Arbitrary-Enforcement Vagueness Challenges Are Inherently Facial and Defendants Have Standing: State v. Stubbs Recasts Kansas Standing Doctrine

Introduction

In State v. Stubbs, No. 125,003 (Kan. June 27, 2025), the Kansas Supreme Court resolved a long-simmering tension in its standing caselaw for vagueness challenges under the United States Constitution. The court held that a defendant convicted under a statute allegedly void for arbitrary enforcement has standing to bring a facial challenge because the injury (the conviction) is cognizable and causally connected to the Legislature’s enactment of the allegedly standardless statute. Rejecting jurisdictional bars historically used by Kansas courts—such as the rules that facial vagueness challenges are disfavored and that a defendant cannot challenge a statute that “clearly prohibited” his conduct—the court recast those limitations as nonjurisdictional and inapplicable to arbitrary-enforcement claims.

On the merits, the court upheld K.S.A. 21-6301(a)(2), which criminalizes knowingly possessing a “dangerous knife” with the intent to use it unlawfully against another, concluding that the phrase “dangerous knife” and the statute’s explicit scienter requirements provide adequate enforcement standards. The court also affirmed the defendant’s conviction for interference with law enforcement, finding sufficient evidence that he knowingly obstructed an officer.

The decision features two separate concurrences/dissents. Justice Biles would maintain Kansas’ prior prudential limits, arguing the majority improperly equates a due-process vagueness claim with structural separation-of-powers violations that render a statute void ab initio. Justice Standridge, while agreeing the evidence sufficed on the interference count, would also retain the established as-applied focus and the “clearly proscribed” bar for facial vagueness challenges absent First Amendment or similar concerns.

Summary of the Opinion

The court, per Justice Wall, announced the following key holdings:

Kansas standing is governed by a two-part jurisdictional test: a cognizable injury and a causal connection between the injury and the challenged conduct. How these elements apply depends on the claim asserted.
Historic Kansas limitations disfavoring facial vagueness challenges and barring challenges by defendants whose conduct was “clearly prohibited” are not jurisdictional. Even if viewed as prudential, they do not apply to arbitrary-enforcement challenges.
Under the U.S. void-for-vagueness doctrine, two distinct constitutional concerns exist: fair notice (due process) and prevention of arbitrary/discriminatory enforcement (separation of powers).
Arbitrary-enforcement challenges are inherently facial. The alleged constitutional violation occurs at enactment when the Legislature delegates too much discretion to enforcers, not during any particular enforcement.
A defendant convicted under an allegedly standardless statute has standing to bring an arbitrary-enforcement challenge. The conviction is the cognizable injury; the enactment of the statute is the cause.
The “clearly prohibited” bar is inapplicable to arbitrary-enforcement claims because a void statute has no valid applications and thus cannot clearly prohibit anything.
Applying these principles, the court reached the merits and upheld K.S.A. 21-6301(a)(2). A “dangerous knife” is one likely to produce death or serious injury when used as a weapon. Coupled with the statute’s knowledge and intent elements, this provides reasonably clear enforcement standards.
The court also affirmed the interference-with-law-enforcement conviction, concluding a reasonable juror could find Stubbs knowingly obstructed an officer’s official duties.

Case Background and Issues

In March 2021, after an altercation at a private residence, Brian S. Stubbs stabbed the occupant with a large kitchen knife and fled. Police pursued; body camera footage captured an officer ordering Stubbs to stop. A jury acquitted him of attempted murder and aggravated burglary but convicted him of criminal use of a weapon (K.S.A. 21-6301[a][2]) and interference with law enforcement (K.S.A. 21-5904[a][3]).

On appeal, Stubbs argued:

The criminal-use-of-weapons statute is unconstitutionally vague under an arbitrary-enforcement theory because “dangerous knife” lacks meaningful standards, inviting subjective enforcement.
The evidence was insufficient to prove he “knowingly” obstructed an officer.

The Court of Appeals held it lacked jurisdiction to entertain a facial vagueness challenge and concluded, alternatively, that the statute was not vague and the evidence sufficed. The Kansas Supreme Court granted review on both issues.

Detailed Analysis

1) Precedents Cited and Their Influence

The Stubbs court situated its holding at the intersection of Kansas standing doctrine and federal vagueness jurisprudence:

Kansas case-or-controversy and standing:
- Gannon v. State, 298 Kan. 1107 (2014) and State ex rel. Morrison v. Sebelius, 285 Kan. 875 (2008): Kansas’ separation of powers implies a case-or-controversy requirement. Standing is a threshold jurisdictional component.
- League of Women Voters v. Schwab, 317 Kan. 805 (2023): Clarifies the two-part Kansas standing test (cognizable injury + causation) and that application of the test depends on the nature of the claim.
- Kansas Building Industry Workers Comp. Fund v. State, 302 Kan. 656 (2015): Kansas standing differs from federal; federal prudential standing rules are self-imposed federal restraints, not constitutional commands for state courts.
Federal and Kansas vagueness framework:
- Sessions v. Dimaya, 584 U.S. 148 (2018) and United States v. Davis, 588 U.S. 445 (2019): The vagueness doctrine serves two functions—fair notice (due process) and anti-arbitrary enforcement (separation of powers)—and can invalidate statutes that are standardless or rely on indeterminate residual clauses.
- Grayned v. City of Rockford, 408 U.S. 104 (1972); Kolender v. Lawson, 461 U.S. 352 (1983); City of Chicago v. Morales, 527 U.S. 41 (1999): Classic U.S. Supreme Court cases invalidating laws that invite ad hoc, subjective enforcement by police and courts.
- United States v. Williams, 553 U.S. 285 (2008): The problem is not occasional difficulty applying a statute but indeterminacy about what the statute prohibits.
- State v. Harris, 311 Kan. 816 (2020): Kansas struck a residual clause (“other dangerous or deadly cutting instrument of like character”) for lacking objective standards; emphasized arbitrary-enforcement concerns.
- State v. Moore, 38 Kan. App. 2d 980 (2008): For “dangerous knife,” adopted a definition: a knife likely to produce death or serious injury when used as a weapon (addressed fair notice, not arbitrary enforcement).
Structural and delegation analogies:
- Bond v. United States, 564 U.S. 211 (2011): A convicted defendant has standing to raise structural challenges (here, Tenth Amendment/federalism). Stubbs relies on this analogy for standing to attack a statute allegedly void from enactment.
- Gundy v. United States, 588 U.S. 128 (2019); Whitman v. American Trucking, 531 U.S. 457 (2001); United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549 (1995); United States v. Morrison, 529 U.S. 598 (2000): Federal cases addressing nondelegation and enumerated powers support the proposition that certain challenges are inherently facial because the constitutional defect inheres in enactment.
Comparative circuits and states:
- Act Now to Stop War v. D.C., 846 F.3d 391 (D.C. Cir. 2017): Recognizes facial arbitrary-enforcement challenges can proceed even where “clearly proscribed” rules might otherwise bar fair-notice claims.
- State v. Ness, 834 N.W.2d 177 (Minn. 2013): Treats arbitrary-enforcement vagueness as suited to facial review.

These authorities shape the court’s two major moves: first, reclassifying certain Kansas “standing” bars as nonjurisdictional and inapplicable to arbitrary-enforcement claims; second, aligning Kansas practice with federal constitutional doctrine by recognizing the inherently facial nature of arbitrary-enforcement challenges.

2) The Court’s Legal Reasoning

The majority’s reasoning proceeds in two steps—jurisdiction (standing) and merits:

Step One: Standing for Arbitrary-Enforcement Claims

Two-part Kansas test controls jurisdiction: The court reaffirms that Kansas standing requires (i) a cognizable injury and (ii) a causal connection between the injury and the challenged conduct. Those are constitutional predicates to judicial power under Kansas’ case-or-controversy requirement.
Historic “bars” are not jurisdictional: Kansas decisions often dismissed vagueness challenges where the statute “clearly prohibited” the defendant’s conduct or where the challenge was facial rather than as-applied. The court now clarifies these are not constitutional jurisdictional barriers.
Arbitrary-enforcement claims are inherently facial: Because the alleged constitutional defect is the Legislature’s delegation of core law-defining power to police, prosecutors, and judges, any violation occurs at enactment. The harm (conviction) is caused by the enactment of a standardless statute, not by idiosyncratic enforcement in a particular case. As such, the plaintiff’s injury and causation are established once convicted under the challenged statute.
“Clearly proscribed” bar inapplicable: That bar belongs to fair-notice inquiries and third-party standing concerns. A statute void for arbitrary enforcement has no valid applications; thus, it cannot “clearly prohibit” anything in the constitutional sense.
No third-party standing problem: A convicted defendant is vindicating his own injury and challenging every application of the statute, including to himself, because the asserted defect taints all enforcement.

Step Two: Merits of the Vagueness Challenge to K.S.A. 21-6301(a)(2)

Governing principles: The anti-arbitrary-enforcement prong asks whether the statute provides reasonably clear guidelines to cabin enforcement discretion. The problem is not that some facts may be hard to apply, but whether the statute is indeterminate about what conduct it prohibits.
Objective definition of “dangerous knife”: Building on Moore, the court adopts a practical, objective meaning: a knife likely to produce death or serious injury when used as a weapon. That standard, the court explains, is not merely subjective or empty; it focuses on capability when used as a weapon, not mere possession of any sharp object.
Scienter limits discretion: The statute criminalizes “knowingly” possessing such a knife “with intent to use [it] unlawfully against another.” These elements channel enforcement and lessen the risk of arbitrary application by requiring proof of mental state and unlawful intent.
Distinguishing Harris: Harris invalidated a residual clause (“of like character”) because it lacked standards for deciding what counted as “like” the listed items. By contrast, “dangerous knife” here is not a residual clause and is anchored to an objective, effects-based definition, further constrained by intent.
Breadth vs. vagueness: The court notes that even if the definition reaches many knives when used as weapons, breadth is a policy choice for the Legislature; vagueness concerns whether the statute supplies sufficient guidance to avoid standardless discretion. To the extent selective enforcement might be alleged, that sounds in equal protection, not vagueness.

Sufficiency of the Evidence on Interference with Law Enforcement

Applying the deferential standard, the court found ample circumstantial evidence (sirens, lights, direct encounter with a patrol car, audible commands captured on bodycam, continued flight) for a reasonable juror to find Stubbs knowingly obstructed an officer’s official duties under K.S.A. 21-5904(a)(3).

3) The Dissents/Concurrences: Countervailing Views

Justice Biles (concurring in part, dissenting in part)

Would preserve Kansas precedent requiring as-applied analysis and barring challenges when conduct is clearly proscribed.
Objects to characterizing arbitrary-enforcement vagueness as a separation-of-powers defect that voids a statute from enactment. In his view, Kansas’ Legislature has broad inherent police power subject to due process limits, and the federal structural cases (e.g., Bond, Commerce Clause) do not translate neatly to state police power contexts.
Warns the majority opens the door to more facial attacks on criminal laws without necessity.

Justice Standridge (concurring in part, dissenting in part)

Agrees the interference conviction is supported but would decline to reach the facial vagueness claim on prudential grounds.
Emphasizes vagueness is fundamentally a due-process doctrine; arbitrary enforcement is a due-process concern about fair administration, not a free-standing separation-of-powers claim.
Reads Kolender and Morales as limited exceptions permitting facial review where statutes restrict constitutional rights and lack mens rea, not as general permission to facially attack all alleged arbitrary-enforcement statutes.
Warns of floodgates and judicial overreach; urges adherence to stare decisis and retention of prudential limits (as-applied first; “clearly proscribed” defeats facial claim absent First Amendment or comparable concerns).

4) Impact and Forward-Looking Implications

Immediate doctrinal shifts in Kansas

Standing clarified and broadened for a class of claims: Defendants convicted under allegedly standardless criminal statutes may mount facial arbitrary-enforcement challenges. The conviction itself supplies injury; the enactment supplies causation.
Historic “standing bars” reclassified: The “as-applied only” and “clearly proscribed” doctrines are not jurisdictional requirements in Kansas. Even if retained as prudential rules in other contexts, they do not restrict arbitrary-enforcement challenges.
Arbitrary-enforcement claims treated as facial by nature: Trial and appellate courts should analyze them accordingly, without demanding a defendant’s fact-specific as-applied showing as a jurisdictional threshold.

How prosecutors, defense counsel, and courts should adjust

Defense strategy: When challenging a statute as impermissibly delegating criminal law-defining power, plead the claim as an arbitrary-enforcement vagueness challenge, identify the standardless terms, and emphasize the facial, structural nature of the defect under federal precedent.
Prosecution approach: Highlight objective markers in the statute (definitions, elements, mens rea) that guide enforcement and reduce discretion. Distinguish breadth objections from vagueness.
Trial courts: Address the merits of arbitrary-enforcement claims even when conduct seems clearly within the statute’s core, because that “clear conduct” bar no longer defeats jurisdiction for this category of challenge.
Appellate review: Expect more facial vagueness appeals focusing on enforcement standards rather than notice. Courts will parse statutory text for objective limits and scienter.

Legislative drafting and statutory maintenance

Define key terms with objective criteria: Provide capability-based or enumerated definitions to constrain discretion.
Include mens rea where appropriate: Scienter requirements (“knowingly,” “intent to use unlawfully”) mitigate vagueness and arbitrariness.
Avoid open-ended residual clauses: If used, anchor them to specified factors or enumerated examples with clear “of like kind” criteria; avoid indeterminate “of like character” or “annoying,” “no apparent purpose” formulations.

Open questions

Scope of prudential limits in Kansas: The court left unresolved whether and to what extent federal-style prudential standing limits remain part of Kansas doctrine outside the arbitrary-enforcement context.
Interface with equal protection: Selective enforcement concerns that do not rest on statutory indeterminacy may migrate toward equal protection claims rather than vagueness.
Application beyond criminal law: While this case involves a criminal statute, expect litigants to test the reasoning in quasi-criminal or civil-penalty contexts where statutes allegedly grant standardless discretion.

Complex Concepts Simplified

Standing (Kansas): A threshold requirement to get into court. You must show you suffered a real, legally recognized harm (injury) and that the harm is connected to what you’re challenging (causation). In Stubbs, the conviction is the injury; the statute’s enactment is the cause.
Facial vs. as-applied: Facial challenges claim a law is unconstitutional in all (or virtually all) applications; as-applied challenges target the specific way the law was used against the challenger. Arbitrary-enforcement vagueness claims are facial because the alleged defect is baked into the statute’s text and structure.
Void-for-vagueness (two prongs):
- Fair notice (due process): Ordinary people must understand what conduct is prohibited.
- Anti-arbitrary enforcement (separation of powers component): The law must have standards that prevent enforcement based on whim, prejudice, or ad hoc judgments.
Nondelegation analogy: Legislatures cannot offload their core task—defining crimes—to enforcers. If a criminal statute has no meaningful standards, it effectively delegates legislative power, inviting arbitrary enforcement.
Scienter: Mental-state elements like “knowingly” and “intent to use unlawfully” narrow enforcement discretion and help save statutes from vagueness challenges.
“Dangerous knife” in Kansas: A knife likely to cause death or serious injury when used as a weapon. This capability-based definition, plus intent to use unlawfully, supplies the needed standards.

Conclusion

State v. Stubbs marks a pivotal recalibration of Kansas standing doctrine for vagueness challenges under the U.S. Constitution. The Kansas Supreme Court held that arbitrary-enforcement vagueness challenges are inherently facial; a convicted defendant has standing to raise them because the injury (conviction) is caused by the statute’s enactment if, indeed, the statute is standardless. The court recast historic Kansas limitations—disfavoring facial vagueness claims and barring challenges where conduct is clearly proscribed—as nonjurisdictional and inapplicable to arbitrary-enforcement claims.

On the merits, the court upheld K.S.A. 21-6301(a)(2), reasoning that “dangerous knife” has an objective, capability-based meaning, and the statute’s mens rea and unlawful-intent elements supply robust enforcement guidelines. The court also affirmed a separate conviction for interference with law enforcement on standard sufficiency-of-the-evidence grounds.

The decision realigns Kansas practice with federal constitutional principles and will likely shape how future vagueness litigation is pled and adjudicated. Legislators are on notice to draft criminal statutes with objective definitions and scienter to guide enforcement. Prosecutors will emphasize those textual guardrails; defense counsel will focus on terms that arguably leave too much discretion to enforcers. While the separate opinions urge caution and adherence to prior prudential limits, the controlling rule in Kansas is now clear: defendants convicted under allegedly standardless criminal statutes may bring facial arbitrary-enforcement challenges, and courts should decide them on the merits.