Government Pleader (C.V Anantakrishna Ayyar) for respondents.—The consent of the nearest male agnate alone will validate an adoption and not that of a cognate. See Veerabasavaraju v. Balasurya Prasad Rao, Kristnayya v. Lakshmipathi which are express on the point. Expressions in other cases as to the consent of female agnates and also of cognates are only casual and obiter. The consent of the cognate even if true is bad as it was got by the widow on representing that her husband also had authorized her to adopt.A. Krishnaswami Ayyar (with W. Kothandaramayya, and K. Balasubrahmanya Ayyar) for appellants.—In the absence of agnates, consent of the cognate presumptive reversioner (the deceased's father's sister's son in this case) will validate a widow's adoption; see The Collector of Madura v. Moottoo Ramalinga Sathupathy(1), which holds that the consent of the nearest sapinda is sufficient. The term “sapinda” includes both agnates and cognates; see Ramchandra Martand Waikar v. Vinayek Venkatesh Kothekar(2). The view that the consent of the nearest male agnate alone will validate an adoption is wrong; see The Collector of Madura v. Moottoo Ramalinga Sathuvathy, to the effect that the consent of Muthuveerayi and of Muthusami Thevar, who were respectively the mother and a Samanodaka relation of the deceased husband of the widow was sufficient. In Rajah Venkatappa Nayanim Bahadur v. Renga Rao, the consent of the senior widow, and in Maharaja of Kolhapur v. Sundaram Ayyar the consent of the mother-in-law was considered necessary and sufficient. Anne Brahmayya v. Chelasami Rattayya(3), the latest decision in my favour, summarizes all the prior decisions. Viswasundara Row v. Somasundara Rao(4) is wrong owing to three misconceptions, (a) that the word gnathi means only agnates, whereas it includes both agnates and cognates according to its meaning in Monnier William's Dictionary and Apte's Sanskrit Dictionary and Maharaja of Kolhapur v. Sundaram Ayyar, (b) that The Collector of Madura v. Moottoo Ramalinga Sathupathy(5) held that the consent of male agnates is necessary and (c) that a daughter's son cannot confer any spiritual benefit. Adoption is a secular act; see Sarkar on Adoption, page 26. Reversioners whether the agnates or cognates who would be prejudiced by the adoption must be consulted. Stray sentences occurring in Veerabasavaraju v. Balasurya Prasada Rao(6) and Kristnayya v. Lakshmipathi(7), to the effect that the consent of “male agnates” or “agnates” is necessary ought not to be twisted into a principle, for in those two cases such agnates were in existence who were entitled to be consulted before cognates. Reference was made to Sri Virada Pratapa Raghunada Deo v. Sri Brozo Kishoro Patta Deo(8), Vellanki Venkata Krishna Rao v. Venkata Rama Lakshmi(9), Ramasami Aiyan v. Venkataramaiyan(10), Suryanarayana v. Venkataramana(11), Venkamma v. Subramaniam(12) and Lakhipriya Dasi v. Raikishori Dasi(13). The next question is whether Kaser Singh who is related to the propositus as the latter's father's sister's son's daughter's son is a heritable bandhu. The lower Court holds that there is no mutuality of sapindaship between the two as propounded in Umaid Bahadur v. Udoi Chand(14), and that the claimant is therefore not a heritable bandhu. This is wrong. The above view which is to be found in the last paragraph of the decision in Umaid Bahadur v. Udoi Chand and which is to the effect that if X is not a descendant of the line of the maternal grandfather of T or Y's father or mother, then X and Y are not sapindas of each other, is obiter and is not supported either by the two Sanskrit texts which alone govern bandhu succession or by text writers such as Sircar or Ghose or by subsequent decisions. According to the first text “the property of a near sapinda shall be that of a near sapinda” which has been interpreted as laying down the rule that there must be mutuality of sapindaship between them. “Sapinda” means “connected by particles of the same body.” The second text lays down that “on mother's side in the mother's line after the 5th, on the father's side in the father's line after the 7th (ancestor) the sapinda relationship ceases.” This means that if A claims B's property as a relation through B's father A must be either directly an ancestor of B within seven degrees or be within seven degrees from the common ancestor. But if A claims relationship through B's mother, the number of degrees allowed either directly or from the common ancestor is only five. Since sapindaship must be mutual, i.e, since both must be sapindas of each other, the above rule must be applied vice versa. There is no third rule like the one contained in the above obiter dictum. Tested according to the above rules the claimant is the heir. The obiter in Umaid Bahadur v. Udoi Chand is supported, only by Dr. Sarvadhikari and by no others. Likewise his elaborate and misconceived views on the question of who alone are Atma Bhandhus, Pitru Bhandhus and Matru Bandhus and the relative priority amongst them and his evolution of five families out of these three kinds of bandhus, who alone are said to be entitled to succeed are opposed to the Mitakshara and are not accepted by other text writers and by the Privy Council; see E.O Muthusami Mudaliyar v. Simambedu Muthukumaraswami Mudaliyar and Vedachala Mudaliar v. Subramania Mudaliar. He relied on Ramachandra Martand Waikar v. Vinayek Venkatesh Kothekar, Adit Narayan Singh v. Mahabir Prasad Tiwari. Umashankar Prasad Parasair v. Mt. Nageswari Kobi, Rami Reddi v. Gangi Reddi and Mr. Justice Sadasiva Ayyar's view in Chinna Pichu Iyengar v. Padmanabha Iyengar, Tirath Ram v. Mst. Kahan Devi, Bishun Prasad v. Binaik Prasad, Ratnasubbu v. Ponnappa, Sethurama v. Ponnammal and Sarkar's Hindu Law, 1924 Edition, page 97, and the article in 9 Madras Law Journal, pages 60 and 59. These show that the intervention of two females is no bar. He referred to and commentated on Babu Lal v. Nanku Ram, Lowji v. Mithabai and Mr. Justice Napier's view in Chinna Pichu Iyengar v. Padmanabha Iyengar.The claimant is not a bandhu. In counting degrees, more than one woman cannot intervene except as mother and daughter. This is the view of Sarvadhikari. Vide Banerjee on Marriage and Sridhann, page 68. Also in the commentary on the Yagnavalkya, the commentator in illustrating how the degrees are to be reckoned, has taken only one female as intervening. There cannot be a line where males and females occur indiscriminately. Sapindaship must be mutual. Umaid Bahadur v. Udoi Chand has been followed in Babu Lal v. Nanku Ram, Lowji v. Mithabai and in Chinna Pichu Iyengar v. Padmanabha Iyengar. “Mutuality” “Sapindaship” require also that both the propositus and claimant must both be within the five families enumerated by Dr. Sarvadhikari. The Privy Council decision in Ramchandra Martand Waikar v. Vinayek Venkatesh Kothekar approved of Dr. Sarjathikari's rules on the subject.W. Kothandaramayya in reply.—The theory that a line cannot have more than one woman intervening is unsound. Even Dr. Banerjee states that a line in descent can have more than one woman, but states that a line in ascent should, not have more than one woman. This is illogical. Learned text writers like Sarkar Sastry and Mandlik do not approve of this restriction. They state that a line may consist of males and females indiscriminately. Again such a restriction of a line would lead to the exclusion of the recognized and enumerated bandhus, (eq) mother's mother's brother's son and mother's mother's sister's son, where certainly two women intervene.