Affirmative Disclosure, Not Mere Plea: The Sixth Circuit Reaffirms the “Tell-All” Requirement for Safety‑Valve Relief Under 18 U.S.C. § 3553(f)(5)

I. Introduction

In United States v. William Hartson, No. 25‑3067 (6th Cir. Nov. 21, 2025) (unpublished), the Sixth Circuit addressed a recurring and practically significant sentencing question: what, exactly, must a defendant do to qualify for the “safety‑valve” that allows a court to sentence below an otherwise applicable mandatory minimum in certain drug cases? Hartson pleaded guilty to serious cocaine trafficking charges that carried a 10‑year mandatory minimum. He sought safety‑valve relief under 18 U.S.C. § 3553(f), arguing that his guilty plea and brief statements accepting responsibility were enough to satisfy the statute’s fifth criterion, which requires a defendant to have “truthfully provided to the Government all information and evidence” the defendant has about the offense and related conduct. The district court disagreed, finding that Hartson, who repeatedly refused to speak with the government out of fear for his safety in prison, had not satisfied § 3553(f)(5). The court imposed the mandatory minimum of 120 months. On appeal, the Sixth Circuit affirmed. Although labeled “Not Recommended for Publication,” the opinion is doctrinally rich. It synthesizes prior circuit precedent and underscores a demanding rule: safety‑valve relief is reserved for defendants who affirmatively and fully disclose what they know to the government, not merely those who plead guilty or accept responsibility in a general way.

II. Factual and Procedural Background

A. The Offense Conduct

Hartson and a companion, Dalvin Rogers, flew from Ohio to California, stayed for two days, and flew back. On the return trip, both checked luggage. Before the bags were placed on the baggage carousel in Ohio, a police canine alerted to narcotics. When Hartson and Rogers claimed their bags, officers stopped them. Both consented to a search. The search revealed large quantities of cocaine in each bag:

• 3.79 kilograms of cocaine in Hartson’s luggage, and
• 3.84 kilograms of cocaine in Rogers’s luggage.

These quantities positioned the case squarely within the federal regime of substantial mandatory minimum penalties.

B. The Charges and Guilty Plea

The government charged Hartson with:

1. Conspiracy to distribute and possess with intent to distribute more than 5 kilograms of cocaine; and
2. Possession with intent to distribute more than 500 grams of cocaine.

Hartson pleaded guilty to both counts. In a statement to the probation office during the presentence investigation, he said:

“I take full responsibility for the role that I played in this case. I knew there were drugs coming back. I apologize to the Courts and to my family for the mistake that I made.”

Based on this statement and his timely decision to plead guilty, the probation office recommended a reduction for “acceptance of responsibility” under the Sentencing Guidelines. With that reduction, Hartson’s:

• Total offense level was 27;
• Criminal history category was II; and
• Advisory Guidelines range would have been 78–97 months, but for the statutory mandatory minimum of 120 months, which superseded the lower Guideline range.

C. The Safety‑Valve Dispute

To escape the mandatory minimum, Hartson invoked the “safety‑valve” provision of 18 U.S.C. § 3553(f), which (when applicable) allows the district court to sentence “without regard to any statutory minimum.” He claimed he met § 3553(f)(5) because:

• He pleaded guilty to the indictment; and
• He thereby “assented to all of the knowledge and information that the [U.S.] Attorney has,” making a separate formal statement unnecessary.

The probation officer rejected this position, pointing out that Hartson “refused to meet with the Government” and thus had not provided the full, truthful disclosure that § 3553(f)(5) requires. At sentencing:

• Hartson renewed his objection, arguing that his plea and his general acceptance‑of‑responsibility statement were sufficient.
• He admitted that he had not provided a statement to the government about his full role in the offense and thus had not met “the exact letter of the law” under § 3553(f)(5).
• The district court explicitly offered to continue the hearing so Hartson could make the required disclosure to the government.
• Hartson, through counsel and personally, declined—citing fear for his safety and how other prisoners would treat him if he were perceived as cooperating.

The government argued that § 3553(f)(5) requires a substantive meeting or equivalent proffer where the defendant discloses:

• What he did;
• How the crime occurred; and
• Information about other participants, if known.

Because Hartson refused every opportunity to meet and provide information, the government urged that the safety valve was unavailable. The district court agreed, held that Hartson had not satisfied § 3553(f)(5), overruled his safety‑valve objection, and imposed the 120‑month mandatory minimum. Hartson appealed only that ruling.

III. Summary of the Sixth Circuit’s Opinion

The Sixth Circuit affirmed the district court’s denial of safety‑valve relief, holding:

• The court reviews a district court’s refusal to apply the safety valve as a factual finding for clear error, citing United States v. Adu, 82 F.3d 119 (6th Cir. 1996).
• The defendant bears the burden of proving, by a preponderance of the evidence, eligibility for the safety valve, per United States v. Haynes, 468 F.3d 422 (6th Cir. 2006).
• Section 3553(f)(5) does more than require admission of the offense conduct; it imposes an affirmative obligation on a defendant to volunteer all information and evidence he has about:
  • The offense(s) of conviction; and
  • Other offenses that are part of the same course of conduct or a common scheme or plan.
• Simply pleading guilty and making generalized statements of responsibility—without providing any detailed information to the government—is insufficient.
• Fear of reprisals in prison does not excuse noncompliance with § 3553(f)(5), in line with United States v. Pena, 598 F.3d 289 (6th Cir. 2010).
• Because Hartson provided “no information whatsoever” to the government and declined multiple opportunities to do so, the district court properly concluded he was ineligible for safety‑valve relief.

The court described safety‑valve relief as available only to those “who truly cooperate,” echoing its earlier language in United States v. O’Dell, 247 F.3d 655 (6th Cir. 2001), and affirmed the 120‑month sentence.

IV. Detailed Analysis

A. Statutory and Guideline Framework: § 3553(f) and U.S.S.G. § 5C1.2

The “safety valve” is codified at 18 U.S.C. § 3553(f) and implemented in the Guidelines at U.S.S.G. § 5C1.2. In relevant part:

• Section 3553(f) allows courts to impose a sentence “without regard” to an otherwise applicable statutory mandatory minimum if the defendant meets five criteria.
• U.S.S.G. § 5C1.2(a) essentially reproduces those five statutory criteria verbatim.

Those criteria (paraphrased) concern:

1. Minimal criminal history;
2. No use of violence or credible threats of violence or possession of a dangerous weapon;
3. No resulting serious bodily injury or death;
4. No leadership, management, or supervisory role in the offense; and
5. Crucially here: before sentencing, the defendant must have truthfully provided to the government all information and evidence the defendant has concerning the offense or related conduct.

The fifth requirement is often the most contested. It is the focal point of the Hartson opinion. The Guidelines commentary (U.S.S.G. § 5C1.2, cmt. n.1(C)) clarifies that the required disclosure includes “all relevant conduct” and offenses part of the same course of conduct or common scheme or plan. The defendant must disclose not just the charged offense, but all connected criminal acts within the relevant conduct framework.

B. The Core Legal Issue: What Does § 3553(f)(5) Demand?

Hartson’s argument distilled to this proposition: if the defendant pleads guilty and (by doing so) admits the facts alleged in the indictment, then the government already knows everything necessary, and a separate safety‑valve “proffer” or debrief should not be required. The Sixth Circuit rejected that view, relying on its prior decisions to emphasize that:

• Section 3553(f)(5) imposes an affirmative obligation on the defendant;
• The requirement goes beyond:
  • Admitting the essential elements of the crime; or
  • Making a generalized statement of remorse or responsibility;
• The defendant must voluntarily disclose all information he has about:
  • His own conduct in the offense; and
  • Other relevant or related conduct, including that of co‑participants, to the extent he knows it.

Thus, a plea colloquy and a brief acceptance‑of‑responsibility statement do not satisfy § 3553(f)(5) unless they amount, in substance, to a full and truthful tell‑all proffer. In practice, this generally requires at least one meaningful debriefing session (or a sufficiently detailed written proffer) with the government.

C. Precedents Shaping the Court’s Reasoning

The panel anchored its analysis in a line of prior Sixth Circuit cases that have steadily built a stringent interpretation of § 3553(f)(5).

1. United States v. Adu, 82 F.3d 119 (6th Cir. 1996)

In Adu, the Sixth Circuit:

• Held that denial of the safety valve is a factual determination reviewed for clear error.
• Confirmed that the defendant has the burden to prove eligibility for safety‑valve relief by a preponderance of the evidence.
• Stressed that § 3553(f)(5) demands more than a basic admission of guilt—it requires the defendant to “truthfully provide all information he has concerning the offense of conviction and all relevant conduct.”
• Noted that this is a stricter requirement than that for an “acceptance of responsibility” reduction under U.S.S.G. § 3E1.1.

The Hartson panel expressly relied on Adu to:

• Set the standard of review (clear error);
• Reiterate the defendant’s burden; and
• Reaffirm that the tell‑all requirement is substantially more demanding than the acceptance‑of‑responsibility standard.

2. United States v. Haynes, 468 F.3d 422 (6th Cir. 2006)

In Haynes, the defendant submitted a four‑page written statement to the government. The Sixth Circuit nonetheless upheld denial of safety‑valve relief because:

• Even a detailed statement “is of no consequence if the defendant possessed additional information that she did not disclose.”
• The statute requires all information; partial disclosure is not enough.

This precedent is significant in Hartson for two reasons:

1. It underscores that completeness is central; the question is not whether the defendant disclosed some information, but whether he disclosed everything he knows.
2. It highlights the contrast with Hartson’s situation: unlike Haynes, Hartson provided no substantive information at all to the government.

The Sixth Circuit invoked Haynes to demonstrate that even quite substantial disclosures can be insufficient if incomplete—therefore, a bare guilty plea and a brief expression of remorse plainly fall short.

3. United States v. Gardner, 32 F.4th 504 (6th Cir. 2022)

Gardner provided a crucial interpretive gloss. The court there explained that § 3553(f)(5):

• Requires the defendant to admit the charged conduct; and
• “Imposes an affirmative obligation to volunteer any information aside from the conduct comprising the elements of the offense.”

This language—quoted and emphasized in Hartson—drives home that:

• The scope of required disclosure reaches beyond what is necessary to sustain the conviction.
• The defendant must proactively offer additional contextual, logistical, and participant‑related information, not merely agree that the indictment is accurate.

By citing Gardner, the panel made clear that simply “pleading to the indictment” cannot satisfy § 3553(f)(5): the statute insists on active cooperation by disclosing all knowledge related to the offense and its broader scheme.

4. United States v. Pena, 598 F.3d 289 (6th Cir. 2010)

Pena dealt directly with the argument Hartson advanced—fear of reprisals in prison. The Sixth Circuit in Pena held that:

• Fear of retaliation for cooperating does not excuse noncompliance with § 3553(f)(5).
• The statute does not contain a “fear” exception; courts must apply the criteria as written.
• Other circuits had reached similar conclusions (collected in Pena), reinforcing a national consensus.

In Hartson, the defendant explicitly grounded his refusal to meet with the government in fear for his safety and his treatment by other prisoners. The panel, citing Pena, reaffirmed that:

• Defendants are free to choose not to cooperate, including out of fear;
• But they cannot then claim the benefits of a statute that expressly conditions relief on full cooperation.

5. United States v. O’Dell, 247 F.3d 655 (6th Cir. 2001)

In O’Dell, the Sixth Circuit described safety‑valve relief as being reserved for those defendants “who truly cooperate.” That phrase—quoted in Hartson—has become a shorthand within the circuit for the idea that safety‑valve eligibility is contingent on more robust cooperation than the minimum needed to sustain a conviction. By invoking O’Dell, the panel ties Hartson into a longer doctrinal trajectory: the safety valve is a tool for incentivizing meaningful, truthful cooperation in drug cases, not a mere reward for pleading guilty.

D. The Court’s Legal Reasoning in Hartson

The panel’s reasoning proceeds in several steps:

1. Identify the sole disputed issue. The parties agreed that only the fifth safety‑valve criterion, § 3553(f)(5), was at issue. Hartson had to show that he had “truthfully provided to the Government all information and evidence” he possessed concerning the offenses and related conduct.
2. Define the statutory standard using precedent. Drawing on Gardner, Adu, and Haynes, the court explains that:
   • The defendant must admit the charged conduct; and
   • Must also volunteer all additional information he has about the offense and related acts.
   • This duty is broader than acceptance of responsibility and is not satisfied by a mere guilty plea.
3. Apply that standard to undisputed facts. The key facts were not in dispute:
   • Hartson never met with the government to discuss his conduct.
   • He provided no detailed proffer or debrief.
   • He explicitly acknowledged at sentencing that he had not complied with the statute’s “exact letter.”
   • He refused two explicit offers by the district court to pause proceedings so he could make the required disclosure.
4. Reject the argument that a plea and generic acceptance suffice. The court emphasizes that:
   • Pleading guilty admits the elements of the offense but not necessarily all relevant conduct or information about related participants.
   • A brief statement like “I knew there were drugs coming back” does not exhaust the set of potential information the defendant may possess.
   • By statute and precedent, the defendant must go further and actively disclose what he knows.
5. Address and reject the fear‑of‑reprisal justification. Citing Pena, the court holds that:
   • Fear for one’s safety in prison is not a legal ground to waive the statutory requirement.
   • Congress did not carve out a fear‑based exception; courts may not invent one.
6. Conclude that denial of safety‑valve relief was correct. Because Hartson provided “no information whatsoever” to the government and refused multiple chances to do so, he failed to meet his burden under § 3553(f)(5). There was no clear error—and indeed, no error at all—in the district court’s finding.

E. Standard of Review and Allocation of Burdens

The opinion quietly reinforces two important procedural points:

• Standard of review: clear error. Whether the defendant satisfied the safety‑valve criteria, particularly § 3553(f)(5), is treated as a factual determination. Under clear‑error review, an appellate court may not overturn that finding unless it has a “definite and firm conviction” that a mistake has been made. Where the material facts are undisputed, as in Hartson, this standard is especially deferential.
• Burdens of proof: defendant’s burden by a preponderance. The defendant must demonstrate eligibility for the safety valve. It is not the government’s burden to prove ineligibility. If the record is ambiguous or incomplete regarding what the defendant disclosed, that ambiguity tends to work against the defendant, not in his favor.

Here, the undisputed record—Hartson’s categorical refusal to talk—made the outcome straightforward under this framework.

F. Fear of Reprisal and the “No‑Excuse” Nature of § 3553(f)(5)

A central human theme in Hartson is the defendant’s fear: he did not want to be labeled a “snitch” or cooperator in the prison environment. The legal system acknowledges that such fears are real, but the Sixth Circuit reiterates that:

• Participation is voluntary. A defendant is not compelled to meet with the government or disclose information; he may elect to remain silent or minimize his exposure in prison culture.
• But relief is conditional. Congress chose to make relief from mandatory minimums conditional on full and truthful disclosure. Defendants cannot accept the benefit while refusing the condition.

Pena and the cases it cited reject any “fear” exception. The Hartson panel simply applies that principle: Hartson may prioritize his safety concerns, but he must then accept the statutory sentence that follows from that choice. This highlights a recurring tension in federal sentencing:

• The safety valve is meant to mitigate the harshness of mandatory minimums for nonviolent, low‑level offenders.
• Yet it is structured to also serve as an investigative tool, effectively requiring defendants to provide actionable intelligence as the price of relief.
• This dual function can put defendants in a difficult position, particularly in prison environments where cooperation carries stigma or danger.

The Sixth Circuit’s approach confirms that this tension, while real, does not authorize courts to rewrite the statute.

G. Safety Valve vs. Acceptance of Responsibility

The opinion explicitly distinguishes two distinct sentencing concepts:

1. Acceptance of responsibility (U.S.S.G. § 3E1.1).
   • Focuses on whether the defendant has acknowledged his guilt and shown contrition.
   • Often satisfied by a timely guilty plea and brief expressions of remorse.
   • Earned Hartson a significant reduction in his offense level (and thus his Guideline range).
2. Safety valve (18 U.S.C. § 3553(f); U.S.S.G. § 5C1.2).
   • Concerned not just with remorse but with cooperation—disclosure of information that can assist law enforcement.
   • Requires full, truthful disclosure about the offense and related conduct, beyond what is needed to sustain a conviction.
   • Imposes a much more demanding standard than acceptance of responsibility.

The Hartson opinion thus reaffirms a critical practice point:

• A defendant can and often does receive acceptance‑of‑responsibility credit without qualifying for the safety valve.
• Defense counsel must therefore treat safety‑valve eligibility as a separate, additional objective requiring separate, additional steps—most notably, a comprehensive safety‑valve proffer.

V. Complex Concepts Simplified

To make the opinion more accessible, it is useful to unpack some of the key legal terms and structures it uses.

A. “Safety Valve” (18 U.S.C. § 3553(f); U.S.S.G. § 5C1.2)

In drug cases, Congress has imposed mandatory minimum sentences for certain quantities and conduct. The “safety valve” is a statutory escape hatch that allows qualified defendants to be sentenced below those rigid floors. In plain terms:

• If you meet all five criteria in § 3553(f), the judge is free to look at the normal Sentencing Guidelines without being forced to impose a mandatory minimum.
• If you fail any one of the five, the mandatory minimum remains binding on the court.

Hartson’s case illustrates the stakes: his Guideline range would have been 78–97 months, but because he did not qualify for the safety valve, the court was required to impose 120 months.

B. “Truthfully Provided to the Government All Information…”

This statutory phrase means:

• The defendant must proactively tell the government everything he knows about:
  • His own involvement in the crime;
  • How the scheme worked;
  • Who else was involved, if known;
  • Related criminal acts that are part of the same broader plan or series of acts.
• He cannot:
  • Pick and choose what to reveal;
  • Hold back information he fears might anger others; or
  • Rely on the assumption that “the government already knows” what he knows.

The time limit is “not later than the time of the sentencing hearing.” Courts often allow disclosure at or even just before sentencing, but if the defendant refuses, the window closes.

C. “Clear Error” Review

“Clear error” is a very deferential standard of appellate review. It means:

• The appellate court will not overturn the district court’s factual finding unless it is firmly convinced a mistake was made.
• If reasonable judges could disagree about the factual conclusion, the district court’s finding stands.

In Hartson, with undisputed facts showing that he never provided information to the government, there was no realistic basis for finding clear error.

D. “Preponderance of the Evidence” and Burden of Proof

“Preponderance of the evidence” means “more likely than not” (think 51% vs. 49%). For safety‑valve eligibility:

• The defendant must show it is more likely than not that he has met each criterion, including full disclosure.
• If the evidence is evenly balanced or incomplete, the defendant has not met his burden.

Because Hartson’s own admissions established that he refused to disclose, he could not carry this burden.

E. “Acceptance of Responsibility” vs. “Safety Valve”

These are different tools with different purposes:

• Acceptance of responsibility rewards defendants who acknowledge guilt and show contrition. It lowers the Guidelines range but does not authorize the court to ignore statutory mandatory minimums.
• Safety valve is available only if the defendant also fully cooperates by providing comprehensive information. Only then can the court disregard the mandatory minimum altogether.

Hartson’s case demonstrates that one can receive the former (acceptance) while being categorically ineligible for the latter (safety valve).

VI. Practical and Doctrinal Impact

A. Doctrinal Significance within the Sixth Circuit

Although the opinion is “Not Recommended for Publication” and thus non‑precedential under the Sixth Circuit’s rules, it is doctrinally consistent with, and therefore reinforces, published precedent. Its practical impact includes:

• Reaffirming the strictness of § 3553(f)(5). The court again makes clear that full, affirmative disclosure is a non‑negotiable condition of safety‑valve relief.
• Clarifying that pleas and generic statements are insufficient. Defense practitioners cannot rely on the plea itself or a short apology to satisfy the safety‑valve requirement; a separate, substantive disclosure is required.
• Confirming that fear does not create an exception. Following Pena, Hartson closes off attempts to carve out informal fear‑based exceptions, at least within the Sixth Circuit.

Future panels confronting similar fact patterns will see (in this opinion and its cited authorities) a consistent doctrinal message: safety‑valve relief is tightly linked to “true cooperation” in the sense of full and candid disclosure.

B. Practical Consequences for Defendants and Counsel

For defendants and defense counsel, the Hartson opinion reinforces several practical imperatives:

1. Early safety‑valve strategy is essential.
   • Defense counsel should identify at the outset whether mandatory minimums are in play and whether the safety valve is potentially available.
   • If so, planning and scheduling a safety‑valve proffer (or equivalent written disclosure) should be a core part of plea negotiations and sentencing preparation.
2. A guilty plea is not enough.
   • Clients who think “I pled guilty, so I did my part” need clear explanation that additional disclosure is required for the safety valve.
   • Defense counsel must explain the difference between merely admitting guilt and fully informing the government.
3. Managing fear and risk.
   • Where clients fear being labeled cooperators, counsel should:
     • Discuss protective measures the Bureau of Prisons may offer;
     • Consider whether some or all of the proffer can be framed in ways that minimize identifiable targeting while remaining truthful and complete; and
     • Ensure that the client understands the sentencing consequences of refusing to cooperate.
   • Hartson shows that courts will not alter the statutory requirement based on such fears.
4. Full disclosure must be timely.
   • Disclosure must be completed no later than the sentencing hearing.
   • Even last‑minute offers to cooperate may be considered, but if a defendant refuses at sentencing—as Hartson did—he cannot later complain.

C. Impact on Sentencing Outcomes in Drug Cases

Hartson showcases a dramatic, quantifiable consequence:

• With safety valve: Hartson’s sentence likely would have fallen within 78–97 months (or perhaps below, if the district court varied downward).
• Without safety valve: He was locked into a 120‑month mandatory minimum.

The decision thus underscores that:

• Safety‑valve relief can mean a difference of years of imprisonment.
• The main gatekeeping function in many drug cases is now the defendant’s willingness to provide a full, truthful debriefing.

D. Broader Policy and Constitutional Tensions (Briefly)

While the Hartson opinion itself does not delve into constitutional questions, it sits against a backdrop of policy and constitutional tensions:

• Fifth Amendment concerns. The safety valve effectively pressures defendants to provide detailed self‑incriminating and third‑party‑incriminating information. Legally, because the decision to cooperate is voluntary and done post‑plea, courts have generally not found Fifth Amendment violations, but the pressure is real.
• Prison‑culture realities. Defendants often perceive cooperating as risking violence or ostracism. Congress and the courts have nonetheless structured sentencing incentives to strongly favor cooperation.
• Mandatory minimums vs. individualized sentencing. The safety valve is a statutory compromise: it preserves mandatory minimums while giving courts limited discretion for defendants who meet strict cooperation criteria. Hartson demonstrates how that compromise works in practice—those who do not fully cooperate remain subject to mandatory floors, even when the Guidelines would otherwise recommend a lower sentence.

Hartson reinforces that, whatever one thinks of these policies, district courts and appellate courts are bound to apply § 3553(f) as written.

VII. Conclusion

United States v. Hartson is a clear, straightforward reaffirmation of a demanding rule: to obtain safety‑valve relief, a defendant must do more than plead guilty and accept responsibility; he must fully and truthfully disclose to the government all information he possesses about the offense and related conduct, by the time of sentencing. Key takeaways include:

• The safety valve’s fifth criterion (§ 3553(f)(5)) imposes an affirmative, comprehensive disclosure obligation on the defendant.
• This obligation is more onerous than what is required for an acceptance‑of‑responsibility reduction.
• Fear of prison reprisals does not excuse noncompliance with § 3553(f)(5); a defendant who declines to cooperate for safety reasons must also forgo the statutory benefit.
• Failure to engage in a substantive safety‑valve debrief (or equivalent written disclosure) will almost invariably foreclose relief, leaving the mandatory minimum intact.

Though unpublished, Hartson fits neatly into the Sixth Circuit’s existing safety‑valve jurisprudence and serves as a practical reminder to defense counsel and defendants: the price of escaping mandatory minimums under § 3553(f) is genuine, thorough cooperation in the form of a truthful, complete tell‑all to the government.