Board-of-Review Protest Is Jurisdictional for Tax Tribunal Appeals: Michigan Supreme Court Partially Overrules Parkview and Clarifies Due Process in EMPP Denials

Introduction

In Sixarp LLC v. Township of Byron, the Michigan Supreme Court resolved a recurring and consequential procedural question in Michigan property tax practice: whether a taxpayer who fails to protest an assessor’s denial before the March Board of Review can nevertheless obtain Michigan Tax Tribunal (MTT) review by invoking due process or equitable principles. The Court answered no on this record. In a unanimous opinion authored by Justice Cavanagh, the Court held that the protest requirement in MCL 205.735a(3) is jurisdictional, not merely a claim-processing step, and it may be waived only by a court—and only when necessary to cure a constitutional due-process violation that deprived the taxpayer of the ability to protest. The Court also clarified the sufficiency of notice in the context of denials of the Eligible Manufacturing Personal Property (EMPP) exemption under MCL 211.9m and MCL 211.9n.

The dispute arose after Praxis Packaging Solutions (Sixarp LLC d/b/a Praxis) applied for EMPP exemptions and received a written denial from the township assessor, followed by a notice of assessment that listed the March Board of Review dates and deadlines. Praxis contacted the assessor but did not file a written appeal until March 10, after the Board had adjourned on March 9. The Tax Tribunal dismissed for lack of jurisdiction; the Court of Appeals reversed on due-process grounds. The Supreme Court reversed the Court of Appeals and reinstated the MTT’s dismissal.

This decision establishes important precedent: (1) the Board-of-Review protest requirement is a jurisdictional prerequisite to Tax Tribunal review; (2) Parkview Memorial Association v. Livonia is overruled to the extent it treated MCL 205.735’s protest requirements as merely procedural rather than jurisdictional; and (3) due-process adequacy is assessed holistically, and actual, timely notice—here, via the separate assessment notice—can cure defects in a denial notice.

Summary of the Opinion

Jurisdiction: The MTT lacks jurisdiction unless the taxpayer first protests the assessment or exemption denial at the March Board of Review, when the denial precedes the Board’s first substantive meeting, as expressly required by MCL 205.735a(3), MCL 211.9m(3), and MCL 211.9n(3).
Equity: The MTT has no equitable power to waive statutory jurisdictional requirements or deadlines.
Partial Overruling: Parkview Mem Ass’n v. Livonia, 183 Mich App 116 (1990), is overruled insofar as it held that the MCL 205.735 protest requirements were merely “procedural” and not jurisdictional limitations on the Tax Tribunal.
Due Process: Due process is flexible and requires notice reasonably calculated to apprise the taxpayer of the proceedings and an opportunity to be heard at a meaningful time and in a meaningful manner. Although the assessor’s denial letter omitted some details, Praxis received actual, timely notice via the separate notice of assessment, which listed Board dates, deadlines, and the need to protest to preserve Tribunal appeal rights. There was no due-process violation.
Result: Because Praxis did not timely protest to the Board and no due-process deprivation occurred, the Tax Tribunal lacked jurisdiction; the Court of Appeals judgment is reversed and the MTT’s dismissal reinstated.

Analysis

A. Statutory Framework and the Court’s In Pari Materia Reading

The Court harmonized the relevant statutes “in pari materia,” reading them together as a coherent scheme:

MCL 205.731(a): The MTT has exclusive and original jurisdiction to review final agency decisions relating to assessment and valuation.
MCL 205.735a(3): In assessment disputes regarding valuation or exemption, “the assessment must be protested before the board of review before the tribunal acquires jurisdiction.”
MCL 205.735a(6): Tribunal jurisdiction is invoked by filing a timely written petition after satisfying preconditions.
MCL 211.9m(3) and 211.9n(3): If the assessor denies an EMPP claim before the Board’s first substantive meeting, the denial “shall” (now “must”) be appealed to the Board by filing the combined document prescribed in subsection (2).
MCL 211.9m(2)(c) and 211.9n(2)(c): If the Board denies the appeal, the taxpayer may petition the MTT within 35 days of the Board’s denial notice.

Applied together, the regime requires: (1) assessor denial → (2) timely protest to Board of Review → (3) if unsuccessful, petition the MTT. Because Praxis skipped step (2), the MTT never acquired jurisdiction.

B. Precedents Cited and Their Influence on the Decision

Highland-Howell Dev Co, LLC v Marion Twp, 469 Mich 673 (2004) and 478 Mich 932 (2007):
Reaffirmed the scope of the MTT’s “exclusive and original jurisdiction” over agency decisions and underscored that statutes cannot be construed to deny due process. The Court used Highland-Howell’s jurisdictional framing and due-process guardrails to clarify that jurisdictional prerequisites stand unless their application deprives due process.
Electronic Data Sys Corp v Flint Twp, 253 Mich App 538 (2002):
Recognized MCL 205.735 (predecessor to §735a) as a jurisdictional statute governing how a petitioner invokes the Tribunal’s jurisdiction. This supported the Court’s conclusion that the protest requirement is jurisdictional, not merely procedural.
Wikman v City of Novi, 413 Mich 617 (1982) and Fed-Mogul Corp v Dep’t of Treasury, 161 Mich App 346 (1987):
Wikman and Fed-Mogul establish that the Tax Tribunal does not possess equitable powers. The Court relied on this to reject the Court of Appeals’ attempt to vest jurisdiction in the MTT as a matter of equity.
Parkview Mem Ass’n v Livonia, 183 Mich App 116 (1990) (partially overruled):
Parkview held that the MCL 205.735 protest requirement was a “procedural requirement for perfecting an appeal,” not a jurisdictional limitation. The Sixarp Court expressly overruled Parkview to that extent, recognizing the Legislature’s clear jurisdictional mandate in §735a(3).
W & E Burnside, Inc v Bangor Twp, 402 Mich 950 (1978) (peremptory order):
This Court remanded to the Tribunal for merits review despite failure to protest to the Board because the taxpayers had no notice of the increase until after Board meetings—effectively depriving them of the opportunity to be heard. Sixarp harmonizes Burnside by treating waiver of the protest requirement as appropriate only when necessary to remedy a constitutional due-process deprivation that prevented a timely protest.
Pueblo v Haas, 511 Mich 345 (2023) and People v Mazur, 497 Mich 302 (2015):
Support the in pari materia approach: statutes on the same subject should be read together to produce a coherent legal scheme, which the Court applied to the MTT and EMPP statutes.
Bonner v City of Brighton, 495 Mich 209 (2014), By Lo Oil Co v Dep’t of Treasury, 267 Mich App 19 (2005), Mathews v Eldridge, 424 US 319 (1976):
These decisions provide the framework for procedural due process—notice and an opportunity to be heard at a meaningful time and in a meaningful manner—and the flexible, context-specific Mathews balancing. The Court used this framework to evaluate the sufficiency of the combined notices Praxis received.
Sidun v Wayne Co Treasurer, 481 Mich 503 (2008) and Jones v Flowers, 547 US 220 (2006):
Define “notice reasonably calculated, under all the circumstances” and clarify that actual notice is not constitutionally required—but when achieved, it tends to satisfy due process.
Gillie v Genesee Co Treasurer, 277 Mich App 333 (2007), disavowed in part by 2 Crooked Creek, LLC v Cass Co Treasurer, 507 Mich 1 (2021):
Cited for the proposition that actual notice satisfies due process, and defects in service become harmless when timely actual notice occurs.
New Covert Generating Co, LLC v Covert Twp, 334 Mich App 24 (2020):
Demonstrates that when the Legislature intends direct Tax Tribunal appeal without Board protest, it says so expressly. This bolsters the conclusion that §735a(3)’s protest requirement is the rule, and enumerated exceptions are narrow.
Wells Fargo Rail Corp v Michigan, 344 Mich App 351 (2022) and Morehouse v Mackinaw Twp (unpublished, 2009):
The Court of Appeals had invoked “equitable tolling” in unusual circumstances (jurisdictional confusion) and had followed Parkview’s waiver approach. Sixarp distinguishes Wells Fargo (no comparable statutory confusion here) and curtails Parkview’s rationale.
Campbell v Dep’t of Treasury, 509 Mich 230 (2022), Liberty Hill Hous Corp v Livonia, 480 Mich 44 (2008), Mt Pleasant v State Tax Comm, 477 Mich 50 (2007), Travelers Ins Co v Detroit Edison Co, 465 Mich 185 (2001), McQueer v Perfect Fence Co, 502 Mich 276 (2018):
Provide standards of review and principles of statutory interpretation applied throughout the opinion.

C. The Court’s Legal Reasoning

1) The protest requirement is jurisdictional

The text of MCL 205.735a(3) directs that an assessment dispute as to valuation or exemption “must be protested before the board of review before the tribunal acquires jurisdiction.” The Court treats this as a clear jurisdictional limitation. Reading §735a together with MCL 205.731(a) (MTT’s exclusive jurisdiction) and MCL 211.9m/.9n (EMPP-specific procedures), the Court concludes that the MTT can only review final agency decisions after the taxpayer has timely protested at the Board. The Tribunal itself lacks power to waive or ignore statutory prerequisites.

2) Narrow due-process-based waiver, by a court—not the MTT

The Court reconciles earlier remedial cases like Burnside by recognizing a narrow avenue for waiver: a court may set aside the protest prerequisite only when necessary to remedy a due-process violation that deprived the taxpayer of the opportunity to protest. This preserves constitutional fairness while respecting the Legislature’s jurisdictional structure and the Tribunal’s lack of equitable power.

3) Due process was satisfied on these facts

EMPP denial notices must: (1) be written; (2) state the reason for denial; and (3) advise that the denial shall/must be appealed to the Board by refiling the “combined document” (Form 5278). The assessor’s denial letter here was written and included a reason (“does not meet the definition” under MCL 211.9m/.9n). The Court holds the statutes do not require more granularity than “the reason for the denial” in general terms. The denial notice did not recite meeting dates/times or the combined-document refiling step; however, the separate notice of assessment mailed on February 17 provided detailed Board dates, deadlines, and modalities (in-person, virtual, or letter appeal), and stated that protesting was necessary to preserve Tribunal appeal rights. Praxis received that notice more than 14 days before the Board met (MCL 211.24c(4)).

Evaluating “all the circumstances,” the Court finds the Township’s combined notices “reasonably calculated” to apprise Praxis of the process and to afford an opportunity to object. Any defects in the denial notice were rendered harmless by timely, actual notice via the assessment notice. The inaccurate newspaper posting about “appointments through March 10” was facially contradicted by the posted March 8–9 meeting dates and there was no proof of reliance. Praxis’s late March 10 letter appeal, after adjournment on March 9, reflects untimeliness—not a due-process deprivation.

4) Outcome

Because Praxis failed to timely protest to the Board and suffered no due-process violation, the MTT lacked jurisdiction. The Supreme Court reversed the Court of Appeals and reinstated the Tax Tribunal’s dismissal.

D. Impact and Practical Consequences

1) For taxpayers and counsel

Strict compliance: A timely protest to the March Board of Review is a jurisdictional prerequisite for nearly all valuation and exemption disputes, including EMPP denials issued before the Board’s first substantive meeting.
Holistic notice: Courts will assess due-process adequacy holistically. A defect in an assessor’s denial notice may be cured by a timely and sufficiently detailed notice of assessment.
Limited waiver: The only viable path around the protest requirement is a genuine due-process deprivation that prevented protest (e.g., no timely notice before the Board meets). Mere confusion, lack of detail, or reliance on oral advice will rarely suffice.
Act early: Do not await assessor guidance; file a written protest/letter appeal well before posted deadlines, and, when required, refile the combined document (Form 5278) as part of the Board protest.
Documentation: Keep proof of when each notice was received; if there is a late or missing notice that forecloses protest, preserve that record for a potential due-process-based waiver request to a court.

2) For assessors and local units

Content of denial letters: Best practice is to include (a) the reason for denial (plainly stated), (b) explicit reference to the need to appeal to the Board, (c) a reminder to refile the combined document, and (d) cross-reference to the separate assessment notice for specific dates and deadlines if not included in the denial.
Curing defects: Timely, detailed assessment notices (MCL 211.24c) can help ensure due process even if a denial notice is succinct. Maintain clear public postings and avoid conflicting information in newspapers.
Communications: Assessors are not statutorily obligated to provide bespoke advice beyond accurate general guidance. Still, providing clear, consistent written instructions reduces litigation risk.

3) For the Tax Tribunal

No equitable jurisdiction: The Tribunal cannot waive or toll jurisdictional prerequisites. Its subject-matter jurisdiction depends on the statutory protest and appeal structure being satisfied.
Focus of review: When a taxpayer invokes due-process waiver, the Tribunal may make factual findings about notice receipt and timing if directed by a court on remand, but it cannot on its own confer jurisdiction absent a protest.

4) Doctrinal clarifications and precedent

Parkview overruled in part: The protest requirement is jurisdictional, not a mere “procedural” step. Practitioners should not rely on Parkview’s framing.
Burnside reconciled: Waiver of the protest requirement is reserved for situations where due process is truly denied—e.g., no timely notice before Board sessions—consistent with constitutional constraints.
Narrow reading of equitable tolling: Wells Fargo Rail’s equitable tolling (statutory-jurisdiction confusion between MTT and Court of Claims) does not apply where the statutory path is clear, as here.
Direct appeal exceptions: New Covert underscores that direct appeals without Board protest are exceptions expressly created by statute (e.g., MCL 205.735a(4)). No comparable exception exists for EMPP denials.

E. Complex Concepts Simplified

MTT (Michigan Tax Tribunal): A specialized administrative forum with exclusive, original jurisdiction over final local tax decisions on assessment and valuation. It cannot exercise equitable powers.
Board of Review (March Board): Local body that meets in March to hear protests on property tax assessments and certain exemptions. For most disputes, you must protest here first to preserve Tribunal review.
EMPP (Eligible Manufacturing Personal Property): A statutory exemption for qualifying manufacturing personal property, governed by MCL 211.9m (new) and 211.9n (existing).
Combined document: Form 5278—used both to claim the EMPP exemption and, if denied before the Board meets, to appeal the denial to the Board by refiling the same combined form.
Jurisdictional requirement vs. claim-processing rule: A jurisdictional requirement limits a tribunal’s power to hear a case; noncompliance bars jurisdiction. A claim-processing rule regulates case steps but does not limit the tribunal’s power. The protest requirement here is jurisdictional.
In pari materia: Reading related statutes together to produce a consistent legal scheme. The Court used this to harmonize the MTT and EMPP statutes.
Due process (notice and opportunity to be heard): The Constitution requires procedures reasonably calculated to inform and allow a meaningful chance to be heard. Actual notice is not always required—but when present and timely, it typically satisfies due process.
Peremptory order: A summary order from an appellate court (like Burnside) that can set binding precedent even without a full opinion, especially when it announces a rule or directs a remedy.

F. Practice Pointers and Compliance Checklist

Upon receiving any EMPP denial, immediately:
- Identify the Board of Review dates and deadlines in the assessment notice or on the township website.
- Calendar the earliest applicable deadline (e.g., letter appeal receipt date).
- File a written letter appeal promptly—do not rely on oral communications—and, when required, refile the combined document (Form 5278) with the Board.
- Retain proof of mailing/receipt.
If notice arrives after the Board has adjourned, document the timing; this may support a due-process waiver request to a court.
Do not rely on newspaper postings with ambiguous dates; verify official Board schedules directly with the township and the mailed assessment notice.
If the assessor provides informal guidance, treat it as nonbinding; statutory deadlines control.

G. Unresolved Issues and Edge Cases

What quantum of defect or confusion, short of total lack of timely notice, suffices to show a due-process deprivation that “deprived the taxpayer of the ability to protest”? Future cases may refine this threshold.
How courts will treat reliance on materially erroneous public postings when a taxpayer can demonstrate detrimental reliance supported by contemporaneous records.
The role of electronic communications and delivery receipts in proving (or disproving) timely notice and opportunity to be heard.
Interaction with the 2021 amendments replacing “shall” with “must” in MCL 211.9m(3)/.9n(3): Sixarp indicates the substance is unchanged; compliance is still required.

Conclusion

Sixarp LLC v. Township of Byron solidifies a clean, predictable rule in Michigan property tax litigation: protesting to the March Board of Review is a jurisdictional prerequisite to invoking the Tax Tribunal’s authority in valuation and exemption disputes, including EMPP denials issued before the Board meets. The Court partially overrules Parkview and aligns the doctrine with the statutory text of MCL 205.735a(3), the Tribunal’s limited powers, and constitutional due process.

On the due-process question, the Court cautions against mechanical checklists: due process is flexible, and courts will assess notice “under all the circumstances.” Here, while the denial letter was succinct and did not include every procedural detail, Praxis received a timely assessment notice with precise Board dates and deadlines; that actual, timely notice satisfied due process. Because there was no due-process deprivation, there was no basis to waive the jurisdictional protest requirement—and the MTT’s dismissal for lack of jurisdiction was properly reinstated.

Key takeaways: file early, file in writing, refile the combined document when required, and do not expect equitable rescue at the Tribunal. Only a court may waive the protest requirement, and only to remedy a true due-process denial that prevented a timely protest. This decision will likely streamline jurisdictional challenges, encourage clearer local notice practices, and reduce litigation premised on non-jurisdictional “equity” in the Tribunal.