Conclusive Presumption of Legitimacy and Constitutional Limits on DNA Testing: Commentary on Ramraj Patel v. State of U.P.

I. Introduction

The decision in Ramraj Patel v. State of U.P. and Another addresses an increasingly frequent and sensitive issue in family and matrimonial litigation: whether a court may direct a DNA test to determine a child’s paternity, in the face of the statutory presumption of legitimacy under Section 112 of the Indian Evidence Act and the constitutional rights to privacy and dignity under Article 21 of the Constitution.

The case arises from proceedings under the Protection of Women from Domestic Violence Act, 2005 (“DV Act”), where the husband (Ramraj Patel) challenged the paternity of a child born to his wife (Savita Devi, opposite party no. 2) and sought a direction for DNA testing of the minor daughter, Priyambada. Both the trial court (Special Chief Judicial Magistrate, Varanasi) and the appellate court (Additional Sessions Judge, Varanasi) refused to order the test. The husband approached the High Court in revision, seeking to overturn these refusals.

The Allahabad High Court upheld the orders of the subordinate courts, reaffirming:

• the conclusive presumption of legitimacy under Section 112 of the Evidence Act;
• the limited and exceptional circumstances in which a DNA test may be directed in paternity disputes; and
• the need to respect the right to privacy and dignity of individuals, drawing upon the Supreme Court’s privacy jurisprudence, particularly K.S. Puttaswamy v. Union of India and the later decision in IVAN RATHINAM v. MILAN JOSEPH (2025 SCC OnLine SC 175).

The ruling thus sits at the intersection of evidence law, family law, and constitutional rights, and clarifies the threshold for ordering DNA tests in domestic violence and similar proceedings.

II. Summary of the Judgment

A. Factual Background

The essential facts noted by the High Court are:

• The revisionist, Ramraj Patel, married Savita Devi (opposite party no. 2) on 15 April 2008 according to Hindu rites.
• After marriage, Savita went to live at her matrimonial home but, according to the husband, stayed only about a week. Thereafter, she allegedly resided mostly with her parents, visiting the husband’s house occasionally for brief periods.
• The husband claimed that:
  • the wife was better educated (B.A., B.P.Ed., employed as a teacher) whereas he had studied only up to High School;
  • she looked down upon him as an “illiterate villager” and did not want to live with him; and
  • she used to accuse him of having illicit relations with his sister-in-law (bhabhi).
• On 17 December 2012, Savita gave birth to a female child, Priyambada.
• The husband asserted that Savita last visited his house on 20 May 2011 and thereafter permanently resided with her parents. On this basis, he claimed that he could not be the biological father of Priyambada.
• Savita instituted a case under Section 12 of the DV Act in 2015 before the Special Chief Judicial Magistrate, Varanasi (Criminal Case No. 120 of 2015).
• In these proceedings, the husband moved an application dated 03 February 2020 seeking a DNA test of Priyambada to challenge her paternity.

B. Procedural History

• The Special Chief Judicial Magistrate, Varanasi, rejected the husband’s DNA test application by order dated 18 January 2021.
• An appeal under Section 29 of the DV Act (Criminal Appeal No. 19 of 2021) before the Additional Sessions Judge, Court No. 1, Varanasi was also dismissed on 07 October 2021.
• Aggrieved thereby, the husband filed the present Criminal Revision No. 3271 of 2021 before the Allahabad High Court.

C. Issues Before the High Court

While the judgment is concise, the core legal issues can be distilled as follows:

1. Whether, in the facts and circumstances of the case, the courts below erred in refusing to direct a DNA test of the minor child at the instance of the husband.
2. How the conclusive presumption of legitimacy under Section 112 of the Evidence Act operates when the husband alleges that the wife was not living with him and that he had no access to her during the conception period.
3. What role the right to privacy and dignity under Article 21 plays when the court considers directing a DNA test to ascertain paternity.

D. Holding

The High Court dismissed the criminal revision, holding that:

• A child born during the subsistence of a valid marriage is conclusively presumed to be legitimate under Section 112 of the Evidence Act, unless it is shown that the spouses had no access to each other at the relevant time.
• The presumption in favour of legitimacy is strong and can be displaced only in exceptional circumstances where the party challenging paternity proves non-access or an equivalent impossibility.
• Ordering a DNA test cannot be done routinely. It can be considered only where the applicant demonstrates that there was no chance of cohabitation during the critical period, and the requirements of privacy and dignity under Article 21 are satisfied.
• Relying on the Supreme Court’s decision in IVAN RATHINAM v. MILAN JOSEPH, any order permitting a DNA test must meet the threefold constitutional test of: (i) legality, (ii) legitimate aim (“need”), and (iii) proportionality as articulated in K.S. Puttaswamy.
• In the present case, the husband had merely made bald assertions about the wife not staying with him, without proving non-access or impossibility of cohabitation. Therefore, both the trial and appellate courts were correct in refusing the DNA test.

Consequently, the High Court found no illegality or perversity in the impugned orders and held that the revision lacked merit.

III. Legal Framework and Precedents

A. Section 112 of the Evidence Act: Conclusive Presumption of Legitimacy

Section 112 of the Indian Evidence Act, 1872 provides:

112. Birth during marriage, conclusive proof of legitimacy.
“The fact that any person was born during the continuance of a valid marriage between his mother and any man, or within two hundred and eighty days after its dissolution, the mother remaining unmarried, shall be conclusive proof that he is the legitimate son of that man, unless it can be shown that the parties to the marriage had no access to each other at any time when he could have been begotten.”

Key elements:

• Valid marriage: The presumption applies where the child is born during the continuance of a valid marriage (or within 280 days after its dissolution, if the mother remains unmarried).
• Conclusive proof: Under Section 4 of the Evidence Act, “conclusive proof” means that when one fact (here, birth during wedlock) is declared to be conclusive proof of another (legitimacy), the court must regard the second fact as proved and cannot allow evidence to disprove it, except to the extent the statute itself permits (here, proof of non-access).
• Exception – non-access: The presumption can be rebutted only by showing that the spouses had no access to each other at any time when the child could have been conceived.

The High Court reiterates that Section 112 creates a strong, almost irrebuttable presumption in favour of legitimacy. The policy basis is clear: to protect children from the lifelong stigma and social consequences of illegitimacy and to promote family stability.

B. Domestic Violence Act Provisions in the Background

Although not discussed in detail in the judgment, it is useful to situate the decision within the DV Act framework:

• Section 12 – Enables an aggrieved woman to approach the Magistrate seeking various reliefs (protection, residence, monetary reliefs, custody, compensation).
• Section 23 – Empowers the Magistrate to grant interim and ex parte orders on the basis of a prima facie case, including monetary reliefs.
• Section 29 – Provides for an appeal to the Court of Sessions against orders passed by the Magistrate under the Act.

In Ramraj Patel, the DV proceedings essentially provided the procedural context in which the husband attempted to dispute paternity, presumably to avoid or reduce monetary and other obligations towards the wife and the child.

C. Supreme Court Jurisprudence on DNA Testing, Legitimacy and Privacy

1. Earlier case law on blood/DNA tests and Section 112

Before the constitutional privacy turn, the Supreme Court had already laid down certain principles governing the use of blood and DNA tests in paternity disputes:

• Goutam Kundu v. State of West Bengal (1993): The Court held that blood tests to determine paternity cannot be ordered as a matter of course. There must be a strong prima facie case, and the court must guard against “fishing inquiries” or attempts to harass the wife. The presumption under Section 112 was emphasised.
• Banarsi Dass v. Teeku Dutta (2005): Reiterated that DNA tests should not be ordered routinely, particularly where they would unsettle long-settled familial relationships and the legitimacy of children.
• Nandlal Wasudeo Badwaik v. Lata (2014): In a case where a DNA test had already been conducted and strongly indicated non-paternity, the Court observed that truth as established by scientific evidence could, in some circumstances, override the presumption of Section 112. However, the Court still cautioned that ordering DNA tests is not to be done mechanically.
• Dipanwita Roy v. Ronobroto Roy (2014): In a matrimonial dispute involving an allegation of adultery, the Court described DNA test as the “most legitimate and scientifically perfect means” of establishing paternity but underscored that compulsion must be balanced with fundamental rights; refusal to undergo the test could justify an adverse inference.

These decisions collectively underline two themes:

1. Courts must be slow and cautious in directing DNA tests in paternity disputes.
2. The presumption of legitimacy under Section 112 is very strong, but there may be rare cases where scientific evidence and the search for truth require its reconsideration, subject to individual rights.

2. Constitutionalisation of privacy and dignity: K.S. Puttaswamy and X2 v. State (NCT of Delhi)

In K.S. Puttaswamy (Privacy-9J.) v. Union of India, a nine-judge Bench of the Supreme Court held that the right to privacy is a fundamental right under Article 21, intrinsic to the right to life and personal liberty. The judgment:

• conceptualised privacy as including personal intimacies, family life, marriage, procreation, and sexual orientation;
• linked privacy to personal autonomy and the right “to be left alone”; and
• laid down a threefold test for any invasion of privacy:
  • Legality: existence of a law permitting the intrusion;
  • Legitimate aim/need: a rational, legitimate state aim; and
  • Proportionality: a rational nexus between the objective and the means adopted, ensuring minimal intrusion.

The Allahabad High Court directly quotes paragraph 325 of Puttaswamy and applies this threefold test to the question of ordering a DNA test, treating it as an intrusion into privacy and personal liberty.

The judgment also relies on X2 v. State (NCT of Delhi), in which the Supreme Court stated that the right to dignity means that every person is a self-governing entity with intrinsic value and can make self-determining choices. Dignity and privacy are described as intertwined, protecting intimate decisions about one's life and sexual activity.

3. IVAN RATHINAM v. MILAN JOSEPH (2025 SCC OnLine SC 175)

The Allahabad High Court’s most explicit reliance is on the Supreme Court's decision in IVAN RATHINAM v. MILAN JOSEPH, particularly on the sub-section titled “Right to privacy and right to dignity”. Based on the passages quoted:

• The Supreme Court recognised that ordering a DNA test is a serious intrusion into an individual’s private and family life, often involving allegations of infidelity.
• Such intrusion can severely affect a person's reputation, social and professional standing, and mental health.
• Therefore, a person has the right to take steps to protect his or her dignity and privacy, including refusing to undergo a DNA test.
• DNA tests relating to paternity also implicate the child’s dignity and privacy, although in that case the child was an adult and voluntarily submitting to the test. The Court highlighted that parents also bear the impact of social stigma surrounding allegations of illegitimacy and infidelity.
• Importantly, the Supreme Court reaffirmed that any direction for a DNA test must satisfy the threefold test in Puttaswamy: legality, need (legitimate aim), and proportionality. If any limb is not met, the test becomes an unwarranted invasion of privacy.

The High Court uses this recent Supreme Court pronouncement to emphasise that courts must subject DNA-test requests to constitutional scrutiny, and not treat them as routine evidentiary tools.

IV. Court’s Legal Reasoning in Ramraj Patel

A. Reaffirming the Presumption of Legitimacy

The High Court first lays down the contours of Section 112:

• A “successive presumption” (the judgment’s phrase) is established in favour of the legitimacy of a child born during a valid subsisting marriage.
• This presumption is a legal recognition that the husband is the father of the child born within wedlock.
• The presumption also stands against “unwarranted intrusion” into the child’s status by branding the child illegitimate, thereby protecting familial relationships and the child’s right to social legitimacy.
• The presumption is conclusive unless it is proved that the husband and wife had no access to each other at the time when the child could have been begotten.
• The burden is on the party disputing paternity (here, the husband) to rebut this presumption.

This restatement of Section 112 aligns with long-standing Supreme Court jurisprudence: the law favours legitimacy, and the burden to prove the contrary is heavy.

B. Meaning of “Access” and “Non-Access”

The Court clarifies that “access” and “non-access” under Section 112 must be understood in a narrow and specific sense:

• Access refers to the possibility of sexual cohabitation between the spouses – that they had the opportunity to engage in marital intercourse during the probable time of conception.
• Non-access can be established not only by physical separation (for instance, one spouse living in another place, imprisonment, or deployment abroad), but also where cohabitation exists but intercourse is effectively impossible – for example, impotency or other factors making procreation impossible.

Therefore, it is not enough to say that the wife stayed away “most of the time”. What is crucial is whether during the probable period of conception, sexual access was impossible or highly improbable. The evidence must be clear and convincing.

C. DNA Tests: Not Routine, but Exceptional

Drawing from established precedent and the Supreme Court’s more recent privacy jurisprudence, the High Court emphasises that orders for DNA testing:

• Cannot be made as a matter of routine or for the mere satisfaction of the husband’s doubts.
• May only be directed in specific, exceptional circumstances where the applicant shows that there is no realistic possibility of cohabitation during the relevant period.
• Must be weighed against the potential harm: invasion of the child’s and parents’ privacy and dignity, possible social stigma, and long-term consequences.

In other words, DNA testing is treated as an intrusive and extraordinary measure, not an ordinary evidentiary step.

D. Constitutional Overlay: Privacy and Dignity

The High Court imports constitutional analysis directly into the evidentiary question. By quoting Puttaswamy and Ivan Rathinam, the Court notes:

• Privacy covers family life, marriage, and procreation, and includes the right to control one’s personal information and intimate decisions.
• Dignity protects every individual’s intrinsic worth and autonomy, enabling self-defining and self-determining choices.
• DNA testing, particularly where it concerns allegations of infidelity and illegitimacy, exposes deeply personal aspects of family life to public and judicial scrutiny, which can be harsh and irreversible in its impact on social standing and mental health.
• Thus, an individual (including the alleged father) has a right to resist or refuse forced DNA testing to protect his or her privacy and dignity.

The Court then reaffirms, following Ivan Rathinam, that any direction to conduct a DNA test must pass the Puttaswamy threefold test:

1. Legality: The intrusion (here, a court-ordered DNA test) must be backed by law and fit within the statutory scheme (Evidence Act, procedural law, etc.).
2. Need/Legitimate Aim: There must be a compelling and legitimate objective – for example, resolving a crucial legal question that cannot be answered by less intrusive means.
3. Proportionality: The measure must be the least restrictive or least intrusive way of achieving the aim, with a clear rational nexus between the objective and the test ordered.

If any one of these elements fails, the DNA test becomes an unconstitutional invasion of privacy.

E. Application to the Facts of the Case

Against this legal and constitutional backdrop, the Court examines the husband’s assertions:

• The husband claimed that the wife:
  • lived with him for only about a week after marriage;
  • used to visit his house occasionally for periods less than a week; and
  • last visited his house on 20 May 2011.
• The child was born on 17 December 2012 – i.e., roughly 19 months after the alleged last visit.
• However, crucially, the husband:
  • did not produce cogent evidence to prove that he and the wife had no access whatsoever around the time the child could have been conceived;
  • relied essentially on bald, self-serving statements about the wife’s residence pattern; and
  • did not demonstrate circumstances of impossibility (such as imprisonment, documented separation, or medical impossibility).

The High Court notes that the trial court and appellate court had given specific findings rejecting the husband’s plea and found no perversity or illegality in those findings. Given the strong presumption under Section 112 and the lack of credible evidence of non-access, the conditions for dislodging the presumption and for invoking an intrusive DNA test were not met.

Consequently:

• The conclusive presumption of legitimacy remained intact.
• The request for a DNA test was held to be unwarranted.
• The revision was dismissed as lacking merit.

F. Scope of Revisional Interference

Although not elaborated at length, it is implicit that in a criminal revision, the High Court’s jurisdiction under Sections 397/401 CrPC is limited. It does not sit as a regular appellate court:

• The High Court examines whether there is any jurisdictional error, illegality, material irregularity, or perversity in the concurrent findings of the courts below.
• Here, both subordinate courts had correctly applied Section 112 and the law on DNA tests. Hence, there was no warrant for interference.

V. Impact and Implications

A. Strengthening the Protection of Children’s Legitimacy

The decision reinforces the idea that children born within wedlock are to be robustly protected from being stigmatized as illegitimate. By reaffirming Section 112 as a strong presumption, the Court:

• discourages casual or strategic challenges to paternity, particularly in the context of monetary and custodial disputes; and
• prioritises the child's best interests, social status, and psychological well-being over the husband’s suspicions unless he can demonstrate a compelling factual and legal basis.

B. Raising the Threshold for DNA Tests in Domestic Violence and Family Litigation

In DV Act proceedings and other family disputes, husbands sometimes seek DNA tests as a litigation strategy to:

• avoid obligations of maintenance or monetary relief to the child; or
• discredit the wife’s character by insinuating infidelity.

By holding that DNA tests cannot be ordered in a routine manner and requiring proof of non-access plus constitutional scrutiny, the High Court sends a clear signal:

• Magistrates and Sessions Judges have full authority to refuse DNA tests when the applicant fails to provide a strong, evidence-based foundation.
• Merely raising doubts or making uncorroborated allegations about the wife’s conduct or residence is not enough.

This will likely have a chilling effect on frivolous DNA-test applications in DV and maintenance proceedings.

C. Integrating Article 21 (Privacy and Dignity) into Evidentiary Decisions

A significant aspect of this judgment is the constitutionalisation of what was historically a purely evidentiary question. Post‑Puttaswamy, courts are increasingly required to:

• view DNA testing as an intrusion into informational and bodily privacy;
• consider the dignitary harm and social stigma that may result from exposing intimate allegations of infidelity; and
• apply the legality–need–proportionality test before compelling such tests.

Ramraj Patel operationalises these principles in the context of Section 112, ensuring that family law and domestic violence adjudication is aligned with modern fundamental-rights jurisprudence.

D. Harmonising Section 112 and Modern Science

Indian courts have long grappled with the tension between:

• the statutory presumption of legitimacy under Section 112; and
• the accuracy of DNA profiling in establishing biological paternity.

This judgment does not deny the probative value of DNA evidence. Instead, it:

• treats DNA testing as a tool that should be sparingly used, only when justified by compelling evidence of non-access and when constitutionally permissible;
• preserves Section 112 as a default rule that favours familial stability and the child’s welfare, subject to rare exceptions.

Thus, the case contributes to a more nuanced harmonisation between statutory presumptions, scientific truth, and constitutional values.

E. Guidance for Future Cases

In practical terms, the judgment suggests that for a court to consider ordering a DNA test in a similar context, the applicant should:

1. Show, with credible evidence (documents, independent witnesses, etc.), that there was no access between the spouses during the likely period of conception.
2. Demonstrate that the question of paternity is central and determinative to the legal relief sought (e.g., legitimacy directly affecting inheritance or status), and cannot be resolved by less intrusive means.
3. Satisfy the court that the test meets the legality–need–proportionality standards under Article 21.

Absent these elements, courts are empowered—and indeed, required—to reject such applications.

VI. Simplifying Key Legal Concepts

A. “Conclusive Proof” under Section 112

Under the Evidence Act:

• “May presume” – the court may accept a fact as proved, but is not bound to.
• “Shall presume” – the court must accept the fact as proved unless it is disproved.
• “Conclusive proof” – the court must accept the fact as proved and cannot allow evidence to disprove it, except as the statute explicitly allows.

Section 112 declares that birth during a valid marriage is conclusive proof of legitimacy—except where non-access is shown. Therefore, the only admissible route to rebut this presumption is proof of non-access; mere suspicion or moral arguments are insufficient.

B. “Access” and “Non-Access”

• Access means the opportunity for the spouses to have sexual relations (marital intercourse) during the relevant time.
• Non-access means the absence or impossibility of such opportunity—e.g.:
  • the spouses living apart in different places with no contact;
  • one spouse being imprisoned or abroad throughout the conception window;
  • impotency or other medical conditions that make conception impossible.

It is not enough for a husband to say, “My wife stayed mostly at her parents’ home.” He must prove that intercourse could not have occurred at the time the child was conceived.

C. DNA Test as Evidence

A DNA test is a highly accurate scientific method to determine biological relationships. In court, it can be powerful evidence of:

• paternity (whether a man is the biological father);
• maternity (in rare disputed cases);
• sometimes, broader kinship links.

However, because it:

• requires bodily samples (blood, saliva, etc.);
• reveals highly personal genetic information; and
• can expose intimate aspects of a person’s sexual and family life,

courts treat it as an intrusive measure, not an everyday evidentiary tool. The law therefore insists on caution, particularly in family disputes involving children.

D. Right to Privacy and Dignity under Article 21

Article 21 of the Constitution guarantees the right to life and personal liberty. The Supreme Court has held that this includes:

• Right to privacy:
  • control over personal and family information;
  • decision-making about intimate matters (marriage, procreation, sexual relations);
  • freedom from unwanted intrusion by the State or others into one’s personal life.
• Right to dignity:
  • the recognition that every person has intrinsic worth;
  • the right to be treated as an autonomous, self-governing individual;
  • protection from humiliation, stigma, and degrading treatment.

When a court orders a DNA test in a paternity dispute, it can:

• invade privacy by exposing intimate aspects of marital and sexual life;
• threaten dignity by implying infidelity or illegitimacy and subjecting the family to social stigma.

Therefore, courts must ensure that such tests are ordered only when:

1. There is a clear legal basis (legality);
2. The aim is sufficiently important and cannot be served by less intrusive means (need/legitimate aim); and
3. The intrusion is proportionate to the objective pursued (proportionality).

VII. Conclusion

Ramraj Patel v. State of U.P. is a significant reaffirmation of the legal and constitutional framework governing paternity disputes in India. The Allahabad High Court:

• reasserts the conclusive presumption of legitimacy under Section 112 of the Evidence Act, emphasising that this presumption protects children from stigma and upholds family stability;
• clarifies that proof of non-access during the conception period is the only recognised statutory route to dislodge this presumption;
• underscores that DNA tests are not routine evidentiary tools, but exceptional measures that intrude upon privacy and dignity;
• incorporates the Article 21 right to privacy and dignity, together with the Puttaswamy threefold test, into the decision whether to direct a DNA test; and
• holds that bald, unsupported allegations about the wife’s residence and character are insufficient to justify a DNA test or to rebut the presumption of legitimacy.

In the broader legal landscape, this judgment:

• provides clear guidance to trial courts handling DV Act and family disputes about when DNA tests may be considered;
• aligns evidentiary practice with contemporary constitutional values of privacy and dignity; and
• reinforces the principle that the best interests and social legitimacy of the child remain central in any adjudication concerning paternity.

For litigants and practitioners, the key takeaway is that challenging the paternity of a child born within wedlock is an extraordinary step with serious legal and ethical implications. The law presumes legitimacy, protects the child, and demands a high threshold—both evidentiary and constitutional—before this presumption can be disturbed or a DNA test can be compelled.