“Private Place” Need Not Be Defined in the Indictment; Courts May Consider Extrinsic Information to Assess Notice on Timely Challenges — State v. Kaakimaka (Haw. 2025)

“Private Place” Need Not Be Defined in the Indictment; Courts May Consider Extrinsic Information to Assess Notice on Timely Challenges — State v. Kaakimaka (Haw. 2025)

Introduction

In State v. Kaakimaka, the Hawaiʻi Supreme Court clarified two recurring problems in criminal charging law. First, it held that the phrase “private place” in Hawaiʻi’s first-degree violation of privacy statute (HRS § 711‑1110.9(1)(a)) is an attendant-circumstances element, but it is not a “generic term” that must be further particularized, and its statutory definition does not add another element that must be pled in the indictment. Second, even when a defendant timely and pretrial challenges a charging document, courts may look beyond the four corners of the charge to other information provided up to the time of the motion to determine whether the accused had actual notice of what had to be defended against.

The case arose from a disturbing act: Koa Kaakimaka placed his iPhone on the exterior ledge of a bathroom window to record a fifteen-year-old girl showering inside. Charged by indictment with first-degree violation of privacy, he moved pretrial to dismiss the indictment as insufficient for not defining “private place.” The circuit court denied the motion; a jury convicted him. On appeal, a plurality of the Intermediate Court of Appeals (ICA) held the indictment deficient and ordered dismissal without prejudice. The Supreme Court reversed, reinstating the indictment and remanding to the ICA to resolve the defendant’s remaining appellate claims.

Summary of the Judgment

The Hawaiʻi Supreme Court vacated the ICA’s judgment and remanded. It held:

  • “In any private place” is an attendant-circumstances element of HRS § 711‑1110.9(1)(a), but the statutory definition of “private place” (HRS § 711‑1100) does not create an additional attendant circumstance element that must be pled.
  • “Private place” is not a generic term requiring the State to “descend to particulars” or plead a species of “private place.”
  • Courts may consider other information provided to the defendant up to the time of the motion—such as police reports and the defendant’s own statements—to determine whether the defendant had actual knowledge of the nature and cause of the accusation, including what location the State alleged to be the “private place.”

Applying those principles, the Court concluded the indictment—which tracked the statutory language and referenced a place where persons are “entitled to privacy therein”—together with the record available by the time of the motion (including the police reports and Kaakimaka’s admission that he recorded through a bathroom window), provided fair notice of the nature and cause of the accusation. The Court therefore remanded the appeal to the ICA to address the defendant’s remaining issues, which the ICA had not reached.

Analysis

Precedents Cited and How They Shaped the Decision

The Court anchored its analysis in a long line of Hawaiʻi charging-sufficiency cases, distinguishing when statutory definitions must be pled, when “generic terms” require particulars, and when extrinsic information can cure notice concerns:

  • State v. Wheeler (2009): The charge alleged that the defendant “operate[d]” a vehicle but omitted a statutory definition that limited “operate” to a “public way.” Because that definition added an attendant-circumstances element not apparent from common usage, the omission was fatal. In Kaakimaka, the Court used Wheeler to reaffirm that statutory definitions must be pled only when they create an additional element that the lay term would not convey.
  • State v. Kauhane (2019): The charge for “obstructing” omitted the statutory definition that made “unreasonable inconvenience or hazard” part of the offense; because that definition created a results-of-conduct element, it had to be pled. Kaakimaka contrasts with Kauhane: the statutory definition of “private place” did not add an extra element.
  • State v. Garcia (2022): Charging documents are often cluttered with statutory legalese; they need not be overloaded with definitions when tracking an offense’s language suffices to give meaningful notice. The Court applied Garcia to reject the idea that “private place” must be defined in the charge.
  • State v. Aquino (2024): The indictment used the term “restrain” without the statute’s definition. The Court held the definition did not create additional elements and need not be pled. Similar logic underpinned the Court’s view that “private place” need not be defined in the indictment.
  • State v. Jardine (2022) and State v. Israel (1995): “Generic terms” (like “substantial bodily injury” with its five statutory classes, or “felony”) require particularization in the charge. The Court distinguished these: “private place” is not a class-based generic term with “species” that must be specified.
  • State v. Van Blyenburg (2022): Emphasized that the constitutional notice inquiry is not about technicalities but about ensuring the accused knows what must be defended against. Kaakimaka reaffirms this anti-technicality approach.
  • State v. Robins (1983), State v. Treat (1984), State v. Abellira (1984): Courts may consider information beyond the charging document—e.g., grand jury transcripts or discovery—to assess notice. Kaakimaka expressly applies this “extrinsic information” principle even when the defendant timely challenges the charge pretrial, confirming that “actual knowledge” analysis is not confined to post-verdict, liberal-construction reviews.

Legal Reasoning

The Court applied the standard for a timely challenge to a charge: the charge is sufficient if it (1) contains the offense’s elements and (2) sufficiently apprises the defendant of what must be defended against. Key steps in the Court’s reasoning:

  • Elemental framing: The offense includes conduct, attendant circumstances, and results (HRS § 702‑205). “In any private place” is an attendant-circumstances element in HRS § 711‑1110.9(1)(a), and the indictment explicitly alleged it.
  • Statutory definition not an added element: HRS § 711‑1100 defines a “private place” as a place where one may reasonably expect to be safe from casual or hostile intrusion or surveillance, excluding locations open to the public. That definition “comports with” the common understanding of “private place”; it does not add another element needing to be pled. The indictment’s reference to persons “entitled to privacy therein” further aligned with the statutory concept.
  • Not a generic term: Unlike “substantial bodily injury” or “felony,” “private place” does not denote an umbrella class of categories demanding “species” particulars. It is a familiar phrase whose ordinary meaning closely tracks the statute’s definition.
  • Extrinsic information and actual knowledge: The record at the time of the motion showed that Kaakimaka had been interviewed by police and admitted recording a girl “in the bathroom,” and the police reports repeated the “bathroom window” description. Even setting aside the definitional debate, those materials provided actual notice of the specific “private place” the State would prove at trial. The Court clarified that this “actual knowledge” inquiry is appropriate even for timely challenges, not just for late, post-verdict Motta/Wells scenarios.

Putting these together, the Court concluded the indictment tracked the statute, used terms intelligible to laypersons, did not omit a definition that would add an element, and was reinforced by extrinsic materials that made clear the “private place” alleged was a bathroom. Due process was satisfied.

Impact

This decision has several practical and doctrinal ripple effects:

  • Charging practice in privacy cases: Prosecutors need not plead the statutory definition of “private place” or identify the specific “private place” as long as they allege the element and provide discovery that makes clear the theory—here, the bathroom. Best practice remains to include straightforward factual particulars (who, what, where, when, how), but failure to append statutory definitions will not, by itself, doom a charge where common usage aligns with the statute.
  • Broader charging sufficiency law: Kaakimaka tightens the line between (a) statutory terms that must be defined because the definition adds an element (Wheeler, Kauhane) and (b) terms that need not be defined because their common meaning overlaps with the statute (Aquino, Garcia). It also narrows the “generic term” doctrine to truly class-based phrases like “substantial bodily injury” and “felony,” signaling that not every multi-word phrase is “generic.”
  • Extrinsic-information rule reaffirmed and extended: The Court expressly confirms that courts may consult discovery, police reports, grand jury transcripts, and other case materials to assess notice even when the defendant challenged the indictment pretrial. Defense counsel seeking dismissal must therefore do more than show a textual omission; they must also demonstrate the absence of actual notice in the pre-motion record.
  • Limiting technical dismissals: The decision embodies an anti-technicality philosophy: charges are judged for whether they give fair notice, not for whether they recite every definitional clause. This will likely reduce dismissals for failure to include statutory definitions for terms aligned with common understanding.
  • Guidance for analogous terms: Terms like “public place,” “dwelling,” or “dangerous instrument” will be evaluated under the same framework. If a statute’s definition adds an element or if the term is truly generic (multiple statutory species), the definition or particularization may still be required. Kaakimaka does not relax those obligations.
  • What the decision does not decide: The Court did not resolve the separate evidentiary/sufficiency argument raised below about whether using a device from outside a bathroom window is “in any private place.” That question remains for future cases or for the ICA on remand if preserved and before it. The Court’s holding is limited to the sufficiency of the charging document and notice.

Complex Concepts Simplified

  • Attendant circumstances: Facts that must exist when the conduct occurs (e.g., that the device is used “in any private place”). They are elements the State must prove, but they are not the conduct itself or its result.
  • Generic term doctrine: If a charging term refers to a broad statutory class with multiple species (like “felony” or “substantial bodily injury”), the charge must specify which one, so the defendant knows exactly what to contest.
  • When statutory definitions must be pled: Only when the statutory definition adds an element that is not apparent from common understanding (e.g., “operate” limited to a “public way” in Wheeler; “obstruct” limited to “unreasonable” inconvenience in Kauhane).
  • Actual knowledge and extrinsic information: Courts may examine discovery, police reports, preliminary hearing testimony, and similar materials available by the time the defendant moves to dismiss to decide whether the defendant knew what the State was alleging. This applies even to timely, pretrial challenges.
  • Timely challenge vs. liberal construction: If a defendant attacks the charge pretrial, the court applies the “elements plus fair notice” test. If the challenge comes for the first time on appeal (post-verdict), the Motta/Wells “liberal construction” rule applies and vacatur occurs only if the charge cannot reasonably be read to allege a crime or the defendant was prejudiced. Kaakimaka operates in the pretrial/timely-challenge posture but still permits consultation of extrinsic materials to assess notice.

Conclusion

State v. Kaakimaka refines Hawaiʻi’s charging sufficiency jurisprudence in two significant ways. First, it holds that “private place” is not a generic term and that its statutory definition does not add an element; therefore, an indictment tracking the statute need not set out that definition. Second, it confirms that courts may examine case materials beyond the four corners of the charge to evaluate whether the defendant had actual notice of the accusation even when the challenge is timely and pretrial. These principles, anchored in anti-technicality and fair notice, will streamline charging practice, reduce dismissals premised on definitional non-pleading where common meaning suffices, and sharpen the burden on defendants to demonstrate a true lack of notice rather than a merely textual omission.

Practitioners should take away three key points: plead the elements; use terms with their everyday meaning unless the statute adds something extra; and build a record—through discovery and motions—showing what the defendant knew and when. Prosecutors are well advised to include straightforward factual particulars in the charge, and defense counsel must be prepared to show both a textual deficiency and the absence of actual notice in the pre-motion record. The Court’s remand to the ICA leaves for another day the resolution of the remaining issues in the case; but as to charging sufficiency, Kaakimaka supplies clear guidance for both privacy prosecutions and Hawaiʻi charging doctrine more broadly.

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