Bail under Section 483 BNSS and Cyber Hoax Bomb Threats: A Commentary on Rene Joshilda Goldwin Joseph v. State of Gujarat

I. Introduction

The order in Rene Joshilda Goldwin Joseph v. State of Gujarat, passed by the Gujarat High Court on 26 November 2025 by Hon’ble Mr. Justice Nikhil S. Kariel, is a significant early articulation of bail jurisprudence under the new procedural code, the Bharatiya Nagarik Suraksha Sanhita, 2023 (“BNSS”).

The case arises from an application for regular bail after filing of the charge-sheet under Section 483 BNSS, in relation to an FIR (C.R. No. 11192011250293/2025) registered at Bopal Police Station, Ahmedabad. The applicant – a woman, Rene Joshilda Goldwin Joseph – was accused of:

• Offences under Sections 351(3) and 353(1)(B) of the Bharatiya Nyaya Sanhita, 2023 (“BNS”; referred to as “BNS Act” in the order); and
• Section 66C of the Information Technology Act, 2000 (identity theft / misuse of electronic credentials).

The gravamen of the allegation was that the applicant sent anonymous emails to various organisations, stating that bombs had been planted there, which led to:

• Harassment and mobilisation of the police machinery; and
• Alarm and inconvenience to the institutions concerned.

Despite the apparent seriousness of “bomb threat” allegations, the High Court granted bail, emphasising several factors:

• The applicant’s mental and emotional condition (“appears to be a disturbed person”), including a background dispute in a personal relationship;
• The fact that she was in custody since 28.06.2025;
• Filing of the charge-sheet, reducing the need for further custodial interrogation;
• Parity with orders of the Sessions Court which had granted her bail in similar offences; and
• Her status as a woman accused.

The Court expressly relied on the Supreme Court’s decision in Sanjay Chandra v. Central Bureau of Investigation, (2012) 1 SCC 40, a leading precedent on bail, to ground its decision.

This order is important not because it radically alters bail law, but because it illustrates the continuity of pre-existing bail principles under the new BNSS regime, and it demonstrates how courts will approach cyber-enabled hoax bomb threats in the bail context, balancing personal liberty with public order and investigative needs.

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II. Summary of the Judgment

1. Procedural Posture

The applicant moved a Criminal Miscellaneous Application for Regular Bail after the filing of the charge-sheet under Section 483 BNSS. The FIR alleged offences under:

• Sections 351(3) and 353(1)(B) BNS (serious offences linked to the bomb-threat–type conduct); and
• Section 66C IT Act (identity theft/misuse of electronic credentials).

The State opposed the application through the learned Additional Public Prosecutor, emphasising the nature and gravity of the offence and the applicant’s role as shown in the charge-sheet.

2. Applicant’s Arguments

As recorded in the order, the applicant’s counsel submitted that:

• The role attributed to the applicant and the nature of the allegations justified the grant of bail.
• The charge-sheet had been filed, hence no useful purpose would be served by further incarceration for an indefinite period.
• The applicant was willing to abide by any conditions imposed by the Court if released on bail.

3. State’s Opposition

The learned Additional Public Prosecutor vehemently opposed the grant of bail, relying on:

• The nature of the offences, involving bomb threats and consequent disruption; and
• The role of the applicant as emerging from the charge-sheet.

4. Limited Reasoning at the Parties’ Request

The Court notes that since this was a bail matter and “learned Advocates appearing on behalf of the respective parties do not press for further reasoned order”, it would refrain from giving a more elaborate discussion of the evidence.

5. Key Considerations

The Court nonetheless identified several factors at paragraph 7:

1. Nature of the Allegations and Mental State:
   The applicant allegedly sent anonymous bomb-threat emails to multiple organisations, causing harassment to the police and the organisations. However, the Court notes that the applicant “appears to be a disturbed person” and that the alleged crime seems to arise from a dispute in a relationship with a third party.
2. Period of Custody:
   The applicant had been in custody since 28.06.2025.
3. Charge-Sheet Filed:
   The investigating officer had already filed the charge-sheet, meaning investigative needs requiring custody were greatly reduced.
4. Parity with Previous Orders:
   The Sessions Court had previously released the same applicant in similar offences.
5. Gender of the Accused:
   The Court specifically records that the applicant is a lady accused, a factor long recognised in bail jurisprudence.

The Court also notes having taken into consideration the law laid down in Sanjay Chandra v. CBI, (2012) 1 SCC 40.

6. Result and Conditions Imposed

On these considerations, the Court held that it was a fit case to exercise discretion in favour of bail. The application was allowed and the applicant was ordered to be released on regular bail upon:

• Executing a bond of Rs. 10,000/- with one surety of the like amount to the satisfaction of the trial court.

The bail was subject to standard conditions, including that the applicant shall:

• Not misuse her liberty or take undue advantage of it;
• Not act in any manner injurious to the interest of the prosecution;
• Surrender her passport, if any, to the lower court within a week;
• Furnish her present residential address to the Investigating Officer (I.O.) and the court, and not change residence without prior intimation.

The Court directed that:

• The applicant be released only if not required in any other case.
• In case of breach of any condition, the Sessions Court is free to take appropriate action.
• The trial court should not be influenced by any observations made in the bail order, which are only of a preliminary nature.

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III. Precedents Cited and Their Role

1. Sanjay Chandra v. Central Bureau of Investigation, (2012) 1 SCC 40

The only precedent explicitly cited is Sanjay Chandra v. CBI, a leading Supreme Court decision on bail delivered in the context of the so-called “2G Spectrum” cases. Although the High Court does not quote the text of that judgment, it expressly states:

“This Court has taken into consideration the law laid down by the Hon'ble Apex Court in the case of Sanjay Chandra v. Central Bureau of Investigation reported in [2012] 1 SCC 40.”

Sanjay Chandra is significant for several settled propositions on bail, many of which echo through this order:

• Presumption of Innocence:
  The Supreme Court emphasised that until conviction, an accused person is presumed innocent. Pre-trial detention must therefore be an exception, justified only by specific legitimate reasons (such as risk of flight, tampering with evidence, or repetition of offences).
• “Bail is the Rule, Jail the Exception” in Practice:
  While this maxim is not a statutory formula, Sanjay Chandra re-affirmed that liberty is the normal state and incarceration prior to conviction should be sparingly resorted to, especially where trial is likely to be protracted.
• Gravity Alone is Not Conclusive:
  The Supreme Court held that although the seriousness of the offence is a relevant factor, gravity by itself cannot justify denial of bail when other factors – such as completion of investigation, absence of flight risk, and no likelihood of tampering – are favourable.
• Length of Custody and Delay:
  A prolonged period of custody coupled with likely delay in trial weighs in favour of bail. Continued incarceration purely for punitive reasons is impermissible at the pre-trial stage.
• Purpose of Bail:
  The object of bail is to secure the presence of the accused at trial, not to punish.

The Gujarat High Court’s reasoning aligns closely with these principles:

• It notes the completion of investigation (charge-sheet filed).
• It considers the duration of custody.
• It balances the nature of the allegation against personal circumstances and mental state.
• It avoids a mini-trial, explicitly stating that it will not discuss evidence in detail.

Thus, Sanjay Chandra provides the normative backbone for the decision: even where allegations sound grave (bomb threats), bail is not to be denied if core risks can be managed by conditions.

2. Continuity with Earlier CrPC-Based Jurisprudence

Though not expressly cited, the approach in this order is consistent with long-standing Supreme Court jurisprudence under the erstwhile Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (CrPC), such as:

• Gurbaksh Singh Sibbia v. State of Punjab, (1980) 2 SCC 565 (on the philosophy of bail);
• State of Rajasthan v. Balchand, (1977) 4 SCC 308 (widely quoted for “bail is rule, jail is exception”); and
• Other decisions stressing proportionality, presumption of innocence, and the need for reasoned bail orders.

While BNSS has replaced CrPC, the High Court’s reliance on Sanjay Chandra implicitly confirms that:

• The substantive principles of bail developed under CrPC continue to govern interpretation of Section 483 BNSS;
• The shift to BNSS is procedural and structural, not a reset of the intermediate appellate and High Court bail jurisprudence.

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IV. Legal Reasoning and Application of Principles

1. Section 483 BNSS: Bail After Charge-Sheet

The application is made under Section 483 BNSS, which vests the High Court with power to grant regular bail (analogous to the erstwhile Section 439 CrPC). While the text of Section 483 is not reproduced in the order, the core features inferred from practice are:

• It empowers the High Court (and the Court of Session) to grant bail in non-bailable offences.
• The scope generally includes bail both before and after filing of the charge-sheet, but here the application is explicitly described as “for regular bail – after charge-sheet”.

In bail after charge-sheet:

• The investigation is substantially complete and the prosecution’s initial case has crystallised;
• The key question becomes whether the continued detention of the accused is necessary, having regard to:
  • risk of absconding,
  • possibility of tampering with evidence or influencing witnesses,
  • likelihood of repeating the offence, and
  • overall needs of a fair trial.

The Court’s reasoning tracks this framework:

• Charge-sheet filed → custodial interrogation no longer necessary.
• Period of custody since June 2025 → weighs against further pre-trial incarceration.
• Conditions imposed → address flight risk and prevent misuse of liberty.

2. Nature of Allegations and the Court’s Nuanced Assessment

On the facts, the allegation is that the applicant:

• Sent anonymous bomb-threat emails to various organisations; and
• Caused unnecessary harassment to the police and anxiety to the recipient organisations.

Ordinarily, bomb threats (even hoax threats) may:

• Trigger serious public order concerns;
• Lead authorities to treat the case as akin to terror-related or public alarm offences; and
• Invite strong prosecutorial opposition to bail.

However, the Court characterises the applicant as:

“a disturbed person more particularly, it would appear that the alleged crime may have been committed by the applicant following some dispute in a relationship with the third party.”

This shows a context-sensitive approach:

• The Court differentiates between:
  • a coldly calculated act of organised terrorism; and
  • a misguided, perhaps impulsive act arising from personal emotional disturbance.
• It recognises that while the consequences of the act are serious (harassment of police and institutions), the mens rea and background may be different from that of a hardened, ideologically motivated offender.

This does not amount to exoneration but informs the proportionality analysis at the bail stage:

• Pre-trial incarceration is not to be used as a substitute for punishment.
• Where the behaviour appears rooted in a personal emotional/mental disturbance, controlled liberty coupled with trial is often sufficient to protect public interest.

3. Duration of Custody

The applicant had been in custody since 28.06.2025. Though the order does not compute the exact number of days, this is clearly a substantial pre-trial detention, particularly when:

• The trial has not commenced or concluded; and
• The charge-sheet has already been filed.

In line with Sanjay Chandra, the Court views such extended pre-trial custody for a non-homicidal, non-terrorism prosecution as unnecessary, absent specific evidence of:

• Flight risk;
• Threats to witnesses; or
• Attempts to destroy or fabricate evidence.

4. Completion of Investigation (Filing of Charge-Sheet)

A critical factor was the filing of the charge-sheet by the Investigating Officer:

“iii. The fact of the Investigating Officer having laid the charge-sheet.”

Once the charge-sheet is filed:

• The prosecution’s initial investigation is complete.
• The evidence is, to a large extent, collected and documented.
• The prospect of the accused tampering with the core documentary or electronic evidence is reduced, especially if further conditions (like not contacting certain persons) are in place.

Hence, the need for continued custodial interrogation is minimal. This dovetails with the principle that:

• Custody for interrogation is one thing and may justify remand in the early stage;
• Custody purely as pre-trial punishment is constitutionally suspect.

5. Parity: Earlier Bail in “Similar Offences”

The Court records:

“iv. The fact of the Sessions Court having released the present applicant in similar offences.”

This is a form of parity reasoning. Ordinarily, parity is invoked for:

• Co-accused similarly placed in the same crime; but here
• The Court notes parity between this case and other similar FIRs or offences in which the same applicant has been granted bail.

This consideration:

• Promotes consistency and coherence in judicial treatment of the same accused for similar conduct.
• Reduces the risk of arbitrary variations in liberty across closely analogous situations.

6. Special Consideration for Women

The Court explicitly notes:

“v. The fact of the present applicant being a lady accused.”

This is aligned with long-standing provisions and jurisprudence recognising that:

• Women, along with minors and infirm persons, are often accorded special consideration for bail, particularly in non-capital offences;
• Earlier, Section 437 CrPC contained a proviso favouring bail to women in certain non-bailable cases; BNSS carries forward the underlying protective policy.

The reference to her gender signals that:

• Being a woman is a relevant, though not decisive, factor for bail in offences not punishable with death or imprisonment for life;
• Courts may lean towards bail where conditions can adequately secure the interests of justice.

7. Limited Discussion of Evidence and Caution to Trial Court

The Court states that, considering the nature of the allegations, and “without discussing the evidence in detail”, it is:

“…of the opinion that this is a fit case to exercise the discretion and enlarge the applicant on regular bail.”

Simultaneously, the order stipulates that:

“At the stage of trial, the trial court shall not be influenced by any observations of this Court which are of preliminary nature made at this stage…”

These passages reflect standard but crucial principles:

• Bail orders are not judgments on guilt or innocence.
• Any prima facie views expressed to gauge the strength of the prosecution’s case are not binding on the trial court.
• This preserves the independence of the trial process and protects the accused’s right to a fair trial.

8. Conditions Imposed: Balancing Liberty and Public Interest

The conditions of bail imposed are classic safeguards designed to:

• Prevent absconding (surety and bond);
• Minimise tampering with evidence or compromising witnesses (no misuse of liberty or acting against the prosecution’s interest);
• Enable supervision and traceability (disclosure and stability of residential address);
• Control risk of flight abroad (surrender of passport); and
• Ensure accountability for compliance (Sessions Court free to act on breach).

This reflects a calibrated approach: the applicant’s liberty is restored but within a structured framework of obligations, ensuring that the criminal process is not frustrated.

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V. Impact and Broader Legal Significance

1. Continuity of Bail Jurisprudence Under BNSS

One of the most important implications of this order is doctrinal continuity. By explicitly relying on Sanjay Chandra – a CrPC-era judgment – to decide bail under Section 483 BNSS, the Gujarat High Court signals that:

• The conceptual and constitutional foundations of bail have not been altered by the procedural shift to BNSS.
• Existing Supreme Court bail jurisprudence remains authoritative for interpreting BNSS provisions.
• High Courts will continue to apply principles such as:
  • Presumption of innocence;
  • Proportionality of pre-trial custody;
  • “Bail as rule, jail as exception” in practical application; and
  • Need for reasoned bail orders even when brief.

2. Approach to Cyber-Enabled Hoax Bomb Threats

The case deals with a modern profile of criminal allegation: anonymous bomb threats disseminated through email, invoking both BNS provisions and the IT Act. The judgment demonstrates that:

• Even when the label of the offence is alarming (“bomb threat”), courts will examine:
  • the actual conduct (hoax vs real threat),
  • the mental and emotional state of the accused, and
  • whether the behaviour was part of a personal emotional outburst rather than organised terror.
• Such cases will not be automatically treated as justifying long pre-trial detention if:
  • the investigation is complete,
  • the accused is not a continuing danger, and
  • conditions can adequately mitigate risks.

For future cyber-crime or public alarm cases (e.g., false threat calls, fake alerts, social media hoaxes), this order suggests that:

• Bail is not barred simply because the offence caused public panic or large-scale police mobilisation.
• The analysis will still be individualised, focusing on:
  • intent,
  • circumstances,
  • mental health indicators, and
  • post-investigation risks.

3. Recognition of Mental/Emotional Disturbance

By describing the applicant as a “disturbed person” and linking the act to a “dispute in a relationship”, the Court implicitly acknowledges:

• The role of mental and emotional factors in the commission of certain offences; and
• The need to factor such elements into bail decisions, without converting bail into a psychiatric inquiry.

This may encourage:

• Defence counsel to bring mental health and personal background more clearly on record; and
• Courts to see some offences less as manifestations of entrenched criminal propensity and more as isolated acts aggravated by emotional disturbance, thereby supporting controlled liberty rather than extended incarceration.

4. Gender-Sensitive Bail Jurisprudence

The explicit reference to the applicant as a “lady accused” reinforces the continuing:

• Gender-sensitive approach to bail where offences are not of the gravest category (death or life imprisonment);
• Relevance of statutory and constitutional commitments to special protection for women in criminal process.

Future cases can be expected to:

• Use this reasoning when women are accused of non-heinous offences and the investigation is complete;
• Emphasise that gender does not immunise from prosecution, but it can tilt the balance towards bail once basic risk factors are addressed.

5. Practical Guidance for Counsel under BNSS

For practitioners, the order suggests a concrete strategy when moving bail under Section 483 BNSS:

• Highlight completion of investigation (filing of charge-sheet) and argue the reduced need for custody.
• Detail the period of custody to show the disproportionality of continued detention.
• Place on record:
  • personal circumstances (including mental health, emotional disturbance, background facts);
  • any earlier bail orders in similar matters for parity;
  • the accused’s willingness to abide by rigorous conditions.
• Rely on Sanjay Chandra and other Supreme Court decisions as authoritative guides even under BNSS.

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VI. Simplifying Key Legal Concepts

1. Regular Bail vs Anticipatory Bail

• Regular Bail (as in this case):
  • Applied for after arrest and remand to judicial custody.
  • Seeks release from ongoing custody during the pendency of trial.
• Anticipatory Bail:
  • Sought before arrest when a person apprehends arrest.
  • Involves a pre-arrest protection, subject to conditions.

This case deals with regular bail after the filing of the charge-sheet, not anticipatory bail.

2. “Bail is the Rule, Jail the Exception”

This widely cited formula means:

• The default position should be that an accused is free during trial, subject to conditions.
• Pre-trial detention is justified only if there are concrete reasons (e.g., flight risk, repeat offence, serious interference with investigation or trial).

It does not mean every accused must be released, but that courts should lean towards liberty unless strong reasons dictate otherwise.

3. Charge-Sheet and Its Relevance to Bail

A charge-sheet is a formal police report submitted to the court after investigation, setting out:

• the accused persons,
• the offences alleged, and
• the evidence collected.

Once the charge-sheet is filed:

• The role of the accused is more clearly defined.
• The need for custodial interrogation sharply reduces.
• Courts become more inclined to grant regular bail, especially if no other strong reason for custody remains.

4. Section 66C of the Information Technology Act

Section 66C penalises identity theft, i.e., the dishonest or fraudulent use of:

• another person’s password,
• digital signature, or
• other unique identification feature,

with intent to cheat or cause wrongful loss. Its relevance in this case suggests that the prosecution alleges that the anonymous bomb-threat emails involved misuse of electronic credentials or impersonation.

5. “Rule is Made Absolute”

In High Court practice:

• Initially, the Court issues “Rule” – a notice to the respondent to show cause why the application should not be allowed.
• When the Court finally allows the petition, it often records that “Rule is made absolute,” meaning the notice has culminated in a final order in favour of the applicant.

Here, “Rule is made absolute” signifies that the High Court has finally granted the bail application, subject to imposed conditions.

6. Preliminary Observations and Their Non-Binding Nature

In bail matters, courts may express limited views on the material to assess whether a prima facie case exists or whether bail is appropriate. Such views:

• Are not findings of fact on guilt or innocence.
• Do not bind the trial court, which must independently assess evidence.

This is why the High Court expressly directs the trial court not to be influenced by its preliminary remarks.

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VII. Conclusion

The decision in Rene Joshilda Goldwin Joseph v. State of Gujarat is a concise yet meaningful statement of how established bail principles will operate under the new BNSS regime. While the order does not purport to reshape the law, it is significant in several respects:

• It confirms the continuing authority of Supreme Court bail jurisprudence (notably Sanjay Chandra) under Section 483 BNSS.
• It demonstrates a measured, context-sensitive approach to serious-sounding allegations such as cyber-enabled hoax bomb threats, recognising:
  • the applicant’s mental/emotional disturbance,
  • the personal relationship background, and
  • the absence of an ongoing investigative need once the charge-sheet is filed.
• It reinforces gender-sensitive bail considerations for women accused in non-capital cases.
• It illustrates the correct balancing of liberty and public interest through tailored bail conditions and clear acknowledgement that bail does not prejudge guilt.

In the broader legal context, this judgment stands as an early example of:

• The seamless migration of bail law from CrPC to BNSS;
• The judiciary’s willingness to protect personal liberty even in technologically sophisticated offences that generate public alarm, provided legal safeguards can adequately contain risk; and
• The reaffirmation that pre-trial detention is an exception to be justified, not a default position.

Therefore, while modest in length, the order is doctrinally important: it anchors Section 483 BNSS bail practice firmly in established constitutional and Supreme Court principles, and offers a practical roadmap for handling similar cyber-hoax and public alarm offences in the future.