Case Title: B.K. Pavitra v. Union of India,
In this case, a two-judge Supreme Court panel issued an intriguing decision which addressed the nexus between seniority difficulties and reservations for members of Scheduled Castes and Scheduled Tribes (SCs/STs) in promotions. The situation was: In 2002, the state of Karnataka passed a law mandating that SC/ST employees would get consequential seniority following their promotions. Simply said, if a member of the reserved category (A) received a promotion before a more senior employee (B) due to A's membership in the reserved category, A would now be superior to B in the higher-level position (when, eventually, the latter would get promoted as well).
This long-running controversy was finally resolved by changes made to Article 16(4A) of the Constitution, which authorized the use of consequential seniority in cases of reservations in promotions. While upholding the amendment in question, the Supreme Court's Constitution Bench also ruled in M. Nagaraj v. Union of India, that the government had to first gather evidence of the "inadequacy" of SC/ST representation in the workforce, their "backwardness," and how this affected "efficiency" before it could pass legislation in accordance with Article 16. (4A).
After that, in 2017, the Supreme Court ruled that the Karnataka law was invalid since it did not follow the Nagaraj judgement (B.K. Pavitra – I). In response, the Karnataka government ordered a review (known as "the Ratna Prabha Committee Report") and based on the report's findings, the prior statute was essentially reinstated.
Numerous questions were brought up by constitutionally challenging the law. It was argued that by re-enacting the law that had been found to be illegal and doing so retroactively on top of that, Karnataka had improperly "overruled" the Pavitra - I ruling. It was claimed that the law had been forwarded to the President for assent stood in error. The study that served as the foundation for the law's passage was said to be flawed. Additionally, it was claimed that the law violated the Constitution because it did not exempt the "creamy layer."
The way this decision moves through different levels of reasoning—from concrete service law issues to abstract substantive equality and merit principles—and how it weaves them all together in one coherent vision of transformative constitutionalism makes it an interesting read. In other words, the Court believes that the Constitution's ideals matter, and it explains precisely how it does so. The Court's conclusion on the substantive question—the constitutionality of the seniority law—is informed by its reasoning about the abstract principles that underline the Constitution's equality code.
Additionally, it continues a significant line of judicial reasoning on affirmative action that critically examines the concepts of "merit" and "efficiency" in light of the original constitutional vision and the ways in which they are ingrained in our social realities. The judgment represented a significant turning point in the development of the tradition of thinking, which had been neglected in our constitutional history.