Including “Age” in No‑Sympathy Jury Instructions Is Not Plain Error; Juvenile Miranda Waiver Upheld Under Totality Despite Reid‑Style Interviewing; Post‑Incision Autopsy Photo Admissible

Case: Hill v. State, S25A0887 (Supreme Court of Georgia, Sept. 30, 2025) — Opinion by Justice Ellington; all Justices concur.

Introduction

This commentary analyzes the Supreme Court of Georgia’s decision in Hill v. State, affirming the convictions of Hunter Nicholas Hill for malice murder and related crimes arising from the shooting death of Justin McKinney and the non‑fatal shooting of Anna Franklin. The appeal presented three principal issues:

• Whether Hill, then a juvenile with documented learning challenges, knowingly and voluntarily waived his Miranda rights before making custodial statements during a Reid‑style interview;
• Whether the trial court committed reversible error by adding “age” to a standard no‑sympathy jury instruction; and
• Whether admitting a single post‑incision autopsy photograph that revealed a skull fracture was an abuse of discretion under Rule 403.

The Court affirmed on all issues. Doctrinally, the opinion reinforces the totality‑of‑the‑circumstances framework for juvenile Miranda waivers, clarifies that inclusion of “age” in a no‑sympathy instruction is not plain error absent controlling precedent to the contrary, and reaffirms that post‑incision autopsy photographs are admissible when probative of injury mechanics and not substantially outweighed by unfair prejudice.

Summary of the Opinion

The Court held:

1. Custodial statements: Hill’s waiver of Miranda rights was knowing and voluntary under the totality of the circumstances. His age, learning disability, lack of sleep, and prior marijuana use did not render the waiver invalid; the interviewing agent’s use of the Reid technique, a sustained monologue, and physical proximity did not amount to coercion or deception. The agent’s statement that reading the rights did not mean Hill was under arrest did not undermine the warnings.
2. Jury instruction on sympathy: Because defense counsel did not object after the charge was delivered, review was for plain error only. There is no controlling precedent holding it error to tell jurors not to be influenced by “age.” Accordingly, any error was not “obvious,” and the claim failed at the second step of plain‑error review.
3. Autopsy photograph: A single post‑incision photo showing a midline skull fracture was relevant to illustrate the nature and location of the victim’s injuries and the energy transfer from the shotgun pellets. Its probative value was not substantially outweighed by unfair prejudice. The State was not required to accept a stipulation or forgo such evidence because the cause of death was undisputed.

Analysis

Precedents Cited and How They Shaped the Decision

• Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966): Establishes the requirement to advise suspects of their rights before custodial interrogation. The threshold question was whether Hill’s waiver was knowing and voluntary.
• Berghuis v. Thompkins, 560 U.S. 370 (2010): Provides the two‑part waiver inquiry: voluntariness (free and deliberate choice, not coerced) and knowingness (awareness of rights and consequences). The Court applied both prongs.
• Clark v. State, 315 Ga. 423 (2023): Reaffirmed a totality‑of‑the‑circumstances test for juvenile waivers and disapproved rigid multi‑factor checklists. Central to the Court’s analysis of Hill’s juvenile status and cognitive profile.
• Sinkfield v. State, 318 Ga. 531 (2024); State v. Franklin, 318 Ga. 39 (2024): Standards of review—clear error for factual findings and de novo for application of law; record construed favorably to the trial court’s ruling.
• State v. Tripp, 320 Ga. 536 (2024); Quintanar v. State, 322 Ga. 61 (2025): Appellate courts may rely on undisputed facts evident in audio/video recordings even if the trial court made no explicit findings; those media can be treated as definitive where credibility is not at issue.
• Hinkson v. State, 310 Ga. 388 (2020): Clarifies that explaining a rights form “has no bearing on anything else” does not diminish otherwise valid warnings or a suspect’s understanding.
• Williamson v. State, 305 Ga. 889 (2019): Urging a suspect to tell the truth does not contradict Miranda absent affirmative misrepresentations; the suspect’s recognition of consequences supports knowingness.
• Griffin v. State, 309 Ga. 860 (2020); Hopwood v. State, 307 Ga. 305 (2019); Colton v. State, 296 Ga. 172 (2014): Intoxication, fatigue, or below‑average intelligence do not by themselves invalidate a waiver; courts examine lucidity, coherency, and understanding under the totality test.
• Jivens v. State, 317 Ga. 859 (2023): An objection at the charge conference does not preserve the issue; counsel must object after the instructions are given to obtain ordinary appellate review.
• Clark v. State, 321 Ga. 732 (2025); Sconyers v. State, 318 Ga. 855 (2024): Plain‑error framework; an error must be obvious under controlling precedent or unequivocally clear legal text to satisfy step two.
• Johns v. State (Ga. Aug. 12, 2025), S25A0875: Restates governing rules (OCGA §§ 24‑4‑401, 402, 403) for autopsy photographs.
• Salvesen v. State, 317 Ga. 314 (2023); Albury v. State, 314 Ga. 459 (2022); Moore v. State, 307 Ga. 290 (2019); Flowers v. State, 307 Ga. 618 (2020): Evidence principles—probative value vs. unfair prejudice, the State’s right to present its case without stipulations, and admissibility of autopsy images to depict injury severity and mechanics.

Legal Reasoning

1) Juvenile Miranda Waiver: Totality‑of‑the‑Circumstances Applied

The Court carefully evaluated the interview dynamics and Hill’s characteristics under the Clark (2023) totality framework, guided by Berghuis. Key facts included:

• Agent Hamby read the Miranda rights verbatim from a GBI card, pausing after each right to confirm understanding; Hill affirmatively agreed to talk.
• Hill, nearly 16 and in 10th grade, had documented learning disabilities and slower processing, but school records also reflected engagement, progress, and strong math skills. He conversed coherently, asked rational questions (including whether his father knew of his presence), and provided responsive answers.
• He never asked for an attorney or a parent. He was given water, not denied basic needs, and a short break occurred mid‑interview.
• Hill shifted narratives, minimized others’ roles, and demonstrated an awareness of the seriousness of the situation (e.g., concern about a friend “getting in trouble” and a later spontaneous statement explaining motive and professing he would “do it again”).
• Hamby used the GBI‑recommended Reid technique, including a 20‑minute rationalizing monologue and moving closer to Hill. There were no threats or promises.
• Hamby told Hill the warnings did not mean he was under arrest—while, in fact, Hill was going to be arrested regardless—yet Hamby did not contradict the warnings or suggest confession would avoid consequences.

Against this record, the Court found no intimidation, coercion, or deception. It relied on Hinkson to reject the argument that explaining the rights advisement “does not mean you’re under arrest” undermines Miranda. The Court also emphasized standards of review: with no factual disputes over the recorded interview, appellate courts may credit undisputed audio content (Tripp; Quintanar) and review the legal conclusion de novo. The waiver was valid.

2) Adding “Age” to a No‑Sympathy Instruction: No Plain Error

The trial court gave a standard “sympathy” instruction but added “age” to the list of factors jurors should not consider. Defense counsel objected at the charge conference but not after the charge was read, limiting review to plain error (Jivens).

Under Clark (2025) and Sconyers, the appellant had to show an error that was obvious under controlling precedent or clear legal text, affected the outcome, and seriously affected fairness or integrity. The Court found no authority indicating it is error to instruct jurors not to be influenced by age, and noted precedent affording trial courts discretion over such cautionary instructions. As a result, any alleged error was not “obvious,” and the claim failed at the second step of the plain‑error test.

Pragmatically, the decision signals that trial courts may include “age” as an impermissible biasing factor in no‑sympathy instructions without committing plain error, so long as the instruction remains a neutral admonition to decide the case on the evidence and the law.

3) Post‑Incision Autopsy Photograph: Relevance and Rule 403 Balancing

The State introduced one post‑incision autopsy photograph demonstrating a midline skull fracture consistent with energy transfer from a .410‑caliber shotgun blast. Even though the cause of death was undisputed, the Court held the photo relevant to show the nature and location of injuries and to corroborate the State’s account of the killing (Albury; Moore).

Applying Rule 403 (OCGA § 24‑4‑403), the Court maximized probative value and minimized undue prejudice (Salvesen). It emphasized that:

• The State is not required to stipulate to elements or forgo demonstrative proof that explains the mechanics and severity of the wound (Salvesen);
• Gruesomeness alone does not render a photo inadmissible (Salvesen); and
• Only one such photo was admitted and the medical examiner explained its relevance, mitigating unfair prejudice.

As in Flowers, the photo illustrated injury severity in a way that aided the jury. The trial court did not abuse its discretion.

Impact and Practical Implications

For Law Enforcement and Prosecutors

• Miranda protocols: Reading warnings verbatim, confirming understanding after each right, avoiding promises, and providing basic comforts all weigh heavily in favor of a valid waiver—even for juveniles with learning disabilities.
• Interview techniques: The Reid technique, including sustained monologues and physical proximity, does not by itself constitute coercion. However, officers should avoid misstatements that contradict the warnings or imply benefits for confessing.
• Recordings matter: High‑quality audio/video records can become “undisputed facts” on appeal, reinforcing the integrity of a waiver determination (Quintanar).
• Autopsy evidence: A limited number of post‑incision photographs with clear forensic explanation remains admissible to illustrate injury mechanics, even if cause of death is undisputed.

For Defense Counsel

• Suppression strategy: To invalidate a juvenile waiver, counsel should develop concrete evidence of coercion, deception, or actual inability to comprehend rights at the time of the interview (e.g., expert testimony, neuropsychological evaluation), not merely school records indicating learning difficulties.
• Preservation of error: Objections at the charge conference are insufficient. To avoid plain‑error review, timely renew objections after the charge is read (Jivens).
• Jury instructions: Challenges to broad anti‑bias language (including “age”) face an uphill plain‑error standard absent controlling precedent. Tailored requests and timely objections are essential.
• Autopsy photographs: Where exclusion is sought, focus on cumulative impact, lack of additional probative value, or risk of confusion beyond mere gruesomeness; consider proposing limiting instructions.

For Trial Judges

• Juvenile waiver findings: Although not required, explicit findings on key circumstances (comprehension, demeanor, interview conditions) can bolster rulings.
• Jury instructions: Courts have discretion to include neutral anti‑bias admonitions. Inclusion of “age” is not plain error under current law, but judges should maintain balanced phrasing.
• Evidence rulings: Apply Rule 403 sparingly to exclude relevant autopsy images; articulate the probative rationale (nature, location, and mechanism of injury).

Complex Concepts Simplified

• Miranda waiver: A suspect can speak to police after being warned of the right to remain silent and to counsel, but the waiver must be voluntary (not coerced) and knowing (understood).
• Totality‑of‑the‑circumstances: Courts look at all relevant facts together—age, education, mental state, interview environment, officer conduct—to decide if a waiver was valid. No single factor is dispositive.
• Reid technique: A structured interrogation method involving rapport, theme development, and sometimes long monologues. Lawful if it avoids threats, promises, or deception that contradicts warnings.
• Plain error: An appellate standard used when an issue was not properly preserved. The error must be obvious under controlling law, likely affected the outcome, and seriously affect the fairness or integrity of proceedings.
• OCGA §§ 24‑4‑401/402/403: Rules of evidence on relevance and admissibility. Evidence is admissible if relevant unless its value is substantially outweighed by unfair prejudice or other listed dangers.
• “Undisputed facts” on appeal: When audio/video conclusively shows what occurred and credibility is not contested, appellate courts may rely on that record even if the trial court made no explicit findings.
• Merger and vacatur: Some convictions merge into others for sentencing; felony murder was vacated by operation of law when the malice murder conviction stood.

Conclusion

Hill v. State makes three practical contributions to Georgia criminal procedure and evidence:

1. It robustly applies the juvenile Miranda totality test, confirming that a waiver can be valid despite youth, learning disabilities, and Reid‑style interviewing, absent intimidation, coercion, or deception and where the record shows comprehension.
2. It clarifies preservation and plain‑error principles for jury instructions and implicitly approves—at least under plain‑error review—the inclusion of “age” among factors jurors must not consider out of sympathy or prejudice.
3. It reaffirms that autopsy photographs, including post‑incision images, are admissible when they aid the jury in understanding injury mechanics and are not substantially outweighed by unfair prejudice.

Collectively, these holdings will influence interrogation practices in juvenile cases, sharpen preservation requirements for instruction challenges, and guide evidentiary rulings on demonstrative forensic proof. The opinion underscores a familiar throughline in Georgia law: flexible, fact‑sensitive standards coupled with deference to trial‑level discretion, all anchored by a careful appellate review of the recorded record.