No Fresh Section 12(1) Application Required in Appeals against Section 12(3) Eviction Orders: Commentary on P.U. Sidhique v. Zakariya (2025 INSC 1340)

No Fresh Section 12(1) Application Required in Appeals against Section 12(3) Eviction Orders under the Kerala Buildings (Lease and Rent Control) Act, 1965

1. Introduction

In P.U. Sidhique & Ors. v. Zakariya, 2025 INSC 1340, the Supreme Court of India (per Manmohan J., with Rajesh Bindal J. concurring) has delivered a significant judgment on the working of the summary rent-payment mechanism under the Kerala Buildings (Lease and Rent Control) Act, 1965 (“the Act”).

On the surface, the case concerns a technical procedural question: whether, in an appeal under Section 18 challenging an eviction order passed under Section 12(3), the landlord must again initiate the full procedure under Section 12 by filing a fresh application under Section 12(1) before the Appellate Authority.

At a deeper level, the Court explicitly frames the question as one about the proper philosophy of interpretation: whether laws are to be applied mechanically in a manner that produces absurd and unjust results, or interpreted “with empathy and pragmatism” as a force of justice.

The case arises out of a long-running landlord–tenant dispute over two commercial shops in the heart of Kochi. The landlords alleged that the tenant, despite occupying two prime commercial premises, had not paid any rent for years and had even suffered a money decree for arrears. Relying on Section 12 of the Act, the landlords secured summary eviction orders from the Rent Controller when the tenant failed to deposit admitted arrears during the pendency of the eviction proceedings. The tenant’s subsequent appeal, and the High Court’s intervention, raised the central procedural question now answered by the Supreme Court.

2. Factual Background

2.1 The Tenancy and Alleged Arrears

  • Premises: Two shops in Kochi, Kerala – Building No. 61/5797 and 61/5932A.
  • Rent (relevant period):
    • Building No. 61/5797 – monthly rent around ₹55,000, with agreed periodic enhancement.
    • Building No. 61/5932A – around ₹99,187 per month (again, with escalations).
  • Alleged default:
    • No rent for one building since January 2020.
    • No rent for the other since February 2020.

2.2 Eviction Petitions and Money Decree

In 2020, the landlords filed RCP No. 187 of 2020 and RCP No. 188 of 2020 before the Rent Control Court, Ernakulam, under Section 11(2)(b) of the Act, alleging arrears of rent after statutory notice.

Separately, in O.S. No. 71 of 2021, the landlords obtained a civil money decree for arrears of rent amounting to ₹21,72,360, with interest and costs taking the total to ₹26,44,614. The tenant’s appeal against that decree (RFA No. 269 of 2023) is pending before the High Court, but there is no effective stay on the money decree, as the tenant failed to comply with the condition to furnish security.

2.3 Invocation of Section 12(1) and Eviction under Section 12(3)

During the pendency of the eviction petitions under Section 11(2)(b), the landlords invoked the summary payment mechanism under Section 12:

  • They filed applications under Section 12(1) – I.A. No. 5 of 2024 (in RCP 187/2020) and I.A. No. 8 of 2024 (in RCP 188/2020).
  • On 25 September 2024, the Rent Controller:
    • Determined the outstanding rent in RCP 187/2020 at about ₹57.8 lakh and future rent at ₹1,73,479.56 per month.
    • Determined the outstanding rent in RCP 188/2020 at about ₹36.86 lakh and future rent at ₹1,10,624.60 per month.
    • Directed the tenant to deposit the arrears within 30 days and continue paying future rent within 15 days of each due date.

The tenant failed to comply. Consequently, on 7 November 2024, the Rent Controller, invoking Section 12(3), stopped further proceedings in both RCPs and ordered the tenant to put the landlords in possession of both shops – in effect, a summary eviction for non-payment of rent during litigation.

2.4 Appeals and Orders of the Appellate Authority

The tenant filed appeals under Section 18:

  • RCA No. 71 of 2024 (arising from RCP 188/2020).
  • RCA No. 72 of 2024 (arising from RCP 187/2020).

Pending these appeals, the landlords initiated execution of the eviction orders. The tenant approached the High Court (OP(RC) Nos. 50 and 51 of 2025), which directed the Rent Control Appellate Authority, Ernakulam, to decide the stay applications within three weeks and deferred execution in the meantime.

On 11 March 2025, the Appellate Authority issued orders titled “Orders on deposit of admitted rent”, directing the tenant to deposit admitted rent on or before 15 March 2025 as a pre-condition for hearing the appeals. It expressly noted that:

  • No fresh application had been filed before it under Section 12(1).
  • In case of default, it would stop hearing and pass consequential orders.

The tenant again failed to deposit. On 19 March 2025, the Appellate Authority:

  • Stopped hearing the appeals.
  • Directed the tenant to comply with the Rent Controller’s orders under Section 12(3).
  • Deferred execution only in deference to the High Court’s interim stay against delivery.

2.5 High Court’s Intervention

The tenant invoked the revisional jurisdiction of the High Court in RCREV Nos. 102 and 114 of 2025. A Division Bench set aside the Appellate Authority’s orders on 22 May 2025, essentially holding:

  • An Appellate Authority can stop proceedings under Section 12(3) only if an application under Section 12(1) is filed before it.
  • In the absence of such an application, the appellate court must hear and decide the appeals on merits, examining the legality of the Rent Controller’s Section 12(3) orders.
  • The Appellate Authority had “bypassed” the procedure mandated by law and by the Full Bench decision in ZEENATH IBRAHIM v. JOY DANIEL.

It restored the appeals and directed the Appellate Authority to dispose of them within four weeks, while adding that any application under Section 12(1) filed before the appellate court should be considered in accordance with law.

2.6 Supreme Court Proceedings

The landlords challenged this High Court judgment by Special Leave. Before the Supreme Court:

  • The landlords argued that once the Rent Controller had properly invoked Section 12(1) and passed eviction orders under Section 12(3), the Appellate Authority was entitled to insist on deposit of the arrears fixed below, and had no obligation to re-run the entire Section 12 procedure.
  • The tenant contended that:
    • Section 12 confers a drastic, summary power which must be exercised strictly and afresh at each stage (including appeal).
    • Without a formal application under Section 12(1) before the Appellate Authority and observance of the minimum four-week period for deposit, no order stopping proceedings could be passed.
    • The decision in Manik Lal Majumdar and the Full Bench ruling in Zeenath Ibrahim supported this position.

3. Summary of the Supreme Court’s Judgment

The Supreme Court allowed the landlords’ appeals and restored the Appellate Authority’s orders stopping hearing of the tenant’s appeals due to non-payment of arrears.

The Court’s key holdings can be summarised as follows:

  1. No mandatory repetition of Section 12 procedure in appeal: In an appeal under Section 18 challenging an eviction order under Section 12(3), the landlord is not required to file a fresh application under Section 12(1). The procedure under Section 12(1)–(3) is “primarily” for the Rent Controller. A Section 12(1) application in appeal is only needed in limited situations involving supervening events (e.g., fresh arrears accruing during appeal).
  2. Right to contest appeals is conditional on payment/deposit: Section 12(1) makes payment or deposit of “arrears of rent admitted by the tenant to be due” and continuing payment of future rent a condition for the tenant’s entitlement to contest the eviction proceedings or prefer an appeal. Following Manik Lal Majumdar, an appeal may be filed without deposit, but the Appellate Authority can lawfully decline to proceed with the hearing or grant relief until arrears are paid or deposited.
  3. No fresh four-week period required before Appellate Authority: The minimum periods prescribed in Section 12(2) (at least four weeks to deposit arrears and two weeks for subsequent rent) govern the Rent Controller’s initial Section 12(1) order. The Act does not require the Appellate Authority, when dealing with an appeal from a Section 12(3) order, to re-grant a further minimum four weeks for deposit.
  4. Full Bench in Zeenath Ibrahim is enabling, not mandatory: The Full Bench only held that applications under Section 12(1) are maintainable in appeals under Section 18 (including those challenging Section 12(3) orders). It does not mandate that such an application must be filed or that the entire Section 12 protocol be repeated in every appeal.
  5. Interpretation must avoid absurd and unjust outcomes: Accepting the High Court’s view would produce “absurd and unjust” results – effectively allowing defaulting tenants to reset the Section 12 clock simply by filing an appeal and insisting on a new Section 12(1) application and another four-week grace period. The Court, invoking the well-established presumption against absurdity, rejects such an interpretation.
  6. Tenant’s conduct justifies strict application of Section 12: Factually, the tenant has been occupying two premium shops in Kochi without paying any rent for over five years and has suffered an unstayed money decree for massive arrears. His procedural objections cannot be allowed to frustrate the statutory purpose of Section 12.

On relief, the Court:

  • Set aside the High Court’s judgment dated 22 May 2025.
  • Restored the Appellate Authority’s orders dated 19 March 2025 stopping hearing of the appeals and requiring compliance with the Rent Controller’s eviction orders.
  • Directed the tenant to hand over vacant physical possession of both shops to the landlords on or before 31 December 2025, subject to filing an undertaking within two weeks to:
    • pay outstanding arrears, and
    • deliver peaceful possession by that date.
  • Provided that, if no undertaking is filed within two weeks, the landlords would be free to execute the eviction decree forthwith.

4. Detailed Analysis

4.1 Statutory Framework: Sections 11, 12 and 18

4.1.1 Section 11: Protection against eviction

Section 11(1) lays down the general rule that a tenant cannot be evicted “whether in execution of a decree or otherwise” except in accordance with the Act. Section 11(2)(b) provides a specific ground for eviction based on non-payment of rent after due notice. It is on this substantive ground that the original eviction petitions (RCP 187/2020 and 188/2020) were filed.

4.1.2 Section 12: Payment or deposit of rent during proceedings

Section 12 is a procedural but powerful provision that overlays any eviction proceedings under Section 11 with a special regime for ongoing payment of rent:

  • Section 12(1):
    • Bars a tenant, against whom an eviction application has been made, from:
      • contesting that application before the Rent Control Court, or
      • preferring an appeal against any order in such proceedings,
    • unless he has:
      • paid or pays to the landlord, or
      • deposits with the Rent Control Court or Appellate Authority, as the case may be,
    • all arrears of rent “admitted by the tenant to be due” up to the date of payment/deposit, and continues to pay/deposit rent that subsequently becomes due.
  • Section 12(2):
    • Requires the court to fix the time and manner for such deposit.
    • Provides that the time for arrears must not be less than four weeks and for future rent not less than two weeks from when it becomes due.
  • Section 12(3):
    • Mandates that, if the tenant fails to pay or deposit rent as above and cannot show sufficient cause, the court “shall”:
      • stop all further proceedings, and
      • make an order directing the tenant to put the landlord in possession of the building.

Thus, Section 12 creates a summary eviction route linked to the tenant’s continued payment of rent during litigation. It operates alongside the substantive grounds for eviction under Section 11.

4.1.3 Section 18: Appellate jurisdiction

Section 18 provides for appeals to an Appellate Authority (not below the rank of Subordinate Judge) from “any order” of the Rent Control Court. The present appeals before the Appellate Authority were filed under this section against the orders passed under Section 12(3).

The central issue is how Section 12’s payment/deposit regime interacts with Section 18 appeals, especially when the very order under appeal is an order passed under Section 12(3) for non-payment.

4.2 Precedents and Their Role in the Judgment

4.2.1 Manik Lal Majumdar v. Gouranga Chandra Dey

The Court relies heavily on the three-Judge decision in Manik Lal Majumdar & Ors. v. Gouranga Chandra Dey & Ors., (2005) 2 SCC 400, interpreting Section 13 of the Tripura Buildings (Lease and Rent Control) Act, 1975, a provision substantially similar to Section 12 of the Kerala Act.

Two aspects of Manik Lal Majumdar are crucial:

  1. Meaning of “arrears of rent admitted by the tenant to be due”:
    • The Court rejected a narrow view that “admitted” requires an express concession by the tenant.
    • It upheld the Gauhati High Court’s view that “admitted” includes inferred admission from the material on record, such as:
      • proof of landlord–tenant relationship, and
      • undisputed rate of rent.
    • This ensures that tenants cannot evade the statutory payment requirement by the simple expedient of refusing to acknowledge arrears.
  2. Whether deposit of arrears is a precondition to filing an appeal:
    • Resolving a divergence between two Judges in an earlier decision, the three-Judge Bench held:
      • An appeal may be filed or presented without prior deposit of arrears; such an appeal is not incompetent.
      • However, the appellate authority may:
        • decline to proceed with the hearing, and
        • refuse to pass interim or final orders in favour of the tenant
        until the arrears of rent (admitted or inferably admitted) are paid or deposited.
    • The appellate authority has the same kind of powers as the Rent Control Court to regulate deposit and to stop proceedings on default.

In P.U. Sidhique, this precedent is used in two ways:

  • To affirm that the appellate authority may insist on deposit of arrears before proceeding with the hearing of an appeal by the tenant.
  • To emphasise that reading a single sentence from a judgment (such as “shall have all the powers under sub-sections (2) and (3)”) in isolation is impermissible; the ratio must be understood contextually, not as a code requiring wholesale repetition of procedures at the appellate stage.

4.2.2 Full Bench of Kerala High Court in ZEENATH IBRAHIM v. JOY DANIEL

The Full Bench decision in Zeenath Ibrahim & Ors. v. Joy Daniel, 2024 SCC OnLine Ker 6489, was central before the High Court and Supreme Court. It held, inter alia:

  • An order under Section 12(3) is essentially an order passed on an application under Section 11 and qualifies as an “order” for the purposes of appeal under Section 18.
  • A Section 12(3) order has all the characteristics of a final eviction order passed under Section 11.
  • Applications under Section 12(1) are maintainable:
    • in appeals from final eviction orders under Section 11, and
    • in appeals from Section 12(3) orders and other interlocutory orders in Section 11 proceedings.

The High Court Division Bench read Zeenath Ibrahim as requiring that, for an appellate authority to stop proceedings under Section 12(3), there must first be an application under Section 12(1) before it. The Supreme Court rejects this reading, clarifying that:

  • the Full Bench merely declared that Section 12(1) applications in appeal are permissible (maintainable);
  • nowhere does it insist that such an application is a mandatory precondition in every appeal from a Section 12(3) order; and
  • it certainly does not require “repeating” the entire Section 12 process when the very basis of the appeal is a prior Section 12(3) eviction for default.

4.2.3 Stay of Money Decrees and Lifestyle Equities v. Amazon

The Supreme Court cites Lifestyle Equities & Anr. v. Amazon Technologies Inc., 2025 SCC OnLine SC 2153, to reaffirm that:

  • Stay of execution of money decrees is exceptional.
  • Such a stay may be granted only where the decree is egregiously perverse, tainted by patent illegality, or facially untenable.

In the present case, there was no stay on the money decree in O.S. No. 71 of 2021. The subsisting decree, combined with the rent agreements and the tenant’s continued occupation, powerfully supports the finding of massive rent arrears and justifies treating them as “admitted” for the purposes of Section 12.

4.2.4 Presumption against absurdity and comparative references

The judgment engages extensively with the presumption against absurdity in statutory interpretation, citing:

  • R v. Alfred Skeen & Freeman (1859) 28 LJMC 91.
  • Several UK decisions: Emmerich Hatzl v. XL Insurance Co Ltd [2009] EWCA Civ 223, Maloba v. Waltham Forest LBC [2007] EWCA Civ 1281, Barclays Mercantile Business Finance Ltd v. Mawson [2004] UKHL 51, Project Blue Ltd v. HMRC [2018] UKSC 30, HMRC v. Jason Wilkes [2022] EWCA Civ 1612.
  • Citation to Craies on Legislation, 13th edition, and Lord Saville’s remark in R (Noone) v. Governor of HMP Drake Hall [2010] UKSC 30 that legislation must be construed to avoid “irrational and indefensible results that Parliament could not have intended”.

These references support the Court’s insistence that, where statutory language admits multiple constructions, courts must reject those that yield manifestly absurd or unjust consequences, especially where they frustrate the Act’s evident purpose.

4.2.5 Judgments are not statutes

The Court also relies on decisions such as:

These cases reiterate the settled principle that judgments are not to be read “as statutes”. Isolated sentences cannot be elevated to binding propositions divorced from context. This is particularly relevant to the tenant’s attempt to rely on a single phrase in Manik Lal Majumdar (about the appellate authority having “all the powers” under the deposit-and-eviction provisions) to argue that the entire Section 12 procedure must be repeated in appeal.

4.3 The Court’s Legal Reasoning

4.3.1 Section 12(1) in appeals: condition to contest, not to file

The Court aligns with Manik Lal Majumdar in affirming that:

  • A tenant can file an appeal under Section 18 without first depositing arrears as contemplated by Section 12(1).
  • However, the tenant is not entitled to contest the appeal or seek interim or final relief from the appellate authority unless he pays or deposits:
    • all arrears of rent “admitted” (in the extended inferential sense), and
    • continues to pay/deposit future rent during the pendency of the proceedings.

In other words, Section 12(1) operates as a gateway condition to be heard, not as a bar to filing the appeal itself. The appellate authority is entitled to:

  • decline to proceed with the hearing, or
  • refuse to grant any interim protection,

until the tenant complies with the statutory payment regime.

4.3.2 Needlessness of repeating Section 12 procedure on appeal

The Court’s decisive holding is that, where the Rent Controller has already:

  • determined the arrears and fixed time for deposit under Section 12(1), and
  • on non-compliance, passed an eviction order under Section 12(3),

it is not necessary for the landlord to move a fresh Section 12(1) application before the Appellate Authority, nor for that authority to re-enact the entire Section 12 timeline.

Two principal reasons are given:

  1. Nature of appellate jurisdiction:
    • The Appellate Authority is not a court of first instance. Its proper function is to examine whether the Rent Controller:
      • correctly determined the arrears and their “admitted” character, and
      • properly exercised jurisdiction under Section 12(3).
    • Re-determining the same arrears and re-running the entire procedure would be superfluous and inconsistent with the summary character of Section 12.
  2. Purpose of Section 12:
    • Section 12 aims to:
      • prevent accumulation of rent arrears during prolonged litigation, and
      • deter tenants from enjoying premises rent-free while dragging out proceedings.
    • Allowing tenants, by merely filing an appeal, to insist on:
      • a fresh Section 12(1) application, and
      • a new minimum four-week grace period,
      would subvert this purpose and enable the very mischief the statute seeks to curb.

4.3.3 Supervening events and limited role of Section 12(1) in appeals

The Court does acknowledge that Section 12(1) applications may be legitimately needed at the appellate stage in certain supervening circumstances, for example:

  • Where at the time of filing the appeal, rent has been paid up to date, but further arrears accrue during the pendency of the appeal.
  • Where the appellate authority needs to regulate ongoing payment in light of changed facts.

In such cases, relying on the Full Bench in Zeenath Ibrahim, the Court affirms that an application under Section 12(1) is perfectly maintainable in appeal. But this is an enabling provision for fresh situations, not a condition precedent in every appeal from a Section 12(3) order.

4.3.4 No statutory requirement of a second four-week grace period

The tenant argued that the Appellate Authority erred in giving only four days (11–15 March 2025) for deposit instead of the minimum four weeks mandated by Section 12(2). The Court rejects this on two grounds:

  1. Textual construction:
    • The four-week minimum in Section 12(2) applies when the “Court” fixes the time for deposit under Section 12(1).
    • In this case, that function had already been performed by the Rent Controller, which had granted 30 days for arrears and 15 days for future rent.
    • The Appellate Authority was not passing a fresh Section 12(1) order; it was enforcing compliance with the existing order as a condition to proceeding with the appeals.
  2. Absence of prejudice:
    • Even assuming some technical argument about time could be entertained, the fact is that more than seven months elapsed after the appellate order and the tenant still did not deposit any amount.
    • It is therefore impossible to argue that the tenant suffered real prejudice from the failure to grant a second four-week period.

4.3.5 Empathy, pragmatism, and avoiding absurdity

The Court repeatedly cautions against a mechanical application of law detached from real-world consequences. It quotes Charles Dickens’ famous line from Oliver Twist (“If the law supposes that, the law is a ass”) to highlight the dangers of legal formalism that offends common sense and fairness.

The Court emphasises that:

  • Human judges, not machines, are entrusted with administering justice.
  • Laws must be interpreted with empathy and pragmatism, as instruments for delivering justice rather than producing “irrational and indefensible results”.
  • This approach justifies a purposive reading of Section 12 that:
    • prevents “intransigent and recalcitrant tenants” from exploiting procedural gaps, and
    • protects landlords from being forced to provide rent-free occupation for years.

On the facts, the Court notes that the tenant has:

  • occupied two prime commercial premises for over five years without paying any rent,
  • suffered a substantial money decree that remains unstayed, and
  • repeatedly failed to comply with conditional orders both in civil and rent control proceedings.

Allowing such a tenant to continue in possession based on a formalistic insistence on a fresh Section 12(1) application in appeal would, in the Court’s view, turn the summary procedure enacted by the legislature “on its head”.

5. Complex Concepts Simplified

5.1 What is “summary eviction” under Section 12?

Ordinarily, an eviction case under Section 11 requires the landlord to prove grounds for eviction (like arrears of rent, bona fide need, etc.) after a full trial. This can take years.

Section 12 overlays these proceedings with a fast-track mechanism:

  1. Once an eviction petition is filed, the landlord can apply under Section 12(1) to require the tenant to:
    • clear admitted arrears (as inferred from the record), and
    • keep paying future rent on time.
  2. The court fixes time for deposit (minimum four weeks for arrears).
  3. If the tenant fails without sufficient cause, Section 12(3) kicks in and the court:
    • halts all further proceedings, and
    • orders the tenant to hand over possession.

Thus, without waiting for final adjudication on other grounds, the landlord can obtain eviction solely on account of the tenant’s refusal to pay rent during litigation.

5.2 “Arrears of rent admitted by the tenant to be due” – what does “admitted” mean?

“Admitted” does not mean the tenant must openly confess “I owe this amount”.

Courts treat arrears as “admitted” if:

  • the tenant admits the tenancy and the rent agreement, and
  • documents and circumstances (e.g., money decree, rent receipts stopping at a certain date) show that rent has not been paid since a particular month.

This prevents a tenant from blocking Section 12 merely by refusing to use the word “admit”.

5.3 “Prefer an appeal” versus “contest an appeal”

Section 12(1) says a tenant cannot “contest … or prefer an appeal” unless rent is paid or deposited. Read with Manik Lal Majumdar, this means:

  • The tenant can file an appeal document in the appellate court.
  • But the tenant cannot insist on the appeal being heard or on any favourable orders unless he clears arrears and keeps paying current rent.

So, filing an appeal is one thing; having a right to a hearing on merits is another, and the latter is conditional on compliance with Section 12.

5.4 “Supervening events” in appeal

A “supervening event” is something that happens after the initial order but before or during the appeal, which changes the factual or legal position – for example:

  • New arrears of rent arising in the appellate stage.
  • Payment of arrears after filing of appeal.

In such cases, parties may need to invoke Section 12(1) again, but this is context-dependent and not a universal requirement.

6. Impact of the Judgment

6.1 On rent control practice in Kerala

The judgment introduces clear, practical guidance for Rent Controllers, Appellate Authorities, landlords, and tenants:

  • No automatic second chance on appeal: Tenants cannot claim that, merely because an order is under challenge, the landlord must restart Section 12(1) in the appellate court with a fresh four-week period.
  • Strengthening summary eviction: Once Section 12(1) and 12(3) have been properly invoked and enforced by the Rent Controller, appellate courts can:
    • refuse to hear the tenant’s appeal on merits until arrears are paid, or
    • even dismiss/stop the appeal for persistent default,
    without entertaining technical objections about the absence of a fresh Section 12(1) application.
  • Clarified scope of Zeenath Ibrahim: The Full Bench is now authoritatively read as:
    • allowing Section 12(1) applications in appeals when needed, but
    • not requiring them in every case as a precondition to exercise of appellate powers.
  • Reliance on unstayed money decrees: Authorities may legitimately treat an unstayed civil money decree for arrears of rent as powerful evidence of “admitted arrears” for purposes of Section 12.

6.2 On tenant and landlord litigation strategies

For tenants:

  • They must understand that:
    • their ability to fight eviction proceedings, including appeals, depends on timely payment or deposit of rent;
    • attempting to use procedural objections to delay payment can lead to summary eviction without a full merits hearing.

For landlords:

  • The judgment underscores the importance of:
    • promptly invoking Section 12(1) once eviction petitions are filed, and
    • pressing for strict enforcement of Section 12(3) where tenants fail to comply.
  • On appeal, landlords can argue that:
    • no fresh Section 12(1) application is required for arrears already adjudicated below, and
    • appeals by defaulters should not be entertained without substantial compliance with prior orders.

6.3 Potential influence beyond Kerala

Because the Court’s analysis draws from and reinforces the interpretation of a similarly worded provision in the Tripura Act (Manik Lal Majumdar), it is likely to have persuasive value in:

  • other States with comparable “payment during pendency” clauses in their rent control statutes, and
  • other contexts where the right to appeal is made conditional on clearing admitted dues (for example, certain tax, regulatory, or labour statutes).

6.4 Broader doctrinal influence on statutory interpretation

Doctrinally, the judgment reinforces:

  • Purposive interpretation: Courts must consider the statute’s object (e.g., preventing rent-free occupation) and choose among plausible readings in a way that furthers that object.
  • Presumption against absurdity and injustice: Where two readings are possible, the one that produces absurd or unfair consequences should be rejected.
  • Non-literal reading of judicial precedents: Isolated phrases from judgments cannot be transformed into rigid procedural mandates; their ratio must be understood in context.
  • Role of empathy and pragmatism: Adjudication is not an algorithmic exercise; courts must remain sensitive to the practical and moral implications of their interpretations.

7. Conclusion

P.U. Sidhique v. Zakariya establishes an important precedent on the working of Section 12 of the Kerala Buildings (Lease and Rent Control) Act, 1965. The Supreme Court holds that:

  • In appeals under Section 18 against eviction orders passed under Section 12(3), landlords are not required to initiate a fresh Section 12(1) process before the Appellate Authority.
  • Section 12(1) operates primarily at the trial level, and its re-invocation in appeal is only necessary in the limited context of supervening events.
  • The appellate authority can insist on compliance with the Rent Controller’s deposit and eviction orders as a condition to hearing the appeal, and can stop proceeding with the appeal in case of persistent default.
  • The statute does not oblige appellate authorities to grant a second, minimum four-week period for deposit of arrears.

Beyond clarifying the procedural architecture of rent control litigation, the judgment is notable for its express endorsement of a purposive, pragmatic approach to statutory interpretation, grounded in the need to prevent “irrational and indefensible” results and to ensure that law functions as an instrument of justice rather than absurdity.

In practical terms, the decision strengthens the hands of landlords facing chronic non-payment and signals to tenants that courts will not tolerate strategic default and procedural gamesmanship. In doctrinal terms, it harmonises Kerala’s rent control jurisprudence with national precedent and affirms a humane yet principled approach to applying the law.

Case Details

Year: 2025
Court: Supreme Court Of India

Judge(s)

Justice ManmohanJustice Rajesh Bindal

Advocates

KARTHIK S.D.

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