The Court draws on Roundstone Development, LLC v. City of Natchez, 105 So. 3d 317 (Miss. 2013), which in turn relies on Board of Aldermen of Bay Springs v. Jenkins, 423 So. 2d 1323 (Miss. 1982):

“[The Board] may consider ‘the statements expressed by all the landowners at the hearing’ and may ‘call upon their own common knowledge and experience in their town.’ Such considerations are ‘sound and practical’ and should be respected unless the findings are arbitrary, capricious, and unreasonable.” (¶33, quoting Roundstone and Jenkins).

This line of authority underpins the Court’s acceptance of lay testimony about drainage, traffic, and neighborhood character as substantial evidence.

D. Administrative Law Context

Outside the zoning context, the Court briefly references Mississippi Department of Corrections v. Harris, 831 So. 2d 1190 (Miss. Ct. App. 2002), for the general principle that appellate courts review the same administrative record as the circuit court and apply the same standard of review (¶25). This reinforces the conception of local zoning boards as administrative bodies within the broader Mississippi administrative law framework.

V. Detailed Analysis of the Court’s Reasoning

A. Issue I: Was the Neighbor’s Appeal Defective and Jurisdictionally Fatal?

1. The Developer’s Argument

Elliott Land’s procedural attack centered on Jackson County Zoning Ordinance § 9.19.02(a), which governs appeals from the Planning Commission to the Board. The ordinance requires that a notice of appeal:

1. Identify the appellant;
2. Identify the Planning Commission matter appealed; and
3. Include “a brief statement of each particular error which the appellant contends was committed by the Planning Commission. No error will be considered by the Board of Supervisors, which has not been distinctly set out in the notice, unless manifest injustice may occur otherwise.” (¶13 & n.2).

Elliott Land argued:

• Lamey’s first notice of appeal contained no statement of particular error, and therefore failed to comply with § 9.19.02(a)(3) (¶29).
• The second notice, which did supply the required error statements, was submitted more than seven days after the Commission’s decision and therefore was untimely under the ordinance (¶13).
• As a result, the Board lacked subject-matter jurisdiction to hear the appeal at all (¶29).

2. The Board’s Response and the Ordinance’s Discretionary Dismissal Provision

The Board countered with two principal points (¶21):

• Elliott Land cited no legal authority for the proposition that defective compliance with a local zoning appeal ordinance is jurisdictional.
• Section 9.19.02 itself addresses defective notices, providing:

  “In the event an appellant disregards or fails to comply with the procedure set out in Section 9.19 of this article hereof, the Planning Director or his/her designee may by motion, request the Board of Supervisors dismiss the appellant’s appeal.” (¶31, emphasis added).

  This language clearly makes dismissal discretionary, triggered only if the Planning Director seeks it. Here, Planning Director Marcus Catchot chose not to move for dismissal (¶21, ¶31).

The Board also noted that nothing in § 9.19.02 required Lamey to have spoken at the Planning Commission hearing as a prerequisite to appeal (¶21), undercutting Elliott Land’s alternative “standing” argument.

3. The Court’s Resolution

The Supreme Court’s analysis is concise but significant:

• The Court expressly adopts the Board’s reading of § 9.19.02: the planning director could have requested dismissal of a noncompliant appeal but was not required to do so (¶31).
• Because the planning director did not move to dismiss Lamey’s appeal, the Board was free to proceed, and the appeal was “properly before” it (¶31).
• Implicitly, the Court rejects the notion that noncompliance with procedural requirements in this ordinance automatically strips the Board of jurisdiction.

This holding is doctrinally important: it draws a line between jurisdictional defects (which courts must police and which cannot be waived) and waivable procedural defects subject to an agency’s internal administrative discretion. By recognizing the ordinance’s explicit grant of discretion to the planning director, the Court establishes that such defects do not by themselves divest the Board of subject-matter jurisdiction.

4. Practical Consequences

The ruling signals:

• Developers cannot easily invalidate local zoning decisions on the basis of minor or cured technical defects in citizens’ notices of appeal when the local ordinance entrusts enforcement of those requirements to an internal officer.
• Planning directors and boards have wide latitude to hear appeals on the merits even if the initial filings are imperfect, so long as they do not choose to invoke the dismissal mechanism.
• Circuit and appellate courts will treat such procedural requirements as internal administrative rules, not as jurisdictional bars, absent clearer indications to the contrary.

The Court does not explicitly rule on Elliott Land’s late-raised contention that Lamey lacked standing because she had not appeared at the Planning Commission hearing. But by affirming that the appeal was properly before the Board, and by noting that the ordinance does not require prior appearance (¶21), the Court effectively rejects that contention as well.

B. Issue II: Did Elliott Land Meet Its Burden and Was the Denial Arbitrary or Capricious?

1. The Applicable Legal Standard

The Court reiterates the multi-layered burden facing a party seeking to overturn a rezoning denial:

1. Substantive burden for rezoning itself. The applicant must prove by clear and convincing evidence:
   • a mistake in the original zoning, or
   • a substantial change in neighborhood character and a public need for the rezoning (¶32).
2. Presumption of validity and standard of judicial review. The Board’s decision is presumed valid; the burden is on the challenger to show it is:
   • arbitrary,
   • capricious,
   • discriminatory,
   • illegal, or
   • unsupported by substantial evidence (¶26–¶28).
3. Fairly debatable test. If the evidence on both sides is substantial and reasonable minds could differ, the issue is “fairly debatable” and the Board’s choice must be upheld (¶28, ¶36, ¶39).

2. Evidence Presented by the Developer

Elliott Land’s presentation was comprehensive and, in many respects, compelling:

• Changed character of the neighborhood (¶37):
  • Map evidence demonstrating that the property is now surrounded by a mix of residential (R‑1 and R‑4) and agricultural zones.
  • Evidence of prior rezonings from agricultural to residential near the property.
  • Google Earth imagery showing at least 160 new homes constructed in the immediate area within three years.
  • Improved water and sewer infrastructure reducing or eliminating the need for large-lot septic systems.
• Public need for rezoning (¶37–¶38):
  • Data indicating that since 2010, the surrounding area accounted for roughly half of all new homes built in Jackson County over the last decade (¶8).
  • Proximity to employment centers (D’Iberville, Biloxi, Ocean Springs) and educational institutions (Mississippi Gulf Coast Community College and University of Southern Mississippi campuses) (¶9).
  • Ease of access to Interstate 10 and Highway 90 (¶9).
  • Argument that smaller, R‑1-lot development would:
    • Support more affordable housing;
    • Allow buyers to trade lot size for house size or amenities; and
    • Align with anticipated growth supported by new roads and infrastructure (¶8).

Given this evidence, Elliott Land argued that the Board’s denial was unsupported by substantial evidence and therefore arbitrary and capricious (¶34).

3. Evidence Presented by Opponents and Considered by the Board

On the other side of the scale, thirteen adjacent property owners provided testimony that the Court characterizes as substantial (¶38). Their points included:

• Preservation of rural character. Residents wished to maintain the existing “country feel” and low-density use patterns (¶5, ¶15, ¶38).
• Reliance interests. Some residents bought their homes in reliance on the existing agricultural zoning and the protections it offered for low-density, rural surroundings (¶5, ¶38).
• Drainage concerns. Multiple residents expressed fears about how the proposed R‑1 subdivision would impact water drainage on and around their properties (¶5, ¶15, ¶38).
• Traffic and infrastructure capacity. Opponents questioned whether the surrounding roads and infrastructure could handle additional traffic from denser development (¶5, ¶15, ¶38).
• Density preferences. Many residents stated they did not oppose new housing entirely, but wanted new homes to be built on larger A‑1 lots instead of smaller R‑1 lots “situated closer together” (¶15).

The Board was also explicitly entitled to draw on “its own common knowledge and experience” with the locality (¶33, ¶38), a right reaffirmed by Roundstone and Jenkins.

4. The Court’s “Fairly Debatable” Assessment

Faced with substantial evidence on both sides, the Court applies the “fairly debatable” doctrine in a textbook manner:

• On one hand, the developer’s expert and empirical evidence strongly suggested significant growth and urbanization, improved utilities, and market demand for additional, possibly more affordable housing (¶37).
• On the other hand, lay testimony plus the Board’s policy judgments supported maintaining agricultural zoning to:
  • Preserve rural character,
  • Protect against potential drainage and traffic problems, and
  • Honor the expectations of existing residents (¶38).

On this record, the Court concludes that:

“We conclude that the issues of whether there has been a sufficient change in the character of the neighborhood and whether a public need exists to warrant rezoning are fairly debatable because both sides presented substantial evidence.” (¶36).

Once the Court characterizes the dispute as “fairly debatable,” its role essentially ends. It reiterates that:

• The Board’s denial is presumed valid (¶39).
• The Court may not disturb the denial “even if we would have come to a different conclusion” based on the evidence (¶39).

This is a powerful reaffirmation that Mississippi appellate courts do not reweigh zoning evidence; they ask only whether the Board’s decision had a substantial evidentiary basis and fell within the realm of reasoned discretionary choice.

5. Treatment of Supervisor Bosarge’s “Never Rezoning” Comment

Elliott Land highlighted Supervisor Bosarge’s remark that he would “never support or vote for a zoning change” for the property as evidence of arbitrariness and personal bias (¶34, ¶18). The Court scrutinizes that assertion under the definitions of “arbitrary” and “capricious” (¶27, ¶40–¶41):

• The Court finds that Bosarge’s actual decision to move for denial was grounded in evidence and reason, not mere will:

  “Supervisor Bosarge heard the residents’ testimony, considered his familiarity with and knowledge of his own district, and then made a motion to overturn the Planning Commission’s decision based on the fact that he did not ‘believe there [was] enough change to warrant the zoning change.’” (¶40).

  This is a legitimate planning judgment under Roundstone and Jenkins.
• The Court notes that the allegedly problematic comment was made after the Board voted to deny the application and:
  • Did not form the basis of the Board’s decision.
  • Did not reflect the unanimous view of the Board, since there was a dissenting vote in favor of rezoning (¶41).
  • Did not alter the outcome: even if Bosarge had been recused, the vote would still have been 3–1 against, and thus the rezoning would have failed (¶35, ¶41).

In combination, these points lead the Court to hold that:

• Bosarge’s decision was not arbitrary because it was not “based on his will alone” but on neighborhood concerns and his own knowledge of the district (¶40).
• His decision was not capricious because it was grounded in “surrounding facts” and controlling planning principles, rather than whim (¶40).
• The Board’s collective action was insulated from attack even if one member expressed a personal, durable opposition to rezoning, so long as the official record shows a reasoned, evidence-based decision.

C. Overall Doctrinal Significance

Doctrinally, the case does not revolutionize Mississippi zoning law but fortifies several key principles:

1. Robust deference to local zoning authorities. If both sides present substantial evidence and the record reflects genuine debate among decision-makers and citizens, courts will be extremely reluctant to intervene, regardless of how persuasive a developer’s expert evidence might seem.
2. Citizen testimony as substantial evidence. Non-expert public testimony about drainage, traffic, neighborhood character, and reliance on existing zoning is squarely recognized as substantial evidence, especially when combined with the Board’s local knowledge.
3. Non-jurisdictional treatment of internal administrative procedures. Procedural missteps in notices of appeal, where the ordinance expressly provides an internal discretionary remedy, will not be converted into jurisdictional defects that overturn Board decisions.
4. Elected officials’ political statements are not per se invalidating. A supervisor’s strong policy stance against rezoning a particular property does not automatically taint the decision if the record shows a reasoned basis and the vote is not outcome-determinative of itself.

VI. Complex Concepts Simplified

1. “Clear and Convincing Evidence”

This is a heighted standard of proof. Imagine three levels of proof:

• Preponderance of the evidence – slightly more likely than not (the ordinary civil standard).
• Clear and convincing evidence – evidence that makes the conclusion highly probable and leaves the decision-maker with a firm belief or conviction in its truth.
• Beyond a reasonable doubt – the highest standard, used in criminal cases.

Rezoning applicants in Mississippi must meet the clear and convincing standard when trying to show that conditions justify changing established zoning classifications.

2. “Change or Mistake” Rule

Mississippi treats zoning maps as relatively stable. To change zoning, one must show either:

• Mistake in the original zoning – that the property was incorrectly zoned when the map was adopted (for example, data was wrong or legally misapplied); or
• Change in character + public need – that:
  • The surrounding area has evolved significantly (e.g., conversion from rural to suburban, major new infrastructure, etc.); and
  • There is a public need (not merely a private desire) for the rezoning (e.g., need for additional housing, services, or compatible land uses).

In Elliott Land, only the second route—change plus public need—was at issue (¶32).

3. “Substantial Evidence”

“Substantial evidence” is a middle-ground concept:

• It is more than a mere suspicion or a tiny amount of proof, but
• Less than the “more likely than not” preponderance of the evidence standard used at trial.

If reasonable people could accept the evidence as adequate to support the conclusion, it counts as substantial. The Court stresses that both developers’ expert evidence and neighbors’ lay testimony can qualify as substantial evidence (¶27, ¶36–¶38).

4. “Fairly Debatable” Standard

If the evidence in favor of and against a zoning decision is such that reasonable minds could differ, then the decision is “fairly debatable.” Under Mississippi law:

• If a zoning question is fairly debatable, the courts must defer to the elected or appointed local decision-makers (¶28, ¶36, ¶39).
• This is effectively a shield for local zoning bodies: as long as they act on some substantial evidence and within legal bounds, their choices will be upheld, even if a reviewing judge personally disagrees.

5. “Arbitrary” and “Capricious” Decisions

These terms describe decisions that fail basic standards of rational governance:

• Arbitrary: a decision based solely on personal will or preference, not grounded in reasoning, evidence, or principles.
• Capricious: an impulsive, whimsical, or erratic decision that ignores relevant facts and established rules.

The Court held that the Board’s decision here was neither:

• It was explicitly tied to the lack of clear and convincing evidence of sufficient change and public need (¶17, ¶39).
• It was supported by specific concerns about rural character, drainage, and traffic (¶23, ¶38–¶40).

6. Subject-Matter Jurisdiction vs. Procedural Compliance

Subject-matter jurisdiction is a court or body’s legal power to hear a particular type of case. If a body lacks subject-matter jurisdiction, its decisions are void.

By contrast, procedural compliance concerns whether parties followed the required steps (e.g., filing deadlines, content requirements for notices). Violations of such rules:

• Sometimes can be waived or cured; and
• Do not automatically strip a tribunal of its power to act, especially where the governing rules make enforcement discretionary (as § 9.19.02 does here, ¶31).

In Elliott Land, the Court firmly treats notice defects as procedural matters entrusted to the planning director, not as jurisdictional defects that invalidate the Board’s authority (¶31).

VII. Impact and Future Implications

A. For Developers and Landowners

This decision sends several clear messages to developers:

• High evidentiary burden remains. Even well-supported expert reports demonstrating growth, infrastructure improvements, and housing demand may not carry the day if local opposition and policy preferences offer substantial countervailing evidence.
• Winning at the Planning Commission is no guarantee. Planning commissions’ recommendations can be reversed by Boards of Supervisors, and courts will defer to boards where the matter is fairly debatable.
• Procedural challenges are limited. Attempts to invalidate zoning denials on the basis of technical defects in citizen appeals will be difficult where local ordinances explicitly make dismissal discretionary, and local officials elect to proceed.
• Political realities matter. The case underscores the importance of early engagement with both community stakeholders and elected officials. The Board’s finding that there was not “enough change” to justify rezoning illustrates that the legal threshold is ultimately filtered through local values and political judgment.

B. For Opposing Neighbors and Citizen Objectors

For objectors like Lamey and the residents who testified:

• Citizen testimony is powerful. The Supreme Court confirms that residents’ concerns about drainage, traffic, neighborhood character, and reliance on zoning are not mere “anecdotes”; they constitute legitimate, substantial evidence upon which Boards can rely (¶38).
• Perfection in filings is not required. Even if a notice of appeal is sparse or imperfect, the Board may still entertain the appeal if the planning director declines to seek dismissal under the ordinance (¶31).
• No requirement to speak at earlier stages. The Court’s acceptance of Lamey’s appeal despite her failure to speak at the Planning Commission hearing (¶21) suggests that “persons aggrieved” can participate by appeal even if they were silent at the initial hearing, provided the ordinance does not say otherwise.

C. For Local Governments and Zoning Authorities

Jackson County and other Mississippi localities can draw several lessons:

• Internal procedural discretion is respected. When an ordinance vests discretion in an internal officer (here, the planning director) to screen or move to dismiss appeals, courts will honor those internal choices and treat defects as non-jurisdictional.
• Board findings should be explicit. The Board’s written order expressly noting the lack of clear and convincing evidence of change and public need (¶17, ¶23) helped persuade the courts that its decision was deliberate, not arbitrary.
• Reliance on comprehensive plans is persuasive but not controlling. The developer argued that its proposal aligned with the County’s Comprehensive Plan (¶9, ¶37–¶38); the Board still refused rezoning. The case underscores that a comprehensive plan is one factor among many, not a binding mandate.
• Statements by officials. While intemperate or overly rigid statements can be scrutinized, they will not alone invalidate a decision so long as the record shows a rational evidentiary basis and the outcome does not hinge solely on that official’s vote (¶40–¶41).

D. Possible Future Litigation Themes

Going forward, litigants may test:

• Where the line is between a “fairly debatable” case and an arbitrary denial—especially where objective data (such as housing shortages or infrastructure upgrades) is overwhelming and citizen objections are more aesthetic or preference-based.
• Whether more extreme or pre-vote statements of prejudgment by Board members might cross into due-process territory, particularly if they suggest inability to consider evidence at all.
• The extent to which comprehensive plans can be used to constrain local discretion, especially where plans clearly designate areas for particular types of future development.

VIII. Conclusion

Elliott Land Developments v. Board of Supervisors of Jackson County is best understood as a consolidating rather than revolutionary decision. It:

• Clarifies that defects in an administrative zoning appeal notice are not jurisdictional when the local ordinance makes dismissal discretionary and the designated official declines to seek it (¶31).
• Strengthens the longstanding Mississippi rule that local zoning decisions are entitled to substantial deference and will not be overturned so long as they are supported by substantial evidence and the matter is fairly debatable (¶36–¶39).
• Affirms that citizen testimony and local knowledge are valid bases for zoning decisions, particularly in matters of neighborhood character, drainage, traffic, and reliance on existing zoning (¶33, ¶38).
• Holds that an elected official’s strong stance against rezoning a particular property does not by itself render the decision arbitrary or capricious, provided the record reflects a reasoned, evidence-based decision by the Board as a whole (¶40–¶41).

In the broader legal context, the decision reinforces Mississippi’s strong preference for local control in land use matters, with appellate courts stepping in only when local authorities truly stray beyond the bounds of reason, evidence, or lawful process. Developers must therefore understand that even well-prepared, data-rich rezoning proposals can fail—and remain unreviewable—if local opposition and planning judgments supply substantial evidence in support of denial.