Sole-Testimony Convictions in Rape Cases Require “Sterling Quality” Evidence; Appellate Deference to Acquittals Reaffirmed, with Post-Judgment Bonds Directed under BNSS Section 481

Case: State of Himachal Pradesh v. Sunil Khan

Neutral Citation: 2025:HHC:31354-DB

Court: High Court of Himachal Pradesh, Shimla (Division Bench)

Bench: Hon’ble Mr. Justice Vivek Singh Thakur and Hon’ble Mr. Justice Sushil Kukreja

Date: 12 September 2025

Appeal: State’s appeal under Section 378 CrPC against acquittal in Sessions Trial No. 8 of 2014

Approved for reporting: Yes

Introduction

This appeal by the State of Himachal Pradesh challenged a 2015 acquittal of the respondent (accused) on charges under Sections 376 and 506 of the IPC. The prosecution case rested primarily on the testimony of the prosecutrix, who alleged that on 31.08.2013, while alone at home around noon, she was subjected to non-consensual sexual intercourse by the accused, a close relative, who left thereafter on a motorcycle. The First Information Report was lodged the next day. The trial court acquitted the accused, and the State brought this appeal seeking reversal and conviction.

The Division Bench framed and addressed three interlinked legal issues:

• The scope and limits of appellate interference with an acquittal, including the “double presumption” of innocence;
• The conditions under which a conviction for rape can be entered on the sole testimony of the prosecutrix—specifically, whether her testimony in this case met the “sterling witness” threshold articulated by the Supreme Court; and
• Post-judgment procedural directions in the era of the Bhartiya Nagarik Suraksha Sanhita, 2023 (BNSS)—notably, the requirement to furnish bonds under Section 481 BNSS for appearance in the Supreme Court if an SLP is filed.

Summary of the Judgment

• Appeal dismissed; acquittal affirmed. The High Court found no basis to interfere, emphasizing the reinforced presumption of innocence following an acquittal and the settled rule that if two reasonable views are possible, the appellate court should not overturn the trial court’s view.
• Sole testimony standard reiterated. While a conviction in a rape case can be based solely on the testimony of the prosecutrix, such testimony must be of “sterling quality”: natural, consistent, and inspiring of confidence, with no material contradictions undermining the core allegation.
• Testimony not of “sterling quality.” The Court identified material inconsistencies and improbabilities:
  • Key detail (mouth gagging) absent from the FIR/initial complaint but introduced later;
  • Allegation of torn clothes juxtaposed with the physical improbability of execution as described and absence of injuries/marks of violence;
  • Unexplained failure to seek immediate help despite nearby houses and a close sister living 2 km away; and
  • Contradiction between the prosecutrix’s explanation that her husband had no phone and his testimony that he received work calls on his mobile.
• Resulting standard of proof not met. Given the cumulative effect of these factors, the Court held that the prosecution did not establish guilt beyond reasonable doubt.
• BNSS Section 481 invoked. Despite affirming acquittal, the Court directed the respondent to execute bonds under Section 481 BNSS to secure appearance in the Supreme Court in the event of an SLP—an updated analogue to the erstwhile Section 437A CrPC.

Detailed Analysis

Precedents and Their Role in the Court’s Reasoning

The Division Bench carefully situated its ruling within settled Supreme Court jurisprudence, deploying a matrix of cases that both protect the credibility of victims and insist on rational probative evaluation.

• Appellate deference to acquittals. The Court reiterated that an appellate court may reappreciate evidence in an appeal against acquittal, but:
  • There is a “double presumption” of innocence: the fundamental presumption plus the reinforcement by acquittal at trial;
  • If two reasonable views are possible, the appellate court should not disturb the acquittal; and
  • The graver the offence, the greater the care in ensuring guilt is proved beyond reasonable doubt (without altering the standard of proof).
• Victim’s testimony can suffice. Citing State of HP v. Gian Chand (2001) 6 SCC 71 and Vijay @ Chinee v. State of MP (2010) 8 SCC 191 (and the cases surveyed therein, including Chandraprakash Kewalchand Jain, Pappu @ Yunus, Gurmit Singh, Thakara Besra, Raghubir Singh, Wahid Khan, and Rameshwar), the Bench reaffirmed:
  • The prosecutrix is not an accomplice; her testimony does not legally require corroboration;
  • Courts must remain sensitive to the realities of sexual offence prosecutions and should not be swayed by insignificant discrepancies; and
  • Delay in FIR may not be fatal if natural and explained.
• The “sterling witness” test. Relying on Rai Sandeep @ Deepu v. State (NCT of Delhi) (2012) 8 SCC 21, the Court emphasized that where conviction rests on a sole witness, her version must be unassailable on core facts, consistent across stages, and insulated from material contradictions—akin to the completeness expected in a chain of circumstantial evidence.
• Improbable narratives cannot anchor conviction. The Bench cited Tameezuddin @ Tammu v. State (NCT of Delhi) (2009) 15 SCC 566, underscoring that even in rape cases—where victim testimony is given predominant consideration—courts must not accept accounts that are inherently improbable or that “belie logic.”
• Contextual seriousness of sexual offences. Jugendra Singh v. State of UP (2012) 6 SCC 297 was quoted to recognize the societal harm inflicted by sexual assault, balancing sensitivity with evidentiary rigor.

How the Court Applied These Principles to the Facts

Having accepted the controlling legal propositions, the Court focused on whether the prosecutrix’s deposition met the “sterling quality” threshold. The Bench identified the following as material fault-lines:

• Material improvement/omission: The claimed detail that the accused continuously gagged her with one hand while tearing clothes with the other did not appear in the immediate complaint/FIR but surfaced in later testimony. Such a core fact, if true, would ordinarily be expected at the earliest instance.
• Physical plausibility and absence of injuries: The allegation of clothes being torn and simultaneous assault by a single assailant, while the prosecutrix’s hands were free, was treated as improbable in the manner described. This conclusion was reinforced by the medical evidence indicating no injuries or marks of violence (on the person or consistent with gagging). The Court was careful, implicitly, to avoid holding that absence of injuries is per se fatal; rather, it weighed the lack of injuries against a description of a physically forceful assault that, if true, would likely leave some trace.
• Post-occurrence conduct: Despite neighboring houses and a close sister living nearby, the prosecutrix neither raised a hue and cry nor informed her sister immediately—conduct the Court regarded as “unnatural” in the specific factual matrix. The Court acknowledged Supreme Court cautions against stereotyped expectations of victim behavior, but here viewed the omissions cumulatively and in light of other contradictions.
• Internal contradiction regarding mobile contact: The prosecutrix explained she could not contact her husband because he did not carry a phone. Her husband, however, testified that he received work calls on his mobile phone; he did not say he lacked the phone that day. This inconsistency impaired the prosecution’s narrative about post-incident steps.
• Forensic silence: Although RFSL analysis was mentioned, the judgment does not rely on any inculpatory forensic result. The absence of supportive scientific evidence, while not determinative, deprived the prosecution of an independent assurance where the core testimony was found wanting.

On this footing, the Bench concluded that the prosecutrix’s testimony, standing alone, did not rise to the “sterling” level necessary to ground a conviction without corroboration, and the prosecution had not proved guilt beyond reasonable doubt. Consequently, deference to the trial court’s acquittal was appropriate.

BNSS Section 481: Post-Judgment Bonds

A noteworthy procedural feature is the Court’s direction requiring the respondent to furnish bail bonds under Section 481 of the Bhartiya Nagarik Suraksha Sanhita, 2023, to secure appearance before the Supreme Court in the event of an SLP. This mirrors the earlier practice under Section 437A CrPC, reflecting the judiciary’s transition to BNSS citations and mechanisms in post-judgment processes. The direction is standard and prophylactic: it does not detract from the acquittal but ensures the respondent’s appearance if the case ascends to the apex court.

Impact and Prospective Significance

• Clarifying the “sterling witness” compass. The decision illustrates how courts may operationalize the “sterling witness” test by evaluating:
  • Consistency across the FIR, Section 164 CrPC statement, and trial deposition;
  • Internal physical plausibility of the account;
  • Medical evidence aligned to the described force or lack thereof; and
  • Post-incident conduct, scrutinized cautiously to avoid stereotypes but still probative where paired with material inconsistencies.
• Appellate restraint in acquittals reaffirmed. The Bench’s approach reinforces that reversal of an acquittal requires manifest error or a patently unreasonable view of the evidence, especially in serious offences where courts must be meticulously sure before convicting.
• Practice implications for prosecution. The ruling underscores investigative imperatives:
  • Capturing core details at the earliest point (FIR/Section 164) to avoid later “improvements” being treated as fatal;
  • Securing and proving physical exhibits (e.g., clothing) and promptly conducting medical and forensic examinations;
  • Documenting reasons for any post-incident delays or atypical conduct; and
  • Corroborating with call data, neighbor testimonies, and any digital footprints where available.
• Defense strategy contours. The decision will likely be invoked by the defense to argue that where the core account appears physically implausible, lacks medical support, or contains material contradictions, the “sterling” threshold is not met and reasonable doubt persists.
• Transition to BNSS. The Court’s reliance on Section 481 BNSS signals the normalization of BNSS procedures in appellate criminal practice, even in legacy cases commenced under the CrPC.

Complex Concepts Simplified

• Beyond reasonable doubt: The prosecution’s burden in criminal trials; the evidence must leave the court firmly convinced of guilt, not merely suspicious or more likely than not.
• Double presumption of innocence: The accused is presumed innocent; after acquittal, that presumption is further strengthened, making appellate interference more guarded.
• Two reasonable views rule: If the evidence permits two plausible interpretations—one consistent with guilt and another with innocence—the court must adopt the view favorable to the accused in an appeal against acquittal.
• “Sterling witness” (Rai Sandeep test): A witness whose testimony on the core facts is so consistent, natural, and credible that it can be relied upon without corroboration; any material inconsistency may prevent the testimony from reaching this threshold.
• Section 164 CrPC statement: A statement of a witness (often the victim in sexual offence cases) recorded by a magistrate; valued for its early capture of the narrative and relative reliability.
• Section 27, Evidence Act: Allows proof of that portion of information received from an accused in police custody that distinctly relates to facts discovered in consequence of that information.
• Section 481 BNSS (formerly Section 437A CrPC): Requires execution of bonds by an accused to appear in appellate forums if higher courts entertain challenges to the judgment; used even when acquittal is affirmed.

Critical Reflections

While the Court was mindful of Supreme Court cautions against discrediting victim testimony due to minor inconsistencies or stereotyped expectations of behavior, it nevertheless treated the omissions and contradictions here as material. This is a delicate line. Courts must avoid reviving disproven myths (for example, that absence of injuries disproves rape or that failure to raise alarm is dispositive). In this judgment, the absence of injuries was not treated in isolation; it was weighed against a specific account of a physically forceful episode that, if accurate, would likely have left some trace, and against other material inconsistencies. The Court’s analysis thus aligns itself with the Supreme Court’s nuanced approach: sensitivity to the context of sexual offences, yet insistence on internal coherence and reliability of the core accusation where conviction rests on a sole witness.

Conclusion and Key Takeaways

• Conviction for rape can rest on the sole testimony of the prosecutrix; however, where the prosecution relies exclusively on that testimony, it must be of “sterling quality.”
• Material inconsistencies between the FIR/initial complaint, 164 CrPC statement, and deposition; physical implausibility of the narrative; and unexplained post-incident conduct may cumulatively prevent the testimony from reaching the “sterling” threshold.
• Appellate courts exercise restraint in overturning acquittals due to the double presumption of innocence and the “two reasonable views” doctrine.
• The judgment exemplifies the High Court’s adoption of BNSS Section 481 for post-judgment bonds, marking continuity with the erstwhile Section 437A CrPC while signaling the procedural transition to BNSS.

State of HP v. Sunil Khan thereby operates less as a departure and more as a clarifying reaffirmation: it consolidates the Supreme Court’s “sterling witness” doctrine within appellate review of acquittals in sexual offence cases and underscores the careful, evidence-based scrutiny required when the prosecution’s case pivots on a single witness. Simultaneously, it reflects the judiciary’s ongoing procedural harmonization under the BNSS.