O R D E R
Jeffrey Leiser, a Wisconsin prisoner, sued prison officials for allegedly violating his right to due process under the Fourteenth Amendment by placing him in disciplinary segregation. The district court granted the officials' motion for summary judgment, concluding no reasonable jury could find Leiser's disciplinary-hearing * We have agreed to decide the case without oral argument because the briefs and record adequately present the facts and legal arguments, and oral argument would not significantly aid the court. FED. R. APP. P. 34(a)(2)(C).
NONPRECEDENTIAL DISPOSITION
To be cited only in accordance with FED. R. APP. P. 32.1
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committee deprived him of a liberty interest. We affirm, though on grounds not reached by the district court.
In November 2022, Leiser, a prisoner at Redgranite Correctional Institution in Redgranite, Wisconsin, received two separate conduct reports. The first conduct report alleged that Leiser made threatening remarks, disobeyed orders, and was in an unauthorized area. It explained that Leiser was socializing with other prisoners in a dayroom without authorization. After a sergeant directed him to leave, Leiser told her she was wasting his time. Leiser then told another staff member that the sergeant
"should be careful" because his brother (also a prisoner at Redgranite) had a lawsuit against her. The sergeant wrote an incident report and later filed a conduct report for Leiser's actions, citing violations of W ISC. ADMIN. CODE DOC §§ 303.18 (Threats), 303.28 (Disobeying Orders), and 303.53 (Being in an Unassigned Area). The second conduct report alleged that Leiser made threatening remarks and was disrespectful toward staff later that day. This report noted that after leaving the dayroom, while walking with a friend in the courtyard, Leiser yelled to his brother through a fence. Leiser allegedly shouted about the sergeant who asked him to leave the dayroom. A different sergeant confronted Leiser and told him to stop yelling and to return to his unit. That sergeant issued a conduct report alleging violations of W ISC. ADMIN. CODE DOC §§ 303.18 (Threats) and 303.29 (Disrespect).
That same day, officials took Leiser to temporary lock-up, where he denied threatening any staff member. Two days later, defendant Lieutenant Dodd provided Leiser the second conduct report (for the incident in the courtyard), notice of disciplinary-hearing rights, and an offer of 15 days' disciplinary segregation for an uncontested disposition. Leiser declined the offer and remained in temporary lock-up for one week until his disciplinary hearing.
Leiser requested two witnesses for the hearing: his brother and his friend. He also requested video evidence from the walkway near the courtyard. Officials approved his requests for witnesses but did not provide the video because it had no audio. Leiser maintained that the video, even without audio, would prove that the second sergeant never instructed him to return to his unit. He appealed the exclusion of video evidence through a partial rehearing, but the outcome remained the same. Leiser, his requested witnesses, and the sergeant who issued the second conduct report made oral statements at the disciplinary hearing. The hearing committee, in considering the conduct report and oral statements, concluded it was more likely than
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not that Leiser shouted threatening and disrespectful statements. It imposed discipline of 15 days' segregation. The next day, Leiser received the notice and documents related to the first conduct report (for the incident in the dayroom). Leiser accepted an offer of 30 days' disciplinary segregation for an uncontested disposition and began his segregation immediately. Because he accepted this offer, Leiser did not have a hearing for his first conduct report.
The two periods of disciplinary segregation ran concurrently and Leiser's total time in disciplinary segregation was 30 days. There, he had a bed, mattress, sink, and toilet. He also received showers, hygiene products, and an intercom to talk with staff. Leiser claims that he was unable to secure enough pain medication to treat a preexisting spine injury and that he was unable to receive food specially ordered before his segregation, resulting in lost funds.
Leiser sued the prison officials involved in the disciplinary proceeding related to the courtyard incident under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. He alleged the hearing and resulting disciplinary segregation violated his right to due process under the Fourteenth Amendment. The district court granted the prison officials' motion for summary judgment concluding no reasonable jury could find that Leiser was deprived of a liberty interest. Leiser appeals.
We review the district court's grant of summary judgment de novo, construing all facts and drawing all reasonable inferences in Leiser's favor. See Adams v. Reagle,
91 F.4th 880, 887 (7th Cir. 2024). Summary judgment is appropriate if the movant shows that there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. F ED. R. CIV. P. 56(a); Torres v. Brookman, 155 F.4th 952, 956 (7th Cir. 2025).
To establish a violation of his right to due process, Leiser had to demonstrate he
(1) was deprived of a liberty interest and (2) the procedures leading to that deprivation were constitutionally deficient. Wolff v. McDonnell, 418 U.S. 539, 556-60 (1974). Even assuming Leiser established a liberty interest in the conditions of his disciplinary segregation, he failed to establish any constitutional flaw in the hearing process. See Torres, 155 F.4th at 956.
Before transfer to disciplinary segregation, the Fourteenth Amendment entitles a prisoner to only "informal, nonadversarial" process consisting of (1) notice of the reason for his placement, (2) an opportunity to present his views, (3) an impartial decisionmaker, and (4) a written statement detailing the reasons for disciplinary action
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and evidence relied upon by the factfinder. Id. at 957. Leiser challenges the notice he received and the impartiality of the hearing committee.
Leiser first contends that he did not receive notice of the reason for his disciplinary segregation. But it is undisputed that Leiser received a copy of the conduct report, as he declined the offer of an uncontested disposition in favor of a contested hearing before the committee. And he was informed of the committee's decision, as reflected in his appeal challenging the committee's findings of guilt under W ISC. ADMIN. CODE DOC §§ 303.18 (Threats) and 303.29 (Disrespect). As such, Leiser was provided constitutionally adequate notice to support disciplinary segregation. See Torres 155 F.4th at 959 (holding conduct tickets with allegations and supporting evidence constitutionally sufficient).
Next, Leiser claims that the committee members were not impartial. But as the district court noted, the undisputed facts revealed that no committee member had any
"independent or prior knowledge; or investigated the alleged incident." Lieutenant Dodd served as the hearing officer, and Leiser suggests that Dodd's delivery of the conduct report to him disqualified Dodd from serving on the hearing committee. But the ministerial act of delivering the conduct report does not make Dodd impartial. See Ealy v. Watson, 109 F.4th 958, 965 (7th Cir. 2024) (holding an inmate had impartial decisionmakers where "none [] were involved in the investigation or initial disciplinary report."); Prude v. Meli, 76 F.4th 648, 657-58 (7th Cir. 2023) (holding an officer who only signs forms in a supervisory capacity is "not involved enough in the investigation to require recusal from the hearing process" and an officer's "substantial[] involve[ment]"
in an investigation bars them from deciding a hearing outcome). Leiser also contends that the other committee member was not paying attention during the hearing. But a committee member's alleged inattention does not suggest partiality. Cf. Liteky v. United States 510 U.S. 540, 555-56 (1994) (holding expressions of "impatience, dissatisfaction, annoyance, and even anger" do not establish bias or partiality sufficient for disqualification under 28 U.S.C. § 455(a)). The process Leiser received is therefore constitutionally sufficient under the informal due process requirements applicable to disciplinary segregation. See Torres, 155 F.4th at 957.
Finally, Leiser contends the hearing committee erred in refusing to allow him access to video evidence. The security director denied Leiser's request because the video contained no audio and did not clearly show the mouths of Leiser or the second sergeant who disciplined him. It was therefore not exculpatory, and Leiser had no entitlement to non-exculpatory evidence. Wilson v. Castaneda, 143 F.4th 814, 819 (7th Cir.
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2025). Furthermore, the security director articulated a security rationale for not allowing Leiser to review the video personally. And as the Supreme Court has explained, prisoners may be restricted from presenting evidence that is "unduly hazardous to institutional safety or correctional goals." Wolff, 418 U.S. at 566. We discern no violation of due process.
AFFIRMED
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