Eleventh Circuit Clarifies Futility & Target-Specific Exceptions to the Takings Finality Doctrine – Commentary on Corey v. Rockdale County

Introduction

In William E. Corey v. Rockdale County, No. 23-13097 (11th Cir. May 7, 2025), the United States Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit revisited a decades-long zoning dispute surrounding a proposed truck stop in Rockdale County, Georgia. William Corey and his company, U.S. Enterprises, sought federal relief after the County repeatedly blocked their development efforts. The litigation raised four primary federal issues: (1) an injunction under the Surface Transportation Assistance Act (STAA); (2) an uncompensated-taking claim under the Fifth Amendment; (3) a substantive due-process challenge; and (4) a “class-of-one” equal-protection claim.

Although the facts tell the familiar story of a landowner fighting local zoning restrictions, the decision importantly refines two doctrinal escape hatches—futility and specific-targeting—within the ripeness or “finality” requirement for federal takings litigation. The panel also reinforces how rational-basis review dooms most facial substantive due-process attacks on zoning ordinances, and how the “similarly situated” standard sinks many class-of-one equal-protection claims.

Summary of the Judgment

STAA Injunction – Moot: Corey sold the property after filing the appeal, eliminating any live controversy over injunctive relief against the ordinance. That claim was dismissed as moot and the district court’s disposition on it was vacated.
Takings Claim – Unripe: Because Corey never sought a permit or variance under the 2021 zoning ordinance, the Court held there was no “final decision” by the County. Neither the futility nor the specifically-targeted exceptions excused this failure, so the claim was dismissed for lack of jurisdiction.
Substantive Due Process – Failed on the Merits: Documents before the County showed rational reasons (crime prevention, pollution control, aesthetics) for prohibiting truck stops. The ordinance easily survived rational-basis review.
Equal Protection (“Class of One”) – Failed on the Merits: Corey could not identify comparators “prima facie identical in all relevant respects.” The gas stations he pointed to lacked the truck-specific features that triggered the ordinance.
Attorney’s Fees: No underlying success, no fees.

Analysis

Precedents Cited & Their Influence

Lozman v. City of Riviera Beach, 119 F.4th 913 (11th Cir. 2024)
The backbone of the takings-ripeness discussion. Lozman reaffirmed that a land-use claimant must procure a final, written decision applying the challenged regulation to the property. The panel treated Lozman as controlling, citing its detailed explanation of the finality requirement and its tight reading of exceptions.
Williamson County Regional Planning Commission v. Hamilton Bank, 473 U.S. 172 (1985) (partially overruled by Knick)
Though the state-litigation prong is gone after Knick, the final-decision prong remains. The Eleventh Circuit explicitly leaned on this prong to declare Corey’s takings claim unripe.
Sovereign Grande View Development Co. v. City of Alabaster, 1 F.4th 1299 (11th Cir. 2021)
Provides the “precisely and only” specific-targeting exception. The panel distinguished S. Grande View, finding Rockdale’s ordinance applied to all C-2 parcels, not uniquely to Corey’s tract.
Christian Coalition of Florida, Inc. v. United States, 662 F.3d 1182 (11th Cir. 2011) & De La Teja v. United States, 321 F.3d 1357 (11th Cir. 2003)
Provide the blueprint for dismissing moot claims on appeal and vacating the corresponding portions of the district court’s order.
Village of Willowbrook v. Olech, 528 U.S. 562 (2000)
Bedrock case for “class of one” equal-protection theory. The court applied Olech but held Corey failed to satisfy its comparator requirement.
Several rational-basis cases—Doe v. Moore, Haves v. City of Miami, Restigouche, Inc. v. Town of Jupiter—buttress the substantive due-process analysis.

Legal Reasoning

1. The Finality Doctrine & Takings Ripeness

The Court reiterated that federal takings claims demand two sequential events:

A regulation that allegedly effects a taking must be applied to the claimant’s property; and
The relevant government actor must issue a final, definitive written decision denying the desired use.

Corey never triggered step 2 under the 2021 ordinance. He argued futility (the County would certainly deny) and specific-targeting (the ordinance aimed solely at him). The panel rejected both:

Futility: Previous denials under other ordinances do not prove futility under the current ordinance. Futility is narrowly reserved for “repeated submission of substantially similar plans.” No submission occurred here.
Specific-Targeting: The ordinance facially covered all C-2 parcels. Allegations that Corey was the de facto target were insufficient because coverage was not “precisely and only” his land.

2. Substantive Due Process – Rational-Basis Review

The 2021 ordinance survived rational-basis review because the County documented non-speculative harms tied to truck stops: crime, human trafficking, pollution, noise, traffic congestion, and aesthetic decline. The panel treated these policy concerns as facially legitimate, refusing to “second-guess the wisdom or fairness” of the County’s policy choices.

3. Equal Protection – “Class of One” Failure

A class-of-one plaintiff must identify comparators prima facie identical in all relevant respects. Corey’s comparators (ordinary gas stations) lacked truck-specific infrastructure such as separate diesel canopies, truck scales, parking, and turnaround space—key features prohibited by the ordinance. Disparity therefore reflected different uses, not irrational discrimination.

4. Mootness of the STAA Claim

Corey’s post-judgment sale of the land deprived the Court of power to grant effective relief. Under Article III, federal courts cannot opine on hypothetical controversies.

Impact of the Judgment

Tightens Futility & Targeting Carve-Outs: By insisting on an application under the current ordinance, the panel sets a rigorous standard for landowners seeking to bypass the finality requirement. Litigants in the Eleventh Circuit now face an uphill climb in invoking futility or the specific-targeting exception.
Confirms Robustness of Rational-Basis Review: The decision exemplifies how easily local governments can defend zoning regulations with even modest evidence of public welfare concerns.
Reiterates Comparator Precision in “Class of One” Cases: Plaintiffs must produce truly alike comparators; superficial similarities will not suffice.
Strategic Litigation Guidance: Real-estate developers must exhaust local processes under the governing ordinance before turning to federal takings claims, even after years of prior denials under superseded regulations.

Complex Concepts Simplified

Finality Requirement (Takings Ripeness): A federal court will not hear a regulatory-takings claim until the local government has issued a final decision about how its rule applies to the exact property. No guessing about what might happen.
Futility Exception: Excuses the finality requirement only if the property owner can show that filing another application identical to those already rejected would be pointless. Mere pessimism or prior denials under different ordinances is not enough.
Specifically-Targeted Exception: Ripeness is excused when a regulation singles out one parcel by name or legal description. A law of general application, even if aimed in practice at one project, does not qualify.
Rational-Basis Review: The most deferential constitutional standard. A law stands if any conceivable legitimate purpose can support it. Courts do not weigh evidence or policy wisdom.
“Class of One” Equal Protection: A plaintiff claims she was uniquely and irrationally treated differently. Success turns on showing nearly identical comparators who received favorable treatment without a rational reason for the disparity.
Mootness: If the court can no longer provide meaningful relief, the case (or claim) is moot and must be dismissed.

Conclusion

Corey’s long-running battle with Rockdale County ends—at least in the federal courts—not with a takings windfall, but with a doctrinal clarification. By demanding a fresh permit application under the 2021 ordinance, the Eleventh Circuit solidifies a strict reading of the finality doctrine, cordoning off two widely-invoked exceptions. The ruling also underscores the formidable hurdles faced by substantive due-process and class-of-one claimants once a local government articulates even modest policy justifications. Future litigants in the Eleventh Circuit should carefully weigh these teachings: exhaust local remedies under the specific ordinance at issue, assemble airtight comparator evidence for equal-protection claims, and anticipate that rational-basis review will rarely be a fruitful avenue for overturning zoning regulations.

Eleventh Circuit Clarifies Futility & Target-Specific Exceptions to the Takings Finality Doctrine – Commentary on Corey v. Rockdale County (2025)