Nonprecedential Clarifications on Civil Protective Orders: Counterman’s Criminal Mens Rea Is Inapplicable; Electronic, Sexualized Emails Can Constitute a “Course of Conduct” for Montana Stalking OOPs

Introduction

In Wooldridge v. Spreadbury, 2025 MT 235N (DA 25-0220), the Montana Supreme Court affirmed a district court’s continuation of a civil order of protection arising from a school-based professional interaction that devolved into sexually explicit electronic communications. The case was resolved by memorandum opinion under Section I, Paragraph 3(c) of the Court’s Internal Operating Rules—expressly noncitable and nonprecedential—yet it offers instructive clarifications on recurring issues:

Electronic communications (here, emails) can satisfy the “course of conduct” element of Montana’s stalking statute, § 45-5-220, MCA.
Sexualized, targeted emails were deemed unprotected by the First Amendment in this context; Counterman v. Colorado’s criminal mens rea analysis does not extend to civil protective orders.
Appellate briefing rules are strictly enforced; unsupported issues are not considered.

The parties appeared pro se throughout. Appellant Michael E. Spreadbury, a substitute teacher, had emailed Appellee Brandia Wooldridge, a full-time teacher at Powell County High School (PCHS), messages the district court found partially sexual in nature. Following Wooldridge’s fear-based petition, a Justice Court issued a protective order; after a de novo hearing, the District Court continued the order for one year. Spreadbury appealed; the Supreme Court affirmed.

Because the opinion is noncitable and nonprecedential, its significance is practical rather than doctrinal—illustrating how settled law is applied to common fact patterns involving electronic harassment and protective orders.

Summary of the Opinion

The Montana Supreme Court affirmed the District Court’s April 28, 2025 order continuing an order of protection against Spreadbury until March 14, 2026. Key points:

Standard of review: Abuse of discretion for decisions to continue, amend, or make permanent protective orders.
Evidence of stalking: Testimony established a “course of conduct” directed at Wooldridge—at least two emails (one inviting her to a hot tub with a “one piece” swimsuit so his “imagination doesn’t run wild,” another with multiple sexual references), plus related conduct concerning school property and communications to staff.
First Amendment: The Court rejected the claim that the emails were protected parody, matters of public concern, or government criticism; it emphasized that obscene speech is not protected and that Spreadbury failed to present supporting authority. The Court also held that Counterman v. Colorado governs criminal prosecutions, not civil protective orders.
Appellate waiver: Two appellate issues—(1) denial of a motion to dismiss and (5) claims of judicial bias—were not considered due to inadequate briefing and lack of supporting authority.
Eligibility for OOP: The Court reaffirmed that a stalking victim may obtain a protective order regardless of relationship to the offender under § 40-15-102(2)(a), MCA.

Concluding the case was governed by settled law and applicable standards of review, the Court affirmed without creating precedent.

Analysis

Precedents and Authorities Cited

Fritzler v. Bighorn, 2024 MT 27, ¶ 7, 415 Mont. 165, 543 P.3d 571: Reiterates that appellate review of protection orders is for abuse of discretion.
Boushie v. Windsor, 2014 MT 153, ¶ 8, 375 Mont. 301, 328 P.3d 631: Defines abuse of discretion as acting arbitrarily, without conscientious judgment, or beyond the bounds of reason. Also emphasizes deference to trial court fact finding.
Cook v. Bodine, 2024 MT 189, ¶¶ 10, 13, 418 Mont. 49, 555 P.3d 236 (citing In re Marriage of Bessette, 2019 MT 35, ¶ 13): Clarifies abuse of discretion can be found where factual findings are clearly erroneous or law is misapplied; underscores trial courts’ role in assessing witness credibility and weighing conflicts in testimony.
M. R. App. P. 12(1)(g): Requires appellants to include contentions, reasons, and citations to authority and record pages; noncompliant issues are not considered.
Penado v. Hunter, 2024 MT 216, ¶ 20; In re Marriage of McMichael, 2006 MT 237, ¶ 12: The Court will not consider unsupported issues or develop arguments for a party.
Estate of Harris v. Reilly, 2025 MT 126, ¶ 16 (quoting McCulley v. American Land Title, 2013 MT 89, ¶ 20): The Court does not guess a party’s position or supply analysis.
State v. Cybulski, 2009 MT 70, ¶ 14; State v. Ferguson, 2005 MT 343, ¶ 41: References to arguments below do not substitute for developed appellate argument.
In re Marriage of McMahon, 2002 MT 198, ¶ 7: Appellant bears the burden to establish error.
Wicklund v. Sundheim, 2016 MT 62, ¶ 26 (quoting State v. Montgomery, 2010 MT 193, ¶ 12): New issues are generally disallowed on appeal; parties may bolster preserved issues with additional authority within the same legal theory.
Counterman v. Colorado, 600 U.S. 66 (2023): Addresses mens rea for “true threats” in criminal cases; held inapplicable to civil protective orders in this case.
Ashcroft v. ACLU, 535 U.S. 564, 573-74 (2002): Notes obscene speech has long been unprotected; Court points out appellant misquoted the case and failed to ground his First Amendment claims in authority.

Key Statutory Framework

§ 45-5-220(1), MCA (Stalking): Requires a “course of conduct” directed at a specific person, where the actor knows or should know it would cause a reasonable person to fear for safety or suffer substantial emotional distress.
§ 45-5-220(2)(a), MCA: Defines “course of conduct” as two or more acts, including electronic communications that threaten, harass, or intimidate.
§ 40-15-201(2), MCA: A court shall issue a temporary order of protection upon finding the petitioner is in danger of harm if the court does not act immediately.
§ 40-15-202(1), MCA: After hearing, a court may continue or amend a temporary order if “good cause” exists.
§ 40-15-102(2)(a), MCA: A stalking victim is eligible to file for an order of protection against the offender regardless of relationship.

Legal Reasoning

The Court’s reasoning proceeds in three strands: evidentiary sufficiency under the stalking statute; First Amendment defenses; and appellate procedure.

1) Stalking and “course of conduct” via electronic communications

The District Court, after a de novo hearing, found that two or more acts occurred constituting a “course of conduct,” notably including sexually explicit or suggestive emails and related behavior (delivery of communications to school officials, a risk of violating the protective order, and an attempt to enter PCHS property without authorization). The Court credited Wooldridge’s and the principal’s testimony over Spreadbury’s contrary description of the emails as professional or parody. Although the district court recognized that much of the first email was “professional,” it found the remainder crossed a line into sexualized content. On this record, the District Court concluded that the statutory elements of stalking were satisfied and that immediate protection was warranted. The Supreme Court refused to reweigh credibility and found no abuse of discretion.

2) First Amendment does not bar reliance on the emails as evidence of stalking

Spreadbury’s First Amendment arguments failed for two reasons:

Substantive failure: The District Court concluded the emails were not protected by the First Amendment in this context. The Supreme Court emphasized that obscene speech is unprotected and, more broadly, that the constitutional shield does not categorically insulate targeted, sexualized communications that form part of a stalking course of conduct. The Court upheld use of the emails as evidence of the course of conduct directed at Wooldridge.
Failure of proof: The appellant offered no developed authority for his claims (parody, public concern, government critique), misquoted Ashcroft, and failed to carry his burden to establish error. The Court declined to craft arguments on his behalf.

On appeal, Spreadbury invoked Counterman for the first time to argue an insufficient mental state to justify speech restrictions. The Court held Counterman inapplicable because it addresses criminal prosecutions for threats; civil protective orders rest on a different legal framework. Even if considered within the broader free-speech theory raised below, Counterman would not alter the outcome.

3) Appellate waiver and standards

Two issues—denial of a motion to dismiss and alleged judicial bias—were not reviewed. The appellant failed to comply with M. R. App. P. 12(1)(g) by providing cogent argument, legal authority, and record citations. Montana precedent consistently holds that courts will not consider such undeveloped arguments or manufacture legal analysis for the parties.

4) Eligibility and standards for protection orders

The Court rejected the appellant’s suggestion that protective orders require a partner/family relationship. Section 40-15-102(2)(a), MCA, plainly allows stalking victims to obtain orders irrespective of relationship. The opinion also recites that temporary orders are issued upon immediate danger of harm (§ 40-15-201(2)), and continued upon “good cause” after hearing (§ 40-15-202(1)). Although the District Court used the phrase “reasonable apprehension of harm,” any imprecision was immaterial because the court expressly found stalking—an independent eligibility basis under § 40-15-102(2)(a).

Impact and Practical Significance

While nonprecedential, the opinion conveys several practical signals for Montana practitioners, courts, schools, and pro se litigants:

Counterman’s limits: The Supreme Court has now expressly indicated (albeit noncitable) that Counterman’s criminal mens rea standard for “true threats” does not apply to civil protective orders. Parties defending against civil OOPs should not presume Counterman controls the analysis.
Electronic harassment as “course of conduct”: Repeated, targeted electronic communications, particularly those with sexualized content, can constitute a course of conduct under § 45-5-220. The opinion’s facts—unsolicited sexualized emails, attempted in-person contact, and school-site incidents—mirror common stalking patterns in workplace and educational settings.
First Amendment boundaries: The decision reinforces that the First Amendment does not immunize sexually explicit, targeted communications used to harass or intimidate, and courts may rely on such communications as evidence in stalking/OOP proceedings.
Deference to trial courts: Appellate courts will not reweigh credibility on a cold record. Protective orders are fact-intensive; once a district court articulates a reasoned basis and credits testimony supporting fear for safety, reversals are rare.
Appellate briefing discipline: Pro se status does not relax briefing obligations. Failure to provide authority, record citations, and coherent argument results in waiver.
Eligibility independent of relationship: Victims of stalking may seek orders regardless of familial or intimate relationship with the respondent; this remains an important pathway for workplace and school-based harassment victims.

Complex Concepts Simplified

Order of Protection (OOP): A civil court order restricting a person from contacting or approaching another to prevent harm. A temporary order may issue quickly upon a showing of immediate danger; after a hearing, the court may continue or modify it upon good cause.
Stalking (Montana): Purposeful or knowing “course of conduct” (two or more acts) directed at someone that would cause a reasonable person to fear for safety or suffer substantial emotional distress. Electronic communications can qualify.
Course of Conduct: A pattern of behavior composed of at least two acts—such as emails, letters, visits, or monitoring—aimed at a specific person and meeting statutory criteria.
Abuse of Discretion (Appellate Standard): A deferential standard; the appellate court overturns only if the trial court acted arbitrarily, ignored reasoned judgment, or made clearly erroneous factual findings or legal errors.
First Amendment and OOPs: Not all speech is protected (e.g., obscenity). Speech that forms part of statutory stalking may be considered by courts; First Amendment defenses require developed legal authority.
Counterman v. Colorado: A U.S. Supreme Court case setting a mens rea requirement for criminal “true threats.” In this opinion, the Montana Supreme Court states it does not govern civil protective order proceedings.
Nonprecedential Memorandum Opinion: An abbreviated decision used when settled law controls; it cannot be cited as precedent and appears on a quarterly list of noncitable cases.
Appellate Waiver: Issues not properly briefed with authorities and record citations are treated as waived and will not be considered.

Conclusion

The Montana Supreme Court’s nonprecedential affirmance in Wooldridge v. Spreadbury underscores several settled but practically significant propositions. First, sexualized, targeted electronic communications can constitute a “course of conduct” sufficient for stalking and support the continuation of a protective order. Second, the First Amendment does not categorically protect such communications, and Counterman’s criminal mens rea framework does not extend to civil protection proceedings. Third, appellate courts will defer to trial-level credibility assessments and enforce briefing rules—waiving inadequately supported arguments even when raised by pro se litigants. Finally, stalking victims may obtain protective orders regardless of their relationship to the respondent. Although noncitable, the opinion provides a clear, real-world application of Montana’s stalking statute and protective-order framework in the context of electronic harassment within a school setting.