Limiting “Other Person Under the Tenant’s Control” to the Initial Invitation Onto the Premises: Justice Wecht’s Dissent in Housing Authority of the City of Pittsburgh v. Nash

Introduction

This commentary analyzes Justice Wecht’s dissenting opinion in Housing Authority of the City of Pittsburgh v. Nash, No. 16 WAP 2024 (Pa. Sept. 25, 2025), a case arising from an eviction action brought by the Housing Authority of the City of Pittsburgh (HACP) after a fatal shooting occurred during a party at tenant Darlene Nash’s residence. The lease at issue imposes strict liability on tenants for the “criminal activity” of certain categories of individuals defined as “Covered Persons,” including an “Other Person Under the Tenant’s Control” (OPTC).

The central legal question, as framed by the dissent, is whether the shooter qualified as an OPTC “as to” Nash. That turns on whether the shooter was “on the Premises” because of Nash’s invitation (or that of her household), as the lease text requires. The dissent rejects the Majority’s conclusion that the shooter was an OPTC with respect to Nash and would have affirmed the Commonwealth Court’s reversal of the eviction. Justice Dougherty joined the dissent.

Although only the dissenting opinion is provided here, the dissent elucidates the Majority’s contrasting rule: according to the Majority (as quoted by the dissent), “An invitation to a Unit is an invitation to the Premises,” and an invitation may be understood as an invitation “to stay or remain” on the Premises, thereby broadening OPTC status. Justice Wecht resists that expansion and insists on a textual, causation-based approach tethered to the lease’s definitions.

Summary of the Opinion

Justice Wecht’s dissent proceeds from several core propositions:

• The HACP lease draws a clear textual distinction between a tenant’s “Unit” and the broader “Premises.” The Unit is a subset of the Premises, but presence in one is not automatically equivalent to presence in the other for purposes of the OPTC definition.
• Under the lease, a person is an OPTC “as to” a tenant only if, “at the time of the activity in question,” the person was “on the Premises” because of an invitation from that tenant (or a household member with authority to consent on the tenant’s behalf).
• Two different invitations may be in play: an initial invitation that brings a person onto the Premises (e.g., by a girlfriend who resides next door) and a later invitation by another tenant into a particular Unit. The second invitation does not make that person an OPTC for the second tenant if the person was already on the Premises due to the first invitation.
• The Majority, in the dissent’s view, impermissibly inserts new language into the lease—treating an invitation to a Unit as necessarily an invitation to the Premises, and treating an invitation as an invitation to “stay or remain”—thereby broadening strict liability beyond the lease’s terms.
• Section 9(M) of the lease, which separately lists conduct occurring “in the Unit or on the Premises,” shows that the drafters intended to distinguish the two locations; reading “on the Premises” to subsume “in the Unit” renders that phrasing redundant.
• Even if there were ambiguity, ordinary contract principles require construing ambiguity against the drafter (here, the Housing Authority). The lease could have made OPTC depend on invitations to the Unit, but it did not.
• Factually, the record did not establish that Nash invited the shooter onto the Premises; it is at least as likely that the shooter’s girlfriend (who lived next door) did so, given the “open house” nature of Nash’s party and the lack of specific proof of Nash’s invitation to the Premises.

On these grounds, the dissent would have affirmed the Commonwealth Court’s unanimous decision reversing Nash’s eviction.

Analysis

Precedents and Authorities Cited

• Mace v. Atlantic Refining & Marketing Corp., 785 A.2d 491 (Pa. 2001) (standard of review): Interpreting a lease is a question of law subject to de novo review. The dissent invokes Mace to underscore that the Supreme Court owes no deference to the lower court’s lease interpretation.
• Mowry v. McWherter, 74 A.2d 154 (Pa. 1950) (whole-contract canon; anti-surplusage): Courts must construe contracts as a whole, giving effect to every word if possible. Justice Wecht applies this canon to Section 9(M), which prohibits Covered Persons’ specified conduct “in the Unit or on the Premises.” He reasons that if “on the Premises” included “in the Unit,” the phrase would be redundant, violating the anti-surplusage principle.
• Insurance Adjustment Bureau, Inc. v. Allstate Insurance Co., 905 A.2d 462 (Pa. 2006) (contra proferentem): Ambiguities are construed against the drafter. The dissent emphasizes that HACP authored the lease and could have drafted OPTC to include invitees to the Unit or to “stay or remain,” but did not. If doubt exists, the narrower reading that disfavors the drafter should prevail.
• Housing Auth. of Pittsburgh v. Nash, 1200 C.D. 2022, 2023 WL 8009066 (Pa. Cmwlth. Nov. 20, 2023) (unpublished): The Commonwealth Court held that the record lacked evidence that Nash or her household invited the shooter to the Premises, noting the “open” nature of the event and the proximity of the shooter’s girlfriend living next door. The dissent aligns with this holding on both textual and evidentiary grounds.
• Housing Auth. of Pittsburgh v. Nash, 320 A.3d 669 (Pa. 2024) (per curiam): Cited for the framing of the question presented—whether the Authority can evict Nash regardless of whether she or the girlfriend invited the shooter onto the Premises.

Lease Text and Definitions

The dissent’s construction is tightly anchored in the lease’s defined terms:

• Covered Person (§ 2(C)): includes a Tenant, any member of the Tenant’s Household, a Guest, or an OPTC.
• OPTC (§ 2(L)): “a person, although not living as a Guest in the Unit, who is, or was at the time of the activity in question on the Premises, as defined below, because of an invitation from Tenant or another member of the Household who has express or implied authority to consent on behalf of Tenant.”
• Premises (§ 2(M)): “the building, or complex, or development in which the Unit…is located, including Common Areas and grounds.”
• Unit (§ 2(R)): “the dwelling space intended for the exclusive use and occupation by the Household,” including adjacent steps, porch, hallway, lawn, or yard reasonably considered part of that dwelling space.
• Section 9(M): Establishes that certain offenses by Covered Persons, if committed “in the Unit or on the Premises,” constitute material breaches warranting termination.

Legal Reasoning

1) Causation Embedded in the OPTC Definition

The OPTC clause requires that, “at the time of the activity in question,” the person was “on the Premises because of an invitation” from the tenant (or her household). Justice Wecht reads this as a causation requirement connected to presence on the Premises, not presence in a particular Unit. The dissent distinguishes two scenarios:

• Scenario A: A tenant invites a person who is not yet on the Premises to the Unit. That invitation necessarily brings the person onto the Premises. In this scenario, the person can be an OPTC as to the inviting tenant because the tenant is the but-for cause of the person’s presence on the Premises at the relevant time.
• Scenario B: A person is already on the Premises (e.g., in common areas or another Unit) due to someone else’s invitation, and a different tenant later invites that person into their Unit. In this scenario, the second tenant’s invite does not cause the person to be “on the Premises” and therefore does not create OPTC status as to the second tenant.

This is a time-and-cause-linked reading: who, at the time of the activity, caused the presence “on the Premises”? If the answer is the girlfriend (or some other tenant), then that person is an OPTC only as to the tenant responsible for bringing the person onto the Premises—not every tenant who later extends a separate Unit invitation.

2) The Unit/Premises Distinction and Anti-Surplusage

Section 9(M) criminalizes certain conduct “in the Unit or on the Premises,” indicating that the contract’s drafters viewed those locations as distinct for purposes of obligations and breaches. If “on the Premises” already encompassed “in the Unit,” the phrase would be redundant. This “whole contract” and anti-surplusage reading (per Mowry) supports the dissent’s rejection of the Majority’s statement that “An invitation to a Unit is an invitation to the Premises.”

3) No Textual Support for “Invitation to Stay or Remain”

The dissent criticizes the Majority for effectively rewriting the OPTC definition to include persons “invited to stay or remain” on the Premises. The actual definition contains no such language. Because “invited to stay or remain” presupposes a prior presence on the Premises, the dissent reasons that the OPTC clause—which turns on being “on the Premises because of an invitation from [this] Tenant”—cannot be satisfied by an invitation that merely prolongs or relocates a presence on the Premises initially caused by someone else.

4) Limiting Strict Liability to the Initial Risk-Creating Act

The dissent acknowledges that the lease imposes strict liability on tenants for the criminal activity of Covered Persons but argues for a narrow application consistent with the text and with fairness. The risk to the community arises from the act that brings an outsider onto the Premises; later invitations into particular Units do not increase that risk beyond what was already introduced by the initial inviter. Therefore, strict liability should attach only to the tenant responsible for the initial invitation onto the Premises. The Majority’s broader rule, in the dissent’s view, would generate outsize consequences, potentially making multiple tenants strictly liable for a single outsider’s conduct following multiple Unit-to-Unit invitations.

5) Evidentiary Shortfall

Justice Wecht emphasizes that the record does not establish that Nash (or her household) invited the shooter onto the Premises. The event was open; the shooter’s girlfriend, who lived next door, could have been the inviter. Compounding this evidentiary gap, the shooter was not charged; the investigation was ongoing, and the suspect was not apprehended. Under the lease’s OPTC definition, the Housing Authority had the burden to show that Nash’s invitation caused the shooter’s presence on the Premises “at the time of the activity in question.” On this record, the dissent concludes that burden was not met.

6) Contra Proferentem

Even if one viewed the OPTC clause as ambiguous, the dissent invokes the principle that ambiguities are construed against the drafter (Allstate). HACP could have drafted OPTC to cover invitations “into the Unit” or invitations “to remain” on the Premises, as it did elsewhere by expressly using “in the Unit or on the Premises.” Its failure to do so should be held against it.

How the Precedents and Authorities Shape the Outcome

• Mace supplies the de novo lens, allowing the Supreme Court to interpret the lease anew.
• Mowry fortifies the dissent’s insistence that “Unit” and “Premises” cannot be collapsed without making Section 9(M) surplusage.
• Allstate puts a thumb on the scale against the drafter (HACP) if the text is indeterminate, discouraging judicial rewrite of OPTC to expand strict liability.
• Commonwealth Court’s decision illustrates the textual and factual approach the dissent would adopt: require proof of who first invited the person onto the Premises, and do not conflate an invitation into a Unit with causation of presence “on the Premises.”

Potential Impact

A. If the Majority’s Rule (as summarized in the dissent) controls

Because the dissent quotes the Majority as stating that “An invitation to a Unit is an invitation to the Premises” and as reading “invitation” to include invitations “to stay or remain,” the controlling precedent appears to broaden OPTC and, with it, tenants’ strict liability exposure. Likely effects include:

• Expanded eviction risk. A tenant who invites someone into their Unit may, under the Majority’s approach, be deemed to have caused that person’s presence on the Premises at the time of any later incident—potentially subjecting the tenant to strict liability even if another tenant initially brought the person onto the property.
• Multiplying potential defendants. Where a visitor moves among Units, multiple tenants could be simultaneously exposed to eviction risk for the visitor’s later misconduct, because each Unit invitation could be characterized as an “invitation to the Premises” or to “stay or remain.” The dissent flags this as an “absurd” outcome risk.
• Proof burdens shift in practice. Landlords may have less incentive to prove which tenant first brought a person on-site. The focus could turn to whether a tenant at any point extended a Unit invitation, which the Majority appears to treat as sufficient to satisfy OPTC.
• Behavioral chill. Tenants may curtail social gatherings or “open house” events for fear that any invite could expose them to eviction due to third-party misconduct.

B. If the Dissent’s Reading Were Adopted

The dissent’s narrower, causation-based reading of OPTC would:

• Align strict liability with initial risk creation. Only the tenant whose invitation first brought the person onto the Premises would be exposed to strict liability for that person’s criminal acts, absent guest/household status.
• Encourage precise proof. Landlords would need to establish, with evidence, who issued the invitation that caused presence on the Premises “at the time of the activity in question.”
• Honor the Unit/Premises distinction. Courts would give operative meaning to “in the Unit or on the Premises,” preserving the structure the drafter used elsewhere in the lease.
• Constrain overbreadth. Contra proferentem would discourage expansively rewriting OPTC in a way that amplifies strict liability in public housing beyond what tenants reasonably agreed to.

C. Drafting and Litigation Guidance

• For drafters (housing authorities and landlords): If the intent is to attach strict liability when a tenant invites someone into a Unit—or invites someone already on the Premises to remain—the lease should say so expressly, mirroring the “in the Unit or on the Premises” phrasing used elsewhere.
• For litigants and courts: Pay close attention to the temporal-causation clause “at the time of the activity in question” and to who caused presence “on the Premises.” Evidence of open invitations, social-media posts, and testimony about who invited whom (and when) may be dispositive.

Complex Concepts Simplified

• Strict liability (lease context): A tenant can be evicted for certain conduct by others without the landlord having to prove the tenant’s fault or knowledge, so long as the actor is a “Covered Person” connected to the tenant in a specified way.
• Covered Person: The lease’s umbrella category that includes (1) the tenant, (2) household members, (3) guests, and (4) “Other Person[s] Under the Tenant’s Control” (OPTCs). Different proofs attach to each category.
• OPTC: A non-guest who, “at the time of the activity in question,” was “on the Premises because of an invitation” from the tenant or a qualifying household member. Under the dissent’s view, this focuses on the first invitation that caused the person to be on-site at the relevant time.
• Unit vs. Premises: The Unit is the tenant’s private dwelling and closely adjacent areas; the Premises encompass the entire development, including common areas and grounds. The dissent treats these as distinct for OPTC analysis, consistent with the lease’s text.
• Contra proferentem: When contract language is ambiguous, courts construe it against the party that drafted it—here, the Housing Authority.
• De novo review: Appellate courts interpret the meaning of contracts without deferring to lower courts’ views of the law.

Key Passages (as Quoted in the Dissent)

“[A]n invitation to a Unit is an invitation to the Premises, because the Unit is part of the Premises.” (Majority, as quoted by the dissent)

“[T]his also means that an invitation from one Unit on the Premises to another Unit is an invitation to stay or remain on the Premises.” (Majority, as quoted by the dissent)

“A person is only an OPTC as to a tenant if he or she is ‘on the Premises . . . because of an invitation’ from that tenant.” (Dissent)

“If committing these offenses ‘on the Premises’ already encompassed committing the offenses in the Unit, then the phrasing of Section 9(M) is redundant.” (Dissent, invoking the anti-surplusage canon)

Conclusion

Justice Wecht’s dissent in HACP v. Nash articulates a precise, text-bound limitation on tenant strict liability under public housing leases: an “Other Person Under the Tenant’s Control” must be on the Premises “because of” the tenant’s invitation at the time of the misconduct. Invitations into a Unit, or invitations to remain, do not satisfy that requirement where the person was already on the Premises due to another tenant’s invitation. The dissent emphasizes core contract-interpretation principles—construing the lease as a whole, avoiding surplusage, and construing ambiguity against the drafter—and stresses the need for proof identifying who caused the presence “on the Premises.”

While the Majority’s decision (as depicted in the dissent) appears to broaden OPTC to cover Unit invitations and continued presence—thereby expanding the reach of strict liability—the dissent warns that this approach risks sweeping in multiple tenants for the acts of a single outsider and effectively rewrites a lease the drafter could have drafted differently. The case thus marks an important inflection point in Pennsylvania’s public housing law on eviction liability for third-party criminal conduct, and the dissent offers a cogent roadmap for future challenges and for careful lease drafting that aligns strict liability with the initial, risk-creating invitation onto the property.