Decoupling Probable Cause from “Practicable to Proceed”:
The Texas Supreme Court’s Interpretation of Family Code § 54.02(j)(4)(A) in In the Matter of J.J.T.

I. Introduction

In In the Matter of J.J.T., No. 23-1028 (Tex. Mar. 28, 2025), the Supreme Court of Texas addresses a recurring and important problem in juvenile justice: what must the State show to justify prosecuting, in adult criminal court, a person for a felony allegedly committed as a juvenile when the prosecution is not initiated until after the person turns eighteen.

The case arises under Texas Family Code § 54.02(j), which governs so-called “late certification” or “post–18 transfer” cases—those in which:

• the alleged conduct occurred when the respondent was a minor; but
• the State did not seek transfer to criminal (adult) court until after the respondent turned eighteen.

The central legal issue is how to interpret one of the statutory “good cause” provisions that permits such a transfer, namely § 54.02(j)(4)(A), which authorizes transfer when:

“for a reason beyond the control of the state it was not practicable to proceed in juvenile court before the 18th birthday of the person.”

The court of appeals had held that if probable cause existed to arrest the juvenile before he turned eighteen, then it was, as a matter of law, “practicable to proceed,” and the State could not satisfy § 54.02(j)(4)(A). A dissenting justice objected that this reading collapsed “practicable to proceed” into a pure probable-cause inquiry and departed from the statute’s ordinary meaning.

The Supreme Court largely agreed with the dissent, held that “practicable to proceed” under § 54.02(j)(4)(A) is not determined solely by the timing of probable cause, and clarified how subsections (A) and (B) of § 54.02(j)(4) interact. At the same time, the Court concluded that the juvenile court had also misapplied the statute by conflating subsection (A) with the “probable cause + new evidence + due diligence” framework in subsection (B). As a result, the Court:

• reversed the court of appeals’ dismissal for lack of jurisdiction; but
• remanded the case to the juvenile court for a new transfer hearing under the correct legal standard.

The decision is a significant statutory-interpretation ruling that will guide Texas juvenile courts, prosecutors, defense counsel, and intermediate appellate courts in future late-certification cases.

II. Factual and Procedural Background

A. The Underlying Offense and Investigation

On October 4, 2020, sixteen-year-old J.J.T. allegedly participated in a robbery during which Milford Gutierrez was shot and killed while attempting to sell an ounce of marijuana. Surveillance video showed three perpetrators fleeing, and text messages on Gutierrez’s phone linked the drug transaction to Alfonso Tovar, a neighbor and friend of J.J.T.

Key investigative steps:

• Deputy David Crain obtained text messages from Gutierrez’s phone that led him to Tovar.
• Surveillance footage showed suspects walking toward Tovar’s residence after the shooting.
• Crain interviewed J.J.T., who initially denied knowledge but later said Tovar told him of a marijuana deal that ended in a shooting, while denying his own involvement.
• A fingerprint and text evidence led to an arrest warrant for Tovar in November 2020.
• Tovar, in turn, admitted his presence and implicated both J.J.T. and a third person, claiming that J.J.T. was the shooter and took the marijuana.

Crain submitted Tovar’s password-protected cell phone for forensic decryption using a tool that could take many months to a year. While awaiting those results, Crain effectively paused further investigation, citing:

• the COVID-19 pandemic,
• his workload, and
• a personal preference to avoid re-interviewing juveniles before obtaining an arrest order, due to the perceived complexity and risk surrounding juvenile interviews.

About a year later, in December 2021, Tovar met with prosecutors during plea negotiations, gave a detailed proffer about the crime and J.J.T.’s involvement, and provided his phone password, enabling access to the device’s contents. In January 2022, J.J.T. turned eighteen.

Progress thereafter:

• July 2022: Crain obtained and quickly received J.J.T.’s phone records, corroborating Tovar’s story.
• November 2022: Crain secured an arrest warrant for J.J.T., who, once arrested, admitted participation in a robbery plan but blamed Tovar for the shooting.
• Crain testified that this admission created probable cause; the State then charged J.J.T. with capital murder.

B. The Transfer Motion and the Juvenile Court’s Order

Because the alleged crime occurred when J.J.T. was sixteen, but the formal charge was brought after his eighteenth birthday, the State could not proceed directly in criminal court. It had to seek a transfer of jurisdiction from the juvenile court under Family Code § 54.02(j).

The State moved to transfer the case to adult criminal court, invoking § 54.02(j). Among other things, this provision requires the juvenile court to find:

• the respondent was within the qualifying age range at the time of the offense (§ 54.02(j)(2));
• no prior adjudication or hearing regarding the offense had occurred (§ 54.02(j)(3));
• probable cause that the respondent committed the alleged offense (§ 54.02(j)(5)); and
• a “good cause” basis under § 54.02(j)(4)(A) or (B) for the State’s failure to proceed before age eighteen.

The “good cause” component has two alternative tracks:

• Subsection (A) – “Reason beyond the control of the state”:
  The court may transfer if it finds that, “for a reason beyond the control of the state it was not practicable to proceed in juvenile court before the 18th birthday of the person.”
• Subsection (B) – “Due diligence + specific reasons”:
  The court may alternatively transfer if, after due diligence of the State, it was not practicable to proceed before age eighteen because:
  • (i) the State lacked probable cause before age eighteen and found new evidence after eighteen;
  • (ii) the person could not be found; or
  • (iii) a previous transfer order was reversed or set aside.

After a hearing, the juvenile court granted the State’s motion in a single, composite finding that improperly fused the language of subsections (A) and (B):

“The Court finds by a preponderance of the evidence that for a reason beyond the control of the State it was not practicable to proceed in juvenile court before the 18th birthday of the Respondent [sic] the State did not have probable cause to proceed in juvenile court and new evidence has been found since the 18th birthday of Respondent.”

This finding did not separately address:

• whether any reason “beyond the control of the state” made it not practicable to proceed; or
• whether the State exercised “due diligence” as required under subsection (B).

C. The Court of Appeals’ Decision

The First Court of Appeals vacated the transfer order and dismissed the case for want of jurisdiction, concluding that § 54.02(j)’s criteria had not been satisfied.

The court reasoned:

• The juvenile court’s finding plainly spliced language from § 54.02(j)(4)(A) and (B) without making the required “due diligence” finding for (B).
• Absent a “due diligence” finding, the order could only stand, if at all, under subsection (A).
• However, in the court of appeals’ view, by the time J.J.T. was still under eighteen, Tovar’s accomplice testimony—corroborated by other evidence—created probable cause to arrest and charge him.
• Because probable cause existed before J.J.T. turned eighteen, it was “practicable to proceed” at that time, and thus the State could not satisfy § 54.02(j)(4)(A).

A dissent by Justice Farris argued that subsection (A) does not turn on the timing of probable cause and that the majority failed to give effect to the ordinary meaning of “practicable to proceed.” She read subsection (A) as allowing the juvenile court to consider a range of reasons beyond the State’s control that might make it infeasible to proceed before age eighteen—probable cause being only one factor, not the sole determinant.

D. Supreme Court of Texas Review

The Supreme Court granted review and:

• agreed that the juvenile court’s blending of subsections (A) and (B) reflected a misapplication of the statute;
• held that the court of appeals also misapplied § 54.02(j)(4)(A) by treating the existence of probable cause as dispositive of “practicable to proceed”; and
• remanded for a new transfer hearing so that the juvenile court can apply the correct legal standard to the developed record.

III. Summary of the Supreme Court’s Opinion

A. Key Holdings

1. “Practicable to proceed” under § 54.02(j)(4)(A) is not tethered to the timing of probable cause.
   The Court held that subsection (A) does not say anything about when probable cause arises; instead, it focuses on whether, for reasons beyond the State’s control, proceeding in juvenile court was reasonably capable of being accomplished before the respondent turned eighteen. The mere existence of probable cause before age eighteen neither automatically proves nor disproves “practicability.”
2. Subsection (A) and subsection (B) are distinct, complementary good-cause pathways.
   Subsection (B) applies where probable cause arises only after age eighteen and requires both:
   • “due diligence” by the State, and
   • one of three specified predicates (including late-arising probable cause with new evidence).
   Subsection (A), by contrast, applies even when probable cause existed earlier, but the State claims that some reason beyond its control made it not practicable to proceed before age eighteen.
3. Both the juvenile court and the court of appeals misapplied § 54.02(j)(4).
   The juvenile court wrongly grafted subsection (B)’s “lack of probable cause + new evidence” language into subsection (A) without the “due diligence” finding. The court of appeals, in turn, erroneously held that the existence of probable cause before age eighteen defeated subsection (A) as a matter of law.
4. The proper inquiry under subsection (A) is fact-intensive and focuses on reasons beyond the State’s control.
   The juvenile court must weigh:
   • delays beyond the State’s control (e.g., timing of accomplice cooperation, technical limitations in decrypting a phone, pandemic-related disruptions); against
   • delays attributable to the State (e.g., investigative choices, workload, failure to pursue known leads such as phone records).
   The appellate role is to review for legal and factual sufficiency and abuse of discretion, but not to substitute its own factfinding.
5. Remand rather than rendition.
   Because the juvenile court applied the wrong legal standard, and factual determinations must be made under the correct standard, the Court remanded the case for a new transfer hearing rather than deciding for itself whether the statutory good-cause standard was met.

B. Disposition

The Supreme Court:

• reversed the First Court of Appeals’ judgment vacating the transfer order and dismissing the case; and
• remanded to the juvenile court for a new § 54.02(j) transfer hearing consistent with its clarified interpretation of “practicable to proceed” under § 54.02(j)(4)(A).

IV. Analysis

A. Statutory Framework and Legislative Evolution

1. Exclusive Juvenile Jurisdiction and Its Limits

The Family Code gives juvenile courts “exclusive original jurisdiction” over delinquency matters involving minors (Fam. Code § 51.04). As a general rule, juvenile dispositions terminate at age eighteen (§ 54.05(b)), with narrow exceptions for some probation-related matters.

Section 54.02 is the “waiver of jurisdiction” or “certification” provision allowing a juvenile court, in its discretion, to relinquish jurisdiction so the respondent can be tried as an adult. Section 54.02(h) covers standard pre-18 transfers; § 54.02(j) specifically governs transfers when the prosecution is initiated after the respondent turns eighteen.

As the Court notes (quoting Moore v. State, 532 S.W.3d 400 (Tex. Crim. App. 2017)), § 54.02(j) “limit[s] the prosecution of an adult for an act he committed as a juvenile if his case could reasonably have been dealt with when he was still a juvenile.”

2. Original Version and 1995 Amendment Adding Subsection (A)

The 1975 predecessor to § 54.02(j) allowed transfer only where:

• the State lacked probable cause to proceed before age eighteen and found new evidence later; or
• the juvenile could not be found.

In 1995, the Legislature significantly expanded the grounds for transfer by adding what is now § 54.02(j)(4)(A), allowing transfer when:

“for a reason beyond the control of the state it was not practicable to proceed in juvenile court before the 18th birthday of the person.”

This addition is crucial. It:

• is not tied explicitly to probable cause or new evidence; and
• centers instead on practicability and reasons beyond the State’s control.

Subsection (B) retains and refines the earlier scheme by:

• requiring “due diligence of the state”; and
• providing specific predicates, including late-arising probable cause and new evidence, an inability to find the person, or reversal of an earlier transfer order.

Over time, the Legislature also expanded the range of qualifying ages and offenses for § 54.02(j) transfers, particularly for serious felonies like capital murder (now allowing transfer where the person was 10–17 at the time of a capital felony).

3. Interaction Between Subsections (A) and (B)

The Court clarifies that the “path to transfer diverges based on the development of probable cause”:

• If probable cause develops only after age eighteen, subsection (B)(i) provides a route: the State must show due diligence and that it lacked probable cause before age eighteen but later secured new evidence establishing it.
• If probable cause develops before age eighteen, subsection (B)(i) is typically unavailable. In that setting, the State may rely on subsection (A), but it must prove that for a reason beyond its control, it was not practicable to proceed before the eighteenth birthday.

Importantly, the Court notes that the State can plead and argue under both subsections (A) and (B) in the alternative. If the juvenile court rejects the State’s factual claim that probable cause only developed after age eighteen, it may still find, under subsection (A), that reasons beyond the State’s control made it not practicable to proceed earlier.

B. Precedents and Their Role in the Court’s Reasoning

1. In re N.J.A., 997 S.W.2d 554 (Tex. 1999)

N.J.A. held that if § 54.02(j)’s criteria are not satisfied for an over-18 respondent, the juvenile court’s only option is to dismiss. It emphasized the strictly limited circumstances in which late adult prosecution is permitted for juvenile conduct.

The Court in J.J.T. cites N.J.A. to reaffirm that:

• § 54.02(j) is a gatekeeping provision; and
• failure to satisfy its conditions mandates dismissal, reinforcing the need to apply its standards correctly.

The opinion also notes the subsequent enactment of § 51.0412, which creates continuing jurisdiction for juvenile proceedings initiated before age eighteen—underscoring that § 54.02(j) primarily covers cases where the State does not initiate proceedings until after eighteen.

2. Moon v. State, 451 S.W.3d 28 (Tex. Crim. App. 2014), and Ex parte Thomas, 623 S.W.3d 370 (Tex. Crim. App. 2021)

Moon set out a two-step review framework for juvenile transfer orders:

1. Evaluate legal and factual sufficiency of the evidence underlying the juvenile court’s findings.
2. Determine whether the transfer order constituted an abuse of discretion.

Moon had also required detailed, case-specific written findings in transfer orders, a requirement later overruled in Ex parte Thomas, which eliminated the heightened findings requirement but did not otherwise prescribe a new standard of review.

The Supreme Court in J.J.T. acknowledges that:

• Texas courts of appeals have continued to apply the Moon two-step standard to § 54.02(j) cases, including those now within the Supreme Court’s civil jurisdiction; and
• the parties in this case did not argue for a different standard, so the Court applies the Moon framework, except that it defers to courts of appeals on purely factual sufficiency determinations as required by the Texas Constitution (art. V, § 6).

3. Moore v. State, 532 S.W.3d 400 (Tex. Crim. App. 2017)

Moore is the principal precedent interpreting § 54.02(j)(4)(A). There, the detective’s heavy caseload and mistaken belief about the respondent’s age delayed forwarding the case to prosecutors for over two years. The Court of Criminal Appeals:

• treated those investigative delays as chargeable to the State; and
• held that they did not constitute reasons “beyond the control of the state,” so the State had not met its burden under subsection (A).

Crucially, Moore did not turn on when probable cause developed. Instead, it focused on the practical feasibility of proceeding in light of the State’s own systemic and individual choices.

In J.J.T., the Supreme Court of Texas aligns its reading of “practicable to proceed” with Moore, emphasizing that:

• the inquiry under subsection (A) is about feasibility in context; and
• investigative delays caused by the State’s own errors or caseload generally do not qualify as reasons “beyond the control of the state.”

4. Court of Appeals Decisions on “Practicable to Proceed”

The opinion surveys a range of appellate cases that have struggled with what counts as:

• a reason “beyond the control of the state”; and
• evidence that it was or was not “practicable to proceed” before age eighteen.

The decisions are fact-specific and sometimes divergent:

• In re A.M., 577 S.W.3d 653 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 2019, pet. denied)
  Investigators wanted more corroborating physical evidence before filing. The court held that such a desire for more evidence was not a reason beyond the State’s control, and thus did not justify failure to proceed.
• In re E.B., No. 12-22-00162-CV, 2022 WL 17074849 (Tex. App.—Tyler Nov. 17, 2022, no pet.)
  A different court viewed the State’s need for further corroborating evidence as supporting a conclusion that it was not practicable to proceed before age eighteen, effectively taking a more generous view of the State’s investigative choices.
• In re B.C.B., No. 05-16-00207-CV, 2016 WL 3165595 (Tex. App.—Dallas June 7, 2016, pet. denied)
  The outcry occurred only 25 days before the juvenile’s eighteenth birthday. The court affirmed the transfer, emphasizing the short timeline in which the State and court system had to act.
• In re L.M.B., No. 11-16-00241-CV, 2017 WL 253654 (Tex. App.—Eastland Jan. 6, 2017, no pet.)
  The court affirmed a transfer after the juvenile court considered the timing of the outcry, calendars of court and counsel, a motion for continuance, and the time needed for a social evaluation.
• In re N.J.T., No. 13-21-00089-CR, 2021 WL 4202165 (Tex. App.—Corpus Christi–Edinburg Sept. 21, 2021, no pet.)
  The court weighed delays attributable to the State against continuances sought by defense counsel and pandemic-related court delays, ultimately affirming a transfer order.

The Supreme Court reads these cases collectively as illustrating that:

• “practicable to proceed” is highly fact-dependent;
• the timing of the outcry or discovery of the offense relative to the eighteenth birthday is a critical factor;
• some delays can legitimately be attributed to circumstances outside the State’s control (e.g., late outcry, court congestion, pandemic); but
• other delays are squarely within the State’s control (e.g., investigative dormancy, workload management, strategic choices in sequencing investigative steps).

5. Other Cited Authorities

• In re R.R.A., 687 S.W.3d 269 (Tex. 2024): cited for the basic principle that the juvenile court is the factfinder and determines credibility and weight of evidence.
• HouseCanary, Inc. v. Title Source, Inc., 622 S.W.3d 254 (Tex. 2021): cited for the general rule that misapplying the law is an abuse of discretion, even when the court has broad discretion over the ultimate decision.

C. The Court’s Legal Reasoning

1. Ordinary Meaning of “Practicable”

The Court gives “practicable” its ordinary legal meaning: “reasonably capable of being accomplished; feasible in a particular situation.” On this understanding:

• the § 54.02(j)(4)(A) inquiry is practical, not abstract;
• the juvenile court can consider the real-world constraints facing investigators, prosecutors, and courts within the limited time before the respondent’s eighteenth birthday; and
• the key question is: was proceeding in juvenile court reasonably feasible before age eighteen, given reasons beyond the State’s control?

The statute then restricts qualifying reasons to those “beyond the control of the state,” meaning that:

• the State cannot meet its burden by pointing to self-created or routine administrative constraints (e.g., heavy caseload, mistaken assumptions about age, reluctance to pursue available investigative steps);
• but legitimate external factors (short time between outcry and eighteenth birthday, pandemic closures, late cooperation by key witnesses, or technical limitations) may, depending on the facts, support a finding under subsection (A).

2. Rejecting the Court of Appeals’ “Probable-Cause-Controls” Approach

The court of appeals treated the existence of probable cause before age eighteen as conclusively showing that it was “practicable to proceed.” The Supreme Court finds no basis for this in the text:

• Subsection (A) does not refer to probable cause at all.
• Subsection (B) explicitly deals with the timing of probable cause (before vs. after age eighteen), which indicates that the Legislature knew how to attach legal consequences to that timing and chose not to import that element into subsection (A).

By tethering “practicable to proceed” to probable cause timing, the court of appeals:

• collapsed subsection (A) into a subset of subsection (B); and
• effectively read out of the statute the distinct function of subsection (A) as a more general practicability inquiry keyed to reasons beyond the State’s control.

3. Correcting the Juvenile Court’s Misapplication

The juvenile court’s transfer order incorporated:

• the “beyond the control of the state” and “not practicable to proceed” language of subsection (A); and
• the “did not have probable cause to proceed in juvenile court and new evidence has been found” clause of subsection (B)(i);

but it omitted any finding that the State exercised “due diligence,” which is indispensable under subsection (B).

Substantively, this reveals that the juvenile court:

• treated the late development of probable cause and new evidence (a subsection (B)(i) concept) as the operative explanation for why it was “not practicable to proceed”; and
• did not separately analyze whether a “reason beyond the control of the state” thwarted earlier prosecution.

The Supreme Court characterizes this as an improper conflation of the two subsections, and therefore a misapplication of the law—an abuse of discretion under HouseCanary.

4. Fact-Intensive Nature of “Practicable to Proceed”

The Court underscores that whether it was “practicable to proceed” before age eighteen is inherently fact-specific and context-dependent. Relevant considerations include:

• the length of time between the offense and the respondent’s eighteenth birthday;
• when key evidence (e.g., accomplice statements, forensic results, phone records) became available;
• external constraints (e.g., pandemic disruptions, court closures, technology limitations);
• the timing of defense continuances and court scheduling realities; and
• what investigative steps were reasonably available and whether the State chose to pursue them.

Applying that framework to the record here, the Court identifies:

• Potential reasons beyond the State’s control:
  • Timing of Tovar’s detailed proffer during plea negotiations;
  • Technical limits of phone decryption tools, which can take many months;
  • A relatively short window (one year and four months) between offense and eighteenth birthday;
  • The COVID-19 pandemic overlapping that period.
• Delays plainly attributable to the State:
  • Crain’s suspension of active investigation;
  • His workload and personal discomfort interviewing juveniles; and
  • His waiting until six months after the eighteenth birthday to seek J.J.T.’s phone records, which were obtained in about ten days and corroborated Tovar’s story.

The Court does not weigh these factors itself; instead, it notes that the juvenile court must weigh them under the correct legal standard—distinguishing what is truly beyond the State’s control from what is not.

5. Standard of Review and Appellate Role

The Supreme Court reaffirms a dual role for reviewing courts:

• Legal sufficiency and error-correction: ensuring the juvenile court applied the correct statutory standard and that some legally sufficient evidence supports its findings.
• Abuse-of-discretion review: determining whether the juvenile court’s decision to transfer (or not) is a reasonable exercise of discretion based on those findings.

Where the juvenile court misapplies the statute—as here—appellate courts must correct that legal error. But in the absence of such a misapplication, they must defer to the juvenile court’s resolution of disputed facts and credibility.

D. Impact and Practical Implications

1. For Prosecutors

The opinion clarifies what prosecutors must—and must not—rely upon when seeking late certification:

• They must still prove probable cause that the respondent committed the offense (§ 54.02(j)(5)), but:
• for § 54.02(j)(4)(A), they must also prove by a preponderance of the evidence that:
  • there were reasons beyond the State’s control; and
  • because of those reasons, it was not practicable to proceed in juvenile court before age eighteen.

Internal constraints and choices—heavy caseload, personal investigative preferences, or avoidable delays in pursuing available evidence—will generally not qualify as “beyond the control of the state.” Prosecutors must therefore build a record demonstrating:

• the timeline of discovery of key evidence;
• objective external impediments (e.g., pandemic shutdowns, witness unavailability, late outcry); and
• reasonable efforts to move forward within the limited pre-18 window.

At the same time, the opinion confirms that early probable cause does not foreclose use of subsection (A). Prosecutors may still argue that, even with probable cause, other factors—such as critical forensic results not yet available, practical impossibility of securing essential witness cooperation, or systemic disruptions— made proceeding impracticable.

2. For Defense Counsel

Defense attorneys gain a clearer statutory structure to challenge late certification:

• They can argue that most delays stem from the State’s investigative choices, not from factors beyond its control.
• They can highlight:
  • missed opportunities to act sooner (e.g., failure to seek phone records or warrants);
  • periods of investigative inactivity; and
  • the absence of objective external barriers to proceeding in juvenile court.
• They can insist on separate, careful findings for:
  • probable cause under § 54.02(j)(5);
  • good cause under § 54.02(j)(4)(A) or (B); and, if (B) is invoked,
  • “due diligence” as a distinct element.

Strategically, defense counsel should build a detailed factual record at the transfer hearing, focusing on timelines, available investigative options, and the State’s reasons (or lack thereof) for delay.

3. For Juvenile Courts

Juvenile courts are reminded that their discretion is broad but bounded by the statutory text:

• They must not assume that the moment probable cause exists is the moment prosecution becomes “practicable” in a legal sense; practicability is broader and more context-dependent.
• They must:
  • separately analyze subsection (A) and (B) when both are invoked;
  • ensure required elements such as “due diligence” under (B) are expressly found if relied upon; and
  • articulate, at least in the record, how the facts support the conclusion that a reason beyond the State’s control rendered pre-18 prosecution impracticable.

While detailed written findings of the sort required by the now-partially-overruled Moon are no longer mandatory, this opinion highlights that failure to accurately track the statutory requirements in the court’s reasoning risks reversal and remand.

4. For Appellate Courts

The opinion is also a corrective to intermediate appellate courts:

• They must avoid importing elements (like timing of probable cause) from one subsection into another.
• They should respect the Legislature’s decision to:
  • address probable cause timing explicitly in subsection (B); but
  • omit it from subsection (A), which is framed in more general practicability terms.
• They remain bound to review for legal and factual sufficiency and abuse of discretion under the Moon framework (as adapted by Ex parte Thomas).

V. Complex Concepts Simplified

1. Juvenile Court “Exclusive Original Jurisdiction”

“Exclusive original jurisdiction” means that, in the first instance, only the juvenile court—not an adult criminal court—can hear delinquency cases involving alleged conduct committed when the person was under 17 (or under age thresholds specified by statute).

Any move to adult criminal court must occur via a valid transfer (or “certification”) order under § 54.02.

2. Transfer / Waiver of Jurisdiction

A “transfer” or “waiver” order under § 54.02 is not a finding of guilt. It is a threshold jurisdictional decision that allows adult criminal prosecution to go forward. The juvenile court decides:

• whether the statutory criteria are met (age, offense, probable cause, good cause); and
• whether, in its discretion, the case should be handled in criminal court instead of juvenile court.

3. Probable Cause vs. Preponderance vs. “Beyond a Reasonable Doubt”

• Probable cause means a reasonable ground to believe that a person committed a particular offense—a lower standard than proof beyond a reasonable doubt.
• Preponderance of the evidence means “more likely than not” (greater than 50% likelihood). The State must meet this standard to prove the existence of good cause under § 54.02(j)(4).
• Beyond a reasonable doubt is the very high burden required to convict someone in a criminal trial. It does not apply to the transfer decision.

4. “Good Cause” Under § 54.02(j)(4)

“Good cause” is not an abstract notion here; it is defined by statute:

• Under subsection (A), it means that for a reason beyond the State’s control, it was not practicable to proceed in juvenile court before age eighteen.
• Under subsection (B), it means that, despite due diligence, it was not practicable to proceed before age eighteen because one of three specific conditions existed (late-developed probable cause with new evidence, inability to find the person, or reversal of an earlier transfer order).

5. “Due Diligence”

Though not elaborated in detail in the opinion, “due diligence” generally means the State took reasonable steps under the circumstances to advance the case. It implies:

• active investigative effort, not passive waiting;
• pursuit of leads that a reasonable investigator would follow; and
• timely action in light of the impending eighteenth birthday.

6. “Abuse of Discretion”

A court abuses its discretion when it:

• acts arbitrarily or unreasonably; or
• fails to correctly apply the law to the facts.

Here, the juvenile court’s misapplication of § 54.02(j)(4) is an abuse of discretion in the latter sense: the court’s discretion is broad, but not unfettered; it must operate within the statutory framework.

7. Interlocutory Appeal in Juvenile Transfer Cases

Unlike typical criminal cases (which go to the Court of Criminal Appeals through the criminal appellate system), § 56.01 of the Family Code now allows an interlocutory appeal from a juvenile transfer order to the courts of appeals, and ultimately to the Supreme Court of Texas, under civil procedures. That is why this opinion—as with other recent juvenile transfer decisions—issues from the Supreme Court, not the Court of Criminal Appeals.

VI. Conclusion: Significance of In the Matter of J.J.T.

In the Matter of J.J.T. is an important clarifying decision in Texas juvenile law. Its central contribution is to state, clearly and authoritatively, that:

Under Family Code § 54.02(j)(4)(A), the question whether it was “not practicable to proceed” in juvenile court before the respondent’s eighteenth birthday is not answered solely by determining when probable cause arose. Instead, it requires a fact-intensive examination of reasons beyond the control of the state that might have made pre-18 prosecution infeasible.

The opinion:

• reconciles § 54.02(j)(4)(A) with § 54.02(j)(4)(B), giving each its proper field of operation;
• aligns Texas Supreme Court jurisprudence with the Court of Criminal Appeals’ decision in Moore on what counts as “beyond the control of the state”; and
• corrects missteps by both the juvenile court (which improperly fused subsections (A) and (B)) and the court of appeals (which made probable cause timing dispositive under subsection (A)).

On remand, the juvenile court must evaluate, under the clarified standard, whether:

• technical, temporal, and pandemic-related constraints genuinely made it infeasible to proceed in juvenile court before J.J.T. turned eighteen; or
• the delay is better explained by the State’s own decisions and omissions, which cannot satisfy § 54.02(j)(4)(A).

Beyond this case, the decision sends a broader message: late adult prosecution for juvenile conduct is permitted only when the State can show, with specific and credible evidence, that the opportunity to proceed in juvenile court was lost for reasons it could not reasonably control. This reinforces the Legislature’s intent to confine adult prosecution of juvenile acts to those situations where juvenile handling was not a realistically available option, thereby preserving the central role of the juvenile system in addressing youth misconduct.