Home-to-Assignment Travel Is Not “Time Work”: Commissioners for HMRC v Taylors Services Ltd & Ors ([2025] EWCA Civ 956)

England and Wales Court of Appeal (Civil Division), 24 July 2025 – Bean LJ (granting permission), Laing LJ, Baker LJ, and Underhill LJ.

1. Introduction

This Court of Appeal decision resolves a long-standing controversy over whether time spent by mobile workers travelling from home to their first work site — and back home from the last site — must be remunerated at the National Minimum Wage (“NMW”). The respondents, Taylors Services Ltd and partners trading as Taylors Poultry Services, operate nationwide “flock-technician” teams. They collected workers in company minibuses, sometimes at 2 a.m., and drove up to four hours to poultry farms. HMRC issued sizeable notices of under-payment, asserting that this travel counted as “time work” under the National Minimum Wage Regulations 2015 (“the 2015 Regulations”).

The Employment Tribunal (“ET”) agreed with HMRC; the Employment Appeal Tribunal (“EAT”) reversed. HMRC appealed, invoking a purposive approach inspired by Uber BV v Aslam and arguing that the EAT had misapplied Royal Mencap Society v Tomlinson-Blake. The Court of Appeal has now dismissed HMRC’s appeal, affirming the EAT and clarifying the proper construction of regulations 30 and 34 of the 2015 Regulations.

2. Summary of the Judgment

• Travel ≠ Work: Time spent merely travelling, even under the employer’s control, is not “work” for NMW purposes unless it falls within a deeming provision.
• Regulation 34 Governs Travel: Regulation 30’s primary definition of “time work” must be read together with regulation 34, which expressly deems (or excludes) certain travel hours as time work.
• Exception Applies: Travel between a worker’s home and “a place of work or a place where an assignment is carried out” is expressly carved out by regulation 34(1)(a)-(b).
• No Purposive Override: Courts must apply the clear wording of the Regulations; policy concerns or perceived unfairness are for the Low Pay Commission (“LPC”) and Parliament to address.
• Mencap Reasoning Transposed: The interpretive methodology in Mencap (sleep-in cases) applies equally to travel cases: the Regulations form a “harmonious whole” and ordinary meaning prevails.

3. Analysis

3.1 Precedents Cited

1. Royal Mencap Society v Tomlinson-Blake [2021] UKSC 8 – Established that “sleep-in” time is not work unless the worker is awake for the purposes of working; emphasised reading the Regulations as an integrated code.
2. Uber BV v Aslam [2021] UKSC 5 – Highlighted purposive interpretation in worker-status cases, but Court distinguished its contractual focus from the present statutory construction issue.
3. Autoclenz Ltd v Belcher [2011] UKSC 41 – Relied on below by HMRC for “true agreement” arguments; found inapplicable because NMW travel rules are prescriptive, not contract-driven.
4. British Nursing Association [2002] EWCA Civ 494 – Authoritativeness questioned in Mencap; illustrates evolution of NMW jurisprudence.

The Court treated Mencap as the decisive authority, reading its reasoning across to travel cases: if regulation 32 shows that “sleep” is not work, regulation 34 shows that “travel” is not work, absent deeming.

3.2 Legal Reasoning

• Integrated Reading: Chapter 3 must be construed holistically. Regulation 30 provides a primary definition; regulations 31-35 specify when particular activities are treated as work.
• Deeming Framework: Regulation 34 is a deeming clause with a built-in exception. The structure is: (i) Travel “for the purposes of time work” and when the worker “would otherwise be working” is treated as time work, (ii) unless the journey is between home (or other non-work residence) and a place of work/assignment.
• Application to Facts: The flock-technicians’ journeys were undeniably between home and assignment sites. They were not simultaneously performing any productive tasks, so they were not “otherwise working”. Therefore, the travel fell squarely within the exception.
• Purposive Limits: While purposive interpretation is legitimate, it cannot rewrite clear statutory language. The Court emphasised the regulatory system’s design: policy gaps are for the LPC and Secretary of State, not for judicial “patching”.
• Findings of Fact Immune: The ET’s factual findings — e.g., journeys could last eight hours, workers were free to chat or sleep — were accepted. The error lay in law, not fact: the ET failed to couple regulation 30 with regulation 34.

3.3 Impact of the Decision

Immediate Practical Effects

• Employers who collect staff from home in company vehicles will not owe NMW for that travel time, provided workers are not performing actual work en route.
• HMRC compliance officers must recalibrate enforcement strategies; notices of under-payment grounded solely on home-to-assignment travel are vulnerable.

Wider Legal Significance

• Clarification of “Time Work”: The judgment provides definitive guidance on the interplay between regulations 30 and 34, closing arguments that employer-mandated travel is inherently “work”.
• Methodological Precedent: Re-affirms that courts must read deeming provisions alongside primary definitions, resisting selective or sequential analysis.
• Signal to Legislators: If extended travel without pay is thought inequitable, the remedy lies with regulatory amendment, not judicial creativity.
• Indirect Effects on Gig Economy: While gig-worker travel (e.g., taxi drivers) often involves actual driving work, peripheral journeys (to log-on points, vehicle depots) are now less likely to attract NMW protection.

4. Complex Concepts Simplified

• Time Work: One of four NMW categories. It covers work paid by reference to hours worked. But activities such as sleep or travel are only included if the Regulations deem them in.
• Deeming Provision: A rule that treats something as work (or not work) regardless of everyday language. Regulations 32-34 are classic deeming clauses.
• “Would Otherwise Be Working”: A counter-factual test: if the worker were not travelling, would they be engaged in their usual duties at that time? If yes (e.g., midday trip between client sites), the travel is brought in — unless the home-travel exception applies.
• Low Pay Commission (LPC): An expert body that advises the government on NMW policy. Its reports heavily influence, but do not dictate, statutory text.
• Purposive Construction: Interpreting legislation to advance its purpose. Courts may deploy it, but cannot defeat explicit wording.

5. Conclusion

The Court of Appeal has drawn a bright, easily administered line: mere travel from home to the first place of work — even if long, compulsory and employer-organised — is not “time work” under the 2015 Regulations. The decision harmonises the treatment of travel with the Supreme Court’s handling of sleep-in shifts and underscores a restrained judicial role: perceived injustices in minimum-wage coverage must be corrected by the LPC and Parliament, not by courts stretching statutory language.

For practitioners, the ruling provides clarity, but also a caution: where a worker performs any productive or mandated function during travel (driving, preparing paperwork, conducting meetings), those hours may still constitute “actual work” and attract NMW. Employers and advisers should audit travel-time practices accordingly.