State v. Robertson and the Constitutional Limits of Treatment-Court Waivers in Probation Revocation

I. Introduction

In State v. Robertson, 52794 (Idaho Nov. 24, 2025), the Idaho Supreme Court squarely confronted the intersection of problem-solving (treatment) courts, probation revocation, and constitutional due process. The case asks a deceptively simple but legally profound question: when the Idaho Rules for Treatment Courts (I.R.T.C.) allow a treatment court termination hearing to double as a probation-revocation hearing, what must a defendant understand and waive before a sentencing court can revoke probation without holding its own evidentiary hearing?

The Court held that, although participation in a treatment court and continued probation can both be conditioned on compliance with program rules, a defendant’s waiver of a treatment-court termination hearing does not automatically and validly waive her separate constitutional right to a probation-revocation hearing. Any such waiver must be knowing, intelligent, and voluntary in the constitutional sense. Because the State failed to demonstrate that Sheryl D. Robertson understood she was also forfeiting her right to a probation-revocation hearing when she signed Wood Court forms, the Court vacated the revocation of her probation and remanded for a proper revocation hearing.

The decision emphasizes two core principles:

• The Constitution—particularly the Fourteenth Amendment’s Due Process Clause—sets the minimum procedural protections for probationers and treatment-court participants; court-promulgated rules cannot dilute those protections.
• Waivers of those protections are strictly scrutinized: the State bears a “heavy” burden to show a defendant clearly understood both the nature of the right being abandoned and the consequences of that abandonment.

II. Background and Procedural History

A. Underlying offense and initial probation

In 2016, Robertson was arrested for felony possession of methamphetamine under Idaho Code § 37‑2732(c)(1). In 2017, she pled guilty pursuant to a plea agreement and received a unified ten-year sentence with four years determinate. The district court retained jurisdiction for one year (a “rider”) and recommended evaluation and/or treatment. After the retained jurisdiction period, Robertson was released onto probation subject to standard conditions.

By January 2021, the Department of Correction reported that Robertson had:

• Failed to begin substance abuse treatment as ordered,
• Used methamphetamine on four occasions, and
• Committed new law violations (leaving the scene of an accident and DUI).

Robertson admitted these violations. Rather than revoke probation, the district court continued her on probation with added conditions:

• 100 hours of community service, and
• Successful completion of a problem-solving/treatment court, initially Butte County, with discretion to place her in Bonneville County’s Wood Court if space became available.

She was ultimately accepted into Bonneville County Wood Court in October 2022.

B. Conflict with Wood Court and State’s termination motion

In March 2023, Robertson—acting pro se—asked the Custer County district court to move her probation back to Butte County so she could be nearer to home and family, escape proximity to an abusive ex-boyfriend, and alleviate the cost of maintaining housing in Idaho Falls. She also complained about Wood Court staff behavior and sought a “stay on any sanctions, punishments or retribution” for raising these concerns. Notably, she made clear she wished to remain in a treatment court, just not Wood Court.

Shortly thereafter, the State moved:

• To terminate her from Wood Court, and
• To revoke her probation again, this time based on alleged violations of Wood Court rules.

The termination motion alleged:

• Unapproved associations,
• Unauthorized deletion of text messages, call history, and search history, and
• Inability to complete the program due to continued association violations, leading to termination.

An “Evidentiary Termination Hearing” was scheduled in front of Treatment Court Judge Dane Watkins in Bonneville County. Before that hearing, Robertson signed:

• A Notification of Rights (Termination from Treatment Court) (“Notification”), and
• A Waiver of Rights Regarding Termination from Treatment Court (“Waiver”).

The Waiver, in relevant part, recited that she:

I further waive my right to a Termination Hearing and request and consent to proceed directly to a Sentencing Hearing.

Based on these documents, Wood Court terminated Robertson from the program. Two days later, the Custer County district court ordered her transported for “a hearing.”

C. The May 15 hearing and immediate disposition

At the May 15, 2023 hearing, the Custer County district court treated the matter as a disposition after treatment-court termination. There was no formal probation-revocation hearing: no new written violation, no sworn testimony, no confrontation of witnesses, and no express admissions to violating probation conditions.

The court acknowledged some procedural uncertainty:

[T]here is a little bit of confusion under the new drug-court rules of who's going to do the disposition, if Judge Watkins should have done it there or if there needs to be a probation violation now filed here… and go through the normal probation-violation proceeding with the allegation being that she failed the drug court program.

Ultimately, the court relied on:

• The 2021 order finding a prior probation violation,
• Its prior order conditioning continued probation on successful completion of treatment court, and
• Judicial notice that she had now “failed” Wood Court and had waived her hearing there.

The court concluded Robertson had effectively already had (and waived) her chance to contest the violation before Judge Watkins in Wood Court. It then proceeded directly to disposition, revoked probation, and imposed a seven-year sentence (three years fixed, four indeterminate).

Robertson’s counsel, for her part:

• Questioned procedural posture (“Is the State going to file a probation violation?”), and
• Requested more time to apply to other problem-solving courts, explaining that Robertson wanted to remain in a program but not in Wood Court.

Robertson herself insisted she “had not done anything wrong” and had “not violated [her] probation.”

D. Court of Appeals decision

On appeal, Robertson argued that she was deprived of the procedural safeguards mandated by Morrissey v. Brewer and Gagnon v. Scarpelli in the context of probation revocation: written notice, disclosure of evidence, an opportunity to be heard, and confrontation rights. She acknowledged that she had signed the Wood Court Waiver but argued her due process rights regarding probation revocation had not been knowingly relinquished.

The State argued that the I.R.T.C. rules provided a unified structure: the same procedural protections at a termination hearing suffice for probation revocation, and Robertson knowingly waived those protections by signing the Wood Court forms.

The Idaho Court of Appeals:

• Held that the I.R.T.C. rules afford the same due process protections as a standard probation-violation hearing,
• Concluded that, under I.R.T.C. 18(b), Robertson’s waiver of a termination hearing allowed the district court to proceed to disposition on the probation violation without any additional hearing, and
• Declined to address Robertson’s constitutional argument about Morrissey/Gagnon on the ground that only the Supreme Court can alter or invalidate rules it has adopted.

Robertson petitioned for review, which the Idaho Supreme Court granted.

III. Summary of the Supreme Court’s Opinion

Justice Brody, writing for a unanimous Court, vacated the district court’s order revoking probation and imposing a modified sentence, and remanded for a probation-revocation hearing.

Key holdings:

• Constitutional baseline: The Fourteenth Amendment’s Due Process Clause, as interpreted in Morrissey and Gagnon, governs the procedural rights of probationers and treatment-court participants facing revocation or termination—not the I.R.T.C. alone.
• Waiver standard: A probationer or treatment-court participant may waive Morrissey/Gagnon procedural rights, but the waiver is valid only if it is knowing, intelligent, and voluntary. The State bears a “heavy” burden to prove such a waiver.
• Insufficient waiver documents: The Wood Court Notification and Waiver documents did not clearly inform Robertson that:
  • The termination proceeding also operated as a probation-revocation proceeding, or
  • Waiving the termination hearing meant forfeiting her right to a probation-revocation hearing in the sentencing court.
  Because of these deficiencies, the Court held that Robertson’s waiver did not extend to her probation-revocation hearing rights.
• Due process violation: Proceeding directly to disposition without first holding a probation-revocation hearing violated Robertson’s unwaived constitutional right to such a hearing.
• Fundamental error doctrine inapplicable: The Court clarified that challenges to the validity of a waiver are not governed by the contemporaneous-objection rule or the fundamental-error doctrine. Because the issue is the validity of the waiver itself—not a “trial error”—Robertson could raise it for the first time on appeal.
• Limited scope: The Court expressly declined to hold that I.R.T.C. 18 is unconstitutional. Its ruling is limited to the insufficiency of the particular Notification and Waiver forms and the absence of proof of a valid waiver in this case.

IV. Detailed Analysis

A. Precedents and Authorities Cited

1. Morrissey v. Brewer and the two-stage revocation model

In Morrissey v. Brewer, 408 U.S. 471 (1972), the U.S. Supreme Court held that parolees enjoy a protected liberty interest that cannot be extinguished without due process. The Court described parolee liberty as “indeterminate” but still encompassing “many of the core values of unqualified liberty,” and recognized that revocation inflicts a “grievous loss.”

Morrissey established a two-stage framework:

1. Preliminary hearing near the place of the alleged violation to determine whether probable cause exists to believe a violation occurred.
2. Final revocation hearing to resolve disputed facts and determine whether revocation is warranted.

At a minimum, due process requires:

• Written notice of claimed violations,
• Disclosure of evidence,
• Opportunity to be heard and present evidence,
• Right to confront and cross-examine adverse witnesses (absent good cause),
• A neutral and detached decisionmaker, and
• A written statement of the evidence and reasons for revocation.

These requirements are flexible in implementation but non-negotiable in substance.

2. Gagnon v. Scarpelli and extension to probation

In Gagnon v. Scarpelli, 411 U.S. 778 (1973), the U.S. Supreme Court extended the Morrissey due process framework to probation revocation. The Idaho Supreme Court in Robertson acknowledges this line explicitly, citing Gagnon and its own precedent in State v. Kelsey, 115 Idaho 311, 766 P.2d 781 (1988), which similarly recognized the necessity of a due process hearing before revocation.

3. State v. Rogers: Idaho’s treatment-court due process framework

In State v. Rogers, 144 Idaho 738, 170 P.3d 881 (2007), the Idaho Supreme Court decided whether participants in diversionary programs (like drug courts) have due process rights when the State seeks to terminate them from those programs.

The Court held that:

• Termination from a diversionary program implicates a constitutionally protected liberty interest, and
• The Morrissey/Gagnon procedural framework applies to termination from such programs, just as it applies to parole and probation revocation.

Robertson builds on Rogers in a critical way. Having previously equated the due-process requirements for drug-court termination and probation revocation, the Court now addresses how those combined proceedings interact with the waiver doctrine—particularly when rules like I.R.T.C. 18(b) permit a single hearing (or a waiver of that hearing) to serve double duty.

4. Waiver jurisprudence: Steele, Bainbridge, and others

The Court reaffirms “hornbook law” that waiver of constitutional rights is valid only if “voluntarily, knowingly, and intelligently” made:

• Steele v. State, 153 Idaho 783, 291 P.3d 466 (2012), and Smith v. State, 146 Idaho 822, 203 P.3d 1221 (2009): applying the “knowing, intelligent, voluntary” standard to various constitutional waivers.
• United States v. Doe, 155 F.3d 1070 (9th Cir. 1998), and Moran v. Burbine, 475 U.S. 412 (1986): emphasizing that a valid waiver requires “full awareness of both the nature of the right being abandoned and the consequences of the decision to abandon it.”

Most notably, the Court invokes State v. Bainbridge, 108 Idaho 273, 698 P.2d 335 (1985), where it adopted a “general presumption against waiver of constitutional rights” and described the State’s burden to overcome that presumption as “heavy.” Though Bainbridge involved the Fifth Amendment right to counsel, Robertson extends that presumption to the waiver of Morrissey/Gagnon procedural protections in the treatment-court/probation context.

5. Error preservation and fundamental error: Perry, Beeks, Wainwright

The Court also cites:

• State v. Perry, 150 Idaho 209, 245 P.3d 961 (2010), and State v. Beeks, 159 Idaho 223, 358 P.3d 784 (Ct. App. 2015), for the general rule that unpreserved errors are not reviewed on appeal absent “fundamental error.”
• Wainwright v. Sykes, 433 U.S. 72 (1977), explaining that the contemporaneous-objection rule helps prevent “sandbagging” and promotes correctness at trial.

In Robertson, however, the Court carefully distinguishes waiver-validity questions from “trial errors,” holding that neither the contemporaneous-objection rule nor the fundamental-error doctrine constrains appellate review of whether a waiver was valid.

6. Other authorities

The opinion also references:

• Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319 (1976), for the concept of “grievous loss” and the broad scope of due process protection.
• Several federal decisions (e.g., United States v. Correa-Torres, 326 F.3d 18 (1st Cir. 2003); United States v. LeBlanc, United States v. Dodson) for the remedy of vacating a sentence when a revocation-hearing waiver is invalid.

B. The Court’s Legal Reasoning

1. Due process as the governing standard—rules cannot override the Constitution

The Court begins by stating directly that the Constitution—not procedural rules like the I.R.T.C.— is “our rubric for determining whether a criminal defendant has been afforded due process.” This is a pointed correction to the Court of Appeals, which explicitly stopped short of assessing the constitutionality of I.R.T.C. 18, deferring instead to the Supreme Court’s rule-making authority.

By re-centering the analysis on the Fourteenth Amendment and the Morrissey/Gagnon line of cases, the Court:

• Reaffirms that probation and treatment-court participation implicate protected liberty interests, and
• Insists that any procedure—rule-based or otherwise—must satisfy those constitutional minima.

2. What Morrissey/Gagnon require in this context

The Court reiterates that a state must provide at least:

• Written notice of claimed violations,
• Disclosure of evidence,
• Opportunity to be heard and present witnesses and documents,
• Right to confront and cross-examine adverse witnesses (with narrow exceptions),
• A neutral decisionmaker, and
• A written statement of reasons and evidence.

Idaho has, via Rogers, already extended these protections to participants in treatment courts facing termination. The I.R.T.C. purport to implement this framework. But implementation cannot dispense with the requirement that any waiver of these protections be constitutionally sound.

3. The waiver analysis: why Robertson’s waiver was invalid

The core of the opinion is an in-depth examination of whether Robertson’s waiver in Wood Court validly extended to her probation-revocation rights.

a. The content and framing of the Notification

The Notification is titled “Notification of Rights (Termination from Treatment Court)” and begins by advising Robertson that termination has been proposed. Critically, the document:

• Never uses the word “probation.”
• Never states that the termination proceeding will also function as a probation-revocation proceeding.
• Only glancingly refers to “Sentencing or Disposition,” and to possible “imposition of any previously suspended sentence” or renewed prosecution of previously suspended cases.

Paragraphs 8 and 12 allude to what may happen if allegations are admitted or proved and to the possibility of waiving the termination hearing, but as the Court highlights, nowhere does the Notification explain:

• That admitting or waiving in the treatment-court termination proceeding eliminates the State’s burden to prove a probation violation in the sentencing court,
• That the termination hearing would function as an admit/deny or evidentiary hearing for purposes of probation, or
• That by waiving the termination hearing, Robertson was also waiving her right to a separate probation-revocation hearing.

The Court concludes that the Notification failed to inform Robertson of the “consequences of waiving the Wood Court termination hearing” with respect to probation. Thus, it does not support a finding that she knowingly and intelligently waived her probation-revocation hearing rights.

b. The content and framing of the Waiver form

The Waiver document is similarly titled “Waiver of Rights Regarding Termination from Treatment Court” and, again, does not mention probation. Two clauses are central:

I further waive my right to a Termination Hearing and request and consent to proceed directly to a Sentencing Hearing.

And:

Based on the circumstances presented, I hereby waive my right to a Termination Hearing and consent to proceed directly to a Sentencing Hearing.

However, as the Court emphasizes:

• The reference to “Sentencing Hearing” is opaque in Robertson’s situation, because she had already been sentenced back in 2017. It does not explicitly tie this “Sentencing” to a probation-revocation disposition.
• The document never states that this waiver also encompasses the rights she would enjoy in a probation-revocation hearing in the Custer County district court.

Thus, the Waiver adds no clarity to the Notification regarding the probation-revocation consequences of waiving the treatment-court termination hearing.

c. Circumstances surrounding the waiver

The Court notes two additional contextual factors:

• No attorney consultation is apparent. The attorney-signature line on the Waiver form is blank. While counsel is not a prerequisite to a valid waiver in every context, its absence matters here because the language of the forms was already ambiguous. Without legal guidance, Robertson was less likely to understand the full implications of what she signed.
• Robertson’s continued insistence on contesting the allegations. At the May 15 hearing, Robertson and her counsel:
  • Expressed a desire to continue in a treatment court (just not Wood Court),
  • Sought to apply to other problem-solving courts, and
  • Asserted that Robertson “had not done anything wrong” and “had not violated [her] probation,” and that Wood Court staff retaliated for her earlier pro se filings.
  These statements strongly suggest she did not intend to concede or abandon any right to challenge the basis for revoking her probation.

Taken together, the ambiguous language of the forms, the absence of clear notice linking treatment court termination to probation revocation, lack of documented counsel input, and Robertson’s own insistence that she had not violated probation lead the Court to conclude that the State failed to carry its “heavy” burden of showing a valid waiver of the probation-revocation hearing.

4. Remedy: Due process violation and vacatur

Because Robertson never validly waived her right to a probation-revocation hearing, the district court’s decision to bypass such a hearing and proceed directly to disposition violated due process under the Fourteenth Amendment as interpreted by Morrissey and Gagnon.

Without a valid waiver, there was no lawful foundation for revoking her probation. The appropriate remedy, consistent with federal precedent, is to vacate the revocation order and modified sentence and remand for a proper probation-revocation hearing that complies with constitutional requirements.

5. Why the fundamental-error doctrine does not apply

Both parties framed Robertson’s appellate claim in terms of “fundamental error,” given her lack of a contemporaneous objection. The Court rejects this framing, drawing an important doctrinal distinction:

• The contemporaneous-objection rule and the fundamental-error doctrine address trial errors—events that occur during trial or sentencing and are arguably erroneous, but not objected to at the time.
• In contrast, Robertson’s claim concerns the validity of a waiver itself—a threshold question of whether she relinquished the right at all. This is not a “trial error” in the conventional sense.

Because:

• The policies behind contemporaneous objection (preventing sandbagging, giving trial courts opportunity to correct errors in real time) do not fit waiver-validity questions, and
• Waiver validity is a mixed question of law and fact involving constitutional rights,

the Court holds that it may freely review waiver validity even if not raised below. No contemporaneous objection was required to preserve the issue.

This clarification has broad significance: appellate courts in Idaho may review whether a defendant validly waived constitutional rights—at least in this kind of procedural setting—even when the claim is first raised on appeal.

C. Impact on Future Cases and Idaho Law

1. Practical impact on treatment courts and I.R.T.C. 18

The decision does not invalidate I.R.T.C. 18(b) or the general concept that a single proceeding can handle both treatment-court termination and probation revocation. But it sends a clear message:

• If the State and courts wish to consolidate these processes, they must ensure that:
  • Defendants are expressly informed that the termination hearing will also function as their probation-revocation hearing, and
  • Any waiver of the termination hearing explicitly and clearly extends to the rights associated with a probation-revocation hearing.

Expect:

• Revisions to Notification and Waiver forms statewide, with:
  • Plain, explicit references to “probation,” “probation violation,” and “probation-revocation hearing,”
  • Clear statements that waiving the termination hearing also waives a separate probation-revocation hearing, and
  • Better articulation of the specific rights being waived (notice, evidence disclosure, confrontation, etc.) and the potential consequences (revocation and execution of suspended sentences).
• More robust, on-the-record colloquies by treatment-court and district-court judges before they accept such waivers, mirroring plea-colloquy practices.

2. Strengthening the constitutional floor in probation and treatment court practice

Robertson reinforces that:

• Probationers and treatment-court participants have meaningful liberty interests,
• Adjudicatory shortcuts or reliance on informal processes cannot sidestep Morrissey/Gagnon protections, and
• When a person’s conditional liberty is at stake, courts must ensure a clear procedural record of either:
  • A proper hearing, or
  • A valid waiver of that hearing.

This will likely produce more formalized procedures in what had sometimes been relatively informal treatment-court contexts, particularly when termination has direct consequences for probation or incarceration.

3. Appellate review of waivers: beyond probation revocation

Although this case arises in the probation/treatment-court setting, its reasoning regarding the inapplicability of the fundamental-error doctrine to waiver-validity questions could influence other contexts, such as:

• Waiver of jury trial,
• Waiver of counsel,
• Waiver of confrontation rights,
• Waiver of appeal or post-conviction rights in plea agreements.

Courts may treat such waiver-validity questions as reviewable on appeal even without a specific objection below, provided the issue is adequately presented in the appellate briefs and the record permits meaningful review.

4. Guidance to trial courts and practitioners

For trial courts:

• When a rule allows a single proceeding to resolve multiple legal consequences (e.g., termination from treatment court and probation revocation), judges must be vigilant in:
  • Explaining the combined nature of the proceeding, and
  • Ensuring any waiver is specifically tied to each right being relinquished.
• Judicial “shortcuts” justified by efficiency or rule text are risky if they obscure constitutional requirements.

For defense counsel:

• Advise clients in treatment courts that termination proceedings may have immediate and profound consequences for probationary status.
• Scrutinize waiver language; insist on:
  • Clear references to probation revocation if the State claims a unified hearing, and
  • On-the-record colloquies reflecting the client’s understanding, especially when recommending signing any waiver.

For prosecutors:

• Do not assume that compliance with I.R.T.C. language alone insulates a case from constitutional challenge.
• Be prepared on appeal to demonstrate, with record citations, that the defendant knew:
  • Termination and revocation were tied together, and
  • Waiver encompassed both.

V. Complex Concepts Simplified

1. Due process and “grievous loss”

“Due process of law” is the constitutional requirement that the government follow fair procedures before depriving someone of life, liberty, or property. A “grievous loss” is a serious deprivation— for example, losing one’s freedom through incarceration.

Probation and treatment-court participation let people live in the community under certain conditions. When the State revokes those statuses and sends someone to prison, it imposes a “grievous loss.” Due process requires:

• Advance notice of the claimed violations,
• A fair chance to contest them, and
• A neutral decision based on evidence.

2. Probation vs. parole vs. treatment courts

• Probation: Court-ordered supervision in the community instead of, or in addition to, jail or prison time, subject to conditions.
• Parole: Supervised release from prison after serving part of a sentence, also subject to conditions.
• Treatment / problem-solving courts: Specialized courts (often for drug, mental health, or veterans’ issues) that combine judicial oversight with treatment. Successful completion often is a condition of probation or avoids conviction/sentence execution.

Though different in structure, all involve conditional liberty and trigger due process protections before that liberty is taken away.

3. Waiver of constitutional rights

A person can give up (waive) certain constitutional rights—such as the right to a hearing, the right to counsel, or the right to confront witnesses. But the waiver is valid only if:

• The person knows what right they are giving up (nature of the right), and
• They understand what will happen as a result (consequences).

Simply signing a form is not enough if the form is unclear. Courts presume people do not waive their constitutional rights unless the State proves otherwise.

4. Fundamental error vs. waiver-validity review

Normally, if a defendant does not object to an error in the trial court, appellate courts will not review it later unless it is “fundamental error”—an error so serious it affects basic rights and the fairness of the proceeding.

In Robertson, the Court draws a line:

• Trial errors: things the court or parties did during the proceeding (e.g., wrong jury instruction, improper admission of evidence). These usually require a contemporaneous objection or must fit within the fundamental-error exception.
• Waiver-validity questions: whether a person really gave up a constitutional right in the first place. These can be reviewed on appeal even if not objected to below, because they concern whether the right was ever relinquished.

VI. Conclusion: The Significance of State v. Robertson

State v. Robertson is a significant clarification of Idaho law at the crossroads of treatment courts, probation, and constitutional due process. The Court:

• Reaffirms Morrissey, Gagnon, and Rogers: revoking a person’s conditional liberty—whether through probation revocation or treatment-court termination—requires robust procedural protections.
• Strengthens the presumption against waiver of constitutional rights, insisting on clear, explicit, and informed waivers when a single proceeding is used to decide both treatment-court status and probation.
• Clarifies that appellate courts may review waiver validity without the constraints of the fundamental-error doctrine, treating it as a distinct class of constitutional inquiry.
• Signals to Idaho’s treatment courts and trial courts that form documents and colloquies must be carefully designed to convey the full reach and consequences of any waiver relating to probation-revocation rights.

On remand, Robertson will receive what she was constitutionally entitled to all along: a probation-revocation hearing at which she can contest the alleged violations and present mitigating evidence before her liberty interest in probation is finally adjudicated. More broadly, the decision underscores that efficiency in problem-solving courts cannot come at the expense of the constitutional bedrock of informed choice and fair process.