State v. Carlin and the Reaffirmation of Montana’s Standards on Substitution of Counsel After a Guilty Plea

I. Introduction

The decision in State v. Kristoffer Charles Carlin, 2025 MT 278N (DA 24‑0170), is a noncitable memorandum opinion of the Montana Supreme Court. Although it does not create binding precedent under Section I, Paragraph 3(c) of the Court’s Internal Operating Rules, it offers a clear illustration of how Montana courts apply settled law on:

• Requests for substitution of counsel after a guilty plea has been entered;
• Allegations that a plea was “coerced” by defense counsel’s sentencing advice; and
• The limits of what a district court must do when a defendant complains of counsel but does not move to withdraw a plea.

The case involves a defendant who entered a binding plea agreement to multiple counts of Sexual Abuse of Children, later claimed he had been pressured by prior counsel, and sought substitute counsel. The District Court denied his request; the Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the District Court:

• Conducted an adequate inquiry into the complaint about counsel, as required by State v. Johnson and State v. Schowengerdt; and
• Correctly concluded that ordinary “risk versus reward” plea advice does not create an actual conflict of interest, coercion, or a breakdown in communication sufficient to warrant substitution of counsel.

This commentary analyzes the opinion’s background, its application of existing precedent, and its practical implications for substitution-of-counsel motions and plea-coercion claims in Montana.

II. Background and Procedural History

A. Charges and Plea Agreement

Carlin was charged with serious sexual offenses:

• Incest;
• Tampering With or Fabricating Physical Evidence; and
• Sixteen counts of Sexual Abuse of Children.

He entered into a binding plea agreement under § 46‑12‑211(1)(b), MCA, which:

• Required him to plead guilty to four counts of Sexual Abuse of Children; and
• Provided for a specific disposition: a net sentence of 40 years in the Montana State Prison, with 20 years suspended;
• In exchange, the State agreed to dismiss the remaining charges with prejudice.

Under § 46‑12‑211(1)(b), MCA, if the court accepts such a plea agreement, it is bound to follow the agreed disposition. If it rejects the agreement, the defendant must be allowed to withdraw any guilty plea made in reliance on it.

B. Change-of-Plea Hearing

Before signing the plea, Carlin met with:

• Attorney Daylon Martin (his counsel of record); and
• Attorney Matthew McKittrick (another OPD attorney),

to review the agreement.

At the July 7, 2023 change-of-plea hearing, the District Court conducted the standard colloquy. Carlin:

• Acknowledged he had signed the plea agreement and the waiver-of-rights form;
• Confirmed he had read the plea agreement and understood it;
• Stated he had discussed the agreement with both Martin and McKittrick; and
• Affirmed he was satisfied with his counsel.

Crucially, the court asked whether he had been:

“threatened, coerced, intimidated, offered you a bribe, reward, or special treatment to get you to enter a [guilty] plea here today,”

and Carlin responded: “No.” He then:

• Pled guilty to four counts of Sexual Abuse of Children; and
• Admitted to specific conduct satisfying each offense’s elements.

C. Later Complaints and Request for New Counsel

Weeks after the plea:

• On August 18, 2023, Carlin sent a “kite” (institutional note) to the District Court stating he had “fired” the Office of Public Defender (OPD).
• On September 5, 2023, attorney McKittrick formally substituted as counsel for Martin.
• On December 5, 2023, Carlin sent an ex parte letter to the State seeking, in effect, to re-negotiate the plea. He claimed:
  • He had felt pressured by attorney Martin to accept the plea; and
  • Attorney McKittrick was aware of these concerns.
• The State filed this letter with the District Court on December 14, 2023.

In response, the District Court scheduled a hearing for January 26, 2024, under the standards articulated in State v. Johnson, 2019 MT 34, to determine whether substitution of counsel was warranted.

D. January 26, 2024 Representation Hearing

At the hearing, the District Court carefully delineated the scope of the proceeding:

• The purpose was to examine whether Carlin’s concerns justified substitution of counsel under Johnson;
• The court explicitly stated it was not considering a motion to withdraw his guilty pleas; and
• If Carlin wished to seek withdrawal of his plea, he would have to file a separate motion.

Carlin never filed such a motion.

On the record, Carlin stated:

• He had lied at the plea hearing when he told the court he had not been pressured;
• He now claimed attorney Martin had coerced him into signing the plea by:
  • Describing a recent case involving one of Carlin’s friends who received the maximum sentence on the same charge after trial; and
  • Allegedly telling Carlin that if he did not plead guilty, he would receive the maximum sentence.
• He wanted new counsel because of this alleged coercion and because he had asked why the plea had not been withdrawn.

Attorney McKittrick, questioned by the court, responded:

• He was present for the conversation between Martin and Carlin about the plea;
• The discussion was a standard “risk versus reward” analysis:
  • Explaining the risks of going to trial on multiple serious felonies (including the potential for harsher sentencing); and
  • Comparing those risks with the certainty and reduced exposure offered by the plea agreement.
• He stated:

  “We always pledged to [Carlin], as we do to all of our clients, that we'll do our very best at trial.”

  thus denying any threat that counsel would abandon him if he refused the plea.

The District Court found:

• No actual conflict of interest between Carlin and his counsel;
• No complete breakdown in communication; and
• No conduct that rose above ordinary plea counseling into coercion or duress.

The court characterized the attorneys’ discussion with Carlin as a commonplace and appropriate risk‑assessment conversation and denied the request for substitution of counsel.

III. Summary of the Supreme Court’s Opinion

The Montana Supreme Court, in an opinion authored by Justice Ingrid Gustafson, affirmed the District Court’s denial of Carlin’s substitution-of-counsel request.

A. Nonprecedential Memorandum Opinion

At the outset, the Court noted that pursuant to Section I, Paragraph 3(c) of its Internal Operating Rules:

• The case is resolved by memorandum opinion;
• It shall not be cited and does not serve as precedent;
• Only its title, cause number, and disposition will appear in the Court’s quarterly list of noncitable cases.

The Court concluded that the appeal was “controlled by settled law or by the clear application of applicable standards of review.”

B. Standard of Review

The Court applied an abuse-of-discretion standard to review:

• The District Court’s handling of Carlin’s substitution-of-counsel request; and
• The adequacy of the court’s initial inquiry into Carlin’s complaints about counsel.

Citing State v. Schowengerdt, 2018 MT 7, ¶ 16, the Court reiterated that it reviews:

“both procedures employed by a district court during the initial inquiry into defendant's complaints and a district court's analysis of whether a defendant's claims are seemingly substantial, necessitating a further hearing[.]”

C. Key Holdings

The Supreme Court held:

1. Adequate inquiry. The District Court properly:
   • Convened a hearing upon receiving Carlin’s complaints;
   • Listened to Carlin’s description of alleged coercion;
   • Obtained counsel’s account of the same conversation; and
   • Engaged in the “critical analysis” required by Schowengerdt and Happel.
2. No “seemingly substantial” complaint of conflict or breakdown. Carlin’s claims that:
   • Counsel discussed sentencing risks; and
   • Referred to a similar case involving a friend who received a harsher sentence after trial,
   did not demonstrate:
   • An actual conflict of interest;
   • An irreconcilable conflict between counsel and client; or
   • A complete breakdown in communication.
3. Ordinary plea counseling is not coercion. The Court agreed with the District Court that:

   “discussion as to sentences imposed on other similarly situated defendants versus accepting a plea agreement [is] commonplace, rather than coercive or constituting duress.”

4. No motion to withdraw plea; no ruling required on plea validity. Because Carlin:
   • Never filed a motion to withdraw his guilty pleas; and
   • Raised his coercion allegations only in the context of substitution of counsel,
   the Court treated the case as solely about substitution-of-counsel and not about the validity of the plea itself.
5. Inconsistency with sworn plea colloquy. The Court noted that:
   • At the plea hearing, Carlin swore he had not been threatened or coerced and was satisfied with counsel;
   • He admitted specific facts establishing guilt; and
   • His later, unsworn assertions of coercion conflicted with this sworn record.
   This undercut any claim that counsel’s advice created a substantial conflict warranting new counsel.

The Court therefore found no abuse of discretion and affirmed the District Court.

IV. Analysis of the Opinion

A. The Legal Framework: Substitution of Counsel in Montana

The opinion synthesizes and applies a line of Montana cases that govern when a defendant is entitled to new counsel. The primary authorities are:

• State v. Schowengerdt, 2018 MT 7;
• State v. Johnson, 2019 MT 34;
• State v. Happel, 2010 MT 200;
• State v. Weaver, 276 Mont. 505 (1996);
• City of Billings v. Smith, 281 Mont. 133 (1997);
• State v. Gallagher (Gallagher I), 1998 MT 70;
• State v. Cheetham, 2016 MT 151;
• State v. Holm, 2013 MT 58;
• State v. Finley, 276 Mont. 126 (1996) (overruled in part on other grounds); and
• State v. Gazda, 2003 MT 350.

1. Adequate Initial Inquiry and “Seemingly Substantial” Claims

Schowengerdt and Happel establish a two-stage framework:

1. Initial inquiry: Upon a request for new counsel, the district court must:
   • Gather information about the defendant’s complaints (Gallagher I);
   • Analyze those complaints in light of counsel’s specific responses (Cheetham, Holm); and
   • Make “some sort of critical analysis at the time the motion was filed” (Finley, as quoted in Happel).
   The purpose at this stage is to determine whether the defendant’s claim is “seemingly substantial”, not whether it is ultimately meritorious (Happel, Gazda).
2. Further hearing and separate counsel (if warranted): If this initial inquiry reveals a seemingly substantial complaint, then:
   • The court must hold a more robust hearing on the validity of the complaints; and
   • Appoint separate counsel to represent the defendant at that hearing (Happel; Gallagher I; Gazda).

In Carlin, the Supreme Court held that the District Court satisfied this duty by:

• Holding a dedicated hearing;
• Allowing Carlin to explain his allegations of pressure/coercion;
• Questioning McKittrick, who was present at the underlying conversation; and
• Articulating a reasoned conclusion that the conversation was normal plea counseling, not misconduct.

2. The Johnson Categories: When Is Substitution Required?

State v. Johnson clarified that a court’s inquiry should focus on whether a defendant’s request for new counsel is supported by material facts showing “good cause”, demonstrated by one of three categories:

(1) an actual conflict of interest;
(2) an irreconcilable conflict between counsel and the defendant; or
(3) a complete breakdown in communication between counsel and the defendant.

The Supreme Court in Carlin explicitly applies this structure. The question is not whether:

• The defendant dislikes counsel’s advice; or
• Counsel’s trial strategy or plea advice seems favorable to the defendant;

but whether there is:

• A real conflict of interest (e.g., counsel’s personal interest diverging from the client’s);
• An irreconcilable conflict (fundamental breakdown of trust preventing representation); or
• A complete breakdown in communication (such that effective representation is impossible).

In Carlin, the Court agreed with the District Court that none of these existed. At most, there was:

• A client who later regretted his plea and disagreed with the advice he had been given; and
• Unhappiness that counsel had candidly described the risks of going to trial.

Under Johnson, that is not “good cause” for substitution.

B. Application to Carlin: Plea Advice vs. Coercion

1. The “Risk vs. Reward” Conversation

Carlin’s core complaint was that attorney Martin:

• Told him about a friend who went to trial on similar charges and received the maximum sentence; and
• Told him that if he did not plead guilty, he would receive the maximum sentence.

McKittrick characterized this as:

• A standard “risk versus reward” discussion; and
• An example used to explain potential consequences, not a threat or ultimatum.

The District Court, and then the Supreme Court, accepted McKittrick’s characterization and understood the conversation as:

• Part of routine, competent representation—ensuring a client understands sentencing exposure; and
• Not coercive per se merely because it referenced a known defendant who received a harsh sentence.

The Supreme Court emphasized that such discussions are:

“part and parcel of a typical conversation … [a] ‘risk versus reward analysis … where ultimately our clients have to weigh the benefits of the plea agreement versus the risk of going to trial[.]’”

Thus, the Court signaled that:

• Candid estimation of sentencing risks—even if bleak—is expected of defense counsel; and
• That form of “pressure,” in the sense of presenting sobering realities, does not amount to legal coercion or create a conflict of interest.

2. The Weight of the Plea Colloquy

Another key feature of the Court’s reasoning is reliance on Carlin’s sworn statements at the plea hearing:

• He told the court he understood the plea and had read and discussed it;
• He said he was satisfied with counsel’s representation; and
• He specifically denied any threats, coercion, or intimidation.

Later, at the substitution hearing, he claimed these statements were lies. The Court’s approach underscores a common doctrine:

• Statements made under oath at a plea hearing carry substantial weight; and
• A defendant who later contradicts those statements faces a high hurdle in establishing coercion or involuntariness.

The Court did not label Carlin’s plea-withdrawal theory frivolous, but it clearly treated his later unsworn assertions as insufficient to transform ordinary plea advice into a substantial complaint warranting new counsel.

3. No Motion to Withdraw the Plea

Procedurally, the District Court expressly told Carlin that if he wanted to withdraw his plea, he needed to file a separate motion. He never did so. This is critical:

• On appeal, Carlin argued the court should have appointed new counsel to advise him on whether to withdraw the plea, given the alleged coercion.
• The State responded that:
  • Carlin conflated a substitution-of-counsel request with a plea-withdrawal motion; and
  • No plea-withdrawal issue was properly before the court because no motion had been filed.

The Supreme Court agreed with the State:

• It confined its analysis to the only issue actually before it—substitution of counsel; and
• It declined to treat Carlin’s generalized dissatisfaction as a plea withdrawal motion by implication.

This reinforces the importance of procedural clarity:

• Defendants must use the correct procedural vehicle (a formal motion) to raise withdrawal-of-plea claims;
• Courts are not obliged to recharacterize every complaint about counsel as an implied motion to withdraw a plea.

C. Conflict of Interest and Ineffective Assistance Claims

On appeal, Carlin argued that:

• Because he alleged his counsel’s conduct was coercive or ineffective, a conflict of interest arose;
• Thus, new counsel was required to advise him independently about withdrawing the plea.

The Supreme Court rejected this framing for several reasons:

1. No factual basis for an “actual conflict.”
   • The only alleged misconduct was a candid risk/benefit discussion;
   • Both Carlin and McKittrick described essentially the same conversation;
   • The District Court reasonably concluded this was not coercion and thus not a conflict of interest.
2. No substantial ineffective-assistance claim raised below.
   • Carlin did not raise an ineffective assistance of counsel (IAC) claim in the District Court;
   • On appeal, he attempted to characterize his complaint as IAC, but the Supreme Court observed he had not made even a “seemingly substantial” showing of deficient performance, let alone prejudice.
3. Disagreement with advice ≠ conflict.
   • Under Johnson, routine disagreement with counsel’s strategic advice—even important advice about whether to accept a plea—is not itself an “actual conflict” or “irreconcilable conflict.”

Implicitly, the Court also signaled that if a true IAC-based conflict arises—such as where counsel’s self-interest in avoiding professional criticism diverges from the client’s interest in litigating an IAC claim—relief might be appropriate. But Carlin did not present such a situation.

D. Procedural Discipline: Limiting Review to Issues Properly Raised

The opinion reflects a disciplined adherence to procedural rules:

• The District Court limited the January hearing to representation issues; and
• The Supreme Court limited its review to whether the court abused its discretion in denying substitution of counsel.

By doing so, the Court avoided:

• Addressing the voluntariness of the plea in the absence of a motion and corresponding record; or
• Developing new law on when counsel must be replaced to advise on plea withdrawal.

Instead, the Court relied on “settled law” and reaffirmed the core principle that:

Dissatisfaction with plea advice and regret over entering a plea, without more, do not require the appointment of substitute counsel.

V. Precedents Cited and Their Influence

A. State v. Schowengerdt, 2018 MT 7

Schowengerdt is the principal authority for:

• The abuse-of-discretion standard in substitution-of-counsel cases; and
• The requirement of an adequate initial inquiry into a defendant’s complaints about counsel.

It holds that appellate courts review:

• Both the procedure used by the District Court (inquiry adequacy); and
• The determination whether the complaints are “seemingly substantial” and thus require further hearing and separate counsel.

In Carlin, the Supreme Court explicitly applied that standard and found:

• The District Court appropriately convened a hearing;
• It heard both the defendant and counsel; and
• It made a reasoned determination that no substantial complaint existed.

B. State v. Johnson, 2019 MT 34

Johnson refined Montana’s law by clarifying:

• The focus of the substitution-inquiry is on:
  • Actual conflicts of interest;
  • Irreconcilable conflicts; or
  • Complete breakdowns in communication;
• The inquiry should not focus on:
  • Every disagreement over strategy; or
  • Second-guessing counsel’s tactical choices.

The Supreme Court in Carlin applied this framework directly, concluding:

• Carlin’s complaints did not meet any of the Johnson categories;
• Therefore, no good cause for substitution existed.

C. State v. Happel, Gazda, Weaver, City of Billings v. Smith, Gallagher I, Cheetham, Holm, Finley

These cases collectively:

• Define what constitutes an “adequate” inquiry (e.g., Gallagher I, Cheetham, Holm);
• Clarify that “seemingly substantial” is a low but meaningful threshold (Happel, Gazda); and
• Require some form of contemporaneous “critical analysis” of complaints (Finley).

The Court in Carlin cited this line of authority to demonstrate that:

• The District Court did exactly what these cases prescribe;
• Its conclusion that Carlin’s complaint was not seemingly substantial is entitled to deference.

VI. Complex Legal Concepts Explained

A. Binding Plea Agreement Under § 46‑12‑211(1)(b), MCA

A “(1)(b) plea agreement” is a specific type of plea bargain in Montana where:

• The plea agreement includes a specific disposition (for example, a precise sentence);
• If the court accepts the agreement, it is bound to impose that sentence;
• If the court rejects the agreement, the defendant must be allowed to withdraw the plea.

Carlin’s 40-year sentence with 20 suspended was the product of such a binding agreement.

B. “Kite” and Ex Parte Letter

• “Kite” is prison slang for a written communication from an inmate, often used to send notes to staff, courts, or others.
• An ex parte letter is a communication to one side (here, initially sent only to the State) without serving or notifying the other parties. The State then properly filed the letter with the court to bring it onto the record and avoid improper ex parte contact.

C. Abuse of Discretion

“Abuse of discretion” is a deferential standard of review. A court abuses its discretion only if it:

• Acts arbitrarily or without conscientious judgment; or
• Exceeds the bounds of reason, resulting in substantial injustice.

In Carlin, the Supreme Court concluded that:

• The District Court used a reasonable, structured process to evaluate the complaint; and
• Its decision not to appoint new counsel fell well within the range of reasonable options.

D. “Seemingly Substantial” Complaints

The term “seemingly substantial” is drawn from cases like Happel and Gazda. It means:

• The defendant’s complaint appears, on its face and in light of counsel’s response, to raise real, significant concerns; but
• The court need not decide merits at that stage; it only decides whether further, more formal inquiry is needed.

In Carlin, the court concluded that:

• Once counsel explained the conversation as ordinary plea counseling;
• And given Carlin’s prior sworn denials of coercion;

the complaint did not pass even this threshold.

E. Actual Conflict vs. Irreconcilable Conflict vs. Breakdown in Communication

• Actual conflict of interest:
  • Occurs when counsel’s personal interests or duties to another client conflict with the defendant’s interests;
  • Examples: representing co-defendants with adverse interests; counsel facing potential criminal charges related to the case.
• Irreconcilable conflict:
  • A deep, fundamental breakdown in trust or objectives between counsel and defendant;
  • Representation is compromised because the relationship is unworkable.
• Complete breakdown in communication:
  • Communication has deteriorated so badly that counsel cannot obtain information, advise the client, or carry out representation effectively.

In Carlin, none of these was present. There was:

• Disagreement and regret, but no showing that counsel could not or would not continue to represent him.

F. Noncitable Memorandum Opinion

Under the Court’s Internal Operating Rules:

• A memorandum opinion is used when:
  • The case is controlled by settled law; or
  • The application of the law is clear under existing precedent.
• Such opinions:
  • Are not precedential and may not be cited as legal authority; but
  • Are summarized in quarterly lists in the Pacific Reporter and Montana Reports.

Thus, while Carlin does not formally create new law, it transparently demonstrates the Court’s continued adherence to its existing framework.

VII. Practical and Doctrinal Impact

A. For Defense Counsel

Although nonprecedential, Carlin sends several clear messages:

• Candid plea counseling is protected, not penalized.
  • Defense attorneys are expected to explain sentencing risks, including:
    • Maximum penalties;
    • Realistic trial outcomes;
    • Examples of sentences imposed on similar defendants.
  • Doing so will not, by itself, be treated as coercive or as creating a conflict of interest.
• Document discussions where possible.
  • The fact that McKittrick could describe the discussion in detail, and that it matched Carlin’s own description aside from the label of “coercion,” helped the court see it as legitimate counseling.
• Plea colloquies matter.
  • Attorneys should ensure their clients understand the importance of answering truthfully;
  • Later attempts to recant such sworn statements will be viewed with skepticism.

B. For Defendants

• Regret is not a legal basis for new counsel.
  • Simply regretting a plea, or being unhappy with prior advice, does not entitle a defendant to new appointed counsel.
• Use the correct procedural tools.
  • If the goal is to withdraw a guilty plea:
    • A formal motion to withdraw must be filed;
    • Arguments about coercion or involuntariness must be presented in that framework.
• Sworn statements carry great weight.
  • Statements denying coercion at the plea hearing will heavily influence later rulings on related claims.

C. For Trial Courts

The opinion validates a structured approach:

• When complaints about counsel arise, promptly:
  • Hold a focused hearing;
  • Let the defendant explain the complaint;
  • Get counsel’s response;
  • Make explicit findings on:
    • Whether any Johnson category is met; and
    • Whether the complaint is “seemingly substantial.”
• Clarify procedural distinctions:
  • Explain when and how a defendant must file a plea-withdrawal motion;
  • Keep substitution and plea-withdrawal issues separate when appropriate.

D. Limited Doctrinal Impact, Strong Illustrative Value

Doctrinally, Carlin adds no new rule: the Court expressly relies on “settled law.” However, it is instructive in showing:

• How the Court views “coercion” allegations grounded solely in counsel’s sentencing predictions; and
• How it expects district courts to implement Schowengerdt and Johnson.

In that sense, Carlin is a concrete example of the application of Montana’s substitution-of-counsel jurisprudence in the plea context.

VIII. Conclusion

State v. Carlin, though a noncitable memorandum decision, offers a clear reaffirmation of Montana’s established standards on substitution of counsel and the handling of post‑plea complaints about counsel’s advice. The Supreme Court:

• Confirmed that a district court acts within its discretion when it:
  • Holds a focused hearing on a defendant’s complaints;
  • Examines both the defendant’s and counsel’s accounts; and
  • Concludes that the complaint does not show an actual conflict, irreconcilable conflict, or breakdown in communication under Johnson.
• Made clear that:
  • Ordinary, candid plea advice—especially “risk versus reward” counseling about sentencing exposure—does not itself constitute coercion, conflict of interest, or duress;
  • Plea colloquy admissions and denials of coercion are entitled to significant weight; and
  • Regret over a plea and dissatisfaction with earlier advice, without more, will not mandate new counsel.
• Emphasized procedural precision:
  • Substitution-of-counsel requests and motions to withdraw a plea serve different purposes;
  • The absence of a plea-withdrawal motion limited the issues properly before the courts.

In the broader context, Carlin reinforces Montana’s commitment to a structured, fact‑sensitive approach to substitution-of-counsel motions, one that balances a defendant’s right to conflict-free, effective representation with the judicial system’s need for orderly, non-frivolous administration of justice.