Introduction

In United States v. Siegel, the Seventh Circuit affirmed a 76-month within-Guidelines sentence imposed after a guilty plea to one count of knowingly receiving child pornography in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 2252A(a)(2)(A). The case presents two core appellate issues: (1) whether the district court inadequately considered and explained mitigation arguments (a procedural reasonableness challenge), and (2) whether the sentence is substantively unreasonable due to alleged unwarranted disparities under 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a)(6).

The panel—Judges Scudder, St. Eve, and Maldonado—held that the defendant waived his procedural challenge by affirmatively acknowledging the court had considered his mitigating factors and by declining an invitation for further elaboration of the court’s reasons. On the merits (assuming no waiver), the panel found the district court sufficiently addressed the principal mitigation points. On the substantive challenge, the panel reiterated that a sentence within a properly calculated Guidelines range necessarily complies with § 3553(a)(6) and that Siegel’s disparity argument failed especially because he identified no truly comparable defendants.

Although designated a nonprecedential disposition under Fed. R. App. P. 32.1, Siegel is an instructive reaffirmation of two recurring principles in federal sentencing appeals: (1) how waiver can extinguish a later complaint about the sufficiency of the district court’s explanation, and (2) the safe harbor a within-Guidelines sentence enjoys against § 3553(a)(6) disparity challenges.

Summary of the Opinion

Brett Siegel engaged in a multi-year pattern of receiving sexually explicit images of children—including boys under five—and encouraged another person to abuse children and share recordings. He pled guilty to receiving child pornography. The statutory minimum was 60 months; the undisputed advisory Guidelines range was 70–87 months. Siegel sought the statutory minimum, arguing the range overstated his culpability and risked an unwarranted disparity, but he offered no comparator cases.

At sentencing, the district court acknowledged a suite of mitigating factors: mental health treatment, low recidivism risk, no criminal history, strong family support, employment as a pediatric social worker, and compliance on pretrial release. The court also addressed aggravation: the conduct spanned years, and Siegel encouraged another to commit child sexual abuse and record it. The court asked Siegel whether it had “considered [his] factors in mitigation”; he replied “Yes.” When the court proposed a 76-month sentence and invited any “further elaboration” of its reasons, both sides declined.

On appeal, Siegel argued the district court failed to adequately address his mitigation arguments and that the sentence created unwarranted disparities. The Seventh Circuit held:

• Procedural claim waived: By twice affirming the court’s consideration and declining further explanation, Siegel waived any challenge to the adequacy of the explanation.
• No magic words: The district court need not use a specific “are you satisfied?” script; asking whether it “considered” mitigation and whether further elaboration was desired sufficed to trigger waiver.
• Merits, even if not waived: The record showed the court addressed the primary mitigation arguments, which is all that is required.
• Substantive reasonableness: A within-Guidelines sentence necessarily complies with § 3553(a)(6). Siegel’s disparity claim failed because he neither offered comparators below nor identified truly similar defendants on appeal.

The judgment was affirmed.

Analysis

Precedents Cited and Their Influence

• Garcia-Segura (7th Cir. 2013) and Brown (7th Cir. 2019): These cases encourage district courts to ask defense counsel, after imposing sentence, whether they are satisfied with the explanation. An affirmative response waives later arguments that the court failed to address principal mitigation points. The panel quotes and applies this waiver principle directly.
• Tyler (7th Cir. 2025): Reinforces that an affirmative answer to the court’s targeted inquiry about mitigation suffices to waive a later procedural challenge and underscores district courts’ broad discretion at sentencing. Siegel relies on Tyler to reject a formalistic requirement that judges recite a particular script.
• Perez (7th Cir. 2021): Upholds waiver where the court asked whether there were “other issues” not addressed or “recommendations” it should consider—illustrating the acceptability of varied wording so long as the inquiry fairly puts the burden on the defense to speak up if unsatisfied.
• Donelli (7th Cir. 2014) versus Morris (7th Cir. 2015): Donelli approves waiver where the judge asked whether the defendant had any disagreement with the sentence or wanted further elaboration; Morris finds a generic “anything further?” insufficient. Siegel’s sentencing colloquy looks like Donelli, not Morris; hence waiver applies.
• Sanchez (7th Cir. 2021) and Jones (7th Cir. 2015): A court need only address the defendant’s primary mitigation arguments, and may do so implicitly or imperfectly so long as the record gives the appellate court confidence that the arguments were considered. The panel uses this to conclude that even absent waiver, the district court’s explanation sufficed.
• Bartlett (7th Cir. 2009) and Rita (U.S. 2007): Teach that a properly calculated within-Guidelines sentence necessarily addresses the need to avoid unwarranted disparities under § 3553(a)(6). The panel invokes these to dispose of Siegel’s disparity argument.
• Reibel (7th Cir. 2012): A district court cannot abuse its discretion by failing to address an argument not presented. Siegel offered no specific comparator cases below; thus, the court had nothing to evaluate on disparity beyond the Guidelines and the statutory factors it already considered.
• Newsom (7th Cir. 2005): Comparator defendants must be similarly situated in relevant respects. On appeal, Siegel’s examples did not match his aggravating conduct (encouraging another to commit and record abuse), undermining his disparity claim.

Legal Reasoning

The panel’s reasoning unfolds in three steps: waiver, adequacy of explanation, and substantive reasonableness.

1) Waiver of procedural challenge

The district court twice asked Siegel functionally equivalent versions of the Garcia-Segura/Brown colloquy: first, whether it had “considered [his] factors in mitigation,” and second, whether either side requested “further elaboration” of the court’s reasons under § 3553(a). Siegel said “Yes” to the first and “No” to the second. That sequence triggers waiver because the judge put counsel on notice that, if anything was overlooked or insufficiently explained, the time to say so was then and there.

Siegel argued on appeal that the court’s use of “considered” (rather than asking whether counsel was “satisfied”) was defective. The panel rejected any magic-words requirement. Citing Tyler and Perez, the court reiterated that the sentencing judge need not follow a precise script; what matters is whether the inquiry fairly invited defense counsel to identify omissions or request more explanation. The district court did exactly that.

2) Adequacy of explanation (even absent waiver)

Turning to the merits, the panel emphasized that a district court must address the defendant’s principal mitigation arguments, but can do so implicitly or imperfectly if the record shows meaningful consideration (Sanchez; Jones). The record here did:

• Mitigating factors recognized: mental health treatment, low recidivism risk, no criminal history, family support, pediatric social work, pretrial compliance.
• Guidelines-based mitigation addressed: the court acknowledged concerns about enhancements (e.g., ubiquitous computer use, relatively low image count, and the offense being receipt/possession rather than production or hands-on abuse).
• Aggravation explained: the conduct spanned years, and Siegel encouraged another person to commit child sexual abuse and to record and share it, with continuing harms documented by victim-impact statements.

This record “gives us confidence” that the court considered Siegel’s main mitigation arguments and explained why a mid-range sentence (76 months within a 70–87 month range) was warranted notwithstanding those mitigating features.

3) Substantive reasonableness and § 3553(a)(6)

Siegel’s disparity argument failed for multiple reasons:

• Within-Guidelines sentences “necessarily comply” with § 3553(a)(6) (Sanchez quoting Bartlett), because the Guidelines promote national uniformity (Rita). The district court also expressly said it had considered the need to avoid unwarranted disparities.
• Siegel did not present comparator defendants at sentencing; a court cannot abuse its discretion by failing to address an argument not made (Reibel).
• Comparators offered for the first time on appeal were not similarly situated (Newsom). Critically, Siegel’s aggravating conduct—encouraging others to perpetrate and record child sexual abuse—differentiated him from mere “receipt” defendants, weakening any claimed disparity.

The panel therefore rejected the substantive reasonableness challenge and affirmed the sentence.

Impact and Practical Significance

While nonprecedential, Siegel consolidates and clarifies several practical lessons for sentencing practice in the Seventh Circuit:

• Preservation at sentencing is critical. If a judge asks whether mitigation has been addressed or whether more explanation is desired, defense counsel should request the needed elaboration or lodge any concern on the record. Saying “Yes” (to consideration) and “No” (to further elaboration) will likely waive procedural challenges on appeal.
• No mandatory script for waiver. District judges may use varied language—“considered,” “addressed,” “further elaboration,” “further amplification”—so long as the inquiry clearly invites objections or requests for more reasoning. Counsel should not rely on hyper-technical distinctions in phrasing to avoid waiver.
• Make disparity arguments concrete. To argue unwarranted disparities under § 3553(a)(6), present specific, similarly situated comparators at sentencing, supported by case facts or Sentencing Commission data. Mere generalities about “first-time offenders” are inadequate, especially where the defendant’s aggravating conduct is distinctive.
• Within-Guidelines “safe harbor” on disparity. Although not dispositive of every substantive challenge, a properly calculated within-Guidelines sentence strongly shields against § 3553(a)(6) claims in the Seventh Circuit because the Guidelines already embody national uniformity concerns recognized in Rita.
• Sufficient explanation, not exhaustive commentary. The court’s duty is to address principal mitigation points; it need not counter every sub-argument or speak to every nuance. A record that acknowledges the key mitigating and aggravating factors and connects them to the chosen sentence will be sustained.

Complex Concepts Simplified

• Waiver vs. Forfeiture: Waiver is the intentional relinquishment of a known right. Here, by affirming that the court had considered his mitigation and declining further explanation, Siegel waived his right to later complain about the sufficiency of the explanation. Forfeiture is simply failing to object; it usually leads to plain-error review. Waiver, by contrast, extinguishes the claim altogether.
• Procedural vs. Substantive Reasonableness: Procedural reasonableness addresses whether the court correctly calculated the Guidelines, treated them as advisory, considered the § 3553(a) factors, and adequately explained the sentence. Substantive reasonableness asks whether, in light of those factors, the sentence is within the realm of reasonableness; appellate courts review for abuse of discretion.
• 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a)(6) (Unwarranted Sentencing Disparities): This factor aims to avoid unjustified differences in sentences among similarly situated defendants nationwide. A within-Guidelines sentence typically addresses this concern because the Guidelines promote uniformity; however, defendants can still argue for variances if they demonstrate genuine, case-specific differences.
• Nonprecedential Disposition: Under Fed. R. App. P. 32.1, parties may cite nonprecedential opinions, but they are not binding precedent. They remain persuasive, especially where they synthesize or apply settled law.
• Comparator Defendants: To prove unwarranted disparity, a defendant must identify others with materially similar conduct and characteristics. Differences in offense features—such as encouraging others to commit and record abuse—can make proposed comparators inapt.
• Statutory Minimum vs. Guidelines Range: Some offenses carry mandatory minimum terms set by statute (here, 60 months). The Sentencing Guidelines are advisory and produce a recommended range (here, 70–87 months). Judges must calculate and consider the range but may vary for sound reasons; appellate courts afford substantial deference so long as the process and explanation are adequate.

Conclusion

United States v. Siegel reinforces two well-settled principles in the Seventh Circuit’s sentencing jurisprudence. First, a defendant who affirmatively acknowledges that the court has considered mitigation and declines an offer of further explanation waives a later procedural challenge to the adequacy of the sentencing explanation. No special wording is required to trigger this waiver so long as the judge’s inquiries clearly invite any remaining concerns. Second, a within-Guidelines sentence necessarily satisfies § 3553(a)(6)’s command to avoid unwarranted disparities, especially when the defendant presents no specific, similarly situated comparators.

On the facts, the district court recognized and weighed substantial mitigating factors but found that prolonged conduct and the grave aggravator—encouraging another to perpetrate and record child sexual abuse—warranted a 76-month sentence within the advisory range. The Seventh Circuit affirmed, concluding that both procedural and substantive challenges were unavailing. For practitioners, Siegel underscores the importance of preserving objections at sentencing, requesting fuller explanations when needed, and substantiating disparity claims with concrete and truly comparable cases.