No Bright-Line “Five-Second Rule”: Sixth Circuit Reaffirms that Post‑Neutralization Force Violates Clearly Established Law and Applies Barnes’s Totality-of-Circumstances Framework

Introduction

In Chelesy Eastep v. City of Nashville, Tennessee, the Sixth Circuit addressed a high‑profile and tragic police shooting that unfolded on the shoulder of Interstate 65 near Nashville. After a 35‑minute standoff, nine officers from three agencies discharged approximately 33 rounds, 12 of which struck and killed Landon Dwayne Eastep. His widow, Chelesy Eastep, brought Fourth Amendment excessive-force claims under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 against the City of Nashville, the City of Mt. Juliet, and nine individual officers. At the pleading stage, the officers moved to dismiss on qualified-immunity grounds. The district court denied the motions. The officers appealed.

The Sixth Circuit affirms in part and reverses in part. It holds that eight officers are entitled to qualified immunity because, viewed under the totality of the circumstances and supplemented by uncontroverted video, their initial use of lethal force was objectively reasonable in response to an immediate threat. But the panel allows the claim to proceed against one officer—Officer Brian Murphy—because the complaint, taken together with the videos, plausibly alleges that he fired two shots only after the threat had been neutralized, other officers had ceased fire, and a ceasefire had been called. In doing so, the court pointedly rejects any “five-second rule” that would grant officers a fixed temporal grace period to continue (or begin) using deadly force without reassessing whether a threat persists, aligning the analysis with the Supreme Court’s recent directive in Barnes v. Felix (2025) to consider the totality of the circumstances with “no time limit.”

The decision clarifies important points about appellate jurisdiction over interlocutory qualified-immunity denials at the motion-to-dismiss stage, the role and limits of video evidence in Rule 12 adjudication, the scope of objective reasonableness under Graham v. Connor, and the clearly established prohibition on “gratuitous” force after a suspect has been incapacitated.

Summary of the Opinion

Jurisdiction: The court has interlocutory jurisdiction to review a denial of qualified immunity at the Rule 12 stage where defendants accept the complaint’s facts, except where clearly contradicted by video. The court denies the appellee’s jurisdictional challenge in a separate order and proceeds to the merits.
Standard and Use of Video: At the pleadings stage, courts may consider uncontroverted video that “blatantly contradicts” the complaint (Scott v. Harris), but must resolve gaps or ambiguities in the plaintiff’s favor.
Objective Reasonableness—Eight Officers: As to Officers Carrick, Plancic, Williams, Pinkelton, Kidd, Llukaj, Trooper Edge, and Trooper Achinger, the videos show that they began firing only after Eastep took two steps toward officers, drew an object from his pocket, and pointed it at them at shoulder level as if it were a firearm. Given the tense, rapidly evolving situation, their initial resort to deadly force was objectively reasonable, and they quickly ceased firing after calls for a ceasefire. The complaint therefore does not plausibly allege a constitutional violation by these eight officers.
Objective Reasonableness—Officer Murphy: By contrast, the videos plausibly show that Officer Murphy did not begin firing until after Eastep had fallen, was on the ground, other officers had ceased fire, and a ceasefire had been called. On those facts, the complaint states a plausible claim that Murphy used “gratuitous” force after the threat had dissipated.
No “Five-Second Rule”: The court rejects the defense’s invitation to infer a categorical “five-second rule” from Untalan and Mullins; instead, the totality-of-circumstances analysis governs, with no bright-line temporal safe harbor.
Clearly Established Law: It has long been clearly established in the Sixth Circuit that force used after a suspect has been incapacitated or neutralized is excessive as a matter of law (Baker; Shreve; Champion; Gambrel). Thus, the claim against Murphy survives the clearly established prong.
Individualized Pleading: Plaintiffs must allege each officer’s personal involvement. Because the videos do not identify which of the eight officers fired any shots after Eastep fell, and the initial use of force by those eight was reasonable, the claims against them fail at the pleading stage. The claim proceeds only against Murphy.

Analysis

Factual Context

The encounter began as a roadside welfare/pedestrian stop: a trooper intended to pat down Eastep and give him a ride off the interstate shoulder. Eastep produced a box cutter, moved away, and then remained noncompliant for roughly 30 minutes as officers gathered. Importantly for the ultimate analysis:

Officers repeatedly commanded him to drop what they perceived as a knife.
Edge warned that Eastep might have other weapons, as the pat down was incomplete.
Eastep would not answer inquiries about what was in his pocket.
He ultimately took two quick steps forward, drew an object from his jacket pocket, and pointed it at officers at shoulder level as one would aim a gun; this triggered the volley.
Within seconds, Eastep fell. Ceasefire commands were issued. Ten or so shots followed the fall; the videos clearly identify Murphy as firing after the fall, while the other shooters are not temporally identified by the footage.

The autopsy revealed 12 hits, including five entry wounds to Eastep’s back, consistent with shots after he fell. The complaint alleged “every” officer fired when no threat existed, but the panel finds that allegation contradicted in part by video.

Precedents Cited and Their Influence

Use-of-Force Framework

Tennessee v. Garner (1985): Deadly force is a “seizure” and permissible only when an officer has probable cause to believe the suspect poses a threat of serious physical harm. The panel’s threat assessment traces to Garner’s core principle.
Graham v. Connor (1989): Objective reasonableness under the totality of the circumstances is the governing standard, with the familiar factors (severity of the crime, immediacy of threat, and resistance/flight). The court uses Graham’s factors but emphasizes, consistent with Supreme Court guidance, that the “totality” inquiry governs the bottom line.
Barnes v. Felix (U.S. 2025): The Supreme Court rejects the “moment-of-threat” rule and underscores that reasonableness must be evaluated under the totality of the circumstances with “no time limit.” The Sixth Circuit explicitly relies on Barnes to eschew any rigid temporal framework and to cabin “segmented” analyses that might eclipse the total picture.

“Gratuitous Force” After Neutralization

Baker v. City of Hamilton (6th Cir. 2006): Force used after a suspect is neutralized is “unjustified and gratuitous,” violating the Fourth Amendment. The panel treats Baker as bedrock, applying it to post-incapacitation gunfire.
Shreve v. Jessamine County (6th Cir. 2006); Champion v. Outlook Nashville (6th Cir. 2004); Gambrel v. Knox County (6th Cir. 2022): Complement Baker in clearly prohibiting unnecessary force against non-resisting, neutralized suspects. These cases collectively establish the “no-gratuitous-force” principle as clearly established law in the circuit.
Russo v. City of Cincinnati (6th Cir. 1992): Recognizes that later volleys can be unreasonable once the threat has dissipated, a concept the panel invokes in assessing Murphy’s delayed shots.

Cases Emphasizing Immediate Threats (Distinguished)

Simmonds v. Genesee County (6th Cir. 2012): Officers reasonably used deadly force where the suspect pointed a metal object like a gun; supports the reasonableness of the initial volley here.
Pollard v. City of Columbus (6th Cir. 2015): Two separate volleys were justified where the suspect repeatedly adopted a gun posture after a crash. The key is the continued appearance of an imminent threat; it does not authorize force after neutralization.
Lemmon v. City of Akron (6th Cir. 2019) (unpublished): Reiterates that deadly force is justified “at the moment of the standoff” when an immediate threat exists. Unpublished and limited to the immediate-threat context; cannot “clearly establish” law.
Boyd v. Baeppler (6th Cir. 2000): Allows continued lethal force when the downed suspect re-aimed a gun at officers. Distinguishable because Eastep had no weapon in hand and lay prone when Murphy fired.

Timing and the Rejection of a Bright-Line Rule

Untalan v. City of Lorain (6th Cir. 2005): A justified shot followed within a “split second” of the suspect dropping a knife as he attacked an officer. The panel rejects reading Untalan as a temporal “rule”—it is fact-bound.
Mullins v. Cyranek (6th Cir. 2015): Two shots within five seconds of the suspect tossing a gun were reasonable given ongoing uncertainty and danger; again, not a “five-second rule,” but a totality analysis.

Qualified-Immunity and Procedural Authorities

Ashcroft v. Iqbal; Bell Atlantic v. Twombly: Pleading standards; the complaint must plausibly allege a violation.
Mitchell v. Forsyth; Ashcroft v. Iqbal: Interlocutory appellate review of qualified-immunity denials and the concept of a “final decision.”
Scott v. Harris; Bell v. City of Southfield; Heeter v. Bowers; Latits v. Phillips: Courts may rely on clear, uncontroverted video that blatantly contradicts the complaint; ambiguities favor the plaintiff.
al-Kidd; Anderson v. Creighton; Pleasant View Baptist Church v. Beshear: Clearly established law must give fair warning; analogical, not identical, precedent suffices; unpublished decisions generally cannot do the job (Bell v. Johnson).
Courtright; Adams v. Blount County; Sterling Hotels; Hodges v. City of Grand Rapids: Sixth Circuit guidance on jurisdictional scope, provisional denials at Rule 12, and fact-law boundaries at the pleading stage.

Legal Reasoning

1) The Graham Factors and Totality-of-Circumstances

Severity of the crime: Minimal (pedestrian on interstate, a Class C misdemeanor). This factor disfavors deadly force.
Immediate threat: The core factor. The videos show Eastep taking two steps toward the officers, drawing an object from his pocket, and pointing it like a firearm. Objectively, that presents an immediate threat. This justified the initial volley by the eight officers.
Resistance/flight: Eastep’s prolonged noncompliance, evasion, and ultimate adoption of a shooting stance moved the case beyond mere passive resistance and into active, volitional defiance.

Guided by Barnes, the panel rejects a “moment-of-threat” tunnel vision and evaluates the totality, recognizing the tense, rapidly evolving dynamics. For eight officers whose initial shots responded to a reasonably perceived imminent threat, the continued firing lasted roughly five seconds and ceased after ceasefire calls. The court declines to “parse the few ticks of the clock” in a continuous, seconds-long sequence where the officers began reasonably and promptly ceased as the threat abated. As to those eight, the complaint fails to allege a constitutional violation.

2) Post-Neutralization Force by Officer Murphy

The analysis changes materially for Officer Murphy. According to the videos:

Murphy had not shouldered his weapon until after Eastep collapsed.
Ceasefire commands had sounded.
Other officers had stopped shooting.
Eastep lay prone, apparently not holding any object.

On these allegations, Murphy’s two shots were “initiated” after incapacitation and after others had ceased fire. That is the paradigmatic “gratuitous” force condemned by Baker and its progeny. The court expressly refuses to recognize any bright-line temporal exception (e.g., a “five-second rule”) and instead adheres to Barnes’s totality-of-circumstances approach. Movements visible on bodycam (a slight arm movement) are too ambiguous to override the complaint at Rule 12, especially where the torso remained prone and the hands no longer held an object. Thus, the complaint plausibly alleges that Murphy’s force was objectively unreasonable.

3) Clearly Established Law

The Sixth Circuit has repeatedly and clearly established that force used after a suspect has been incapacitated or neutralized violates the Fourth Amendment (Baker; Shreve; Champion; Gambrel). Those cases provided “fair and clear warning” well before 2022. Defendants’ reliance on immediate-threat cases (Simmonds; Pollard; Lemmon) is inapposite to post-neutralization shots. Accordingly, the claim against Murphy survives both prongs of qualified immunity at the pleading stage.

4) Individual Liability and Pleading Specificity

The court underscores individualized pleading: a plaintiff must plausibly allege each defendant’s personal involvement in the alleged constitutional violation. The videos allow the court to identify Murphy as firing after the fall. By contrast, the videos do not show which of the other eight officers (if any) fired after incapacitation. Because the initial volley by those eight was reasonable and the complaint does not plausibly tether post-fall shots to any specific one of them, the claims against those eight cannot proceed.

Impact

Practical Takeaways for Law Enforcement and Municipalities

No temporal safe harbor: Officers receive no categorical “grace period” to continue or commence lethal force once the threat is neutralized. Training and policies should emphasize immediate reassessment once a suspect goes down or drops a weapon.
Ceasefire commands matter: Audible ceasefire commands and the prompt cessation of others’ fire weighed against late-firing force. Agencies should train on clear command protocols and rapid de-escalation once the threat dissipates.
Bodycam/video strategy: Early preservation and synchronized review of bodycams, dashcams, and audio are critical. Here, video clarity at Rule 12 drove partial dismissal and narrowed litigation to a single officer.
Individual accountability: Plaintiffs must connect specific officers to allegedly excessive post-neutralization force. Absent video or other concrete allegations identifying the shooter, such claims may be dismissed before discovery.
Cross-agency coordination: Off-duty or out-of-jurisdiction officers (like Officer Llukaj) are judged under the same standards. Mutual-aid encounters require uniform adherence to constitutional use-of-force principles.

Doctrinal Significance

Barnes alignment: The opinion operationalizes Barnes’s repudiation of the moment-of-threat rule. The analysis is anchored in the totality of the circumstances and resists microsecond parsing except where distinct rounds are clearly separable and the threat status materially changes.
Segmented approach in flux: The panel notes post-Barnes uncertainty about narrower “segmented” analyses but does not resolve the question. Expect continued evolution in the Sixth Circuit toward a holistic evaluation while still recognizing that distinct episodes (e.g., clearly separate volleys) can merit separate scrutiny.
Video at Rule 12: The court reinforces a calibrated approach—courts may rely on video to contradict allegations only where it is clear and uncontroverted; gaps and ambiguities still go to the plaintiff. This incentivizes early disclosure and precise use of video in motion practice.

Complex Concepts Simplified

Qualified immunity: Shields officers from suit unless a plaintiff plausibly alleges (1) a constitutional violation and (2) that the violated right was clearly established at the time so that every reasonable officer would know the conduct was unlawful.
Clearly established: Plaintiffs need not find a case with identical facts; analogous precedent that gives fair warning suffices. In the Sixth Circuit, multiple cases make clear that force used after a suspect has been neutralized is unconstitutional.
Objective reasonableness: Courts judge the officer’s conduct from the perspective of a reasonable officer on the scene, not with hindsight. The key is whether the totality of the circumstances justified the degree of force used.
Totality-of-circumstances vs. moment-of-threat: Under Barnes, courts must consider the whole encounter rather than freezing the analysis at a single, carefully selected slice in time. There is no fixed time window that automatically blesses continued force.
“Gratuitous” force: Force that is unnecessary because the suspect has ceased resisting or has been incapacitated. It is categorically unlawful under the Fourth Amendment.
Video at the pleading stage: Courts can use clear video to override contrary allegations, but any uncertainty is resolved in the plaintiff’s favor for purposes of a motion to dismiss.

Conclusion

The Sixth Circuit’s decision in Eastep draws two powerful lines. First, it reaffirms, in harmony with the Supreme Court’s Barnes decision, that use-of-force reasonableness is a totality-of-circumstances inquiry with “no time limit,” rejecting efforts to convert prior cases into a bright-line “five-second rule.” Second, it underscores the long-settled and clearly established rule that “gratuitous” force—force applied after a suspect is incapacitated or neutralized—violates the Fourth Amendment.

Applying those principles, the court holds that eight officers are entitled to qualified immunity at the pleading stage because their initial resort to deadly force was reasonable in response to an immediate, apparent lethal threat and they quickly ceased firing. But the claim against Officer Murphy survives because the complaint and videos plausibly show he began shooting after the suspect was on the ground, after ceasefire orders, and after the threat had dissipated.

Beyond its immediate disposition, Eastep provides clear guidance for officers, agencies, and litigants: reassess the threat the instant circumstances change; treat ceasefire commands as operative signals of de-escalation; and recognize that post-neutralization force is not just potentially unreasonable—it is clearly unconstitutional. At the procedural level, the opinion also exemplifies the careful, cabined use of video at the Rule 12 stage and the necessity of individualized allegations to overcome qualified immunity. As such, Eastep will likely become a frequent citation in multi-officer shooting cases where seconds matter, videos exist, and the critical legal question is not simply when the shooting started—but whether the threat had already ended.