Introduction

This appeal arises from a Florida premises-liability action removed to federal court, where plaintiff-appellant Donald Arby Van Dorsten, Jr. alleged he slipped on a clear liquid puddle while shopping at a Wal-Mart and suffered serious back injuries requiring multiple surgeries. The dispositive issues were whether Wal-Mart had constructive knowledge of the dangerous condition under Florida Statute § 768.0755 and whether summary judgment was appropriate given a record featuring still photos, surveillance video, and an employee’s testimony about the frequency of spills and leaks.

The district court granted summary judgment to Wal-Mart, concluding the store lacked constructive knowledge because surveillance footage “clearly” showed a child in a shopping cart was the source of the spill roughly 6–7 minutes before the fall and because general testimony about the frequency of spills in the store could not, as a matter of law, establish foreseeability. The Eleventh Circuit reversed, holding that the district court misapplied the summary-judgment standard by drawing inferences in favor of the movant from equivocal video evidence and by treating “general” spill-frequency testimony as legally insufficient to show foreseeability. The panel remanded for a jury to resolve disputed factual issues.

Summary of the Opinion

The Eleventh Circuit reviewed the grant of summary judgment de novo and reversed. It concluded that the district court improperly:

• Resolved factual ambiguities in Wal-Mart’s favor by treating a blurry surveillance “speck” near the site of the fall and a child in a shopping cart as “direct evidence” that the puddle formed only minutes before the incident.
• Discounted photographic evidence (e.g., dirty water and drying edges) and the presence of a wet-floor sign nearby without allowing a jury to weigh their probative value on duration and notice.
• Declared that “general” testimony about frequent spills and leaks could not, as a matter of law, demonstrate foreseeability under § 768.0755(1)(b), despite mixed Florida authority and fact-intensive inquiry.

Emphasizing the summary-judgment requirement to view all evidence and draw all reasonable inferences in favor of the nonmovant, the panel held that genuine disputes of material fact exist as to the spill’s origin, duration, the adequacy of Wal-Mart’s response, and foreseeability. Accordingly, the case was remanded for further proceedings.

Analysis

1) Precedents and Authorities Cited

• Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 56(a): Summary judgment is proper only if there is no genuine dispute of material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. The opinion reinforces that the burden on the movant is exacting where evidence is equivocal.
• Baxter v. Santiago-Miranda, 121 F.4th 873 (11th Cir. 2024): Reiterates the de novo standard of review and the requirement to view evidence in the light most favorable to the nonmovant while drawing all reasonable inferences in that party’s favor.
• Richmond v. Badia, 47 F.4th 1172 (11th Cir. 2022): Confirms that courts accept video evidence over a party’s account only when the video “obviously contradicts” that account. Absent obvious contradiction, inferences must favor the nonmovant.
• Pourmoghani-Esfahani v. Gee, 625 F.3d 1313 (11th Cir. 2010) and Scott v. Harris, 550 U.S. 372 (2007): Establish the “blatant contradiction” standard for video evidence at summary judgment. The Eleventh Circuit applied this line of cases to reject the district court’s treatment of ambiguous footage as determinative.
• Florida Statute § 768.0755(1): Governs slip-and-fall claims involving transitory foreign substances in business establishments. Plaintiffs must prove actual or constructive knowledge. Constructive knowledge can be shown by circumstantial evidence that either:
  • (a) the dangerous condition existed long enough that it should have been discovered, or
  • (b) the condition occurred with regularity and was therefore foreseeable.
• Walker v. Winn-Dixie Stores, Inc., 160 So. 3d 909 (Fla. 1st DCA 2014): Noted instances where plaintiffs failed to present evidence of regular wet conditions at the specific site of a fall; often cited by defendants to argue for location-specific proof under the foreseeability prong.
• Loren v. Once Upon a Time Group, Corp., 415 So. 3d 222 (Fla. 4th DCA 2025): Cited by the panel as an example in the other direction—where evidence of regular wet conditions around the business sufficed to defeat a directed verdict. The panel used this to underscore that Florida decisions do not impose a per se prohibition against “general” testimony on foreseeability.

2) The Court’s Legal Reasoning

a) Ambiguous Video and the Summary-Judgment Standard

The central procedural error identified by the Eleventh Circuit involved the district court’s treatment of surveillance footage. The district court inferred from a “speck” appearing in blurry CCTV frames—after a family with a small child had parked a cart over the area—that the child caused a spill 6–7 minutes before the fall. On that basis, it concluded the puddle existed too briefly to impute constructive knowledge to Wal-Mart.

The panel held that the video did not “obviously contradict” any nonmovant-favorable account and remained equivocal on several material points:

• What the child was holding (if anything) and whether it was liquid rather than a snack or toy.
• Whether the “speck” was on the floor at all (as opposed to an artifact on the camera view) and, if on the floor, whether it reflected pre-existing liquid disturbed by the cart’s movement.
• Whether the puddle pre-dated the family’s presence, given other customers and employees traversed the area beforehand.
• Whether employees saw or should have seen the condition during that period.
• The significance of a nearby wet-floor sign—whether it related to this hazard, whether it was close enough to warn, and whether it predated the family in question.

Because the video left these questions open, the court emphasized that all reasonable inferences should have been drawn for Van Dorsten. By instead crediting Wal-Mart’s chain of inferences as if they were “direct evidence,” the district court contravened Rule 56 and Scott v. Harris principles as articulated in Richmond and Pourmoghani-Esfahani.

b) Constructive Knowledge Under § 768.0755: Duration and Regularity

The panel addressed both statutory routes to constructive knowledge:

• Duration (Fla. Stat. § 768.0755(1)(a)): Van Dorsten’s evidence—photos showing dirty water and drying edges, coupled with extensive foot traffic visible on the video—could reasonably support an inference that the condition existed long enough for Wal-Mart to have discovered and remedied it. Whether those visual cues indicate elapsed time is a classic jury question not amenable to resolution on an ambiguous record.
• Regularity/Foreseeability (Fla. Stat. § 768.0755(1)(b)): Wal-Mart employee Josh Kersey testified to frequent spills and that liquid hazards were generally more common on the grocery side of the store. Van Dorsten fell in an entry area leading into the grocery section. The district court faulted the plaintiff for relying on “general testimony” rather than site-specific proof. The Eleventh Circuit rejected any categorical rule against such testimony, noting Florida decisions are mixed and fact-dependent. Whether Kersey’s testimony sufficiently establishes foreseeability is for a jury to decide on this record.

3) Impact and Significance

Although unpublished and therefore non-precedential, the decision is likely to be persuasive within the Eleventh Circuit—especially in Florida diversity cases—on two recurring issues in slip-and-fall litigation:

• Use of Surveillance Video at Summary Judgment: Defendants frequently rely on store cameras to narrow or eliminate disputes over origin and duration. Van Dorsten reaffirms that only videos that “obviously contradict” the nonmovant’s version can trump competing inferences. Ambiguity belongs to the jury.
• Proof of Constructive Knowledge via Regularity: The opinion resists a bright-line rule that excludes “storewide” testimony as a matter of law. It preserves for juries the ability to weigh generalized evidence of frequent spills—particularly when tied to the part of the store where an accident occurred (e.g., the grocery entry)—as probative of foreseeability under § 768.0755(1)(b).

Practically, plaintiffs may find it easier to survive summary judgment where surveillance is equivocal and where employee testimony depicts frequent spills in the relevant department or area. Businesses, by contrast, can expect courts to scrutinize attempts to treat ambiguous footage as conclusive and may need to augment defenses with:

• Clear, time-stamped inspection logs and sweep records.
• Specific training and response protocols linked to high-risk areas (e.g., grocery entries).
• Documented placement and purpose of warning signs contemporaneous to the incident.

For district courts, Van Dorsten is a reminder to avoid drawing fine-grained inferences from indistinct video or treating “specks” and shadows as dispositive; and to recognize that § 768.0755’s regularity prong often presents fact questions unsuited to summary disposition.

Complex Concepts Simplified

• Summary Judgment: A pretrial ruling that no reasonable jury could find for the nonmoving party on material facts. Courts must view evidence in the light most favorable to the nonmovant and avoid weighing credibility or choosing among competing inferences.
• Constructive Knowledge (Fla. Stat. § 768.0755): Even if a store did not actually know about a spill, liability can rest on what it should have known. Plaintiffs can show constructive knowledge by:
  • Duration: The condition existed long enough that a reasonable inspection would have discovered it (signs include dried edges, dirt or track marks in liquid, and sustained foot traffic).
  • Regularity/Foreseeability: The condition occurs often enough that the store should anticipate and prevent it (e.g., frequent spills in the grocery area).
• “Obviously Contradicts” (Scott v. Harris): Video evidence overcomes a party’s version only if it clearly and indisputably refutes it. Ambiguous or grainy footage does not meet this threshold; juries, not judges, resolve such ambiguity.
• Per Curiam; Non-Argument Calendar; Not for Publication:
  • Per curiam means the opinion is issued by the court collectively, without a single authoring judge.
  • Non-argument calendar indicates the case was decided without oral argument.
  • Not for publication means the decision is non-precedential, though it can be persuasive.
• Diversity Jurisdiction: The case was in federal court because the parties are citizens of different states and the amount in controversy exceeded $75,000. Federal procedural rules govern summary judgment; state substantive law governs the tort claim.

Conclusion

Van Dorsten v. Wal-Mart underscores two core principles in Florida slip-and-fall litigation adjudicated in federal court. First, at summary judgment, courts cannot transform equivocal surveillance images into definitive proof for the movant; unless the footage “obviously contradicts” the nonmovant’s account, disputes about origin, timing, and employee awareness must go to the jury. Second, Florida’s § 768.0755 does not impose a categorical bar on using “general” testimony about frequent spills to prove foreseeability; when such testimony is tethered to the area of the store at issue, it may suffice to create a triable question under the statute’s regularity prong.

By reversing and remanding, the Eleventh Circuit preserves the jury’s role in resolving contested fact questions central to constructive knowledge—how the spill formed, how long it existed, whether employees should have discovered it, and whether spills in the grocery area were common enough to make the hazard foreseeable. Even as an unpublished disposition, the opinion offers a clear procedural roadmap for handling ambiguous video evidence and a substantive reminder that both duration and regularity remain viable—and deeply fact-bound—avenues to proving constructive knowledge in Florida premises liability cases.