“Indictments Are Not Convictions”: Limits on Impeachment and Clarification of “Sexual Penetration” in People of Guam v. Reyes (2025 Guam 8)

I. Introduction

In People of Guam v. William Robert Reyes, 2025 Guam 8, the Supreme Court of Guam addressed two central issues arising out of a child sexual abuse prosecution:

Whether the trial court abused its discretion in denying a mistrial after allowing the prosecution to cross-examine the defendant about a decades-old arrest and indictment for child-related offenses that never resulted in conviction; and
Whether the evidence at trial was sufficient to sustain a conviction for first-degree criminal sexual conduct, which requires proof of “sexual penetration.”

The case pits two powerful concerns against one another: on one hand, preventing wrongful convictions in “word against word” sexual misconduct trials tainted by highly prejudicial, improperly admitted character evidence; and on the other, ensuring that valid verdicts supported by sufficient evidence are not disturbed on technical grounds.

The Supreme Court ultimately:

Held that the trial court abused its discretion by allowing impeachment with a prior arrest and indictment under Guam Rule of Evidence 609—which applies only to convictions—and by denying a mistrial without any serious evidentiary analysis or remedial measures; and
Held that, notwithstanding this error, the evidence of “sexual penetration” was legally sufficient under Guam law because a rational juror could infer penetration from the complainant’s description of the touching and the resulting pain.

Because the evidentiary error was not harmless, the convictions for both first- and second-degree criminal sexual conduct were vacated, and the case was remanded for a new trial. However, the finding of evidentiary sufficiency means Reyes is not entitled to acquittal, and the People may retry him.

This opinion is significant in at least two respects:

It draws a sharp doctrinal line between convictions (which may be used in certain circumstances for impeachment under Rule 609) and mere arrests or indictments, reinforcing that the latter cannot simply be treated as interchangeable impeachment tools; and
It clarifies and solidifies Guam’s already victim-protective definition of “sexual penetration,” emphasizing that even slight intrusion past the labia or touching of the clitoris, inferred from circumstantial evidence and pain, can suffice—even where a complainant at times says the defendant did not “go inside.”

II. Factual and Procedural Background

A. The Underlying Allegations

Reyes was charged with:

First-degree criminal sexual conduct (“CSC I”), and
Second-degree criminal sexual conduct (“CSC II”),

both as first-degree felonies, arising from allegations by J.S., who testified about events occurring when she was in the third or fourth grade.

According to J.S., when she was a child she sometimes got off the bus at a middle school where Reyes worked, and he and his wife would watch her at their home until her parents finished work. On one such day, J.S. testified that she was napping in Reyes’s bedroom when he:

Came into the room;
Put his hands down her pants; and
Touched her vagina with his fingers in a circular motion.

She disclosed the abuse to her mother in December 2022 at age nineteen and reported it to the police the next day. She was twenty when she testified.

B. The Penetration Evidence at Trial

The key factual disputes relevant to the CSC I count involved whether Reyes’s conduct constituted “sexual penetration” as defined by Guam law.

On direct examination, J.S. gave nuanced and at times seemingly inconsistent testimony:

When asked if Reyes “ever actually go[es] inside” her vagina, she answered, “No.”
She described Reyes’s fingers moving in a circular motion, with “pressure on the bottom” and “on the middle part” of her vagina, and confirmed that the pressure was coming from inside her vagina.
She said Reyes “tried to” enter, but “didn’t,” yet also testified that she felt “the tip of his fingers” and, when asked if she felt that inside, she responded: “Yeah, like he was trying to force it inside.”

On cross-examination, J.S. reiterated that Reyes did not enter her vaginal opening but testified that she experienced severe pain for a day or two, though without bleeding or infection. On redirect, she added that Reyes’s fingertips passed her labia majora.

After the People rested, the defense moved for a judgment of acquittal on the CSC I charge, arguing that there was insufficient evidence of “sexual penetration.” The trial court denied the motion, finding that a reasonable juror could conclude beyond a reasonable doubt that penetration had occurred.

C. The Defendant’s Testimony and the Impeachment Controversy

Reyes testified in his own defense and denied touching J.S. sexually. In an effort to bolster his credibility, defense counsel asked whether Reyes had ever been:

Convicted of a felony; or
Convicted of a misdemeanor involving lying, cheating, or stealing.

Reyes answered “no” to both, which appears to have been factually accurate.

On cross-examination, the prosecutor seized on this and embarked on a highly prejudicial line of questioning:

She asked whether Reyes had been arrested in around 2002.
She referred to an arrest involving his daughter for a “so-called incident.”
She pressed him on alleged arrests involving two other girls, his neighbors, which he denied.
She confronted him with a 2002 indictment alleging crimes against three girls, including his daughter and neighbors, and asked if it refreshed his recollection that he had been indicted; he continued to deny recalling it.

The indictment was shown to Reyes on the stand but was not admitted into evidence. Defense counsel objected when the questioning began, but the trial court allowed it, citing Guam Rule of Evidence 609 (“Impeachment by Evidence of Conviction of Crime”).

D. Use of the Indictment in Closing and the Mistrial Motion

In closing argument, the prosecutor returned to this prior indictment:

She told the jury that defense counsel had asked about whether Reyes had “been indicted” or had a criminal record, suggesting the defense was trying to show he had no prior history.
She recounted how she confronted Reyes with being arrested for allegations involving his daughter and “the other two girls.”
She then described showing him the indictment and emphasized that, although he was not on trial for those prior allegations, his denial of remembering that indictment was probative of whether he was telling the truth on the stand.

Defense counsel moved for a mistrial based on this impeachment with prior non-conviction allegations. The trial court reserved its ruling until after arguments.

When the court reconvened for the verdict, the judge denied the mistrial motion, stating on the record that the Ninth Circuit is “a little more lenient” in allowing questioning about prior convictions on cross, and that he assumed “indictment/conviction will be interchangeable.” In a brief written order, the court:

Recognized that no prior conviction had actually been introduced, technically making Rule 609 inapplicable; but
Conducted a Rule 609 analysis anyway, relying on United States v. Osazuwa, and concluded that even if the indictment were treated as a “conviction,” the limited questions asked fell within the permissible scope of impeachment.

The court’s written order cited no other evidentiary rules and did not address any rule-based alternative (e.g., Rules 403, 404, 608). It did not issue any specific curative instruction addressing the prior arrest/indictment or its permissible use.

The jury convicted Reyes of both CSC I and CSC II, and he appealed.

III. Summary of the Supreme Court’s Decision

On appeal, Reyes raised four issues:

The denial of his motion for a mistrial based on the prosecutor’s cross-examination about the 2002 arrest and indictment;
The denial of his motion for judgment of acquittal on CSC I, arguing insufficient evidence of sexual penetration;
The prosecutor’s leading questions on direct examination of J.S.; and
The prosecutor’s alleged argument of a fact not in evidence during closing.

The Supreme Court held:

Mistrial: The trial court abused its discretion by allowing impeachment with prior arrests and an indictment under an inapplicable rule (Rule 609), by erroneously treating indictments as interchangeable with convictions, and by failing to conduct any meaningful evidentiary analysis under the correct rules or to take remedial measures. This evidentiary error was not harmless, given the centrality of credibility in the case and the way the prosecutor exploited the prior allegations. The convictions were therefore vacated and the case was remanded for a new trial.
Sufficiency of the evidence (CSC I): Despite inconsistencies in J.S.’s testimony, a rational juror could infer “sexual penetration” from the facts she described—particularly that Reyes’s fingertips passed her labia majora, that she felt pressure “inside,” and that she experienced severe pain for one to two days. The trial court did not err in denying the motion for judgment of acquittal.
Remaining claims: Because the convictions were reversed on the mistrial issue, the Court declined to reach the issues of leading questions and statements in closing argument.

Thus, while the Court found the evidence legally adequate to sustain a conviction on CSC I, it nevertheless vacated both CSC I and CSC II due to prejudicial evidentiary error infecting the trial.

IV. Detailed Analysis

A. Precedents and Doctrinal Background

1. Standards of Review and Harmless Error

The Court relied on several of its prior decisions to frame the standard of review:

Denial of mistrial: Reviewed for abuse of discretion (People v. Aguon, 2020 Guam 24; People v. Palisoc, 2002 Guam 9; People v. Gutierrez, 2005 Guam 19; People v. Patrick, 2016 Guam 2).
Sufficiency of the evidence: Denial of a motion for judgment of acquittal is reviewed de novo, with extreme deference to the jury’s verdict and consideration of whether any rational trier of fact could find guilt beyond a reasonable doubt (People v. Hosei, 2023 Guam 22; People v. Jesus, 2009 Guam 2; People v. Song, 2012 Guam 21; People v. Pinaula, 2023 Guam 2; People v. Riosen, 2023 Guam 23; People v. Kotto, 2020 Guam 4).
Harmless error: Non-constitutional evidentiary errors are harmless if it is more probable than not that they did not materially affect the verdict (People v. Pugh, 2018 Guam 14; People v. Bosi, 2022 Guam 15; People v. Cepeda, 2021 Guam 9; People v. Asprer, 2019 Guam 19; People v. Roten, 2012 Guam 3; People v. Tedtaotao, 2016 Guam 9; People v. Flores, 2009 Guam 22).

These authorities collectively reinforce that:

The appellate court is not free to substitute its judgment for the trial court on discretionary matters unless the trial court’s decision rests on an erroneous legal premise or lacks any rational basis in the record; and
Even when error is found, reversal is not automatic; it must be shown (by the prosecution, in criminal cases) that the error was harmless under a structured multi-factor test.

2. Evidence Law and Prior Misconduct

The evidentiary framework in Guam, patterned on the Federal Rules, includes:

Rule 403: Allows exclusion of relevant evidence when its probative value is substantially outweighed by a danger of unfair prejudice.
Rule 404: Generally forbids character evidence or “other crimes, wrongs, or acts” to prove action in conformity with a particular character trait, subject to specific exceptions.
Rule 608(b): Permits inquiry on cross-examination into specific instances of conduct only if they are probative of the witness’s character for truthfulness or untruthfulness, and bars use of extrinsic evidence to prove those instances.
Rule 609: Governs impeachment by evidence of convictions for crimes, subject to relevance, probative value, and other limitations.
Rule 413: Allows, in certain criminal sexual conduct cases, admission of evidence of prior sexual offenses to show propensity, provided it passes Rule 403 balancing (People v. Aguon, 2020 Guam 24).

The trial court applied only Rule 609, which by its text deals exclusively with convictions, not arrests or indictments. The Supreme Court pointedly contrasted this with:

United States v. Osazuwa, 564 F.3d 1169 (9th Cir. 2009), cited by the trial court, which interpreted Federal Rule 609 in the context of actual convictions; and
State v. Lynch, 432 S.E.2d 349 (N.C. 1993), another 609 case about convictions.

None of these authorities supported the trial court’s assumption that indictments and convictions are functionally interchangeable for impeachment purposes.

3. The “Opening the Door” Doctrine

The Court drew from recent Guam decisions interpreting the “opening the door” doctrine:

People v. Morales, 2022 Guam 1: A party who “opens the door” by creating a misleading impression may be confronted with otherwise inadmissible evidence that clarifies or corrects that impression—but the rebuttal must remain within the scope of the issue opened.
People v. Callahan, 2022 Guam 13: Reaffirmed the doctrine’s limits: it is not a licence to introduce broad swaths of otherwise inadmissible character or propensity evidence.

The Court also cited persuasive authority from other jurisdictions:

McGuire v. State, 232 S.E.2d 243 (Ga. 1977) – holding that testimony that a defendant has no prior convictions does not open the door to evidence of prior arrests.
United States v. Heckman, 479 F.2d 726 (3d Cir. 1973) – allowing cross-examination into prior convictions, not arrests, when the defendant introduced his “good” criminal record.

These authorities collectively support the proposition that a defendant’s truthful testimony that he has no prior convictions does not authorize the prosecution to bring in prior arrests, accusations, or indictments.

4. Definition of “Sexual Penetration” and Prior CSC Cases

The statute defines “sexual penetration” as:

“sexual intercourse, cunnilingus, fellatio, anal intercourse, or any other intrusion, however slight, of any part of a person’s body or of any object into the genital or anal openings of another person’s body, but emission of semen is not required.”
9 GCA § 25.10(a)(10) (emphasis added).

The Court drew heavily on two of its earlier criminal sexual conduct decisions:

People v. Enriquez, 2014 Guam 11:
- Held that “the breach of any part of the vagina, including the labia majora, is sufficient to constitute penetration.”
- Stated that “the hymen and the clitoris are within the outer layers of the vagina, and a touching of these areas would constitute sexual penetration.”
- Emphasized that there are “no magic words” required; penetration may be inferred from the totality of the evidence and can be inferred from the victim’s experience of pain.
People v. Mendiola, 2014 Guam 17:
- Reaffirmed that even “the slightest breach” of the vaginal area, including the labia majora, suffices.
- Clarified that penetration can be proven wholly by circumstantial evidence.

These precedents establish that Guam law adopts a broad, victim-protective view of “penetration,” under which even minimal intrusion beyond the external genital structures (or contact with the clitoris or hymen) satisfies the statutory element.

B. The Court’s Legal Reasoning

1. Abuse of Discretion in Denying the Mistrial

Under the abuse-of-discretion standard, the Court asks:

Was the trial court’s decision based on an erroneous conclusion of law? or
Is there no evidence in the record on which the trial court could have rationally based its decision?

The Supreme Court answered “yes” to both, focusing on three key errors.

a. Misapplication of Rule 609: Indictments ≠ Convictions

The trial court allowed the damaging line of cross-examination about Reyes’s 2002 arrest and indictment on the theory that Rule 609 permitted impeachment by prior crimes. But Rule 609, by its plain language and as interpreted by both federal and Guam courts, applies only to convictions.

The Supreme Court noted:

The trial court itself later acknowledged in its written order that “The People did not introduce evidence of a prior conviction.”
Yet the court inexplicably proceeded to analyze the questioning as if Rule 609 applied, and even mused that “indictment/conviction will be interchangeable” for these purposes.

This conflation constitutes an erroneous conclusion of law. Arrests and indictments are accusations, not findings of guilt. Impeaching a defendant with unproven allegations, especially involving children, raises severe unfair prejudice concerns and is not permitted under Rule 609.

b. Failure to Engage with the Correct Evidentiary Rules

Having realized that Rule 609 was technically inapplicable, the trial court should have paused, acknowledged that its original ruling was flawed, and:

Determined whether the evidence might be admissible under some other rule (e.g., Rule 404(b), Rule 608(b)), subject to Rule 403 balancing; and/or
Considered issuing curative instructions or other remedial steps to mitigate prejudice.

Instead, the trial court:

Cited no evidentiary rules other than 609;
Relied solely on caselaw interpreting 609 in the context of proper convictions (Osazuwa and Lynch); and
Did not undertake any Rule 403 balancing analysis, any Rule 404(b) relevance inquiry, or any Rule 608(b) assessment of whether the prior conduct was even probative of truthfulness.

The Supreme Court underscored that there was “no analysis under any relevant evidentiary rules” and that the trial court “took no corrective measures, such as issuing a specific jury instruction, to remedy the risk of unfair prejudice.” This failure to use the correct analytic framework renders the decision an abuse of discretion.

c. The “Opening the Door” Argument Rejected

On appeal, the People attempted to justify the cross-examination by arguing that Reyes had “opened the door” when his counsel elicited testimony that he had never been convicted of a felony or a crime of dishonesty. The Supreme Court firmly rejected this argument:

Reyes’s testimony that he had never been convicted of certain crimes was accurate; it did not mislead the jury into thinking he had never been arrested, indicted, or accused.
He did not testify that he had never been arrested, never investigated, or never accused of misconduct involving children.
Therefore, there was no “false or misleading impression” to correct within the meaning of the “opening the door” doctrine.

The Court cited McGuire (Ga. 1977) and Heckman (3d Cir. 1973) to support the principle that truthful testimony about a clean conviction record does not authorize cross-examination about prior arrests.

The Court also emphasized the limits of the doctrine from its own cases (Morales and Callahan): the door, when opened, is narrow and does not justify a flood of otherwise inadmissible character or propensity evidence.

The net result: there was no valid evidentiary basis—under 609, 404(b), 608(b), or any “open door” theory—for the prosecutor to bring in the 2002 arrest and indictment.

2. Harmless Error: Why the Improper Impeachment Required Reversal

Even when a trial court abuses its discretion, reversal is warranted only if the error is not harmless. For non-constitutional errors, Guam applies a “more probable than not” standard: the error is harmless if it is more probable than not that it did not materially affect the verdict.

The Court weighed four factors:

Overall strength of the prosecution’s case;
Prosecutor’s conduct regarding the improper evidence;
Importance of the improper evidence; and
Whether the evidence was cumulative of other properly admitted evidence.

a. Overall Strength of the Case

The Court drew a distinction between:

CSC II (sexual contact): The People's case was strong. J.S.’s clear testimony that Reyes touched her vagina in a sexual manner was sufficient to support a conviction for CSC II. No sufficiency challenge was raised on that count.
CSC I (sexual penetration): The case was much weaker. The element of penetration was hotly contested, and J.S. had repeatedly said Reyes did not “go inside” or enter her vagina, although she also described conduct from which a jury could infer penetration.

The Court characterized the overall case on CSC I as “not strong,” citing Asprer as an example where non-overwhelming evidence made evidentiary errors more likely to be prejudicial.

Thus:

For CSC II, the strength of the case favored harmlessness.
For CSC I, the strength factor weighed against harmlessness.

b. Prosecutor’s Conduct

This factor examines whether the prosecutor:

Repeatedly referenced or emphasized the improper evidence; and
Relied on it in arguing for a guilty verdict.

Here, the Court found that the prosecutor:

“Extensively” cross-examined Reyes about the arrest and indictment;
Physically showed him the indictment while he was on the stand;
Did not limit the reference to a bare acknowledgment but revisited the allegations in closing argument; and
Used these prior allegations to attack Reyes’s credibility—a central issue in a case that boiled down to his word against J.S.’s.

Accordingly, the prosecutor’s conduct factor weighed strongly against harmless error.

c. Importance of the Wrongly Admitted Evidence

The Court concluded that the prior arrest and indictment:

Had no genuine impeachment value because Reyes’s original testimony (that he had no convictions) was truthful; and
Were therefore not legitimately needed to correct a misrepresentation or to probe truthfulness.

The only real “value” of the evidence was its obvious prejudicial effect: that Reyes had previously been arrested and indicted for serious allegations involving young girls—very similar to the charge on trial. In contrast, its probative value on any permissible issue (truthfulness, bias, motive) was nil given the lack of conviction and the passage of time.

Because the evidence was highly prejudicial and not necessary for any proper purpose, the Court found it important in the sense that it likely influenced the jury’s evaluation of Reyes’s credibility. This weighed against harmlessness.

d. Cumulative or Unique?

If the improper evidence merely duplicates other properly admitted evidence, the likelihood of prejudice is diminished. Here, the Court observed that the indictment and arrest:

Were not cumulative of anything else;
Introduced completely new and inflammatory allegations into the case; and
Therefore increased the risk of material impact on the verdict.

This factor likewise weighed against harmless error.

e. Overall Harmless Error Conclusion

For CSC I, all four factors (weakness of proof on penetration, prosecutorial emphasis, importance of the improper evidence, and its non-cumulative nature) pointed away from harmlessness.

For CSC II, three of the four factors weighed against harmlessness, with only the strength-of-the-case factor favoring the State.

The Court held that it could not say it was more probable than not that the improperly admitted impeachment did not materially affect the jury’s verdict on either count. The error was therefore not harmless, and both convictions had to be reversed.

3. Sufficiency of the Evidence of “Sexual Penetration”

Even though the convictions were vacated on evidentiary grounds, the Court was required to address the sufficiency challenge because a finding of insufficient evidence would entitle Reyes to an acquittal and would bar retrial on that charge under double jeopardy principles (People v. Belga, 2016 Guam 1; People v. Anastacio, 2010 Guam 18).

a. The Standard

The question is not whether the appellate court itself is convinced of guilt beyond a reasonable doubt, but whether:

After viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the prosecution, any rational trier of fact could have found the essential elements of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt.

The Court stressed:

It is “highly deferential” to the jury’s verdict.
It must give “full play” to the jury’s role in resolving testimonial conflicts and drawing reasonable inferences.
The appellate court is concerned only with the existence of evidence, not its weight.
It must presume that any conflicts were resolved in favor of the prosecution.

b. Applying the Definition of Penetration

Reyes argued that J.S.’s testimony was contradictory and that her repeated statements that he did not “go inside” foreclosed a finding of penetration. The Court acknowledged the tension in her testimony but applied the statutory definition and prior caselaw in a holistic way.

In particular, the jury heard evidence that:

Reyes moved his fingers in a circular motion on J.S.’s vagina.
His fingertips passed her labia majora.
J.S. described feeling pressure “on the bottom” and “in the middle part” of her vagina, and confirmed that the pressure was coming from “inside.”
She testified that his fingertips were “trying to force” inside and that she felt the tip of his fingers “inside.”
She experienced severe vaginal pain for up to two days afterward.

The Court reasoned that a rational jury could:

Infer from the testimony that the tips of Reyes’s fingers intruded into J.S.’s genital opening, even if only slightly, when he was “trying to force” them in; and/or
Infer that he made contact with her clitoris, which, under Enriquez, lies within the outer layers of the vagina and contact with which constitutes penetration.

Under Guam precedent:

“The breach of any part of the vagina, including the labia majora, is sufficient to constitute penetration” (Enriquez, 2014 Guam 11 ¶ 15; Mendiola, 2014 Guam 17 ¶ 18).
Penetration can be inferred from pain and circumstantial evidence, and “no magic words” are required (Enriquez, 2014 Guam 11 ¶¶ 19–20).

Therefore, even though J.S. sometimes used lay terms suggesting no “entry,” the details she provided were enough for a rational fact-finder to conclude that penetration—defined broadly as “any intrusion, however slight” into the genital opening or contact with the clitoris/hymen—had occurred.

The Court explicitly cautioned against “fine-grained factual parsing” that would invade the jury’s fact-finding role, quoting Coleman v. Johnson, 566 U.S. 650 (2012), and United States v. Nevils, 598 F.3d 1158 (9th Cir. 2010).

Accordingly, the denial of the motion for judgment of acquittal on CSC I was affirmed.

4. Unreached Prosecutorial Misconduct Claims

Reyes also alleged:

Improper leading questions on direct and redirect of J.S.; and
Improper closing argument by the prosecutor, who allegedly referred to “burning” sensations that were not in evidence.

Because the Court vacated the convictions on the mistrial issue, it did not reach these issues. However, their presence serves as a reminder that this trial was already fraught with boundary-pushing prosecutorial tactics, which could be scrutinized more closely on retrial.

V. Impact and Practical Implications

A. Evidentiary Law and Trial Practice

1. Clear Separation Between Convictions and Non-Conviction Misconduct

Perhaps the clearest doctrinal message of Reyes is that indictments are not convictions. For impeachment purposes under Rule 609:

Only convictions may be used, and even then, subject to strict limits; and
Arrests, charges, or indictments—especially decades old and especially for similar sexual offenses—carry an enormous risk of unfair prejudice and generally cannot be used to impeach.

Trial courts must:

Carefully enforce this distinction;
Resist any impulse to treat an indictment or arrest as a quasi-conviction; and
Recognize that misuse of prior allegations in child sex cases is particularly likely to require reversal because of their inflammatory character.

2. Tight Limits on “Opening the Door”

The decision reinforces that:

A defendant’s truthful testimony that he has no prior convictions does not open the door to questions about arrests or unproven allegations.
“Opening the door” allows only as much otherwise inadmissible evidence as is necessary to correct or contextualize a misleading impression created by the opposing party.
Courts should be vigilant to ensure the prosecution does not stretch this doctrine into a backdoor for character or propensity evidence.

Practically:

Defense counsel can, with some comfort, ask a defendant whether he has prior convictions, knowing that this alone will not license probing questions about past arrests or accusations—so long as the questions are precise and truthful.
Prosecutors must think carefully before invoking “opening the door” to justify introducing highly prejudicial evidence; they must show a genuine misleading impression, not merely an unfavorable one.

3. Need for Rule-by-Rule Evidentiary Analysis and Curative Measures

Reyes signals that:

Trial judges must identify the specific evidentiary rule under which evidence is offered (609, 608, 404(b), 413, etc.),
Apply that rule correctly, together with Rule 403 balancing, and
When an error has occurred, consider remedial actions (curative instructions, striking testimony, limiting instructions) rather than simply leaving the jury to sort it out.

The Supreme Court’s criticism of the absence of any GRE 403/404/608 analysis is a clear directive: a bare conclusion under an inapplicable rule (like 609) will not survive appellate scrutiny when highly prejudicial evidence has been admitted.

B. Criminal Sexual Conduct Prosecutions

1. The “Any Intrusion” Standard Is Strongly Reaffirmed

Although the Court was reviewing sufficiency in a defendant’s favor, its analysis reaffirms a robust standard for “sexual penetration”:

Any slight intrusion into the genital opening is enough.
The labia majora, clitoris, and other external genital structures are included in what Guam law treats as part of the vagina for penetration purposes.
Pain and circumstantial evidence can suffice without explicit testimony that “he penetrated me.”

This has several consequences:

For prosecutors: It underscores the importance of carefully eliciting detailed anatomical and experiential testimony (e.g., where exactly the touching occurred, what the complainant felt, whether there was pressure “inside,” pain afterwards) rather than relying on legal jargon that a child or lay witness may misunderstand.
For defense counsel: It indicates that cross-examination focusing solely on a complainant’s statement that the defendant did not “go inside” may not be enough to defeat penetration, if other details suggest slight intrusion.
For judges: Jury instructions must accurately reflect that “penetration” includes any slight intrusion and may be inferred from circumstantial evidence, consistent with Enriquez and Mendiola.

2. Inconsistent Testimony Does Not Automatically Defeat Sufficiency

Reyes confirms that:

Inconsistencies in a complainant’s testimony go to weight and credibility, which are for the jury; they do not necessarily render the evidence legally insufficient.
On appeal, the court must assume the jury resolved those inconsistencies in favor of the prosecution if a rational juror could do so.

This is particularly significant in child sexual abuse cases, where victims may struggle with terminology or feel conflicted about describing events, leading to apparent contradictions.

C. Appellate Advocacy and Harmless Error

The Court reiterated that the People bear the burden of proving harmless error and that failure to address harmlessness in their opening brief can amount to waiver, as noted in Pugh. In Reyes, the People did not meaningfully address harmless error, but the Court nonetheless conducted its own analysis and found the error not harmless.

The message for appellate practitioners is clear:

When defending a conviction in the face of an evidentiary error, the State must methodically apply the harmless error factors; silence is dangerous.
Defense counsel should highlight how each factor supports prejudice, particularly in close credibility cases like sexual assault trials.

VI. Simplifying Key Legal Concepts

A. Abuse of Discretion

A court abuses its discretion when:

It bases its decision on an incorrect understanding of the law; or
Its decision is not supported by any reasonable interpretation of the facts in the record.

In plain terms, even if judges have a range of acceptable choices, they cannot:

Apply the wrong legal rule; or
Make a ruling that no reasonable judge could support given the evidence before them.

In Reyes, the trial court misapplied Rule 609 to an indictment, a clear legal error, and failed to do any serious evidentiary analysis, leaving its decision without a rational foundation.

B. Harmless Error (Non-Constitutional)

Not every trial mistake leads to reversal. For most evidentiary errors, the question is:

Is it more likely than not that the error did not affect the jury’s decision?

If the court is confident that the jury would have convicted even without the error, the conviction stands. But in a close case—especially where credibility is central and the improper evidence is highly prejudicial—courts are reluctant to deem an error harmless.

C. “Opening the Door”

“Opening the door” is a doctrine that prevents a party from gaining an unfair advantage by introducing a misleading or incomplete picture. If one side raises an issue in a one-sided way, the other side may be allowed to bring in additional evidence that would otherwise be inadmissible in order to correct the impression.

But:

The correction must be proportionate and focused on the specific misleading point.
It does not justify a free-for-all into unrelated bad acts or character attacks.

In Reyes, truthful testimony that he had never been convicted did not open the door to questions about unrelated prior arrests or accusations.

D. Sexual Penetration vs. Sexual Contact

Under Guam law:

Sexual contact involves intentional touching of the intimate parts or the clothing covering them when done for sexual arousal or gratification.
Sexual penetration requires some kind of intrusion—even slight—into the genital or anal openings, including:
- Digital or object intrusion;
- Contact with internal parts (like the hymen or clitoris, as construed by Guam precedent); and
- Even the slightest breach of the labia majora.

Proof of penetration does not require:

Full vaginal intercourse;
Emission of semen; or
Explicit use of the word “penetration” by the witness.

It can be inferred from the nature of the touching and its effects (e.g., pain).

VII. Conclusion

People of Guam v. Reyes stands at the intersection of evidentiary rigor and substantive criminal law in sexual abuse prosecutions.

On the evidentiary side, the Supreme Court’s message is unambiguous:

Courts cannot treat indictments and arrests as equivalent to convictions for impeachment purposes.
The “opening the door” doctrine has strict limits and does not legitimize broad character attacks based on unproven allegations.
Trial judges must apply the correct evidence rules (403, 404, 608, 609, 413) and take corrective measures when prejudicial evidence slips in.

On the substantive side, the Court reaffirms Guam’s expansive definition of “sexual penetration”:

“Any intrusion, however slight,” into the genital opening—including breaches of the labia majora or contact with the clitoris—satisfies the penetration element.
Penetration may be inferred from circumstantial evidence and the victim’s experience of pain, even where the victim’s lay descriptions appear at times to deny “entry.”

The result—a vacated conviction but a finding of sufficiency—preserves the People’s ability to retry Reyes while ensuring that any future conviction rests on a trial free from the taint of unfair impeachment by prior, unproven allegations. The decision thus reinforces both the integrity of Guam’s criminal trials and the careful calibration of its criminal sexual conduct jurisprudence.