Indefinite Leave Is Not a Reasonable NJLAD Accommodation; Decisionmaker Knowledge and Pre‑Existing Termination Plans Defeat Retaliation

Case: Susan Wong v. RWJ Barnabas Health; Clara Maass Medical Center (3d Cir. No. 23‑2844, Dec. 4, 2024) — Non‑precedential decision affirming summary judgment.

Introduction

This appeal arises from the termination of a long‑tenured registered nurse, Susan Wong, by Clara Maass Medical Center (CMMC), an affiliate of RWJ Barnabas Health, following a workplace incident and a series of return‑to‑work evaluations. Wong alleged race discrimination, disability discrimination, failure to accommodate, and retaliation under the New Jersey Law Against Discrimination (NJLAD), as well as retaliation for filing a workers’ compensation claim under N.J.S.A. 34:15‑39.1. The District Court granted summary judgment to CMMC on all claims; the Third Circuit affirmed.

At the core of the dispute were (1) Wong’s repeated refusals to return to work after multiple CMMC Corporate Care clearances; (2) her request for leave “until further notice” contrary to Corporate Care’s “full duty” determinations; and (3) her assertion that the discipline and termination were retaliatory responses to her race‑based complaints and requests for accommodation, and to her workers’ compensation filing. The appellate panel held that Wong could not make out a prima facie case on her discrimination or accommodation claims because she was not able to perform essential job functions and sought indefinite leave. Her retaliation claims failed for lack of causation and because the decisionmaker lacked knowledge of the protected activity; the record also showed an independent, legitimate reason for termination that predated her final complaint.

Summary of the Opinion

• Standard of review: De novo review of summary judgment; facts viewed in the non‑movant’s favor.
• Discrimination (race and disability) under NJLAD: Wong failed at the prima facie stage because she could not establish she was qualified and performing the essential functions of her job. She repeatedly missed work after being medically cleared and communicated an indefinite inability to return.
• Failure to accommodate under NJLAD: An indefinite leave request is not a reasonable accommodation; because Wong could not perform essential functions, her accommodation and interactive‑process claims fail.
• NJLAD retaliation (race complaints and accommodation requests): No prima facie causation. Temporal gaps of two to six months were not unusually suggestive; termination discussions predated the last complaint; and the decisionmaker lacked knowledge of her complaints. CMMC also articulated a legitimate, non‑retaliatory reason (repeated absences after medical clearance) not shown to be pretextual.
• Workers’ compensation retaliation: No prima facie case. The decisionmaker did not know of the claim, and termination was based on absences after clearance.
• Procedural notes: Although Wong’s brief lacked record citations, the Court reached the merits; her attempt to supplement the record on appeal was rejected under Fed. R. App. P. 10 due to absence of exceptional circumstances.

Analysis

Precedents Cited and Their Influence

• McDONNELL DOUGLAS CORP. v. GREEN, 411 U.S. 792 (1973) and VICTOR v. STATE, 4 A.3d 126 (N.J. 2010): The Court applied the familiar burden‑shifting framework to NJLAD discrimination claims. At step one, the plaintiff must show she was qualified and performing essential job functions. Wong failed here, obviating the need to proceed to pretext on her discrimination claims.
• Svarnas v. AT&T Communications, 740 A.2d 662 (N.J. App. Div. 1999): Central to the accommodation analysis. The panel relied on Svarnas to reaffirm that (1) an employee who cannot perform essential functions due to attendance/absence problems is not “qualified,” and (2) an indefinite leave request is not a reasonable accommodation under NJLAD.
• Hohider v. UPS, Inc., 574 F.3d 169 (3d Cir. 2009): The interactive process is immaterial if the employee is not a qualified individual. Because Wong could not perform essential functions and sought indefinite leave, her interactive‑process claim failed.
• Battaglia v. UPS, Inc., 70 A.3d 602 (N.J. 2013): Sets the NJLAD retaliation prima facie elements: protected activity known to the employer, adverse action, and causal connection. The Court used this framework in assessing Wong’s retaliation theories.
• YOUNG v. HOBART WEST GROUP, 897 A.2d 1063 (N.J. App. Div. 2005): Temporal proximity supports causation only when “unusually suggestive.” Gaps of two to six months did not suffice; moreover, employer action underway before the complaint defeats causal inference.
• LEBOON v. LANCASTER JEWISH COMMUNITY Center Ass’n, 503 F.3d 217 (3d Cir. 2007): Causation is undermined when the reasons for termination or the strained supervisor relationship predate the protected activity. Applied here to reject Wong’s causation theory.
• Hejda v. Bell Container Corp., 160 A.3d 741 (N.J. App. Div. 2017) and GALANTE v. SANDOZ, INC., 470 A.2d 45 (N.J. Law Div. 1983), aff’d, 483 A.2d 829: For workers’ compensation retaliation, plaintiff must show discharge in retaliation for making the claim; absence of decisionmaker knowledge and the presence of an independent, non‑retaliatory reason defeat the claim.
• CELOTEX CORP. v. CATRETT, 477 U.S. 317 (1986): Summary judgment standard—failure to make a sufficient showing on an element with the burden of proof requires judgment as a matter of law.
• Mylan Inc. v. SmithKline Beecham Corp., 723 F.3d 413 (3d Cir. 2013) and Hugh v. Butler Cnty. Family YMCA, 418 F.3d 265 (3d Cir. 2005): De novo review and viewing the record in the non‑movant’s favor.
• SEPTA v. Orrstown Fin. Servs., Inc., 12 F.4th 337 (3d Cir. 2021), Fed. R. App. P. 28(a)(8)(A), and 3d Cir. L.A.R. 28.3(c): Despite briefing shortcomings (lack of record citations), the Court preferred merits adjudication over technical dismissals.
• Fed. R. App. P. 10(a), In re Capital Cities/ABC, Inc., 913 F.2d 89 (3d Cir. 1990), and ACUMED LLC v. ADVANCED SURGICAL SERVS., Inc., 561 F.3d 199 (3d Cir. 2009): Appellate record supplementation is disfavored absent exceptional circumstances. Wong’s certification on appeal was not considered.

Legal Reasoning and Application

1) NJLAD Discrimination (Race and Disability): Failure at the Prima Facie Stage

Under McDonnell Douglas and Victor, Wong had to show she was qualified and performing essential functions. The undisputed record established:

• Corporate Care cleared Wong to return to “full duty” multiple times after examinations and diagnostic imaging.
• Wong did not report to work for scheduled shifts after those clearances.
• She communicated that she was “unable to [return to] work until further notice,” i.e., an indefinite inability to work.

Attendance and the ability to report for assigned shifts are quintessential essential functions in nursing. Because Wong could not perform those functions and continued to miss work notwithstanding full‑duty clearances, she could not meet the prima facie “qualified” element for either race or disability discrimination theories. The Court therefore affirmed summary judgment on the discrimination claims without needing to reach pretext.

2) Failure to Accommodate and the Interactive Process

Two related conclusions drive this outcome:

• Indefinite leave is not reasonable: Relying on Svarnas, the Court reiterated that a request for leave “until further notice,” without a definite end date or timeframe, is not a reasonable accommodation under NJLAD.
• Inability to perform essential functions: Because Wong acknowledged she could not return to work indefinitely, she was not a “qualified” employee capable of performing essential functions even with accommodation.

Given those predicates, Wong’s interactive‑process claim also failed. Under Hohider, the adequacy of the employer’s process is immaterial if the employee is not a qualified individual. The Court thus did not need to parse the adequacy of Corporate Care’s engagement or the parties’ communications regarding additional testing.

3) NJLAD Retaliation: Race Complaints and Accommodation Requests

To make a prima facie retaliation case, Wong had to show protected activity known to the employer, an adverse action, and causation. The panel identified several breaks in that chain:

• Temporal proximity not “unusually suggestive”: The disciplinary actions in February and March 2017 followed her Fall 2016 complaints by two to six months—insufficient standing alone under Young.
• Knowledge gap: There was insufficient proof that the supervisors who issued the 2017 disciplinary warnings knew of her discrimination complaints. And crucially, the decisionmaker who terminated her (CHRO Alfred Torres) had no knowledge of her complaints.
• Pre‑existing termination discussions: HR was discussing termination as early as April 5, 2018—before Wong’s April 24, 2018 discrimination complaint—undercutting any inference that the April 25 termination was retaliatory.
• Legitimate reason unrebutted: CMMC enforced a neutral policy: termination for failure to return to work after being medically cleared. Wong did not present evidence that this reason was pretextual.

The same analysis defeated her theory that requesting accommodation caused her termination. The employer acted in accordance with a neutral policy after multiple clearances; no reasonable juror could find the discharge was because she asked for accommodation.

4) Workers’ Compensation Retaliation (N.J.S.A. 34:15‑39.1)

Under Hejda, Wong needed to show she was discharged because she filed a workers’ compensation claim. Two facts were dispositive:

• No decisionmaker knowledge: Torres did not know Wong had filed a workers’ compensation claim (Galante).
• Independent, legitimate reason: Repeated failure to report to work after full‑duty clearance—unchallenged as a bona fide reason—grounded the decision.

Summary judgment was therefore proper.

5) Procedural Posture and Appellate Practice

• Record citation deficiencies: Although Wong’s brief lacked record citations contrary to Fed. R. App. P. 28(a)(8)(A) and 3d Cir. L.A.R. 28.3(c), the Court reached the merits, citing its preference for substantive adjudication (SEPTA v. Orrstown). Counsel should not assume such leniency in other cases.
• Record supplementation: Wong’s post‑judgment certification was not considered. Under Fed. R. App. P. 10 and Acumed, appellate supplementation requires exceptional circumstances not present here. Litigants must develop the full record in the district court.

Impact

Although non‑precedential, the decision reinforces settled principles in a fact pattern common to health‑care workplaces and other safety‑sensitive settings.

• Accommodation boundaries: Employers are not required to provide indefinite leave under NJLAD. Employees seeking leave should provide a time‑limited, medically supported return‑to‑work plan.
• Essential functions include attendance: Where Corporate Care or occupational medicine repeatedly clears an employee to full duty and the employee nonetheless refuses to return, courts are likely to find the employee cannot perform essential functions—and thus cannot make out discrimination or accommodation claims.
• Retaliation proof of causation:
  • Temporal proximity must be “unusually suggestive” or be accompanied by additional evidence (pattern of antagonism, inconsistent explanations) to establish causation.
  • Employer discussions about termination that predate the protected activity, and lack of decisionmaker knowledge, strongly undercut causation.
• Decisionmaker knowledge: Both NJLAD and workers’ compensation retaliation claims are vulnerable where the plaintiff cannot show that the decisionmaker knew about the protected activity. Plaintiffs should consider discovery tailored to knowledge, participation, and influence in the decision (and any cat’s‑paw theory where applicable).
• Policy compliance and documentation: Employers should maintain clear, consistently applied return‑to‑work policies; document Corporate Care clearances; and contemporaneously record termination deliberations and communications to show neutral enforcement.
• Appellate practice: Complete the record below and cite it on appeal; courts seldom allow supplementation absent truly exceptional circumstances.

Complex Concepts Simplified

• Prima facie case: The initial, minimal showing a plaintiff must make to raise an inference of unlawful conduct. For NJLAD discrimination, this includes showing the employee was qualified and performing essential job functions.
• Essential functions: The fundamental duties of a job. For nurses, this includes being able to report to assigned shifts and perform core clinical tasks.
• Reasonable accommodation: Modifications that enable a qualified employee with a disability to perform essential functions. Under NJLAD, indefinite leave—no clear return date—is not reasonable.
• Interactive process: The dialogue between employer and employee to identify possible accommodations. If the employee is not “qualified” even with accommodation, failures in the process are not actionable.
• Temporal proximity: The time between a protected activity (e.g., complaint) and an adverse action (e.g., termination). Short intervals can suggest retaliation, but only if “unusually suggestive” or coupled with other evidence.
• Decisionmaker knowledge: To prove retaliation, the person who made the adverse decision must generally know about the protected activity; otherwise, causation is difficult to establish.
• Summary judgment: A procedural device to resolve a case without trial when there is no genuine dispute of material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.

Conclusion

The Third Circuit’s non‑precedential decision in Wong underscores three recurring themes in NJ employment litigation:

• Employees who cannot perform essential job functions and who seek indefinite leave cannot sustain discrimination or accommodation claims under NJLAD.
• Retaliation claims require more than speculation or modest temporal proximity; plaintiffs must show the decisionmaker’s knowledge and a causal nexus not undermined by pre‑existing, documented termination plans.
• Where an employer consistently applies a neutral return‑to‑work policy and documents full‑duty clearances and absences, courts are inclined to credit the proffered non‑retaliatory reason for termination.

For employers—especially in health care—this case illustrates the importance of clear occupational health protocols, consistent enforcement, and meticulous documentation. For employees and their counsel, it highlights the need to present time‑bounded medical plans for leave, to ensure protected complaints reach decisionmakers, and to build a factual record that ties adverse actions to protected activity beyond timing alone. While the decision does not constitute binding precedent, it is an instructive application of NJLAD and workers’ compensation retaliation standards to a common workplace scenario.