Precedents and Authorities Cited

• § 40-4-212, MCA (Best-Interest Factors): Central to Montana parenting determinations, including factor (1)(l): “frequent and continuing contact with both parents ... is considered to be in the child’s best interests unless the court determines, after a hearing, that contact with a parent would be detrimental.” The district court explicitly relied on this factor when approving a step-up to 50/50 time.
• Bessette v. Bessette, 2019 MT 35, 394 Mont. 262, 434 P.3d 894: Reiterates (a) clear-error review for findings, (b) correctness for legal conclusions, and (c) abuse-of-discretion review for parenting plans. Applied here to validate the district court’s broad discretion.
• In re M.C., 2015 MT 57, 378 Mont. 305, 343 P.3d 569: Defines “clear error” as lack of substantial evidence, misapprehension of evidence, or a firm conviction of mistake. The Supreme Court found none in the district court’s parenting or property findings.
• In re C.J., 2016 MT 93, 383 Mont. 197, 369 P.3d 1028: Emphasizes the trial court’s broad discretion in parenting decisions, reversed only for clear abuse. The equal-time step-up plan fell within that discretion.
• In re Marriage of Bliss, 2016 MT 51, 382 Mont. 370, 367 P.3d 395: Appellate deference to trial courts on credibility and weight of evidence. Critical here given conflicting parental narratives and family-member testimony.
• Markegard v. Markegard, 189 Mont. 374, 616 P.2d 323 (1980), and Czapranski v. Czapranski, 2003 MT 14, 314 Mont. 55, 63 P.3d 499: Montana abandoned the Tender Years Doctrine decades ago. The governing test is the statutory best-interest standard without any maternal presumption. The Court rejected Ashley’s invitation to revive the doctrine.
• Longjaw v. State, 2012 MT 243, 366 Mont. 472, 288 P.3d 210: Though a criminal context, cited for the principle that conflict-of-interest claims require a showing of actual prejudice—i.e., that counsel’s conflict caused foregone or inadequate pursuit of material evidence or arguments. The Court found no such showing.
• In re Kessler, 2018 MT 231, 392 Mont. 540, 427 P.3d 77: No right to effective assistance of counsel in a custody dispute between private parties. This limits constitutional attack routes for dissatisfied family-law litigants alleging attorney error.
• In re Killpack, 2004 MT 55, 320 Mont. 186, 87 P.3d 393: Parties are held to stipulations made in open court. Applied to enforce the property settlement and the agreed trade of debt payoff in lieu of spousal maintenance.
• Treatises and Secondary Sources: Ashley cited the treatise Legal Rights of Children (Horowitz & Davidson, 1984) and the historical origin of the Tender Years presumption (Helms v. Franciscus, 2 Bland 544 (Md. Ch. 1830), and a law review critique (Robb Strom, 21 San Diego L. Rev. 861 (1984)). The Court treated these as nonbinding and reiterated Montana’s settled statutory framework.

Legal Reasoning

1) Conflict-of-Interest Claim and Fair Trial: The Court addressed the Sixth Amendment invocation by clarifying that the right to counsel and effective assistance is a criminal-law protection; in private custody disputes, Montana does not recognize a right to effective assistance (In re Kessler). The proper inquiry is whether any alleged conflict produced actual prejudice or a fundamentally unfair proceeding. Borrowing the prejudice concept from Longjaw, the Court looked for record-based instances where counsel’s supposed conflict caused the omission of material evidence or arguments. It found none.

The opinion details that issues Ashley identified—driving concerns, anger management, special medical needs, interim support checks, photos, insurance statements, text messages, and journal entries—were addressed through testimony and some exhibits, with photos admitted. Ashley’s assertion that she only learned post-trial of her attorney’s prior personal use of opposing counsel lacked specifics tying that relationship to any strategic decisions causing prejudice. Dissatisfaction with counsel’s choices, without record proof of misconduct or court refusal to admit offered evidence, did not warrant relief.

2) Parenting Plan—Best Interests, Not Tender Years: The Court reaffirmed Montana’s statutory best-interest framework (§ 40-4-212, MCA) and rejected reliance on the Tender Years Doctrine. The district court found both parents are loving, attentive, and capable caregivers. It expressly recognized the younger child’s medical needs and found both parents competent to coordinate specialist care—an assessment bolstered by Justin’s medical training as a Navy hospital corpsman and Ashley’s history of attending appointments.

The trial court’s step-up plan to equal residential time was consistent with the statute’s emphasis on frequent and continuing contact with both parents unless such contact is detrimental. No record finding of detriment was warranted. Given the children’s young ages, the step-up approach allowed adjustment while maintaining and strengthening bonds with each parent. Appellate deference (Bessette, C.J., Bliss) supported affirmance; there was no clear error in the findings or abuse of discretion in the ultimate schedule.

3) Property Division and Maintenance—Binding Stipulations and Preservation: The parties stipulated on the record to sell the marital home, use proceeds first to pay credit card debt (with Ashley carrying the larger share), and split the remainder; they agreed that debt payoff would be in lieu of spousal maintenance. The district court adhered to those terms, also awarding vehicles, accounts, and a 50/50 split of Justin’s thrift savings plan. While Ashley later criticized Justin’s vehicle-sale proceeds management, the court credited testimony that the funds served interim expenses and support. Under Killpack, parties are bound by open-court stipulations, and Ashley did not preserve a formal maintenance request at trial. The court was not obliged to award maintenance sua sponte.

4) Appellate Sanctions/Fees: Although Justin requested fees or sanctions on the ground that Ashley’s appeal was frivolous, the Court declined to impose either—implicitly recognizing that, while unsuccessful, her arguments were not sanctionable.

Impact and Practical Implications

Nonprecedential but Instructive: As a memorandum opinion, this case does not set precedent and is not citable under the Court’s Internal Operating Rules. Nevertheless, it underscores several practical points for Montana family law:

• Conflict-of-Interest Allegations Require Record-Based Prejudice: Family-law litigants cannot convert dissatisfaction with counsel into reversible error without specific, documented prejudice tied to the conflict. Absent a criminal right to effective assistance, relief is rare without clear unfairness.
• Best-Interest Standard is Neutral and Evidence-Driven: Montana continues to reject maternal presumptions. Even with a special-needs child, the critical question is each parent’s capacity to meet needs and the absence of detriment from shared contact—not which parent was historically primary.
• Step-Up Plans to 50/50 Are Within Discretion: Especially for very young children, gradual equalization of time is consistent with § 40-4-212 when both parents are competent and involved.
• Stipulations Have Teeth: In-court agreements on property and maintenance will be enforced. Parties should ensure they understand and are comfortable with on-the-record stipulations; undoing them on appeal is difficult.
• Issue Preservation Matters: Requests for maintenance or evidentiary relief must be clearly raised below. Courts are not required to award maintenance absent a preserved request and supporting proof.
• Special-Needs Considerations: A child’s medical regimen influences scheduling and responsibilities, but does not presumptively justify limiting a capable parent’s time. Parties should present concrete medical evidence and practical plans for continuity of care.
• Sanctions Are Reserved: The denial of fees/sanctions here signals the Court’s reluctance to chill appeals by self-represented parties absent truly frivolous litigation.