Conn. Gen. Stat. § 46a-82
(1949 Rev., S. 7406; 1959, P.A. 334; February, 1965, P.A. 576; 1967, P.A. 715, S. 3; 1971, P.A. 547, S. 1; P.A. 74-54; P.A. 75-27; 75-214, S. 1, 2; P.A. 76-141, S. 1, 2; P.A. 80-422, S. 30; P.A. 83-569, S. 13, 17; P.A. 90-246, S. 9; P.A. 91-58, S. 28; P.A. 07-142, S. 5; June Sp. Sess. P.A. 15-5, S. 74.)
Annotations to former section 31-127: Former limitation period of 6 months did not begin to run until expiration of period within which it could reasonably be expected that application would be acted upon. 140 Conn. 537. Where nothing in the record indicated consideration of commission's complaint by commission members, complaint did not contain the date of the alleged unfair practice as required by regulation and nowhere in the statement of facts, finding or conclusion of the hearing tribunal did it appear when plaintiff was alleged to have committed the act charged, held the complaint and findings were defective and plaintiff's appeal from cease and desist order of commission's hearing tribunal should be sustained. 153 C. 174. Cited. Id., 652; 163 Conn. 327; 165 Conn. 318; 170 Conn. 327; 176 C. 291; 178 C. 700; 198 Conn. 479; 211 Conn. 464. Order must be limited to unfair practice found to exist and should leave applicant free to determine whether or not he still seeks that employment; it should not be an affirmative order to employ the applicant. 17 Conn.Supp. 93. Former 6-month period of limitation cannot begin until the discrimination is established. 18 CS 131. Legislative intent was to impose mere administrative duty on chairman to appoint hearing tribunal after certification of complaint; no discretion involved; only hearing tribunal can determine whether unfair employment practice exists; Attorney General has no authority to overrule investigator's certification. 27 CS 147. Cited. 28 CS 344. Statute contemplates no determination of probable cause until after an investigation has been completed. 35 Conn.Supp. 565. Annotations to present section: Cited. 195 Conn. 226; Id., 543; 198 Conn. 479; 202 Conn. 601; Id., 609; 211 Conn. 464; 232 Conn. 91; 236 Conn. 250. Cited. 3 Conn.App. 464; 44 Conn.App. 446. Subsec. (a): Statute does not require that specific statutory reference be stated in complaint. 46 CS 153. Subsec. (e): Filing requirement is not pure statute of limitations which may be raised only by a party as a special defense; commission has standing to raise time limit issue due to its institutional responsibilities in the petition process, which are different from those of a court; filing requirement is not subject matter jurisdictional; it is mandatory and subject to consent, waiver or equitable tolling. 257 C. 258. Subsec. is a mandatory time limitation and is jurisdictional. 54 CA 251. Filing period commences upon actual cessation of employment, rather than notice thereof. 103 CA 188. Subsec. (f): Statute of limitations began to run on the last day the plaintiff worked, not on the date of notice thereof. 289 C. 57. Town's failure to further investigate plaintiff's allegations, absent other allegations, does not constitute a discriminatory act from which the statute of limitations would run. 136 CA 278. Because allegations in the amended complaint present a different set of operative facts from those presented in the initial complaint, the relation back doctrine is inapplicable, and therefore allegations of retaliatory acts occurring more than 180 days prior to filing of amended complaint are time barred. 138 CA 141.