Larson v. Gibson: Clarifying “Abuse” Under Delaware PFA to Include Pursuit-Induced Panic and Sexual Coercion

Introduction

In Larson v. Gibson, No. 344, 2024 (Del. June 2, 2025), the Supreme Court of Delaware reviewed cross-petitions for Protection From Abuse (PFA) filed by Cindy Gibson (“Petitioner/Appellee”) and Eric Larson (“Respondent/Appellant”). The matter arose from an alleged consensual workplace relationship at a Wilmington law firm that soured in late 2022. Ms. Gibson claimed that Mr. Larson became obsessive, followed her through Philadelphia streets on December 16, 2022 causing her acute fear and panic, and then coerced her into sexual acts the next day. Mr. Larson sought reciprocal relief, alleging threats, unauthorized searches of his home, and knife-wielding. After a fact-finder (a Family Court commissioner) granted Gibson’s petition and denied Larson’s, and following remands on evidentiary and procedural issues, the Family Court judge affirmed. The Supreme Court affirmed the order, crystallizing a new precedent on what qualifies as “abuse” under Delaware’s PFA statute.

Summary of the Judgment

1. The Court affirmed that Ms. Gibson and Mr. Larson were in a “substantive dating relationship” within the meaning of 10 Del. C. § 1041(2).
2. By a preponderance of the evidence, Mr. Larson’s conduct on December 16 (pursuing Gibson through the city, inducing a panic attack) and December 17 (coercing oral sex by threatening professional and criminal consequences) constituted “abuse” under subsections (b), (d) and (h) of 10 Del. C. § 1041(1).
3. Constitutional challenges to the PFA statute (void-for-vagueness, overbreadth, First and Second Amendment) were not preserved below and, in any event, were rejected.
4. The court found no reversible error in allowing the remanded recordings, extending ex parte orders consistent with procedural defaults and case-complexity, or in credibility determinations.
5. The two-year PFA was properly entered as protection from further abuse.

Analysis

Precedents Cited

10 Del. C. § 1041 (2015–2023): Defines “domestic violence,” “abuse,” and “substantive dating relationship.” The Court applied subsections (b) (placing another in apprehension of injury), (d) (course of alarming conduct), and (h) (any threatening or harmful conduct).
10 Del. C. § 1043: Governs ex parte and emergency PFA orders, including the 30-day maximum extension for ex parte orders. The Court held that extensions consented to or caused by procedural delays (e.g., motions to dismiss, scheduling complex hearings) did not violate this statute.
Stuart v. Stuart, 159 A.3d 265 (Del. 2017): Establishes that a Family Court judge must conduct an independent, de novo review of a commissioner’s order on objections, and that appellate review encompasses fact, law, inferences, and deductions.
Tribbitt v. Tribbitt, 963 A.2d 1128 (Del. 2008): Warns against taking judicial notice of facts outside the record; the Court found no error here because the commissioner used a “bench card” only to frame expert examination, not as independent evidence.
Bennett v. State, 2010 WL 987025 (Del. 2010) & Cassidy v. Cassidy, 689 A.2d 1182 (Del. 1997): Emphasize that questions must be fairly presented below to preserve constitutional challenges; the Court declined to consider vagueness and overbreadth arguments raised for the first time on appeal.
Counterman v. Colorado, 600 U.S. 66 (2023): Discusses the mental-state requirements for speech-based prosecutions under the First Amendment; Delaware’s PFA is a civil scheme based on conduct, not solely speech, and its constitutionality was upheld.

Legal Reasoning

• Scope of “Abuse”: The Court confirmed that non-violent pursuit causing fear and panic qualifies as “abuse” under 10 Del. C. § 1041(1)(d) and (h). Chasing a person who has expressly withdrawn consent, inducing a panic attack documented by colleague testimony and surveillance video, falls squarely within the statute’s protection.
• Sexual Coercion as Abuse: Coercive sexual extortion—threatening professional ruin, criminal charges, or bar discipline to obtain sexual compliance—constitutes “abuse” under the same subsections. The Family Court’s comparison to criminal sexual extortion principles underscores that PFA relief may address non-physical yet highly coercive sexual conduct.
• Procedural Integrity: The Court reaffirmed that ex parte orders may be extended by agreement or to accommodate scheduling of motions and multi-day hearings, so long as the respondent is heard on objections and eventual full hearing occurs within a reasonable timeframe.
• Evidence and Hearings: Secret recordings made by one party may be admitted if they comply with Delaware’s one-party-consent rule and are authenticated. A de novo review of remanded evidence is required, but credibility findings lie with the fact-finder and will not be disturbed absent clear error.
• Constitutional Challenges: The Court held that Delaware’s civil PFA statute is not unconstitutionally vague, does not impermissibly penalize subjective fear, and does not infringe First or Second Amendment rights when applied to threatening or harmful conduct.

Impact

This decision clarifies and broadens the practical reach of Delaware’s PFA statute:

PFA petitions need not allege or prove physical violence—non-physical pursuit that triggers genuine fear and panic meets the statutory definition of abuse.
Sexual coercion by threat of professional or legal consequences can support a PFA finding even in the absence of physical force.
Lower courts now have clear guidance on admissibility of one-party-consent recordings and the scope of protective orders’ duration and geographic scope.
Appellate courts will enforce strict preservation requirements for constitutional challenges and defer to trial-court credibility assessments in PFA proceedings.

Complex Concepts Simplified

Preponderance of the Evidence: The standard in PFA hearings requiring that abuse is “more likely than not” to have occurred (over 50% probability).
Substantive Dating Relationship: A consensual relationship involving emotional and/or sexual intimacy, time together, and steps toward exclusivity, as defined in 10 Del. C. § 1041(2).
Ex Parte Protective Order: An emergency order issued without notice to the respondent, lasting up to 30 days unless extended by agreement or necessity, to prevent imminent harm.
Bench Card: A judicial reference tool summarizing definitions and elements of offenses or concepts; it cannot replace record evidence.
Judicial Notice: A court’s acceptance of certain facts without formal proof; Delaware courts restrict this to indisputable, publicly documented facts.
Void-for-Vagueness: A constitutional doctrine requiring laws to define prohibited conduct clearly so that individuals have fair notice and are not subject to arbitrary enforcement.

Conclusion

Larson v. Gibson establishes that “abuse” under Delaware’s PFA statute encompasses non-violent, distress-inducing conduct such as pursuit leading to panic attacks and coercive sexual extortion. The decision reinforces the legislature’s intent to protect intimate partners from a spectrum of harmful behaviors, not limited to physical assault. By affirming the de novo review process, evidentiary standards, and procedural flexibility for protective orders, the Supreme Court offers practitioners and respondents firm guidance on filing, defending, and adjudicating PFA petitions. This precedent will shape future domestic violence litigation by confirming that emotional distress and coercion are as legally actionable as overt physical violence.