Mandatory Judicial Findings for Perjury‐Based Sentencing Enhancements Under U.S.S.G. §3C1.1

Introduction

United States v. Jeremy Mooney, decided April 25, 2025 by the Sixth Circuit, presents a former law‐enforcement officer’s appeal of his conviction under 18 U.S.C. § 242 for depriving an inmate of civil rights under color of law and a challenge to his sentence, particularly an enhancement for obstruction of justice under U.S.S.G. § 3C1.1 based on alleged trial perjury. The defendant, Deputy Jeremy Mooney, and the victim, inmate Thomas Friend, appear against a backdrop of conflicting testimony about the use of force and the destruction of potentially exculpatory video evidence. Key issues include sufficiency of evidence for willful deprivation of rights, admissibility of certain testimony, a Fifth Amendment challenge to destroyed footage, and the procedural requirements for imposing an obstruction‐of‐justice enhancement rooted in perjury.

Summary of the Judgment

The Sixth Circuit affirmed Mooney’s conviction on two counts under 18 U.S.C. § 242, finding there was ample evidence—surveillance video, testimony on training, and Mooney’s own admissions—to support a finding of willfulness.
The court rejected Mooney’s evidentiary challenges, including testimony by a fellow deputy that explained what use‐of‐force training teaches and the district court’s exclusion of evidence that the inmate had Hepatitis C.
The appeal of the district court’s refusal to dismiss the indictment for destroyed video evidence failed because the lost footage was at most “potentially useful” and not shown to have been erased in bad faith.
The court vacated Mooney’s sentence and remanded solely because the district court imposed a two‐level obstruction‐of‐justice enhancement under U.S.S.G. § 3C1.1 without making the specific factual findings—or a comprehensive finding—required to support a perjury‐based enhancement.

Analysis

Precedents Cited

Jackson v. Virginia (443 U.S. 307): Established the standard for reviewing sufficiency of evidence; whether any rational juror could find guilt beyond a reasonable doubt.
Brady v. Maryland (373 U.S. 83): Governs destruction or suppression of exculpatory evidence; distinguished here as inapplicable because the government never possessed the full footage.
Arizona v. Youngblood (488 U.S. 51) and California v. Trombetta (467 U.S. 479): Clarified that for “potentially useful” evidence, bad faith must be shown, which was not proved.
United States v. Dunnigan (507 U.S. 87): Requires district courts to make independent factual findings when enhancing a sentence for perjury—identifying specific false testimony and finding each element of perjury.
United States v. Chance (306 F.3d 356): Holds that a general finding of untruthfulness is insufficient; materiality and intent must be addressed.

Legal Reasoning

1. Sufficiency of Evidence under § 242: Mooney challenged that he lacked willful intent. The circuit applied Jackson, drawing all reasonable inferences in favor of the verdict and held that Mooney’s own training admissions, the deputies’ testimony on use‐of‐force rules, and video of repeated pepper‐spraying and punching a restrained inmate supplied ample evidence of willfulness “beyond a reasonable doubt.”

2. Evidentiary Rulings:

Lay Opinion vs. Legal Conclusion: Chandler’s testimony about what he was taught in training was fact‐based, not a legal conclusion, and thus did not violate Rules 701 or 702.
Hepatitis C Evidence: Excluded under Rules 401 and 403 as not relevant to willfulness and unduly prejudicial.

3. Destroyed Footage: The District Court correctly applied the Brady framework, finding no bad faith in routine erasure and that the remaining video did not clearly point to exculpatory facts—at worst, it was “negligently” overwritten.

4. Obstruction Enhancement for Perjury:

Under U.S.S.G. § 3C1.1, willful obstruction includes perjury at trial. A court must (a) identify the specific testimony deemed false and (b) make findings on each perjury element—willfulness, falsity, materiality, and intent to mislead.
The Sixth Circuit held that the District Court did identify Mooney’s claim about Stansberry’s pepper‐spray order but failed to make any finding on materiality or willfulness of that false statement. Therefore, under Dunnigan and subsequent decisions, the enhancement could not stand without remand for proper findings or resentencing.

Impact

This decision clarifies a critical procedural safeguard in sentencing law: a perjury‐based obstruction enhancement cannot be tacked on by an unsupported or cryptic judicial remark. District courts must comply with Dunnigan’s dual‐finding mandate. Future sentencing proceedings will require explicit, on-the-record findings for each element of perjury to uphold enhancements under § 3C1.1. The case also reinforces:

The robustness of the “willfulness” standard under § 242, emphasizing minimal requirements for establishing a law‐officer’s knowledge of wrongdoing.
The strict application of federal disclosure obligations: destroyed evidence is only Brady‐violative if “evidently exculpatory” or if bad‐faith destruction of “potentially useful” materials is proven.

Complex Concepts Simplified

Willfulness (18 U.S.C. § 242): A deliberate intent to do something the officer knows is unlawful—proof can rest on training admissions and pattern of prohibited conduct.
Color of Law: Acting with official authority, as a peace officer or other government agent.
Obstruction of Justice Enhancement (U.S.S.G. § 3C1.1): A two‐level increase in offense level when a defendant “willfully obstructs or impedes” proceedings, including by perjury.
Perjury Elements: (1) A false oath, (2) concerning a material matter, (3) made willfully with intent to mislead.
Brady, Youngblood & Trombetta Principles: Different standards depending on whether destroyed evidence is in government hands, clearly exculpatory, or merely “potentially useful.”

Conclusion

United States v. Mooney affirms the conviction standard under § 242 for law‐enforcement misconduct, rejects broad objections to training testimony and Hepatitis C evidence, and clarifies the limits of due‐process challenges to destroyed video. Crucially, it establishes—and impresses upon district courts—the non-waivable duty to furnish specific factual findings when enhancing sentences for perjury under U.S.S.G. § 3C1.1. This ruling will guide sentencing judges to ensure transparency and fairness in applying obstruction enhancements and reinforce defendants’ rights to a reasoned, on-the-record explanation when their trial testimony forms the basis for elevated punishment.