“Sign-In-Wrap” Arbitration Clauses Receive Fourth-Circuit Blessing:
Darrell Austin, Jr. v. Experian Information Solutions, Inc.

1. Introduction

The Fourth Circuit’s published decision in Austin v. Experian Information Solutions, Inc., No. 23-2301 (Aug. 1, 2025) resolves two recurring questions in modern consumer-finance litigation: (1) What evidentiary showing must a corporate defendant make when moving to compel arbitration; and (2) When does an online “sign-in-wrap” screen give a consumer sufficient notice and manifest assent to an arbitration clause?

Plaintiff Darrell Austin sued Experian under the Fair Credit Reporting Act (FCRA) after the company allegedly misreported discharged debts. Experian moved to compel arbitration, relying on Austin’s free enrollment in “CreditWorks,” a credit-monitoring service operated by an Experian affiliate, whose Terms of Use contained a broad arbitration provision. The district court (E.D. Va.) excluded Experian’s key declaration by Vice-President David Williams and denied arbitration, finding the enrollment webpage “deceptive.” In a unanimous opinion by Senior Judge Floyd, the Fourth Circuit reversed and remanded, directing that the dispute be sent to arbitration.

The opinion sets a significant precedent on digital contracting and on the admissibility of corporate declarations at the summary-judgment/arbitration stage.

2. Summary of the Judgment

• Evidentiary Ruling Reversed. The district court abused its discretion in excluding the Williams declaration. Corporate officers are presumed to possess personal knowledge of a corporation’s acts, and screenshots/terms proffered to show their existence—not their truth—are not hearsay.
• Arbitration Compelled. Applying traditional contract principles to online interfaces, the court held that CreditWorks’ enrollment page gave reasonable notice and obtained manifest assent. A separate “I Agree” click-box is not indispensable when the page states in bold that clicking “Create Your Account” binds the user to the Terms of Use and provides a conspicuous hyperlink.
• Disposition. Judgment reversed; case remanded with instructions to enforce the arbitration agreement.

3. Analysis

3.1 Precedents Cited

• Dhruva v. CuriosityStream, Inc., 131 F.4th 146 (4th Cir. 2025) – Adopted the two-step “reasonable notice” and “manifest assent” test for online agreements; emphasized that conspicuous hyperlinks satisfy notice.
• Marshall v. Georgetown Mem’l Hosp., 112 F.4th 211 (4th Cir. 2024) – Same two-step framework; clarified summary-judgment burden in arbitration context.
• Sgouros v. TransUnion Corp., 817 F.3d 1029 (7th Cir. 2016) – Distinguished; Seventh Circuit refused to enforce arbitration where design hid the clause.
• Catawba Indian Tribe v. South Carolina, 978 F.2d 1334 (4th Cir. 1992) (en banc) & progeny – Recognized presumption of personal knowledge for corporate officers.
• Federal Rules of Evidence 602, 801, 1001, and FRCP 56(c)(4) – Governing standards for declarations, hearsay, and authentication at summary judgment.

3.2 Legal Reasoning

3.2.1 Evidentiary Abuse-of-Discretion

The district court faulted Williams for not identifying specific records he reviewed and for relying on screenshots the court labeled hearsay. The Fourth Circuit disagreed:

• The screenshots and Terms of Use were offered to prove existence/appearance, not truth; therefore, they were non-hearsay (Rule 801(c)).
• Rule 1001(d) treats printouts of electronic records as “originals” if they accurately reflect the information.
• Under Catawba and Apex Express, a long-time corporate VP may testify about routine business records and website interfaces absent contrary evidence.
• The court emphasized that Rule 56(c)(4) imposes only a “minimal” burden—the declaration need not attach every underlying record when personal knowledge is asserted and uncontradicted.

3.2.2 Contract Formation on the Internet

Applying North Carolina contract law (undisputed), the court required: (1) reasonable notice of an offer; and (2) manifestation of assent. The enrollment page satisfied both because:

• Bold text directly above the action button stated: “By clicking ‘Create Your Account’ I accept and agree to your Terms of Use Agreement,” with “Terms of Use” hyperlinked in blue on an uncluttered screen.
• No scrolling, hidden boxes, or multiple steps were needed—distinguishing Sgouros.
• Clicking “Create Your Account” after being so informed is an objective manifestation of assent; the FAA does not require a separate “I Agree” button.

3.2.3 FAA Policy

Reiterating that §2 of the Federal Arbitration Act makes arbitration agreements “valid, irrevocable, and enforceable,” the panel noted that refusing to enforce clearly disclosed online arbitration clauses would undermine that mandate and incentivize forum shopping.

3.3 Impact of the Decision

• Digital Contracting Landscape. The Fourth Circuit joins the Second, Fifth, Eighth, and Ninth Circuits in upholding “sign-in-wrap” agreements when design and language are sufficiently clear, but it expressly rejects the rigid approach suggested by Sgouros.
• Litigation Strategy. Defendants can rely on concise officer declarations and authenticated screenshots without exhaustive technical affidavits, streamlining motions to compel arbitration.
• Compliance Guidance for Businesses. To minimize risk, companies should:
  • Place acceptance language immediately adjacent to the action button.
  • Use boldface or contrasting color for hyperlinks.
  • Retain timestamped screenshots and back-end records to support later testimony.
• Consumer-Protection Suits. FCRA and other federal statutory claims in the Fourth Circuit are increasingly likely to be diverted to arbitration when consumers interacted with well-designed sign-up screens.
• Evidentiary Practice. The decision lowers the bar for authenticating routine business webpages and reinforces the presumption of personal knowledge for corporate officers.

4. Complex Concepts Simplified

• Federal Arbitration Act (FAA). A 1925 statute requiring courts to enforce private agreements to arbitrate, treating them like any other contract.
• Clickwrap vs. Sign-In-Wrap.
  • Clickwrap: Terms pop up and the user must click “I Agree.”
  • Sign-In-Wrap: Notice near a sign-in or action button says that proceeding binds the user, usually with a hyperlink to terms.
• Personal Knowledge (Rule 602 / FRCP 56(c)(4)). A witness may testify only about information they learned firsthand or through their job responsibilities; corporate officers are presumed to have such knowledge about routine company operations.
• Hearsay. An out-of-court statement offered for its truth. Screenshots offered solely to prove what the page looked like, not the substance of statements on it, are not hearsay.
• Summary-Judgment Standard in Arbitration Motions. The party seeking arbitration must show the agreement’s existence using evidence admissible at trial; courts view the record like a Rule 56 motion.

5. Conclusion

Austin v. Experian cements two doctrinal pillars in the Fourth Circuit:

1. Corporate declarations grounded in routine business knowledge generally satisfy Rule 56(c)(4), and screenshots/terms of use are readily admissible to prove formation of online contracts.
2. Well-designed sign-in-wrap interfaces—bold acceptance language plus a conspicuous hyperlink—create enforceable arbitration agreements even without a separate “I Agree” checkbox.

Practitioners should treat the case as authoritative guidance on drafting online user flows, preparing evidentiary packages for motions to compel arbitration, and challenging or defending such motions in the digital commerce context. Consumers within the Fourth Circuit should assume that clicking a clearly labeled button after conspicuous notice will likely waive courtroom rights in favor of private arbitration.