No Permanent Address Is Not a Bar to Bail: A Liberty-Centric Framework under BNSS Section 483

Introduction

In CRM-M-39682-2025, titled Sanjay Gordhanbhai Darji v. State of Haryana, the Punjab & Haryana High Court (per Hon’ble Mr. Justice Anoop Chitkara) delivered a reportable, reasoned judgment on 30 September 2025, reserved on 8 September 2025, addressing a regular bail application under Section 483 of the Bharatiya Nagarik Suraksha Sanhita, 2023 (BNSS).

The petitioner was incarcerated pursuant to FIR No. 261 dated 27 September 2024, Police Station Sector 40, Gurugram, for offences under Sections 406, 420, 468, and 120-B of the Indian Penal Code (IPC). The FIR was registered following a magistrate’s direction on a complaint by Umesh Goyal (Kuru Agri Products) alleging a commercial cheating/forgery conspiracy involving supply of arecanut (supari) worth Rs. 19,59,552 on the alleged guarantee of a third party (V.S. Trading), with subsequent non-payment, alleged appropriation of goods, and use of a false registered address.

The State and the complainant resisted bail primarily on the ground that the petitioner lacked a verifiable permanent address, was arrested after about 33 months from the alleged transaction, and posed a flight risk. The petitioner sought bail on stringent terms and expressed consent to cancellation if he committed future serious offences. Notably, the status report acknowledged that the petitioner had no criminal antecedents, his custody was about two months at the time of consideration, and the case was triable by a Judicial Magistrate.

The judgment squarely confronted a recurring yet under-theorized issue in bail jurisprudence: whether absence of a permanent abode can, by itself, be a basis to deny bail. It also set out a suite of practical, proportionate bail conditions designed to address flight risk without undermining personal liberty protected under Article 21 of the Constitution.

Summary of the Judgment

The Court granted regular bail under BNSS Section 483, emphasizing that:

• There was prima facie material linking the petitioner to the alleged offence; however, pre-trial incarceration must not be a surrogate for post-conviction punishment.
• The petitioner had clean antecedents and had been in custody for only about two months; the case is triable by a Magistrate.
• Crucially, lack of a permanent address cannot, by itself, be a ground to deny bail. In contemporary socio-economic conditions—marked by unaffordable housing and transient living—many citizens do not have fixed residences, and denying bail on that sole ground would be a miscarriage of justice and contrary to the objectives of bail.
• To mitigate concerns of flight risk and ensure attendance, the Court imposed calibrated conditions:
  • Release on furnishing bonds to the satisfaction of the competent court, with or without surety, with a cap of INR 10,000.
  • Option to furnish a fixed deposit (FD) of INR 10,000 with non-encumbrance directions, in lieu of surety.
  • Provision of identity and contact particulars (Aadhaar, Passport if available, mobile number, email), especially where the attesting officer finds flight risk concerns.
  • Standard non-tampering conditions and an appearance obligation on all dates.
  • A foundational condition: if, during bail, the petitioner commits a non-bailable offence punishable with more than seven years, the State may seek cancellation before the competent court.
• To ensure immediate restoration of liberty, subordinate courts must accept downloaded copies of bail or suspension orders (subject to verification), following the Division Bench ruling in AMIT RANA v. STATE OF HARYANA (05.08.2025).

The Court carefully clarified that its observations are not on the merits of the case and are limited to bail considerations.

Analysis

Key Issues Before the Court

• Whether absence of a permanent abode/address can be treated as a determinative ground to deny bail.
• How to balance liberty (Article 21) with concerns of flight risk and integrity of the trial, especially where prima facie involvement is alleged but the case is triable by a Magistrate and the accused has limited custody.
• What conditions can be tailored to proportionately address risks without making bail illusory, oppressive, or impractical.
• How to ensure immediate efficacy of bail orders in practice (addressing delays in transmission/execution of release orders).

Precedents Cited and Their Influence

• Vaman Narain Ghiya v. State Of Rajasthan (2008) [E-SCR]: The Supreme Court underscored the philosophy of bail as a balance between the State’s power to arrest and the presumption of innocence. The High Court invoked this jurisprudence to re-affirm that deprivation of liberty demands compelling justification beyond mere allegations, especially at the pre-trial stage.
• State Of Kerala v. Raneef (2011) [E-SCR]: The Supreme Court highlighted delay in trial as a critical factor for grant of bail; if acquittal follows years of incarceration, Article 21 is gravely compromised. Although the petitioner’s custody was comparatively short, the principle buttressed the High Court’s liberty-centric approach that prolonged pre-trial detention must be guarded against.
• Siddharam Satlingappa Mhetre v. State of Maharashtra (2010) [E-SCR], para 127: The Supreme Court emphasized that personal liberty—being a precious fundamental right—should be curtailed only when imperative under peculiar facts. This value permeates the High Court’s evaluation, especially in refusing to equate the lack of a permanent address with a per se denial of bail.
• Babu Singh v. State of U.P. (1978) [E-SCR]: The Court reminded that negating personal liberty is a grave judicial act to be undertaken with care, not casually. This caution informs the High Court’s refusal to convert socio-economic status (homeless/transient living) into a categorical bar against bail.
• Sanjay Chandra v. CBI (2011) [E-SCR], para 26: The Supreme Court observed that detention pending trial cannot be used as a substitute for punishment. The High Court’s articulation—“pre-trial incarceration should not be a replica of post-conviction sentencing”—reflects this core holding.
• AMIT RANA v. STATE OF HARYANA (P&H HC, DB, 05.08.2025): The Division Bench directed that downloaded copies of bail/suspension orders be accepted (subject to verification) to avoid delay in release. By invoking this, the High Court strengthened the operational aspect of restoring liberty without bureaucratic drag.

Collectively, these precedents grounded the judgment in bedrock constitutional and bail principles: presumption of innocence, proportionality, Article 21 protection, and the need to avoid punitive pre-trial incarceration while preserving the administration of justice through sensible safeguards.

Legal Reasoning and Application

• Prima facie nexus vs. pre-trial punishment: While acknowledging that there is prima facie material connecting the petitioner with the alleged cheating/forgery conspiracy, the Court emphasized that this does not translate into a mandate for continued detention. Bail decisions are not a referendum on guilt; they are risk-management tools to secure trial attendance and protect the integrity of the process.
• The “permanent address” objection, deconstructed: The State’s and complainant’s principal objection was that the petitioner lacked a verifiable permanent residence and had been evasive. The Court responded with a nuanced, reality-aware exposition:
  • In modern India, steep housing costs and unstable rentals mean many citizens lack fixed, long-term addresses. To deny bail for that reason alone would unjustifiably penalize socio-economic vulnerability.
  • Even those with “permanent” addresses can relocate or sell property; a fixed address is, therefore, not a guarantor of presence.
  • In bailable offences, the law mandates release irrespective of address status; a contrary approach to non-bailable matters would be illogical and overbroad.
  • Monastics and ashram residents are part of India’s social fabric; the law cannot treat their itinerancy as inherently suspect.
  Conclusion: Permanent abode is not an indispensable criterion for bail. The correct approach is to craft conditions proportionate to risk.
• Proportional, workable conditions:
  • Monetary burden calibrated: A cap of INR 10,000 on bond, with an FD alternative, ensures the bail is not illusory or oppressive. The FD condition, with banking endorsements against encumbrance, is a modern, low-friction substitute for traditional surety hurdles.
  • Identity and contact anchoring: Mandating Aadhaar, Passport (if available), mobile number, and email secures alternative means of contact and verification, tailored by the attesting authority’s assessment of flight risk.
  • Surety’s capability test: Insistence that the surety be capable of producing the accused refocuses the inquiry on functional reliability rather than on rigid residential formalism.
  • Foundational condition on future offences: If the petitioner commits a non-bailable offence punishable with more than seven years while on bail, the State is directed to seek cancellation; this calibrated deterrent protects the public interest without transforming bail into a trap.
• Operationalizing liberty: By directing subordinate courts to accept downloaded copies of bail orders (as per Amit Rana), the Court translated principle into practice, minimizing administrative delays that often render bail orders ineffectual for days.

New Principles and Clarifications Emanating from the Judgment

• Absence of a permanent abode/address cannot, by itself, be a ground to deny bail under BNSS Section 483. Bail must focus on risk mitigation, not on socio-economic profiling.
• The Court endorsed a practical, rights-respecting bail toolkit:
  • Low surety cap appropriate to the case’s gravity and stage.
  • FD alternative to surety, with non-encumbrance safeguards.
  • Identity-contact particulars to address flight risk.
• A “foundational condition” for cancellation upon commission of serious non-bailable offences during bail period is appropriate to balance liberty with societal protection.
• Reinforcement of the procedural rule that downloaded bail orders must be accepted (subject to verification) to ensure immediate release.

Impact and Likely Influence

• Bail jurisprudence under BNSS: The judgment is among the early, reportable pronouncements under BNSS Section 483 to expressly de-link “permanent address” from the bail entitlement calculus. It provides a template for courts to manage flight risk through proportionate conditions rather than categorical denial.
• Protection of vulnerable and transient populations: Migrant workers, the urban homeless, seasonal laborers, and residents of religious institutions often lack formal residential proofs. This decision curbs discriminatory bail outcomes against such groups, realigning practice with Article 21 and the presumption of innocence.
• Practical guidance for subordinate courts: The decision offers a replicable set of conditions—identity anchoring, surety capability assessment, FD alternative—that can be adapted across cases, especially those triable by Magistrates where the maximum punishment is limited.
• Administrative efficiency: By insisting on acceptance of downloaded bail orders, the Court reduces the “paper-handling lag” that needlessly prolongs incarceration even after judicial grant of liberty.
• Measured deterrence against recidivism during bail: The foundational condition about cancellation upon commission of a serious non-bailable offence serves as a clear warning and provides a ready pathway for the State to act if liberty is misused.

Complex Concepts Simplified

• BNSS Section 483: The provision under which the High Court considers regular bail applications (functionally analogous to the erstwhile CrPC framework for High Court/Session Court bail). It empowers higher courts to release accused persons in custody, subject to conditions.
• Prima facie evidence: Material which, if unrebutted, suggests involvement in the alleged crime. It is a threshold assessment for bail decisions—not a determination of guilt.
• Non-bailable offence: An offence for which bail is not a matter of right but is at the court’s discretion. Many IPC offences fall in this category, but bail can still be granted on suitable terms.
• Surety: A person who undertakes to ensure the accused’s appearance in court and compliance with bail conditions; may forfeit the bond if obligations are breached.
• Fixed Deposit (FD) alternative: Instead of producing a surety, an accused may deposit a specified amount in a bank FD with directions preventing encashment without court permission. This is often simpler, faster, and less exploitative than finding private sureties.
• Ilaqa Magistrate/Duty Magistrate: The local magistrate with territorial jurisdiction (or on rotation/duty) competent to accept bail bonds when the designated court is not available.
• Triable by a Judicial Magistrate: Indicates the case falls within a Magistrate’s jurisdiction (often correlating with lower maximum sentences), which typically weighs in favor of bail compared to sessions triable offences.
• E-SCR citations: References drawn from the Supreme Court’s digitized reporting (“Electronic Supreme Court Reports”), confirming authoritative jurisprudence.
• Cancellation of bail vs. rejection: Cancellation occurs after bail is granted, typically due to misuse of liberty (e.g., tampering with evidence, committing new offences). It is conceptually distinct from rejection, which is an initial refusal to grant bail.

Practical Takeaways and Checklists

For Trial Courts

• A “permanent address” is not a litmus test for bail. Focus on risk-specific, tailored conditions.
• Consider:
  • Identity anchoring: Aadhaar, Passport (if available), active mobile, email.
  • Functional capacity of surety to produce the accused, rather than formalistic property-based criteria.
  • FD-based alternatives with appropriate non-encumbrance endorsements.
  • Appropriate bond caps proportionate to offence gravity and stage.
• Implement the Amit Rana directive: accept downloaded bail/suspension orders (post-verification) to facilitate immediate release.
• Record a foundational cancellation clause for serious re-offending during bail to clearly flag the consequences of liberty misuse.

For Investigating Agencies/Prosecution

• Instead of relying on “no permanent address” as a blanket ground, supply concrete, case-specific flight-risk material (e.g., past absconsion, non-cooperation, tampering attempts).
• Leverage digital identity markers (telecom KYC, banking trails, validated emails) to propose additional safeguards if necessary.
• If re-offending occurs during bail, promptly move for cancellation, documenting the statutory thresholds (non-bailable, >7 years) and the breach.

For Defence Counsel/Accused

• Offer workable solutions to mitigate risk: ready FD, reliable surety, complete identity/contact particulars, location updates.
• Highlight custody duration, clean antecedents, and the fact that the case is triable by a Magistrate where applicable.
• Affirm willingness to comply with identity disclosures and digital monitoring conditions consistent with privacy norms and the order’s caveats (e.g., Passport “if available”).

Conclusion

Sanjay Gordhanbhai Darji v. State of Haryana marks a significant, reportable refinement of bail law in the BNSS era. The Punjab & Haryana High Court firmly articulated that absence of a permanent abode cannot be treated as an indispensable criterion to deny bail. The judgment roots itself in Article 21, reaffirms the presumption of innocence, and deploys a contemporary, workable toolkit—identity anchoring, modest surety caps, FD options, and a clear cancellation trigger—to address flight risks without criminalizing socio-economic vulnerability.

By further directing acceptance of downloaded bail orders (following Amit Rana), the Court closed the gap between principle and practice, ensuring that liberty granted on paper is liberty realized in fact. The decision’s careful synthesis of Supreme Court jurisprudence (from Babu Singh to Sanjay Chandra) with ground realities—migrant movement, rental churn, ashram living—renders it a persuasive precedent for magistrates and sessions courts across jurisdictions.

Key takeaway: Bail is about calibrated risk management, not socio-economic profiling. In prioritizing proportionality and practicality, this judgment offers a durable framework for liberty-centric adjudication under BNSS Section 483, likely to influence future cases involving transient or address-insecure accused while preserving the integrity of the criminal process.