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citation codes
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  • SECTION 106 TRANSFER OF PROPERTY ACT
  • Sections 106 and 107 of the Transfer of Property Act.
  • Order 12, Rule 6 of the Code of Civil Procedure
  • Order 12, Rule 8, C.P.C;2.
  • Order 12, Rule 6, C.P.C
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Cites
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Citation Codes
Equivalent Citations
citation codes
Case Number
Attorney(S)
Judges
Acts
  • SECTION 106 TRANSFER OF PROPERTY ACT
  • Sections 106 and 107 of the Transfer of Property Act.
  • Order 12, Rule 6 of the Code of Civil Procedure
  • Order 12, Rule 8, C.P.C;2.
  • Order 12, Rule 6, C.P.C
Smart Summary

Factual and Procedural Background

The plaintiff/respondents filed a suit against the defendant/appellant seeking eviction and recovery of possession of premises measuring 6359.85 sq. ft. at property No. 71/2, Industrial Area, Najafgarh Road, New Delhi. The suit also sought recovery of Rs. 3,51,000/- in arrears of rent and damages/mesne profits from 1.5.1995 until vacation of the premises. The premises had been let out at a monthly rent of Rs. 9,500/-. The tenancy was terminated by a registered notice dated 16.3.1995 effective from 30.4.1995. Despite service of notice, the appellant did not vacate the premises and failed to pay rent from 1.3.1992 to 30.4.1997. The defendant contested the suit claiming the tenancy was permanent and not temporary, relying on Section 106 of the Transfer of Property Act, and challenged the validity of the termination notice.

The plaintiff filed an application under Order 12, Rule 6, C.P.C. seeking decree for possession based on the defendant's admission in the written statement. The Trial Court, by judgment dated 4.6.1997, held no material dispute existed, validated the notice of termination, and passed a decree for eviction under Order 12, Rule 6, C.P.C., leaving the quantum of arrears and mesne profits for trial. The defendant/appellant filed the present appeal against the decree dated 4.9.1997.

Legal Issues Presented

  1. Whether the tenancy was a lease from year to year requiring six months' notice of termination under Section 106 of the Transfer of Property Act, or a monthly tenancy terminable by 15 days' notice.
  2. Whether the notice of termination dated 16.3.1995 was valid and in accordance with law.
  3. Whether a decree for possession could be passed under Order 12, Rule 6, C.P.C. based on admissions in the written statement without framing an issue on the legal question of tenancy duration and notice validity.

Arguments of the Parties

Appellant's Arguments

  • The tenancy was intended to be permanent or from year to year because the lease was granted for manufacturing purposes.
  • The notice of termination dated 16.3.1995 was not in conformity with Section 106 of the Transfer of Property Act, which requires six months' notice expiring on the last day of the tenancy year.
  • The admission of receipt of notice could not be taken in isolation, as the appellant raised a legal question about the nature of tenancy and validity of notice.
  • The Court should have framed an issue on the legal question instead of passing decree under Order 12, Rule 6, C.P.C.
  • Section 107 of the Transfer of Property Act, requiring registered instruments for leases exceeding one year, controls the application of Section 106, and since no registered lease deed existed, the tenancy should be deemed month-to-month.
  • Reliance was placed on the Supreme Court decision in Ram Kumar Das v. Jagdish Chandra Deo, which supports the appellant’s position.

Respondents' Arguments

The opinion does not contain a detailed account of the respondents' legal arguments.

Table of Precedents Cited

Precedent Rule or Principle Cited For Application by the Court
Jagat Taran Berry v. Sardar Sant Singh, AIR 1980 Delhi 7 Interpretation of Sections 106 and 107 of the Transfer of Property Act regarding tenancy duration and notice requirements. Followed by the Trial Court and approved by the Division Bench to hold that absence of registered instrument implies a contract to the contrary, making the tenancy month-to-month.
Theeta Industrial Heating Equipments (P) Ltd. v. Harvinder Singh, 1996 (39) D.R.J 739 Approval of the legal position in Jagat Taran Berry’s case on tenancy and notice. Used to affirm the Trial Court’s approach and reasoning in the present case.
State Bank of India v. Ashok Kumar Gupta, 47 (1992) D.L.T 679 Validity of notice of termination under the Transfer of Property Act. Relied upon by the Trial Court to uphold the validity of the notice served on the appellant.
D. Rani Puri v. Chanan Lal, 1987 II AD (Delhi) 679 Principles governing tenancy termination notices. Applied by the Trial Court in validating the notice of termination.
Ram Kumar Das v. Jagdish Chandra Deo, AIR 1952 S.C 23 Requirement of registered instrument for leases exceeding one year and effect on tenancy duration and notice. Considered and distinguished by the Trial Court in Jagat Taran Berry’s case; affirmed that absence of registration implies month-to-month tenancy.
Shri Janki Devi Bhagat Trust, Agra v. Ram Swarup Jain, (1995) 5 S.C.C 314 Manufacturing lease not from year to year; notice requirement under Section 106. Quoted with approval to support that manufacturing leases without registered instruments require only fifteen days' notice.
Allenbury Engineers Pvt. Ltd. v. Shri Ram Krishna Dalmia and Others, AIR 1973 S.C 425 Not decided by Constitution Bench on the issue of notice under Section 106 for manufacturing leases. Mentioned by appellant but not decided in the context of the present legal question.

Court's Reasoning and Analysis

The Court analyzed the provisions of Sections 106 and 107 of the Transfer of Property Act, emphasizing that Section 106 presumes year-to-year tenancy requiring six months' notice, but this presumption can be negated by a "contract to the contrary." Section 107 mandates that leases exceeding one year must be by registered instrument, failing which the lease is void as to duration beyond one year.

Since no registered lease deed existed and the lease was granted orally for manufacturing purposes, the Court inferred a contract to the contrary, meaning the tenancy was month-to-month, terminable by fifteen days' notice. This interpretation was consistent with the precedent set in Jagat Taran Berry’s case, which was approved by a Division Bench in Theeta Industrial Heating Equipments and further supported by the Supreme Court decision in Shri Janki Devi Bhagat Trust.

The Trial Court correctly held that the appellant’s admission of tenancy and receipt of notice was sufficient to pass decree under Order 12, Rule 6, C.P.C., as the legal question was settled by binding precedents and did not require framing of an issue. The Court found no material dispute on the tenancy’s nature or the notice’s validity, and thus no interference with the Trial Court’s decree was warranted.

Holding and Implications

The appeal is dismissed.

The Court upheld the Trial Court’s decree for eviction and possession in favor of the plaintiff/respondents, confirming that an oral manufacturing lease without a registered instrument creates a month-to-month tenancy terminable by fifteen days' notice. The decision clarifies the application of Sections 106 and 107 of the Transfer of Property Act in this context and affirms that where admissions exist and legal principles are settled by precedent, a decree under Order 12, Rule 6, C.P.C. may be passed without framing issues. No new precedent was set; the ruling applies established law to the facts, resolving the dispute between the parties.

    Samir Mukherjee v. Davinder Kumar Bajaj.

    Devinder Gupta, J.— This appeal by the defendant/appellant is against the decree passed on 4.9.1997 by Ms. Manju Goel, Additional District Judge, Delhi in favour of plaintiff/respondents by allowing their application under Order 12, Rule 8, C.P.C;

    2. The suit was filed by the plaintiff/respondents against the appellant for grant of decree for recovery of possession by eviction from premises measuring 6359.85 sq. ft. forming part of property bearing No. 71/2, Industrial Area, Najafgarh Road, New Delhi, shown as red in the plan attached with the plaint and for recovery of Rs. 3,51,000/-. In addition decree for recovery of damages/mesne profits from 1.5.1995 till such time the premises are vacated was also prayed. It was alleged that the premises were let out to the appellant at a monthly rent of Rs. 9,500/-. The tenancy was terminated through registered notice dated 16.3.1995 w.e.f the close of 30.4.1995 Despite service of notice, the premises are vacated and even rent from 1.3.1992 till 30.4.1997 had not been paid. In addition to claiming decree for possession, decree for arrears of rent and for future mesne profits, as aforementioned was prayed.

    3. The suit was contested by the defendant/appellant on a number of grounds. While admitting the plaintiffs to be the owner and, that the premises had been let out on a monthly rent of Rs. 9,500/-, it was stated in the written statement that the intention of the parties at the time of creation of the tenancy was to grant tenancy permanently and not for any temporary period because lease was granted in favour of the appellant for manufacturing purposes and since the inception of tenancy, the appellant has been carrying on his business of manufacturing Transmission Towers and Railway Electrification Fittings. As such lease would be deemed to be from year to year as per the provisions of Section 106 of the Transfer of Property Act. While admitting the receipt of notice dated 16.3.1995, it was pleaded that the said notice was not in accordance with Section 106 of the Transfer of Property Act. The notice ought to have been for six months expiring on the last day of the year of tenancy.

    4. In view of the pleas taken by the defendant in his written statement, the plaintiff filed an application under Order 12, Rule 6 of the Code of Civil Procedure stating that there was a clear admission in the written statement on the part of the defendant. As such, decree for possession was liable to be passed on such admission. The said application was also contested by the defendant.

    5. Through the impugned judgment dated 4.6.1997, the Trial Court proceeded to hold that there was no material dispute. The defendant had admitted itself to be a tenant in respect of the suit property. The validity of notice of termination stood established. The plaintiff admittedly was the landlord and thus was entitled to recover possession from the defendants on termination of tenancy. It was also held that all conditions necessary for judgment under Order 12, Rule 6, C.P.C were fulfilled. Accordingly, the Trial Court proceeded to pass decree for eviction directing the defendant/appellant to hand over peaceful vacant possession to the plaintiff/respondents. The question of quantum of arrears of rent and mesne profits, which was in dispute was kept pending for trial.

    6. We have heard learned Counsel for the parties at length at the admission stage. Having considered the submissions, we are of the view that the judgment of the Court below calls for no interference.

    7. Learned Counsel for the appellant has vehemently contended that though the receipt of notice dated 16.3.1995 was admitted but the same was not in consonance with law. The admission of the defendant had to be taken as a whole and could not have been split in parts. There was a plea raised by the defendant in the written statement that the intention of the parties, at the time of creation of tenancy was to create permanent tenancy and not a tenancy for a temporary or limited period because the lease was granted for manufacturing purposes. Since the inception of the tenancy the defendant has been carrying on the business of manufacturing Transmission Towers and Railway Electrification Fittings. Notice terminating the tenancy ought to have been of six months expiring on the last day of the year of the tenancy. In view of this legal question which was raised in the written statement, the Court ought not to have disposed of the matter under Order 12, Rule 6, C.P.C instead an issue ought to have been framed and decided in accordance with law.

    8. Learned Counsel for the appellant referring to the provisions of Section 106 of the Transfer of Property Act urged that since the lease was for manufacturing purposes, legal presumption as envisaged in Section 106 of the Act would apply under which such tenancy has to be regarded as a tenancy from year to year terminable by six months notice and not by 15 days notice. It was further contended that no doubt under Section 107 of the Act a lease from year to year can be made only by a registered instrument but Section 107 of the Act in no way controls the presumption laid down in Section 106 of the Transfer of Property Act. As such the notice was bad in law. Such a contention though raised was not decided by Constitution Bench in Allenbury Engineers Pvt. Ltd. v. Shri Ram Krishna Dalmia and Others, AIR 1973 S.C 425.

    9. The trial Court while decreeing the suit for possession followed the ratio of the decision of a learned Single Judge of this Court in Jagat Taran Berry…Appellate v. Sardar Sant Singh…, AIR 1980 Delhi 7, which decision was duly approved by a Devision Bench in Theeta Industrial Heating Equipments (P) Ltd… v. Harvinder Singh…, 1996 (39) D.R.J 739. In addition to relying upon the above decision in Jagat Taran Bed's case (supra), the Trial Court also held the notice to be valid by the ratio of decision of this Court in State Bank of India v. Ashok Kumar Gupta and Another, 47 (1992) D.L.T 679 and in D. Rani Puri… v. Chanan Lal…., 1987 II AD (Delhi) 679.

    10. Admittedly, no written lease deed or agreement was executed. The premises were let out orally. A lease of immovable property from year to year or for a term exceeding one year, under Section 107 can be made only by a registered instrument and any lease of this kind would be void unless it is created by a registered instrument. All other leases of immovable property may be made either by a registered instrument or by an oral agreement accompanied by delivery of possession. Whose Section 106 of the Act refers to the duration of certain leases in the absence of written contract or local usage, Section 107 lays down the mode how the leases are to be made. An oral lease for manufacturing purposes cannot be deemed to be a lease from year to year for the purposes of notice of termination, in view of the provisions contained in Section 107 of the Act. In the case of a lease for manufacturing purpose, the absence of registration itself would imply that parties entered a contract to the contrary and without any registered instrument, tenancy would be deemed to be from month to month and not from year to year, for which 15 days notice will be a valid one. The decision of the Supreme Court in Ram Kumar Das v. Jagdish Chandra Deo, Dhabal Deb and Another, A.I.R 1952 S.C 23 relied upon by learned Counsel for the appellant was duly and rightly considered in Jagat Taran Beri's case.

    11. In Jagat Taran Beri's case (supra), learned Single Judge held that there can never be a conflict between Sections 106 and 107 of the Transfer of Property Act. On an analysis of the two provisions, it was observed:

    “Under Sec. 107 the parties have an option. They can negotiate a lease of a duration mentioned in the first paragraph. If they decide upon such a lease, they must execute a registered instrument. Alternatively, they can decide to have a lease for a shorter period. In that event they can create the lease with or without executing a registered instrument. Whenever, a lease is created without a registered instrument the inevitable conclusion must be that the parties have so to speak, opted out of the first paragraph. They have negatived any intention of creating a lease of the duration therein mentioned. Or, to put it in positive form, they have agreed upon a lease of a duration coming within the second paragraph. This is, or must be deemed to be a conscious decision on their part. It is, therefore, indicative of a contract between them. That contract is that the lease will not be of a duration mentioned in the first paragraph of Sec. 107 Such a contract will always be a ‘contract to the contrary’ envisaged by the opening words of Sec. 106. The Supreme Court has said that a ‘contract to the contrary’ can be implied, and need not be express. So, from the single fact that a registered instrument is not executed, one can, and should, immediately deduce a contract to create a lease of the kind that can be created without such an instrument. Thus, if the lease is for, agricultural or manufacturing purposes' and there is no registered instrument, that fact itself is conclusive to establish a ‘contract to the contrary’. Considering that it was always open to the parties to execute a registered instrument but they chose not to do so, this inference accords with their intention, whether actual or ascribed.”

    The aforementioned observations were quoted with approval in Theeta Industries' case (supra) and a reference was also made to the decision of Supreme Court in Shri Janki Devi Bhagat Trust, Agra v. Ram Swarup Jain, (1995) 5 S.C.C 314. The Supreme Court held that a manufacturing lease, which is not from year to year, does not require six months notice for termination. It will fall in the second half of Section 106 requiring fifteen days notice of termination.

    12. In so far as the Trial Court is concerned, it rightly followed Jagat Taran Beri's case (supra), which was duly approved by a Division Bench of this Court in Theeta Industrial Heating Equipments (P) Ltd. (supra), which in turn also relied upon the decision in Janki Devi Bhagat Trust's case. As such there was no question of law arising for determination and the Trial Court was not obliged to frame an issue on the alleged legal proposition. The Trial Court in view of the law declared by this Court rightly on the facts admitted proceeded to pass decree for possession of the premises.

    13. Consequently, the appeal, which has no force, is dismissed.

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    Comments

    Samir Mukherjee v. Davinder Kumar Bajaj.
    (Jan 23, 1998)