No Bright-Line “Five-Second Rule”: Sixth Circuit Reaffirms Duty to Reassess; Deadly Force After Threat Is Neutralized Is Clearly Unconstitutional

Introduction

In Chelesy Eastep v. City of Nashville, the Sixth Circuit addressed the constitutional limits on police use of deadly force during a rapidly unfolding standoff on a Nashville interstate. After a 35-minute encounter, nine officers collectively discharged approximately 33 rounds at Landon Eastep, killing him. The decedent’s spouse sued under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, alleging excessive force in violation of the Fourth Amendment. The officers moved to dismiss on qualified immunity grounds. The district court denied the motions; the officers appealed.

The Sixth Circuit’s published decision affirms, clarifies, and applies several core principles:

No bright-line “five-second rule” authorizes continued deadly force without reassessment once an initial threat dissipates.
Use of force after a suspect is incapacitated or neutralized is clearly excessive as a matter of law.
Video evidence can override allegations “blatantly contradicted” by the footage at the pleadings stage, but ambiguities in the video are resolved in the plaintiff’s favor.
Officer-specific pleading remains essential; where the complaint and video plausibly identify a particular officer’s allegedly gratuitous shots, the claim proceeds; others are entitled to qualified immunity.

The panel (Judges Murphy, Davis, and Bloomekatz; opinion by Judge Davis) affirmed in part and reversed in part: eight officers receive qualified immunity; one officer (Brian Murphy) must face the excessive-force claim based on two shots fired after the decedent fell and others had ceased fire.

Summary of the Opinion

Jurisdiction: The court exercised interlocutory jurisdiction to review the denial of qualified immunity at the Rule 12(b)(6) stage, taking the plaintiff’s facts as true except where clearly contradicted by video. The appellee’s motion to dismiss the appeal was denied in a separate order.
Standard and Evidence: The court reviewed de novo and incorporated clear video footage under Scott v. Harris principles, resolving gaps and uncertainties in the plaintiff’s favor.
Initial Volley (Eight Officers): As to Officers Carrick, Plancic, Williams, Pinkelton, Kidd, Llukaj, Edge, and Achinger, the initial decision to fire when Eastep took two steps toward officers, drew an object, and assumed a two-handed, shoulder-height shooting stance was objectively reasonable under Graham and Garner. Those eight officers receive qualified immunity.
Officer Murphy: The complaint and video plausibly allege Murphy fired two shots after Eastep fell, other officers called for and observed a ceasefire, and the threat was neutralized. The court held that such post-incapacitation force is “gratuitous” and clearly unconstitutional under longstanding Sixth Circuit precedent; qualified immunity was properly denied as to Murphy at the pleadings stage.
No “Five-Second Rule”: The court rejected any suggestion that officers have a categorical temporal window, emphasizing the totality-of-the-circumstances inquiry, consistent with the Supreme Court’s recent decision in Barnes v. Felix (2025).
Officer-Specific Liability: The complaint proceeds only against Murphy; the allegations do not plausibly identify unconstitutional shots by the other eight officers.

Analysis

Precedents Cited and Their Role

Graham v. Connor and Tennessee v. Garner: These bedrock cases frame the excessive-force analysis. Graham supplies the objective reasonableness standard and the three guideposts (severity of crime, immediate threat, resistance/flight). Garner bars deadly force absent probable cause the suspect poses a serious threat of physical harm.
Scott v. Harris; Bell v. City of Southfield; Heeter v. Bowers; Latits v. Phillips: Together they authorize reliance on clear, uncontroverted video at the pleadings stage and require that factual ambiguities in the footage be resolved in the plaintiff’s favor.
Barnes v. Felix (U.S. 2025): The Supreme Court rejected a narrow “moment-of-threat” rule and reaffirmed that courts assess force under the totality of circumstances, with no rigid temporal cutoff. The Sixth Circuit follows Barnes’s framework here.
Mullins v. Cyranek and Untalan v. City of Lorain: Defendants invoked these cases to argue a de facto temporal safe harbor. The court explained that both decisions turned on the totality of the circumstances and an ongoing reasonable perception of danger, not a timing bright-line.
Baker v. City of Hamilton; Russo v. City of Cincinnati; Shreve v. Jessamine County Fiscal Court; Champion v. Outlook Nashville; Gambrel v. Knox County: These Sixth Circuit precedents establish that force used after a suspect is neutralized or incapacitated is “gratuitous” and violates the Fourth Amendment. They supply the clearly established law controlling Murphy’s alleged post-incapacitation shots.
Simmonds v. Genesee County; Pollard v. City of Columbus; Boyd v. Baeppler: The court distinguished these cases where officers continued to face an apparent active threat (e.g., aiming motions with an object, or an actual firearm), underscoring that they do not authorize force after the threat is gone.
Ashcroft v. Iqbal; Anderson v. Creighton; Ashcroft v. al-Kidd; Pleasant View Baptist Church v. Beshear: These decisions supply the clearly-established-law standard: fair notice through sufficiently analogous precedent, without demanding identical facts.
Sterling Hotels, LLC v. McKay; Mitchell v. Forsyth: The panel reiterated that denial of qualified immunity at the pleadings stage is provisional; courts may revisit on summary judgment when the factual record is developed.

Legal Reasoning

The court deployed a methodical, issue-by-issue analysis grounded in Graham’s totality-of-the-circumstances approach, as sharpened by Barnes.

1) Appellate Jurisdiction and the Pleadings Posture

The court had interlocutory jurisdiction over the denial of qualified immunity, because the appellants accepted the plaintiff’s facts except where contradicted by video; the appeal raised legal questions only. The panel emphasized that courts may consider clear video that blatantly contradicts the complaint while resolving uncertainty in the plaintiff’s favor.

2) Initial Use of Force by the Eight Officers

Applying Graham, the panel weighed:

Severity of the crime: Minimal (walking on a freeway shoulder is a Tennessee Class C misdemeanor). This factor weighed against deadly force.
Immediate threat: Strongly favored the officers. The video showed Eastep repeatedly disobeying commands, moving toward officers, drawing an object, and pointing it with both hands at shoulder height, closely mimicking a firing stance. A reasonable officer could perceive an imminent lethal threat.
Resistance/flight: Eastep’s persistent noncompliance escalated to apparent armed confrontation, tipping this factor toward the officers.

The court concluded the eight officers’ decision to fire when Eastep assumed a shooting posture was objectively reasonable. Although up to ten shots were fired after Eastep fell, the panel declined to micro-segment the seconds-long, continuous volley given the rapidly evolving context and the fact that officers quickly heeded ceasefire calls once he was down. The opinion thus avoided deciding whether the Sixth Circuit’s historical “segmented approach” survives Barnes, because under Barnes’s totality analysis the eight officers’ conduct was reasonable regardless.

3) Officer Murphy’s Two Shots After Incapacitation

The analysis diverged for Officer Murphy. The complaint and video plausibly show:

Eastep fell to the ground and ceased posing an apparent threat.
At least two officers called for a ceasefire.
Other officers stopped shooting.
Only thereafter did Murphy, positioned farthest away and shouldering his weapon only after the collapse, fire two shots.

Under controlling Sixth Circuit precedent (Baker, Russo, Gambrel, Shreve, Champion), force after a suspect is neutralized is “gratuitous” and violates the Fourth Amendment. The panel rejected the defense suggestion of a categorical temporal allowance (a supposed “five-second rule”), explaining that Mullins and Untalan were fact-intensive totality-of-circumstances decisions grounded in a continued perception of danger. Barnes reinforces that there is no time-based immunity doctrine; officers must reassess the threat continuously. Because the complaint plausibly alleges that Murphy shot after the threat dissipated and after ceasefire calls, the claim survives the motion to dismiss.

4) Clearly Established Law

The court held that, at the time of the shooting, it was clearly established that officers may not use force once a suspect is incapacitated or neutralized. Baker and its progeny put reasonable officers on notice that “gratuitous” force—particularly lethal force—after the threat is gone violates the Fourth Amendment. By contrast, cases like Simmonds, Pollard, and Boyd involved continued apparent threats and therefore did not undermine the clearly established rule.

5) Officer-Specific Pleading and Liability

The court reiterated that § 1983 liability is officer-specific. Although the autopsy and footage suggest multiple post-collapse shots, the complaint and video identify only Murphy as having fired after Eastep was down and others had ceased fire. Accordingly, the claim proceeds solely against Murphy; the eight other officers are entitled to qualified immunity.

Impact

This decision will reverberate across police-practices litigation and training in the Sixth Circuit:

Reaffirmed Rule Against Post-Incapacitation Force: The opinion crystalizes that officers must stop when the threat stops. Shots fired after a suspect is down and neutralized are exposed to liability, and this is clearly established law.
No “Five-Second” Safe Harbor: The court expressly disclaimed any temporal bright-line. Instead, Barnes’s totality-of-circumstances framework governs. Officers must continually reassess; ceasefire calls and the suspect’s posture (e.g., flat on the ground, no visible weapon) are highly probative.
Role of Ceasefire Commands: Express ceasefire calls are powerful evidence that the threat has dissipated, undermining any claim of a reasonable ongoing perception of danger.
Video at the Pleadings Stage: Clear footage can defeat allegations and narrow claims early, but uncertainties in the video accrue to the plaintiff. Plaintiffs should plead—and defendants should contest—officer-specific acts with reference to the footage.
Group-Shooting Cases: Plaintiffs must plausibly connect specific officers to allegedly gratuitous shots. Without such specificity, claims against bystander shooters will fail at the Rule 12 stage. Conversely, an officer uniquely firing post-collapse (as alleged here) faces exposure.
Training and Tactics: Agencies should emphasize continuous threat reassessment, rapid cessation upon neutralization, and heeding ceasefire commands. The decision underscores the liability risk of delayed reassessment in multi-officer engagements.
Monell Considerations: Although municipal liability was not resolved here, surviving claims against an individual officer can sustain a Monell theory if an underlying constitutional violation is proven. Agencies may expect discovery focused on training regarding reassessment and ceasefire protocols.

Complex Concepts Simplified

Qualified Immunity: A defense that shields officers from suit unless the plaintiff shows (1) a constitutional violation on the alleged facts and (2) the violated right was clearly established—meaning a reasonable officer had fair notice the conduct was unlawful.
Clearly Established Law: Not a demand for a case with identical facts. It requires sufficiently analogous precedent that would inform a reasonable officer that the conduct is unconstitutional.
Objective Reasonableness (Graham): Courts assess reasonableness from the perspective of a reasonable officer on the scene, considering the severity of the crime, immediate threat, and resistance/flight, within the totality of circumstances.
Totality-of-the-Circumstances (Barnes): Courts do not confine the analysis to a single “moment of threat” or any fixed time window. Officers must continuously reassess as facts evolve.
“Gratuitous” Force: Force used after a suspect is incapacitated or neutralized. The Sixth Circuit deems such force excessive as a matter of law.
Interlocutory Appeal: An appeal of a non-final order. Denials of qualified immunity at the pleadings stage are immediately appealable to the extent they raise legal questions based on the plaintiff’s facts (as modified by clear video evidence).
Video at the Pleadings Stage: Courts may rely on clear video that “blatantly contradicts” the complaint. Where the video is ambiguous or incomplete, courts accept the plaintiff’s version of events.

Conclusion

The Sixth Circuit’s decision in Eastep delivers two central messages. First, there is no bright-line temporal shield for officers who continue to fire after an initial threat; Barnes’s totality-of-the-circumstances approach demands continuous reassessment, and the Sixth Circuit’s long-standing rule against post-incapacitation force remains firmly in place. Second, officer-specific pleading and proof are essential in multi-shooter cases; claims survive where the complaint and video plausibly attribute gratuitous force to a particular officer, as with Officer Murphy’s two post-collapse shots here, but otherwise fail.

As a precedential ruling, Eastep will guide district courts in resolving qualified immunity at the pleadings stage, structuring discovery in police shooting cases, and informing law enforcement training on the imperative to cease force when the threat ends. It reinforces that constitutional reasonableness is fact-intensive, that video can streamline litigation, and that when the suspect is down and the danger is past, the Constitution requires the guns to go silent.