Introduction

This commentary examines the Wyoming Supreme Court’s decision in Joel Lee Wilson v. The State of Wyoming, 2025 WY 116 (Oct. 28, 2025), affirming convictions for aggravated burglary and robbery arising from a violent home invasion in Casper. The case squarely presents two recurring issues in modern criminal prosecutions: (1) whether circumstantial evidence—including pre‑entry social media communications—can establish the specific intent to commit theft required by both burglary and robbery statutes when no property is ultimately taken; and (2) when, and on what foundation, communications between alleged co‑participants are admissible as non‑hearsay “co‑conspirator” statements under Wyoming Rule of Evidence 801(d)(2)(E).

Wilson challenged the sufficiency of the evidence as to intent to steal and objected to the admission of Facebook messages between himself and an accomplice, Daniel Hemmer, arguing they were improperly treated as co‑conspirator statements. The Court rejected both arguments and affirmed, clarifying the continued vitality of inferential proof of intent, the limited role of “nothing was taken” in burglary/robbery analyses, and the evidentiary predicates for admitting digital communications among alleged co‑conspirators.

Parties: Appellant/Defendant, Joel Lee Wilson; Appellee/Plaintiff, the State of Wyoming. Opinion by District Judge Kirven, sitting by designation, joined by Chief Justice Boomgaarden and Justices Gray, Fenn, and Jarosh.

Summary of the Opinion

The Court affirmed Wilson’s convictions for aggravated burglary (Count I) and robbery (Count II). Applying the established sufficiency‑of‑the‑evidence standard, the Court held that the jury reasonably could infer Wilson’s intent to commit theft from the totality of the circumstances: coordinated pre‑entry Facebook communications about a money‑making “opportunity,” awareness of “high police presence,” Wilson’s “I’m moving toward you now” response, the forcible shoulder‑ing open of the front door, immediate aggression upon entry, and a violent confrontation with the homeowner. The Court reiterated that neither burglary (Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 6‑3‑301(a)) nor robbery (Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 6‑2‑401(a)(i), referencing the theft statute, § 6‑3‑402) requires direct evidence that a theft was completed; circumstantial evidence suffices and the absence of an actual taking is not dispositive (citing Mirich v. State).

On evidentiary grounds, the Court upheld the admission of the Facebook messages under W.R.E. 801(d)(2)(E). The district court did not improperly “bootstrap” the messages to prove a conspiracy. Independent evidence—two men arriving together, knocking/scratching, and then jointly forcing entry—supported the preliminary findings that (1) a conspiracy existed, (2) Wilson and Hemmer participated, and (3) the statements were made during and in furtherance of the conspiracy (Vlahos v. State; Jandro v. State). Accordingly, the messages were part of the total evidentiary mosaic from which the jury could infer intent to steal.

Analysis

Statutory Framework

• Burglaries: Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 6‑3‑301(a) makes it a crime to enter or remain without authority “with intent to commit theft or a felony therein.” The gravamen is the intent at the time of unauthorized entry or remaining.
• Robbery: Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 6‑2‑401(a)(i) requires that “in the course of committing” a theft as defined by § 6‑3‑402, the defendant inflicts bodily injury. Thus, the State may prove that the defendant was engaged in or moving forward with a theft offense during which the violence occurred.
• Theft: § 6‑3‑402(a) covers knowing unauthorized control or transfer of another’s property with the requisite intent (e.g., to deprive). The Court emphasized that the statutes do not require direct proof that property was actually taken in order to sustain burglary or robbery; proof of intent to steal (or being in the course of committing theft) is sufficient, and may be shown circumstantially.

Precedents Cited and Their Influence

• Huckins v. State, 2020 WY 21, ¶ 10, 457 P.3d 1277, 1279: Reiterates the sufficiency standard—whether the evidence could reasonably support the verdict. This frames the appellate perspective: deferential to the jury.
• Hanson v. State, 2025 WY 80, ¶ 7, 571 P.3d 1282, 1285 (with Munoz v. State, 2024 WY 103): In sufficiency review, courts accept the State’s evidence as true, disregard defense‑favorable evidence, and draw all reasonable inferences for the State. This deference undergirds affirmance despite Wilson’s alternative explanations.
• Whitmore v. State, 2024 WY 81; Berry v. State, 2023 WY 75; Bittleston v. State, 2019 WY 64; Jones v. State, 2019 WY 45; Wiese v. State, 2016 WY 72; Lane v. State (2000): These cases collectively affirm that circumstantial evidence can establish every element—including intent—and juries may infer intent from the totality of circumstances.
• Stroble v. State, 2020 WY 158, ¶ 11, 478 P.3d 649, 652: The State may satisfy its burden through reasonable inferences from indirect or circumstantial evidence; there is no categorical preference for direct evidence.
• Mirich v. State, 593 P.2d 590, 593 (Wyo. 1979): The absence of an actual taking does not negate an inference of intent to steal at entry; a foundational proposition for today’s burglary/robbery inferential analysis.
• Thompson v. State, 2021 WY 84, ¶ 15, 491 P.3d 1033, 1040: Evidentiary rulings, including hearsay determinations, are reviewed for abuse of discretion—did the trial court act reasonably? This standard supports the admission of the Facebook messages.
• Vlahos v. State, 2003 WY 103, ¶ 29, 75 P.3d 628, 636; Jandro v. State, 781 P.2d 512, 521 (Wyo. 1989): Establish the three‑part predicate for admitting co‑conspirator statements: a conspiracy existed, the declarant and defendant were participants, and the statement was made during and in furtherance of the conspiracy. These guardrails prevent bootstrapping and channel the Court’s analysis of the Facebook messages.

Legal Reasoning

The Court’s reasoning proceeds in two channels: sufficiency and evidentiary admissibility.

1. Sufficiency of the Evidence
   • Applying the deferential standard, the Court viewed the evidence in the light most favorable to the verdict. It accepted the State’s proof and drew all reasonable inferences supporting the jury’s findings (Hanson/Munoz).
   • The Court emphasized that circumstantial evidence can prove intent (Berry; Bittleston; Jones; Wiese; Lane). The Facebook exchanges (“opportunity for you to make money,” “tell me ur ready,” “I’m moving toward you now”), combined with the coordinated arrival, persistent knocking/scratching, forced entry, immediate aggression, and violent confrontation with the homeowner, reasonably supported an inference that Wilson entered with the intent to steal—and was “in the course of committing” a theft when he inflicted injury (Stroble).
   • That nothing was ultimately taken is immaterial to intent (Mirich). The inquiry centers on intent at entry (burglary) and conduct “in the course of committing” a theft (robbery), which the jury could infer from pre‑entry planning and the nature of the forced entry and ensuing violence.
2. Admissibility of Co‑Conspirator Statements
   • The district court admitted Hemmer’s Facebook messages under W.R.E. 801(d)(2)(E) after finding independent evidence of a conspiracy. The Supreme Court agreed that independent, non‑message evidence supported: (a) the existence of a conspiracy (two men arriving together, coordinated knocking/scratching, joint forced entry), (b) both Hemmer and Wilson as participants, and (c) that the statements were made immediately before and in furtherance of the planned offense (Vlahos; Jandro).
   • The Court rejected Wilson’s claim that the district court improperly relied on the messages themselves to establish the predicate conspiracy. The record showed the trial court considered independent facts first, then admitted the messages. No abuse of discretion occurred (Thompson).

Application to the Evidentiary Record

• Digital communications and coordination: Hemmer’s messages laid out an “opportunity” to make money, discussed police presence, and urged readiness. Wilson confirmed movement toward Hemmer. Calls occurred between messages. This supports pre‑entry planning for a theft‑related venture.
• Conduct at the scene: After persistent attempts to gain entry, Wilson shoulder‑forced the door, damaged the jamb, confronted the pregnant wife, and immediately engaged in violence in the bedroom. Hemmer’s “hesitation” and scanning suggested a targeted plan that may have misidentified the residence. The jury could view this as evidence of an intended theft gone awry, not as exculpatory confusion.
• Post‑arrest statement: Wilson told a detective he went to help “collect” on a debt and “collect dumbass sh*t”—language consistent with an intent to unlawfully take property, permitting the jury to infer the requisite theft intent.
• No taking required: The absence of stolen property does not defeat an inference of theft intent for burglary/robbery (Mirich). Given the totality, the jury could reasonably conclude Wilson intended to commit theft or was in the process of committing theft when the violence occurred.

Impact

This decision has several notable implications:

• Digital planning evidence carries significant weight: Social media messages and call logs between alleged co‑actors can be potent circumstantial evidence of intent to steal. When paired with independent corroboration (joint arrival, forced entry), such communications are admissible and probative.
• “No property taken” is not a defense to intent‑based burglary/robbery: Prosecutors need not show an actual taking to satisfy the theft‑related components of aggravated burglary and robbery. The focus is intent at entry and conduct “in the course of committing” theft.
• Clarification on W.R.E. 801(d)(2)(E) in the digital era: Courts will continue to require independent evidence of conspiracy before admitting co‑conspirator communications, but the threshold can be met through practical, real‑world indicators of joint action, including coordinated arrival and joint forced entry. The case underscores that “bootstrapping” remains impermissible, yet the independent‑evidence bar is not insurmountable.
• Deference to juries on intent inferences: The opinion reinforces that juries are entitled to draw reasonable inferences from a defendant’s preparatory communications and forceful conduct. Appellate efforts to reweigh such inferences are unlikely to succeed.
• Defense strategy recalibration: Merely arguing “debt collection” or “wrong house” may not negate intent to steal, especially when communications suggest a planned property offense. Defenses will need to challenge authentication, seek exclusion on foundational grounds, or present compelling alternative interpretations of the communications and conduct.

Complex Concepts Simplified

• Sufficiency of the Evidence: On appeal, the court asks if any rational juror could have found the defendant guilty beyond a reasonable doubt, viewing the evidence in the State’s favor and drawing reasonable inferences for the State. The court does not reweigh evidence or assess witness credibility anew.
• Circumstantial vs. Direct Evidence: Direct evidence directly proves a fact (e.g., an eyewitness to a taking). Circumstantial evidence supports a fact by inference (e.g., pre‑entry planning, forced entry, flight). Both are equally valid; intent is often proven circumstantially.
• Intent to Commit Theft (Burglary): The State must prove the defendant intended to commit theft or a felony at the time of unauthorized entry. It does not have to prove a theft was completed.
• “In the Course of Committing” Theft (Robbery): For robbery, the violence must occur while the defendant is engaged in conduct that constitutes, or advances, the theft offense as defined in § 6‑3‑402. A completed taking is not necessary if the evidence shows an ongoing theft endeavor.
• Co‑Conspirator Statements (W.R.E. 801(d)(2)(E)): Statements by one participant in a conspiracy may be used against another if: (1) a conspiracy existed, (2) the defendant and the declarant participated, and (3) the statement was made during and to further the conspiracy. Critically, there must be some independent evidence of the conspiracy beyond the statements themselves.
• Rule 29 Motion for Judgment of Acquittal: A mid‑trial motion arguing the State’s evidence, even if believed, cannot support a conviction. Denial will be affirmed if, viewing the evidence most favorably to the State, a reasonable juror could convict.

Practical Takeaways

• For prosecutors:
  • Document and authenticate digital communications between alleged co‑actors. Pair them with independent evidence (joint arrival, tools of entry, coordinated conduct) to meet W.R.E. 801(d)(2)(E) prerequisites.
  • Highlight pre‑entry planning, forceful entry, and contemporaneous violence as circumstantial proof of theft intent. Emphasize that “no property taken” does not negate intent.
• For defense counsel:
  • Challenge the independent‑evidence predicate for 801(d)(2)(E); request on‑the‑record findings. Consider authentication and authorship challenges to digital messages.
  • Develop credible, specific alternative interpretations of ambiguous phrases (“make money,” “serve someone”) and contextualize any “debt collection” to negate theft intent if supported by evidence.
  • Seek tailored jury instructions on intent and the permissible use of co‑conspirator statements, and preserve Rule 29 arguments element‑by‑element.
• For trial courts:
  • Make explicit, independent findings on each 801(d)(2)(E) factor. Identify the non‑statement evidence relied upon to avoid bootstrapping concerns.
  • When ruling on sufficiency or Rule 29, articulate how circumstantial evidence and reasonable inferences support each element, especially intent.
• For law enforcement:
  • Preserve digital evidence holistically: messages, call logs, timestamps, geolocation where available, and tie them to physical‑world actions (surveillance, doorbell cameras, damage to entry points).

Conclusion

Wilson reinforces three settled but important points in Wyoming criminal law. First, intent to commit theft for burglary and robbery may be established entirely by circumstantial evidence drawn from the totality of circumstances, including pre‑entry planning and the violent execution of an unlawful entry. Second, the absence of an actual taking does not defeat a burglary or robbery conviction where the evidence supports an inference of theft intent or conduct “in the course of committing” theft. Third, digital communications between alleged co‑participants are admissible as co‑conspirator statements when supported by independent evidence of a conspiracy and when made during and in furtherance of that conspiracy.

In an era where criminal planning often leaves digital footprints, the Court’s opinion provides clear guidance for trial courts and litigants alike: juries are entitled to draw reasonable inferences about intent from coordinated messaging and aggressive execution, and courts will admit such communications when the Vlahos/Jandro predicates are independently satisfied. The decision thus strengthens the evidentiary and inferential pathways by which theft‑related intent can be proven in Wyoming’s burglary and robbery prosecutions.