Ensuring “Real Weight” to Advisory Guidelines: Limits on Upward Variances in Sentencing

Introduction

United States v. Deshawn Martin (11th Cir. Jan. 14, 2025) addresses how district courts must treat the advisory Sentencing Guidelines when imposing above-Guidelines sentences. Defendant Deshawn Martin pled guilty to Hobbs Act conspiracy and robbery (18 U.S.C. §§ 1951(a), (b), 2, 371). At sentencing the district court varied upward to the statutory maximum (240 months), despite a Guidelines range of 100–125 months. Martin appealed, arguing both procedural error (failure to give any real consideration to the Guidelines) and substantive unreasonableness (an extreme upward variance). The Eleventh Circuit affirmed in part, but vacated and remanded for resentencing, holding that a district court abuses its discretion when it fails to give “real weight” to the Guidelines and does not adequately justify a major upward variance.

Summary of the Judgment

• The district court calculated Martin’s Guidelines range at 100–125 months after including conduct from his plea agreement.
• Despite acknowledging the Guidelines range as “woefully insufficient,” the court imposed a 240-month sentence (the statutory maximum) as “the minimum” sentence necessary to punish, deter, and protect the public.
• On appeal the Eleventh Circuit held that Martin’s procedural challenge (failure to consider the Guidelines) was reviewed for plain error and rejected—because the court had in fact acknowledged and computed the range.
• However, the court found the 115-month upward variance substantively unreasonable: the district court did not explain why such a dramatic variance was needed, gave insufficient consideration to the advisory range, and failed to tie the severe punishment to Martin’s largely nonviolent criminal history.
• The sentence was vacated in part, and the case remanded for resentencing with adequate consideration to the Guidelines and a reasoned explanation for any variance.

Analysis

Precedents Cited

• Gall v. United States, 552 U.S. 38 (2007): Established the two-step reasonableness review—procedural then substantive—and required district courts to begin sentencing with the Guidelines and remain “cognizant” of them throughout.
• United States v. Irey, 612 F.3d 1160 (11th Cir. 2010) (en banc): Held that an appellate court must assess the district court’s § 3553(a) balancing and will vacate if a clear error of judgment leaves it with the firm conviction the sentence is outside the range of reasonable sentences.
• United States v. Pugh, 515 F.3d 1179 (11th Cir. 2008): Reversed a probationary sentence where the court gave no real weight to a 97–120 month Guidelines range.
• United States v. Hunt, 459 F.3d 1180 (11th Cir. 2006): Emphasized that the Guidelines represent an accumulation of experience and that district courts must assign them real weight, but may weigh other § 3553(a) factors more heavily if justified.
• United States v. Rodriguez, 628 F.3d 1258 (11th Cir. 2010): Recognized wide discretion for variances, but that a major variance requires a more significant justification than a minor one.

Legal Reasoning

The Eleventh Circuit employed the two-step framework of Gall. First, it addressed Martin’s claim of procedural error—that the district court “failed to consider” the Guidelines. Although Martin did not preserve this objection at sentencing, the court reviewed for plain error. It found no such error, because the district court repeatedly calculated and remarked on the Guidelines range before imposing any variance.

Second, the court turned to substantive reasonableness. Under Irey, a sentence must fall within the universe of reasonable outcomes given the § 3553(a) factors, and an appellate court must ask whether the district court “clearly erred” in balancing those factors. Here, the district court imposed the statutory maximum without explaining:

1. Why 240 months was needed rather than a sentence within or even close to 100–125 months;
2. How Martin’s criminal history—consisting largely of BB-gun robberies and short custodial sentences—justified an extreme 115-month upward variance;
3. Why specific deterrence and protection of the public demanded the maximum combination of concurrent 240 month sentences.

The court concluded that by calling the statutory maximum “the minimum” and overlooking the extent of the variance, the district court did not give the Guidelines “real weight” and failed to articulate a reasoned basis for so dramatic an upward variance.

Impact

United States v. Martin reinforces two critical sentencing principles:

• Advisory Guidelines matter. Even though they are no longer mandatory, district courts must give them “real weight” and treat them as a primary “starting point and initial benchmark” (Gall).
• Major upward variances demand major justification. When a court exceeds the top of the advisory range by many months—or up to the statutory maximum—it must explain with particularity why lesser sentences would be insufficient to meet the purposes of sentencing (§ 3553(a)).

Going forward, sentencing courts in the Eleventh Circuit must ensure that when they depart or vary significantly upward, they (1) quote the exact Guideline range, (2) state the precise size of the variance, and (3) tie that variance to specific facts about the defendant’s conduct, history, or the needs of deterrence, protection, and justice.

Complex Concepts Simplified

• Advisory Guidelines: A set of sentencing ranges promulgated by the U.S. Sentencing Commission. Although no longer mandatory, courts must begin with—and properly weigh—these ranges.
• Variance vs. Departure: A “departure” invokes an earlier, now-abandoned system of mandatory Guidelines. A “variance” arises under the post-Booker advisory regime when a court chooses a sentence outside the Guidelines range for policy reasons or distinct facts.
• Plain‐Error Review: A more deferential standard applied to unpreserved objections. The defendant must show a clear and obvious error that affects his rights and the fairness of the proceeding.
• § 3553(a) Factors: The statutory guideposts for sentencing, including the Guidelines range, seriousness of the offense, history of the defendant, need for deterrence, and avoidance of unwarranted disparities.

Conclusion

United States v. Deshawn Martin clarifies that district courts must do more than recite advisory Guidelines before imposing an above-Guidelines sentence—they must give those Guidelines “real weight” and provide a detailed justification when imposing a major upward variance. Sentences that leap to the statutory maximum without sufficient explanation risk reversal and remand. This decision will guide both sentencing judges and practitioners to focus carefully on how the advisory ranges inform fair, consistent, and transparent sentencing.