5th Cir. 2010): Under Texas RFRA (mirroring RLUIPA), facing punishment for noncompliance with a grooming policy that infringes religious exercise constitutes a substantial burden.
  • Sossamon v. Lone Star State of Tex., 560 F.3d 316, 335 (5th Cir. 2009): RLUIPA imposes a more stringent standard than the First Amendment’s Turner test.
• First Amendment in correctional settings:
  • Turner v. Safley, 482 U.S. 78, 89-91 (1987): Prison regulations impinging on constitutional rights are valid if reasonably related to legitimate penological interests; the government must identify the interest and connection.
  • DeMarco v. Davis, 914 F.3d 383, 389 (5th Cir. 2019): Courts should not speculate; officials must “put forward” their concerns under Turner.
  • Hare v. City of Corinth, 74 F.3d 633, 639 (5th Cir. 1996) (en banc): The State cannot punish pretrial detainees (a principle rooted in Bell v. Wolfish).
• Parties, capacity, and remedies:
  • Cozzo v. Tangipahoa Par. Council—President Gov’t, 279 F.3d 273, 280-83 (5th Cir. 2002): An official-capacity suit is a suit against the governmental entity (political subdivision).
  • Opulent Life Church v. City of Holly Springs, 697 F.3d 279, 290 (5th Cir. 2012): Political subdivisions can be sued for money damages under RLUIPA and § 1983; sovereign immunity does not shield municipalities.
  • Herman v. Holiday, 238 F.3d 660, 665 (5th Cir. 2001): Transfer from the challenged facility typically moots claims for injunctive and declaratory relief, but not damages.

Collectively, these authorities guided the panel to conclude that Johnson’s allegations cross the plausibility threshold under both RLUIPA and the First Amendment and that early dismissal was improper where the government has yet to justify its policy or the punitive deprivations imposed.

Legal Reasoning

The court’s analysis proceeds on two tracks—RLUIPA and the First Amendment—framed by the procedural posture of initial screening under the PLRA.

First, under RLUIPA, the plaintiff bears an initial burden to show a substantial burden on religious exercise. The district court held there was none because Johnson continued to refuse haircuts, maintaining his vow. The Fifth Circuit rejected this view as both doctrinally and practically flawed: the more committed the religious adherent, the harsher the penalties he may bear; it would invert RLUIPA’s protections if continued adherence negated a substantial burden. Citing Adkins, the panel emphasized that forcing an adherent to choose between non-trivial benefits (yard, phone, commissary) and religious adherence, or subjecting him to punitive conditions (confinement in a moldy dorm) because of his adherence, constitutes a substantial burden at the pleading stage.

Because Johnson has met his threshold burden at screening, the case cannot be dismissed before the government has an opportunity to meet its own burdens under strict scrutiny: to show both a compelling interest and that the policy is the least restrictive means of furthering that interest. The panel did not pass on whether JPSO can make that showing on a fuller record; it held only that Johnson’s allegations are sufficient to proceed past screening to responsive pleadings and, if necessary, factual development.

Second, under the First Amendment, restrictions on religious exercise in correctional institutions are ordinarily evaluated under Turner’s deferential “reasonable relationship” test. The district court invoked general hygiene and security interests to uphold the haircut policy and the resulting sanctions at the screening stage. The panel identified two errors. One, courts must not supply hypothetical justifications; Turner requires prison officials to “put forward” their reasons so the court can assess the rational connection and the availability of alternatives. Two, pretrial detainees cannot be punished; while Turner affords deference, it cannot override the fundamental constraint that the State may not impose punitive measures on those who have not been convicted. Here, the complaint plausibly alleges punitive deprivations imposed because Johnson refused to cut his hair for religious reasons, and the record contained no articulation by the Sheriff’s Office of the specific penological concerns or why less restrictive responses were not feasible. Dismissal was therefore premature.

Finally, the panel addressed threshold remedial considerations. Even if injunctive relief has become moot due to Johnson’s transfer or release, the damages claims remain viable against the Sheriff in his official capacity, which operates as a claim against the parish’s political subdivision. The court cited Opulent Life Church to confirm that monetary damages may be available against municipal entities under RLUIPA and § 1983 in the Fifth Circuit, and Cozzo to clarify the official-capacity posture.

Impact

Although unpublished and therefore nonprecedential under Fifth Circuit rules, the decision is instructive for district courts and jail administrators across the circuit. Its likely effects include:

• PLRA screening discipline. District courts should be cautious about dismissing religious exercise claims at screening where the complaint plausibly alleges non-trivial deprivations (such as phone, yard, commissary) or punitive conditions tied to religious adherence. The fact that an adherent persists in practice does not defeat substantial burden.
• Government’s justificatory burden. Jail officials must articulate, in the pleadings or early record, concrete penological or compelling interests and explain why less restrictive alternatives (e.g., hair ties, net caps, enhanced searches) are insufficient. Courts should not hypothesize these interests for the government.
• Pretrial detainee protections. Where the plaintiff is a pretrial detainee, the “no punishment” principle heightens scrutiny of sanctions imposed for religious noncompliance. Even policies that might be defensible as to convicted prisoners may be unconstitutional if applied punitively to pretrial detainees.
• Grooming policies under RLUIPA. Hair- and beard-related restrictions remain susceptible to RLUIPA challenges post-Holt. Where policies exist, correctional authorities should proactively document the specific risks they address (e.g., contraband concealment, identification, health) and evaluate feasible less restrictive means before imposing categorical or punitive measures.
• Damages exposure. The Fifth Circuit’s reliance on Opulent Life Church underscores that municipal entities can face damages under RLUIPA and § 1983. Even if transfers moot injunctive relief, damages claims can survive, incentivizing institutions to ensure that policies and enforcement practices are defensible under strict scrutiny and Turner.
• Pleading sufficiency for municipal liability. By allowing official-capacity claims to proceed where the plaintiff alleged the sanctions flowed from an official haircut policy, the decision illustrates how a plaintiff may plausibly allege an actionable policy or custom at the pleading stage.

In short, this opinion reinforces that the combination of RLUIPA’s strict scrutiny and the constitutional protection against punishing pretrial detainees creates a high bar for jails that sanction religious noncompliance without a carefully articulated, narrowly tailored rationale.

Complex Concepts Simplified

• RLUIPA (Religious Land Use and Institutionalized Persons Act): A federal law that gives strong protection to religious exercise for people in institutions (including jails). If the government substantially burdens religious exercise, it must prove that doing so is the least restrictive way to achieve a compelling interest.
• Substantial Burden: Not every inconvenience qualifies. A substantial burden occurs when an inmate is pressured to violate beliefs or must choose between following those beliefs and receiving non-trivial benefits or avoiding punishment. Examples here include loss of yard time, phone access, and commissary, and confinement to a moldy unit.
• Least Restrictive Means: Even if the government has a compelling interest (such as security or hygiene), it must show there is no less burdensome way to achieve it. In hair cases, alternatives might include searches, hair ties, or hair nets rather than forced cuts or punitive sanctions.
• Turner v. Safley Test: For constitutional claims (like the First Amendment), prison rules that impact rights are usually valid if they reasonably relate to legitimate penological interests. Officials must identify the interests and show a rational connection; courts consider available alternatives and the policy’s impact on safety and resources.
• Pretrial Detainees Cannot Be Punished: People detained before trial have not been convicted. The Constitution forbids punitive measures against them. Restrictions must be reasonably related to a legitimate purpose, not implemented to punish.
• PLRA Screening: Courts must screen prisoner suits early and dismiss those that are frivolous or fail to state a claim. But at this stage courts read pro se complaints liberally and accept facts as true; dismissal is improper when the complaint plausibly alleges a legal claim.
• Official-Capacity Suit: A claim against a government official in their official capacity is treated as a claim against the government entity itself (here, the parish’s political subdivision). Such suits can seek damages and injunctive relief, subject to available defenses.
• Mootness of Injunctive Relief: If a detainee is transferred or released, requests to change conditions at the old facility may become moot. However, claims for money damages typically remain live.

Conclusion

Johnson v. Jefferson Parish Sheriff underscores that, at the initial screening stage, courts must take seriously a detainee’s allegations that he is being punished for adhering to his faith. The Fifth Circuit held that severe deprivations—loss of yard, phone, and commissary privileges and confinement to unsanitary conditions—imposed because a pretrial detainee refuses to violate a religious vow plausibly constitute a substantial burden under RLUIPA. The panel also emphasized that courts cannot sustain restrictions by conjecture; officials must articulate their interests and explain why less restrictive alternatives will not suffice. That admonition is doubly important where the plaintiff is a pretrial detainee, whom the State may not punish.

On remand, the Sheriff’s Office will have to present its policy rationales and show, under RLUIPA, that any burdens on Johnson’s religious practice serve a compelling interest through the least restrictive means, and, under the First Amendment, that any restrictions are reasonably related to legitimate penological interests. The decision serves as a practical guidepost: jail administrators should carefully tailor grooming policies and enforcement measures, document specific risks, and consider readily available alternatives to avoid imposing punitive burdens on religious exercise—particularly for those awaiting trial.