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  • provisions of Chapter VIII, Rule 5 of the rules
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Citation Codes
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citation codes
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  • provisions of Chapter VIII, Rule 5 of the rules
  • Rule 10(1) of the Allahabad High Court Rules
  • Rule 5 of the Allahabad High Court Rules
Smart Summary

Factual and Procedural Background

This special appeal challenges an interim order dated 1-7-2004 passed by a learned single Judge, which stayed the State Government's order dated 7-6-2004. The State Government's order had deprived the writ petitioner, who was the Adhyaksha of Zila Panchayat, Kanpur Nagar, of her financial and administrative powers pending an enquiry into charges under the proviso to Section 29(1) of the U.P Kshetra Panchayat and Zila Panchayat Adhiniyam, 1961. The enquiry was initiated following allegations of misconduct, with a Commissioner appointed as Inquiry Officer after concerns of bias against the District Magistrate initially assigned. The Commissioner found eight out of fifteen charges prima facie proved against the petitioner. The writ petitioner challenged the deprivation of powers, leading to the interim order under appeal.

Legal Issues Presented

  1. Whether a special appeal lies against an interim order passed by a learned single Judge during summer vacations exercising jurisdiction normally vested in a Division Bench under Chapter V, Rule 10(1) of the Allahabad High Court Rules.
  2. Whether a special appeal is maintainable against an interim order that grants final relief prayed for in the writ petition.
  3. The scope and limits of interference by the High Court under Article 226 of the Constitution in matters involving prima facie findings under the proviso to Section 29(1) of the U.P Kshetra Panchayat and Zila Panchayat Adhiniyam, 1961.
  4. The correctness of the interim order staying the State Government's order depriving the petitioner of her financial and administrative powers pending enquiry.
  5. Whether the transfer of financial and administrative powers to a committee of three elected members of the Zila Panchayat complies with the proviso to Section 29(1) of the Adhiniyam.

Arguments of the Parties

Respondents' Arguments

  • The interim order dated 1-7-2004 was passed during summer vacations and thus should be treated as an order of a Division Bench, barring special appeal.
  • No special appeal lies against an interim order.
  • The procedure for holding the enquiry was not followed properly.
  • The administrative and financial powers, if taken away from the Adhyaksha, should have been given to the District Magistrate or another officer rather than to three elected members of the Zila Panchayat.
  • The three members appointed to exercise the powers had contested election against the respondent, which was argued to be inappropriate.
  • Reliance on the Supreme Court decision in Devraj v. State of Maharashtra to support the validity of the interim order granting final relief.

Court's Response to Arguments

  • Rejected the contention that the order passed by a single Judge during summer vacations becomes an order of a Division Bench; the single Judge exercises Division Bench jurisdiction but does not become a Division Bench.
  • Held that special appeal lies against an interim order granting final relief.
  • Did not consider the procedural objections regarding the enquiry as the appeal was allowed solely on the ground that final relief could not be granted by an interim order.
  • Upheld the transfer of powers to three elected members as mandated by the proviso to Section 29(1), rejecting the objection regarding the eligibility of the members.
  • Distinguished the Devraj case as an exceptional circumstance where only one nomination was filed and no contest existed, unlike the present case.

Table of Precedents Cited

Precedent Rule or Principle Cited For Application by the Court
State of U.P v. Smt. Dayavati Khanna, 1995 (Suppl) RD 159 Clarification that a single Judge exercising Division Bench jurisdiction does not become a Division Bench for purposes of appeals. Supported the court's view that special appeal lies against the interim order passed by the single Judge during summer vacations.
Ashok Kumar Bajpai v. Dr. (Smt.) Ranjana Bajpai, 2004 (1) AWC 88 When an interim order amounts to a judgment and thus is appealable. Used to justify maintainability of special appeal against interim orders granting final relief.
Committee of Mgt. v. Manju Keshi Dixit, 1999 (4) AWC 3167 Special appeal maintainable against interim order granting final relief. Reinforced the principle that interim orders granting final relief are appealable.
State of U.P v. Param Hansh Singh, 2001 (3) AWC 2106 Interim orders granting principal relief claimed are appealable. Supported the court's view that the interim order was appealable.
Hind Lamps Ltd. v. Deputy Labour Commissioner, 2002 (3) AWC 1908 Special appeal maintainable against interlocutory orders granting relief affecting vital rights. Affirmed appealability of such interim orders.
Prof. Y.C Simhadri v. Deen Bandhu Pathak, 2001 (3) UPLBEC 2373 Special appeal lies against interlocutory orders with traits of finality. Supported the principle that the impugned order was appealable.
Sandeep Agarwal v. Adarsh Chaddha, 2002 (4) AWC 3083 Interim orders with trappings of final orders are appealable. Reinforced appealability of the impugned interim order.
Nagar Palika Inter College v. Dr. Hawaldar Singh, 1993 AWC 1362 Interim order granting final relief is illegal and appealable. Referenced to distinguish the limits of interim relief.
State of U.P v. Kumari Renu Tiwari, 1993 (3) UPLBEC 1325 Special appeal maintainable against interim orders granting practical final relief. Supported the maintainability of the appeal.
Union of India v. Modiluft Ltd., 2003 (6) SCC 65 Interim order cannot grant final relief. Used to emphasize that final relief cannot be granted by interim orders.
Assistant Collector of Central Excise v. Dunlop India Ltd., (1985) 1 SCC 260 Disapproval of interim orders granting principal relief. Supported the court's stance against granting final relief via interim order.
Union of India v. Jain Shudh Vanaspati Ltd., Civil Appeal No. 11450 of 1983 Interim orders granting substantial relief are not warranted. Reinforced the principle limiting interim relief.
State of Rajasthan v. Swaika Properties, (1985) 3 SCC 217 Interim orders granting final relief are improper. Supported the court’s reasoning on interim relief.
State of West Bengal v. Calcutta Hardware Stores, (1986) 2 SCC 203 Admonition against interim orders granting final relief. Reiterated the caution against such interim orders.
U.P Junior Doctors' Action Committee v. Dr. B. Sheetal Nandwani, 1992 Supp (1) SCC 680 Relief available at interlocutory stage should not be granted. Supported the principle restricting interlocutory relief.
Guru Nanak Dev University v. Parminder Kumar Bansal, (1993) 4 SCC 401 Admission should not be granted by interim directions. Illustrated limits on interim relief in educational matters.
Bharatbhushan Sonaji Kshirsagar v. Abdul Khalik Mohd. Musa, 1995 Supp (2) SCC 593 Interim orders allowing writ petition relief should not be passed. Reinforced the limitation on interim relief.
Commissioner Secretary to Government v. Dr. Ashok Kumar Kohli, 1995 Supp (4) SCC 214 Restriction on interim orders granting final relief. Supported the court’s approach.
Bank of Maharashtra v. Race Shipping and Transport Co. (P) Ltd., (1995) 3 SCC 257 Disapproval of interim orders granting principal relief. Affirmed the limits on interim relief.
Ranjeet Singh v. Ravi Prakash, (2004) 3 SCC 682 High Court cannot sit in appeal over prima facie findings of enquiry officer. Applied to limit interference with preliminary enquiry findings.
Mukesh Rajput v. State of U.P, 2003 3 UPLBEC 2587 Prima facie findings are subject to regular enquiry; writ court cannot interfere prematurely. Supported refusal to interfere with State Government’s order pending enquiry.
Chandra Singh v. State of Rajasthan, 2003 (6) SCC 545 Writ jurisdiction is discretionary; court not bound to interfere even on error of law. Supported discretionary refusal to interfere under Article 226.
Ramniklal Bhutta v. State of Maharashtra, (1997) 1 SCC 134 Discretionary nature of writ jurisdiction. Reinforced the court’s discretionary approach.
Union Public Service Commission v. Rajeshwar Singh, 2003 (3) UPLBEC 2393 Discretionary writ jurisdiction. Supported refusal to interfere prematurely.

Court's Reasoning and Analysis

The Court analyzed the jurisdictional question under Chapter V, Rule 10(1) of the Allahabad High Court Rules and concluded that a single Judge exercising Division Bench jurisdiction during summer vacations does not become a Division Bench, and thus the order passed remains that of a single Judge. Consequently, a special appeal lies against such an order under Chapter VIII, Rule 5.

Regarding appealability, the Court relied on numerous precedents establishing that an interim order which grants final relief prayed for in the writ petition is effectively a judgment and is appealable by way of special appeal. The impugned interim order permitting the writ petitioner to continue exercising financial and administrative powers was thus maintainable as a subject of appeal.

The Court distinguished the Supreme Court decision in Devraj v. State of Maharashtra, which allowed final relief by interim order only in exceptional and "fool proof" cases where no contest existed. The present case involved serious allegations and ongoing enquiry, making it unsuitable for such relief.

The Court emphasized that under the proviso to Section 29(1) of the U.P Kshetra Panchayat and Zila Panchayat Adhiniyam, the State Government may temporarily deprive the Adhyaksha of powers if prima facie financial irregularities are found, pending final enquiry. The Court cannot interfere with the prima facie findings of the Inquiry Officer, nor substitute its opinion for the enquiry process.

It held that the learned single Judge erred in granting final relief by the interim order and should have confined himself to directing the expeditious completion of the enquiry. The Court rejected the respondents' contention that the powers should have been given to the District Magistrate rather than elected members, since the proviso explicitly mandates delegation to a committee of three elected members.

Finally, the Court noted that writ jurisdiction is discretionary and interference under Article 226 is not warranted at this interlocutory stage, especially given the ongoing enquiry and prima facie findings.

Holding and Implications

The Court ALLOWED the special appeal and set aside the impugned interim order dated 1-7-2004 passed by the learned single Judge.

The direct effect of this decision is that the stay granted by the interim order on the State Government’s order depriving the petitioner of her financial and administrative powers is vacated, thereby permitting the State Government's order to operate pending final enquiry. The Court directed that the writ petition be decided finally at an early date and that the parties may apply for expedition to the Chief Justice.

No new precedent was established; the Court applied and reiterated established principles limiting the grant of final relief by interim orders and underscoring the discretionary nature of writ jurisdiction and the importance of respecting prima facie findings in administrative enquiries.

    State Of Uttar Pradesh And Others v. Smt. Meera Sankhwar And Others

    M. Katju, J.:— This special appeal has been filed against the impugned interim order of a learned single Judge dated 1-7-2004. By that order the learned single Judge has stayed the order of the State Government dated 7-6-2004 by which the writ petitioner (who was the Adhyaksha of Zila Panchayat, Kanpur Nagar) was deprived of her financial and administrative powers pending the enquiry into the charges against her under the proviso to Section 29(1) of the U.P Kshetra Panchayat and Zila Panchayat Adhiniyam, 1961.

    2. Heard learned counsel for the parties. A preliminary objections has been taken by the learned counsel for the respondents in this appeal that the impugned interim order dated 1-7-2004 was passed by a learned single Judge during the summer vacations and hence in view of Chapter V, Rule 10(1) of the Allahabad High Court Rules the said interim order amounts to an order of a Division Bench of this Court; and hence no special appeal will lie against it. We do not agree.

    3. Chapter V, Rule 10 states:—

    “Criminal work shall continue to be dealt, with during the vacation by such Judge as may be appointed for the purpose by the Chief Justice.

    4. They may also exercise original, appellate, revisional, civil or writ jurisdiction vested in the Court in fresh matters which in their opinion require immediate attention.

    5. Such jurisdiction may be exercised even in cases which are under the Rules cognizable by two or more Judges, unless the case is required by any other law to be heard by more than one Judge.”

    6. The provision in the said Rule that the jurisdiction of a Division Bench can be exercised by a learned single Judge does not mean that the order of a learned single Judge becomes an order of Division Bench. It only means that the learned single Judge can exercise the jurisdiction which normally a Division Bench exercises. This does not mean that the single Judge becomes a Division Bench. Hence in our opinion the order remains an order of a learned single Judge, and hence a Special Appeal will lie under Chapter VIII, Rule 5 of the High Court Rules.

    7. A similar view was taken by a Division Bench of this Court in State of U.P v. Smt. Dayavati Khanna, 1995 (Suppl) RD 159.

    8. It is then contended by the respondents that no Special Appeal lies against an interim order.

    9. We are of the opinion that by the impugned interim order the learned single Judge has granted the final relief of permitting the writ petitioner to continue to exercise the financial and administrative powers of Adhyaksha of the Zila Panchayat, Kanpur Nagar. Hence in our opinion this Special Appeal is maintainable.

    10. In this connection we may mention that Chapter VIII, Rule 5 of the Allahabad High Court Rules states that an appeal shall lie to the Court from a judgment. As to when an interim order will be a judgment and when it will not, has been discussed in detail by a Division Bench of this Court in Ashok Kumar Bajpai… v. Dr. (Smt.) Ranjana Bajpai…., 2004 (1) AWC 88 : 2004 All LJ 953.

    11. In Committee of Mgt. v. Manju Keshi Dixit, 1999 (4) AWC 3167 a Division Bench of this Court held that a special appeal against an interim order of a learned single Judge in writ petition was maintainable where it virtually gave the final relief prayed for. That interim order stated:

    “Until further orders we direct that the petitioner shall get salary of LT Grade teacher and no recovery shall be made in respect of LT Grade which he had already received.”

    12. The Division Bench was of the view that the special appeal was maintainable against that impugned interim order because the said order amounted to a judgment as it gave the final relief prayed for. The Division Bench followed the decisions in (i) U.P Jr. Doctor's Action Committee v. Dr. B. Sheetal Nandwani, 1992 (1) JT (SC) 571 : (1992 All LJ 224) (ii) State of U.P v. Committee of Management, 1994 (3) High Court Views Daily (All) 153 (iii) State of U.P v. Smt. Dayawanti Khanna, 1994 ALR 140, (iv) Ramayan Rao v. Rama Shanker Prasad, 1993 (2) ACJ 938, and (v) State of U.P v. Km. Renu Tiwari, 1993 (3) ALR 233.

    13. Similarly in State of U.P v. Param Hansh Singh, 2001 (3) AWC 2106 : (2001 All LJ 2073) a similar view has been reiterated. It was held therein that if an interim order amounts to final relief claimed in the writ petition, the special appeal is maintainable. The Court held as under:

    “In our opinion, the contention raised has no substance. The provisions of Chapter VIII, Rule 5 of the rules do not prohibit filing of special appeal against an interim order. If the interim order is of such a nature which grants principal relief claimed in the writ petition, the special appeal against such an order cannot be held to be barred.”

    14. A similar view has been reiterated in Hind Lamps Ltd. v. Deputy Labour Commissioner, Agra, 2002 (3) AWC 1908, and State of U.P v. Kumari Renu Tiwari, 1993 (2) UPLBEC 1325 : Prof. Y.C Simhadri Vice Chancellor, Banaras Hindu University v. Deen Bandhu Pathak, 2001 (4) AWC 2688 : 2001 (3) UPLBEC 2373 : (2001 All LJ 2081). In all these cases it was held that an interlocutory order which decides the matter in dispute or affects vital and valuable rights of the parties and which works serious in justice to the parties concerned, is a judgment and is as such appealable.

    15. In Sandeep Agarwal v. Adarsh Chaddha, 2002 (4) AWC 3083, the Court held that when the order of the Court has the trappings of a final order it would be appealable for the reason that there may not be final adjudication of the case nor the proceedings may come to an end, but if the order grants relief which could have been granted after final adjudication on the disputed questions, it would amount to a judg ment.

    16. In Society Madarsa Mazahir Ulopm Mubarak Shah Saharanpur… v. Muzaffar Hussain…., 1994 AWC 55, it was held that where the order passed by this Court affects the valuable rights and amounts to prehearing the judgment, it would be appealable. While deciding the case, the Court placed reliance upon a large number of judgments including Nagar Palika Inter College, Jaunpur v. Dr. Hawaldar Singh, 1993 AWC 1362 : (1993 All LJ 1247) and Committee of Management of S.S.W Post Graduate College, Hapur v. Sushil Kumar Sharma, 1993 (2) UPLBEC 1263, etc.

    17. In view of the above decisions we are clearly of the opinion that this special appeal is maintainable as it has been filed against an interim order granting the final relief.

    18. In Prof. Y.C Simhadri v. Deen Bandhu Pathak, 2001 (3) UPLBEC 2373 : (2001 All LJ 2081), a Division Bench of this Court has held that a special appeal will lie against an interlocutory order where the said order contains the traits and trappings of finality.

    19. In the aforesaid decision the special appeal was directed against an order of the learned single Judge who had entertained an application filed by the writ petitioner under Art. 215 of the Constitution on the allegation that an earlier order passed by the learned single Judge had not been complied with. The Division Bench held that a special appeal was maintainable against this interlocutory order.

    20. In Sandeep Agarwal v. Adarsh Chaddha, 2002 (4) AWC 3083 a Division Bench of this Court held that the special appeal against an interim order of a learned single Judge directing the Registrar to hold election on the basis of the list of the voters valid on 21-3-1999 and also directing to ignore all resolutions passed subsequently was maintainable because the interim order has the trapping of a final order. The Division Bench referred to a large number of Supreme Court decisions on the point.

    21. In Hind Lamps Ltd. v. Deputy Labour Commissioner, 2002 (3) AWC 1908 a Division Bench held that a special appeal against an interim order of the learned single Judge to be maintainable. By his order the learned single Judge had stayed the order dated 27-3-2002 passed by the Deputy Labour Commissioner, Agra granting permission to the appellant to lay off its workmen, and further directing that a fresh application may be made complying with the rules and the same may be disposed off expeditiously. The Division Bench held that such an interim order should not have been passed, and a special appeal lie against it.

    22. In Nagar Palika Inter College v. Dr. Hawaldar Singh, 1993 AWC 1362 a learned single Judge of this Court directed that the petitioner should be appointed as the Principal of the College within a month and be paid salary. Against this interim order a special appeal was filed before a Division Bench which set aside the interim order holding that it has granted the final relief and hence was illegal. This decision relied on the Supreme Court decision in Shah Babulal Khimji v. Jayaben D. Kania, (1981) 4 SCC 8 : AIR 1981 SC 1786 vide para 113(3).

    23. In State of U.P v. Kumari Renu Tiwari, 1993 (3) UPLBEC 1325 a special appeal was filed against the interim order of this Court of a learned single Judge by which the petitioner was directed to be paid salary in a particular grade’ and to be given other benefits available to regularly appointed lecturers. The Division Bench held that by the interim order practically the final relief has been granted which could not have been done. Accordingly the special appeal was held to be maintainable and was allowed.

    24. In Union of India v. Modiluft Ltd., 2003 (4) AWC 2796 : ((2003) 6 SCC 65 : AIR 2003 SC 2218) a three Judge Bench of the Supreme Court (vide paras 16 and 17) held that by an interim order the final relief in the case can not be granted.

    25. In Assistant Collector of Central Excise v. Dunlop India Ltd., (1985) 1 SCC 260 : AIR 1985 SC 330 (vide para 5) the Supreme Court deprecated the practice of granting an interim order which practically gave the principle relief sought in the petition.

    26. Similar view was taken by the Supreme Court in Union of India v. Jain Shudh Vanaspati Ltd. Civil Appeal No. 11450 of 1983 in which the Supreme Court observed:

    “After hearing learned counsel for the rival parties, we are of the opinion that the interim order passed by the High Court on Nov. 29, 1983 is not warranted since it virtually grants to the respondents a substantial part of the relief claimed by them in their writ petition. Accordingly, we set aside the said order.”

    27. The above view was followed by the Supreme Court in State of Rajasthan v. Swaika Properties, (1985) 3 SCC 217 : AIR 1985 SC 1289 (vide para 10).

    28. A similar view again taken by the Supreme Court in State of West Bengal v. Calcutta Hardware Stores, (1986) 2 SCC 203 : AIR 1986 SC 614 where the Supreme Court again administered a strong admonition deprecating the practice of the High Court of granting interim orders which practically have the effect of granting the final relief prayed for.

    29. In U.P Junior Doctors' Action Committee v. Dr. B. Sheetal Nandwani, 1992 Supp (1) SCC 680 : AIR 1992 SC 671 (vide para 8) the Supreme Court observed:

    “It is a well known rule of practice and procedure that at interlocutory stage a relief which is asked for and is available at the disposal of the matter is not granted.”

    30. In Guru Nanak Dev University v. Parminder Kumar Bansal, (1993) 4 SCC 401 : AIR 1993 SC 2412 the Supreme Court observed that admission should not be granted in an educational institution by means of interim directions.

    31. In Bharatbhushan Sonaji Kshirsagar v. Abdul Khalik Mohd. Musa, 1995 Supp (2) SCC 593 the Supreme Court again reiterated that an interim order passed pending a writ petition which has the effect of allowing the writ petition should not have been passed.

    32. A similar view was taken by the Supreme Court in Commissioner Secretary to Government v. Dr. Ashok Kumar Kohli, 1995 Supp (4) SCC 214 and in Bank of Maharashtra v. Race Shipping and Transport Company (P) Ltd., (1995) 3 SCC 257 : AIR 1995 SC 1368.

    33. Learned counsel for the respondents (writ petitioners) invited our attention to a two Judge Bench Decision of the Supreme Court in Devraj v. State of Maharashtra, 2004 (4) JT SC 440 : ((2004) 4 SCC 697 : AIR 2004 SC 1975) and on the strength of paras 12 and 13 of the same submitted that the said interim order could be passed granting final relief.

    34. We have carefully perused the judgment of the Supreme Court in Devraj v. State of Maharashtra (supra), and we are of the opinion that the said decision is wholly distinguishable. In that case the facts were that in an election only one nomination was filed which was found to be in order and was not withdrawn. The time for filing nominations, scrutiny and withdrawal was over and there was no contest. Nothing remained to be done. Hence in these very rare and exceptional circumstances the Supreme Court held that since it was a fool proof case interim order can be granted giving final relief of declaration of the result.

    35. In our opinion in the present case it cannot be said that there is a fool proof case in favour of the writ petitioner. In the present case the facts are that there were several serious allegations against the writ petitioner and an inquiry was set up under Section 29 of the U.P Kshettra Panchayat and Zila Panchayat Adhiniyam in which the District Magistrate was initially appointed as the Inquiry Officer. The writ petitioner alleged that the District Magistrate was prejudiced against her and the Inquiry Officer should be changed. Hence the State Government appointed the Commissioner as the Inquiry Officer. After holding a preliminary enquiry the Commissioner found that out of the 15 charges against the writ petitioner as many as eight charges were prima facie found proved.

    36. In this connection we may refer to Section 29(1) of the said Adhiniyam:—

    “If in the opinion of the State Government the Adhyaksha or the Up-Adhyaksha while acting in place of Adhyaksha willfully omits or refuses to perform his duties or functions under this Act or abuses the powers vested in him or is found to be guilty of misconduct in the discharge of his duties, (or because physically or mentally incapacitated for performing his duties) the State Government, after giving the Adhyaksha or Up-Adhyaksha, as the case may be, a reasonable opportunity for explanation may by order remove him from office (and such order shall be final and not open to be questioned in a Court of law):

    (Provided that where in an enquiry held by such person and in such manner as may be prescribed, an Adhyaksha or Up-Adhyaksha is prima facie found to have committed financial and other irregularities such Adhyaksha or Upadhyaksha shall cease to exercise and perform the financial and administrative powers and functions, which shall, until he is exonerated of the charges in the final enquiry, be exercised and performed by a committee consisting of three elected members of the Zila Panchayat appointed in this behalf by the State Government.”

    37. Under the proviso to Section 29(1) in the preliminary inquiry if there is prima facie satisfaction in the enquiry officer that the Adhayaksha has committed financial and other irregularites he can be temporarily deprived of his financial and administrative powers and functions, which may be restored if he is exonerated of the charges in the final enquiry. At the present stage the enquiry is still going on and the learned Commissioner has found 8 of the 15 charges to be prima facie proved against the petitioner. This Court cannot sit in an appeal over this prima facie finding of the Commissioner, vide Ranjeet Singh v. Ravi Prakash., (2004) 3 SCC 682 : (AIR 2004 SC 3892).

    38. In Mukesh Rajput v. State of U.P, (2003) 3 UPLBEC 2587 a Division Bench of this Court held that prima facie findings under the proviso to Section 29(1) are subject to the findings in the regular inquiry. This Court under Art. 226 of the Constitution cannot sit as a Court of appeal over the prima facie findings of the Commissioner. Moreover, the order under the proviso to Section 29(1) was only interlocutory in nature since the guilt or innocence of the petitioner has yet to be established in the regular inquiry. For these reasons the Division Bench dismissed the writ petition.

    39. Sri T.P Singh, learned counsel for the respondents submitted that procedure for holding the inquiry was not followed. Since we are allowing this appeal only on the ground that by an interim order final relief has been granted which could not be validly done we are not going into this point submitted by Sri T.P Singh. He can urge it at the time of final hearing of the writ petition.

    40. We are further of the opinion that this is not a fit case for interference under Art. 226 of the Constitution. Writ jurisdiction is discretionary jurisdiction vide Chandra Singh v. State of Rajasthan, 2003 (6) JT (SC) 20 : ((2003) 6 SCC 545 : AIR 2003 SC 2889) (vide para 42), Ramniklal Bhutta v. State of Maharashtra, (1997) 1 SCC 134 : (AIR 1997 SC 1236), Union Public Service Commission v. Rajeshwar Singh, 2003 (3) UPLBEC 2393 : (2002 All LJ 2385), etc. Hence, even when there is an error of law this Court is not bound to interfere.

    41. On the facts of the case we are of the opinion that apart from what we have stated above the learned single Judge should not have interfered with the order dated 7-6-2004, and he should only have directed that the enquiry be completed expeditiously. The enquiry is still pending and hence it would be inappropriate to interfere with the impunged order of the State Government at this stage, particularly by an interim order.

    42. Shri T.P Singh learned counsel for the respondent in this appeal has submitted that even if the administrative and financial powers of the Adhyaksha were to be taken away they should have been given to the District Magistrate or some other officer, instead of giving them to members of the Zila Panchayat. We cannot agree with this submission. The proviso to Section 29(1) clearly mentions that such powers can only be given to three elected members of the Zila Panchayat. Shri Singh then urged that the three persons appointed had contested election against the respondent. There is nothing in the proviso to Section 29(1) that a person who had contested election against the Adhyaksha cannot be a member of the three member committee. All that the proviso requires is that he should be an elected member of the Zila Panchayat.

    43. For the reasons given above we set aside the impunged interim order of the learned single Judge dated 1-7-2004 and request the Court before whom the matter may come up now to decide the writ petition itself finally at an early date.

    44. Appeal is allowed.

    45. The parties may approach Hon'ble the Chief Justice with an expedite application. Let a copy of this order be given to the learned counsel for the parties on payment of usual charges by tomorrow.

    46. Appeal allowed.

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    State Of Uttar Pradesh And Others v. Smt. Meera Sankhwar And Others
    (Jul 12, 2004)