Michigan Supreme Court Signals Reexamination of Appellate Review for Best-Interests Determinations in Termination of Parental Rights

Introduction

In In re Blevins/Dials/Holland, Minors, the Michigan Supreme Court denied the application for leave to appeal from a February 14, 2025 decision of the Court of Appeals and also denied a motion to enforce that appellate judgment. Although the Court declined to take up the case on the merits, Chief Justice Megan K. Cavanagh penned a separate concurrence that may reverberate across child-protection jurisprudence in Michigan. She invites the bench and bar to reconsider a foundational question: What is the correct standard of appellate review for a trial court’s best-interests determination in a proceeding to terminate parental rights (TPR)?

The petitioner was the Michigan Department of Health and Human Services (DHHS), and the children’s lawyer-guardian ad litem (L-GAL) was invited to respond. The case arose from the Wayne County Family Division (No. 2023-002384-NA). While Justice Kimberly A. Thomas did not participate due to potential independent knowledge regarding the case, the Court’s denial of leave leaves the Court of Appeals’ judgment in place. Yet the concurrence highlights a doctrinal tension: Michigan appellate courts have long reviewed the best-interests stage for “clear error,” a standard classically reserved for factual findings, even though selecting the outcome that best serves a particular child’s welfare looks more like a discretionary judgment.

Summary of the Opinion

By order dated June 6, 2025, the Court directed DHHS (and invited the L-GAL) to answer the leave application.
On November 14, 2025, after receiving those responses, the Court denied leave to appeal, stating it was not persuaded that the questions presented merited review.
The Court also denied a motion to enforce the Court of Appeals’ judgment.
Chief Justice Cavanagh concurred in the denial but wrote separately to question whether the “best-interests” determination in TPR cases should continue to be reviewed for clear error, suggesting that the ultimate best-interests conclusion may be more appropriately reviewed for an abuse of discretion.

Analysis

Precedents Cited and Their Influence

The concurrence carefully situates today’s practice within the historical evolution of Michigan’s statutory and case law on TPR appeals:

In re Trejo, 462 Mich 341 (2000). The leading authority instructing appellate courts to review both statutory-grounds findings and the best-interests determination for clear error. Trejo also recognized that a 1994 amendment “significantly diminished” the trial court’s discretion by making termination mandatory once a ground is established unless termination is clearly not in the child’s best interests.
In re Sours, 459 Mich 624 (1999) (cited by Trejo). Sours relied on In re Cornet to apply clear-error review to termination proceedings.
In re Cornet, 422 Mich 274 (1985). In an era when termination turned almost entirely on whether a statutory ground existed (with no statutory best-interests requirement), this Court held probate judges’ termination findings should be reviewed for clear error. As Chief Justice Cavanagh notes, that framework was heavily fact-centric.
In re McDuel, 142 Mich App 479 (1985), superseded by 1994 PA 264. Acknowledged that, under the pre-1994 regime, “best interests” had no statutory role in the termination decision itself (though relevant to disposition after termination).
In re Irving, 134 Mich App 678 (1984). Illustrates the pre-1994 paradigm: termination could rest purely on factual findings of statutory grounds, receptive to clear-error review.
In re Jackson, 199 Mich App 22 (1993). Clarified that even when a ground for termination was found, the actual termination decision was discretionary under the then-current statute (“The court may terminate…”), prompting a split in how appellate courts approached review.
In re McIntyre, 192 Mich App 47 (1991). Applied a mixed approach: clear-error review for factual findings, but abuse-of-discretion review for the ultimate decision whether to terminate, reflecting the discretionary character of the end-stage decision under the older statute.
1994 PA 264 (effective January 1, 1995) added MCL 712A.19b(5), making termination mandatory once statutory grounds are established unless termination is “clearly not” in the child’s best interests. This change “significantly diminished” discretion, but did not eliminate the distinct, evaluative role of best interests.
2008 PA 199 changed MCL 712A.19b(5) to its present form, requiring an affirmative finding that termination “is in the child’s best interests.” This heightened the salience of a best-interests analysis as a distinct, necessary part of the decision—not merely an exception.
In re Gazella, 264 Mich App 668 (2005), superseded by 2008 PA 199. Recognized that under the pre-2008 language, specific best-interests findings were not required, underscoring how the 2008 amendment materially altered the analysis.
In re Hansen, 285 Mich App 158 (2009), vacated on other grounds 486 Mich 1037 (2010). Read the post-2008 statute to require an affirmative best-interests determination.
In re Olive/Metts Minors, 297 Mich App 35 (2012). Described the multifactor nature of the best-interests inquiry, emphasizing child-specific, context-dependent weighing of considerations.
In re COH, ERH, JRG, & KBH, 495 Mich 184 (2014), and In re Sanborn, 337 Mich App 252 (2021). Continued the practice of applying clear-error review to the best-interests determination, effectively carrying forward Trejo even after the 2008 statutory shift.
People v Boykin, 510 Mich 171, 182 (2022). Clarifies that abuse-of-discretion review recognizes multiple “principled outcomes,” a concept Chief Justice Cavanagh invokes to frame the best-interests decision as one that may properly admit of more than one acceptable result.
Fletcher v Fletcher, 447 Mich 871, 889 (1994). Emphasizes the inappropriateness of appellate courts reweighing multi-factor determinations de novo and the preference for remand, an analogy the concurrence draws to best-interests reviews to question when the Court of Appeals should order termination outright vs. remanding for a new hearing.
Illustrative references to the clear-error standard for fact-finding across contexts: People v Carson (2025), People v Morris (2025), Webster v Osguthorpe (2025), People v Armstrong (2025), and Schafer v Kent Co (2024). These underscore that “clear error” is traditionally tethered to factual determinations capable of objective verification, a premise central to the concurrence’s critique.

Legal Reasoning in the Concurrence

The concurrence’s core claim is conceptual: the best-interests determination is not a “fact” in the conventional sense. While factual findings undergird the analysis (e.g., the child’s placement history, bond with caregivers, parent’s compliance and progress, safety risks), the ultimate best-interests conclusion requires the trial court to:

Consider multiple factors and options;
Weigh competing values and evidence;
Select among potentially several “principled outcomes” the one that best serves the particular child’s welfare.

That is the hallmark of discretionary decision-making, which in Michigan is typically reviewed for abuse of discretion. By contrast, clear-error review is designed for determinations that can be objectively confirmed or negated—quintessentially, historical facts. The concurrence suggests a more nuanced, bifurcated approach:

Underlying facts supporting the best-interests analysis: reviewed for clear error.
Ultimate best-interests conclusion: reviewed for abuse of discretion, reflecting the trial court’s comparative advantage in hearing live testimony, weighing credibility, and balancing competing child-centered considerations.

Why does this matter? Chief Justice Cavanagh identifies a downstream, remedial consequence: the chosen standard of review should influence what the Court of Appeals does after finding error. If the best-interests conclusion is discretionary, a more fitting remedy when error is found may be a remand for a new best-interests hearing—rather than the appellate court ordering termination (or non-termination) by reweighing the interests itself. The analogy to Fletcher reinforces that appellate courts should be cautious about substituting their judgment for trial courts in multi-factor, discretion-laden decisions.

The concurrence also flags the longstanding court rule, MCR 3.977(K), which mandates the clearly erroneous standard for “the court’s findings” on appeal from an order terminating parental rights. Chief Justice Cavanagh notes that provision’s historical lineage to former MCR 5.974(I)—a rule forged when termination largely turned on fact-bound statutory grounds, before the Legislature (in 1994 and again in 2008) embedded best interests into the heart of the termination decision. This historical mismatch raises the question whether the court rule should be reexamined or refined in light of the modern statutory framework.

To be clear, the concurrence does not announce a change in law. Chief Justice Cavanagh expressly states she is not prepared, in this posture, to alter the standard of review and that the issue was neither raised nor briefed by the parties. Instead, she signals openness to revisiting the question in a future case squarely presenting it and suggests that, even if altered, the standard might not change the result in this case. Accordingly, she concurs in the denial of leave.

Impact and Forward-Looking Implications

While the Court’s order is non-precedential on the merits, the concurrence is a meaningful jurisprudential signal:

Potential recalibration of appellate deference. A shift to abuse-of-discretion for the ultimate best-interests judgment would align review with the discretionary character of that determination, preserving clear-error review for the factual predicates. This would likely reduce appellate reweighing and increase remands for updated best-interests hearings when reversible error is found.
Effect on remedies. If the best-interests conclusion is discretionary, the Court of Appeals may be less inclined to order termination or non-termination in the first instance after detecting error. Instead, trial courts would more frequently conduct renewed best-interests proceedings, particularly where the factual record is stale or incomplete.
Harmonization with family law analogies. The approach would mirror how Michigan appellate courts treat other multi-factor, child-centered determinations (e.g., certain custody and parenting-time issues), where appellate reweighing is disfavored and remand is common when legal errors infect the analysis.
Court rule reconsideration. MCR 3.977(K) may warrant refinement to acknowledge a dual-track review (clear error for facts; abuse of discretion for the ultimate best-interests determination), or at a minimum to clarify whether “findings” encompasses the discretionary end-call. Any change would likely come either through a merits decision or through the Court’s rulemaking authority.
Trial practice effects. Anticipating greater deference at the ultimate step, trial counsel may be incentivized to build robust, explicit best-interests records—linking facts to each factor and proposing child-specific rationales—so that the trial court’s discretionary balancing is transparent and defensible.
Appellate briefing strategies. Litigants may begin preserving and presenting arguments for a bifurcated standard of review, and where error is identified in the best-interests analysis, they may emphasize remand as the appropriate remedy rather than appellate reweighing.
Child welfare timelines. More remands could extend proceedings in some cases; however, the tradeoff is a best-interests determination that is both procedurally sound and based on updated circumstances—a critical feature given the dynamic needs of children in care.

Complex Concepts Simplified

Termination of Parental Rights (TPR): A legal process that permanently severs the parent-child relationship. In Michigan, TPR typically involves two stages:
- Statutory grounds: The petitioner must prove by clear and convincing evidence at least one ground under MCL 712A.19b(3) (e.g., chronic neglect, failure to rectify conditions, abuse).
- Best interests: Even if a ground is proven, the court must affirmatively find that termination is in the child’s best interests under MCL 712A.19b(5) before ordering termination.
Best-Interests Determination: A holistic, multi-factor assessment focused on the child’s welfare, including safety, stability, permanency, the strength of the child’s bond with parents and caregivers, the parent’s progress and capacity, and the child’s needs. It is less about verifying a single historical fact and more about balancing competing considerations for a particular child.
Standards of Appellate Review:
- Clear Error: Deferential review of factual findings; reversal only if the appellate court is left with a definite and firm conviction that a mistake has been made.
- Abuse of Discretion: Deferential review of discretionary decisions; recognizes that multiple principled outcomes may be acceptable. A decision is an abuse of discretion if it falls outside the range of reasonable and principled outcomes.
- De Novo: Non-deferential review, where the appellate court decides the issue anew. Typically reserved for pure questions of law.
MCR 3.977(K): The court rule instructing that “the clearly erroneous standard shall be used in reviewing the court’s findings on appeal from an order terminating parental rights.” The concurrence suggests this rule may reflect an earlier, more fact-centric era of TPR law.
Remand vs. Appellate Disposition: When an appellate court identifies error, it can either decide the issue itself (if the record permits and the standard allows) or send the case back to the trial court for further proceedings. In multi-factor, discretion-laden settings, remand is often preferred to avoid appellate reweighing.
Roles of DHHS and L-GAL: DHHS commonly petitions for termination when statutory criteria are met. The lawyer-guardian ad litem represents the child’s interests and is often invited to weigh in on appellate questions affecting child welfare.

Conclusion

The Michigan Supreme Court’s order in In re Blevins/Dials/Holland, Minors is brief on outcomes—leave to appeal is denied, and a motion to enforce the Court of Appeals’ judgment is denied. Its significance lies in Chief Justice Cavanagh’s concurrence, which thoughtfully questions the fit between the clear-error standard and the inherently discretionary nature of best-interests determinations at the culmination of termination proceedings. By tracing the statutory evolution—from a fact-dominated inquiry pre-1994, through the “clearly not” exception era, to today’s affirmative best-interests requirement—the concurrence underscores a doctrinal incongruity: courts are applying a factual-review lens to what is, in substance, a balancing judgment.

Although no rule changes today, the concurrence signals openness to a mixed standard of review—clear error for underlying facts; abuse of discretion for the ultimate best-interests decision—and highlights how that refinement would affect appellate remedies, favoring remand over appellate reweighing in appropriate cases. Practitioners should begin preserving arguments on the standard of review and remedies, and trial courts should continue to make detailed, factor-by-factor best-interests findings that reveal the reasoning path. The Court’s invitation suggests this question is ripe for full briefing in a future case, with the potential to recalibrate Michigan’s appellate review of some of the most consequential decisions in child-protection law.