Thomas v. Parker

United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit ____________

No. 24-30610

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Christopher G. Thomas, Plaintiff—Appellant,

versus

Earlton Parker, #1771; Roderick Perry, #573, Defendants—Appellees.

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Appeal from the United States District Court for the Western District of Louisiana USDC No. 5:21-CV-3452

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Before Barksdale, Willett, and Duncan, Circuit Judges. Per Curiam:^*

After pro se plaintiff Christopher Thomas rested his case at trial, the district court entered judgment as a matter of law in favor of Deputies Earlton Parker and Roderick Perry on Thomas's malicious-prosecution claims. Thomas now appeals that ruling, as well as the district court's decisions excluding certain evidence. But Thomas failed to preserve his evidentiary challenges, and the district court committed no error in granting judgment as _____________________

* This opinion is not designated for publication. See 5th Cir. R. 47.5. United States Court of Appeals

Fifth Circuit

FILED

November 13, 2025 Lyle W. Cayce Clerk

Case: 24-30610 Document: 65-1 Page: 1 Date Filed: 11/13/2025

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a matter of law. We therefore AFFIRM the judgment below. And because no exceptional circumstances justify the appointment of counsel, we DENY Thomas's motion for appointed counsel on appeal. See Cooper v. Sherriff, Lubbock Cnty., 929 F.2d 1078, 1084 (5th Cir. 1991).

I

Thomas filed numerous amended complaints in this case, raising claims against numerous defendants arising from numerous incidents. The district court, however, dismissed all of Thomas's claims except for his state and federal malicious-prosecution claims against Deputies Earlton Parker and Roderick Perry arising out of two criminal charges filed against Thomas in February 2019.¹Thomas does not contest the dismissal of his other claims, so only his malicious-prosecution claims are before us on appeal. After discovery, the parties filed cross-motions for summary judgment on Thomas's malicious-prosecution claims. The district court denied both motions and set the case for a jury trial. At trial, Thomas attempted to introduce the magistrate judge's report and recommendation on the parties' summary-judgment motions. When the defendants' objection was sustained, Thomas informed the court that he had brought none of his evidence with him. He then took the stand, describing his arrest (and resulting injuries), the two days he spent in jail before his parents bonded him out, and an earlier incident in which the defendants searched his home. He did not mention the result of his criminal case. Thomas also called three other witnesses, none of whom testified about the outcome of the criminal charges against him. Though he asked several times _____________________

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when he could introduce his exhibits, he never introduced any documentary evidence.

When Thomas rested his case, Deputies Parker and Perry jointly moved for judgment as a matter of law. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 50(a). They argued (1) that Thomas had not presented any evidence that the criminal charges against him terminated in his favor, (2) that probable cause supported the charges, and (3) that qualified immunity shielded them from liability. The district court declined to rule on the qualified immunity argument, but it agreed that Thomas had not introduced sufficient evidence of either favorable termination or the absence of probable cause, and accordingly granted the deputies' motion.

After trial, Thomas moved for reconsideration, and the district court denied his motion. Thomas (still proceeding pro se) timely appealed.

II

"We review a district court's grant of judgment as a matter of law de novo." Cristain v. Hunter Bldgs. & Mfg., L.P., 908 F.3d 962, 964 (5th Cir. 2018) (citation omitted). "Judgment as a matter of law is appropriate where 'a reasonable jury would not have a legally sufficient evidentiary basis to find for the party on that issue.'" Id. (quoting Kelso v. Butler, 899 F.3d 420, 424 (5th Cir. 2018)); see Fed. R. Civ. P. 50(a) ("If a party has been fully heard on an issue during a jury trial and the court finds that a reasonable jury would not have a legally sufficient basis to find for the party on that issue, the court may: (A) resolve the issue against the party; and (B) grant a motion for judgment as a matter of law against the party on a claim or defense that, under the controlling law, can be maintained or defeated only with a favorable finding on that issue."). "[T]he court must draw all reasonable inferences in favor of the nonmoving party, and it may not make credibility determinations Case: 24-30610 Document: 65-1 Page: 3 Date Filed: 11/13/2025

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or weigh the evidence." Reeves v. Sanderson Plumbing Prods., Inc., 530 U.S. 133, 150 (2000) (citations omitted).

III

To prevail on a Fourth Amendment malicious-prosecution claim, a plaintiff must establish (1) an unreasonable seizure in violation of the Fourth Amendment, (2) the commencement or continuation of a criminal proceeding, (3) that the defendant's actions were the legal cause of the criminal proceeding, (4) that the criminal proceeding terminated in the plaintiff's favor, (5) the absence of probable cause, (6) malice, and

(7) damages. See Armstrong v. Ashley, 60 F.4th 262, 279 (5th Cir. 2023). The elements of a malicious-prosecution claim under Louisiana law are similar, except that they do not require an unreasonable seizure. See Jones v. Soileau,

448 So. 2d 1268, 1271 (La. 1984) ("[T]he elements of a malicious prosecution action are: (1) the commencement or continuance of an original criminal or civil judicial proceeding; (2) its legal causation by the present defendant in the original proceeding; (3) its bona fide termination in favor of the present plaintiff; (4) the absence of probable cause for such proceeding; (5) the presence of malice therein; and (6) damage conforming to legal standards resulting to plaintiff." (citation omitted)).

The district court found that there was "[n]o evidence . . . at all" of favorable termination. We agree. Although some evidence appears to have been in the summary-judgment record, the question before us on appeal is whether there is "sufficient evidence in the trial record to support" a verdict in Thomas's favor. Dupree v. Younger, 598 U.S. 729, 735 (2023) (emphasis in original); see also Ortiz v. Jordan, 562 U.S. 180, 184 (2011) ("Once the case proceeds to trial, the full record developed in court supersedes the record existing at the time of the summary-judgment motion."). Our review of the trial record confirms the conclusion the district court reached: Thomas never Case: 24-30610 Document: 65-1 Page: 4 Date Filed: 11/13/2025

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introduced any evidence about the termination of the charges against him. As a result, "a reasonable jury would not have a legally sufficient evidentiary basis to find for" Thomas on that issue. Fed. R. Civ. P. 50(a)(1). That omission is fatal to Thomas's malicious-prosecution claims. See Haygood v. Morrison, 116 F.4th 439, 446 (5th Cir. 2024) ("Malicious prosecution requires, as an element of the tort, the favorable termination of proceedings."

(citation omitted)).²

Although Thomas never introduced evidence of favorable termination at trial, he did attach state-court documents to his complaint showing the charges against him were dismissed, and his pretrial statement indicates that he intended to present this evidence at trial. The remaining question, therefore, is whether the trial court erroneously prevented Thomas from introducing this evidence.

At several points during his case-in-chief, Thomas asked whether he could introduce exhibits and was told that he could not do so at that time, _____________________

2 At the summary-judgment stage, Deputies Parker and Perry conceded that the charges against Thomas were dismissed, and thus that the favorable-termination element was satisfied. We are not persuaded, however, that these concessions made at the summary-judgment stage constituted judicial admissions for purposes of trial. "A judicial admission is a formal concession in the pleadings or stipulations by a party or counsel that is binding on the party making on them." Martinez v. Bally's La., Inc., 244 F.3d 474, 476 (5th Cir. 2001). "A statement made during the course of a lawsuit—even a statement made in a pleading filed with the court—should be considered a judicial admission only 'if it was made intentionally as a waiver, releasing the opponent from proof of fact.'" Mays v. Dir., Off. of Workers' Comp. Programs, 938 F.3d 637, 647 (5th Cir. 2019) (quoting Martinez,

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either because it was not appropriate during the defendants' cross-examination or because he had not properly moved to have the evidence admitted. Even if we were to conclude that the district court erred in refusing to admit Thomas's evidence, however, we could not reverse on that basis because Thomas did not properly preserve any claim of error resulting from those rulings.

A party contending that a district court erred in excluding evidence must preserve that claim of error by "inform[ing] the court of [the evidence's] substance by an offer of proof, unless the substance was apparent from the context." Fed. R. Evid. 103(a)(2). Unlike other circuits, which

"take[ ] a more lenient approach, this circuit will not even consider the propriety of the decision to exclude the evidence at issue, if no offer of proof was made at trial." United States v. Winkle, 587 F.2d 705, 710 (5th Cir. 1979) (citations omitted). Although "courts are more lenient with pro se litigants, we have cautioned that the right of self-representation does not exempt a party from compliance with relevant rules of procedural and substantive law, and that those who venture into federal court without the assistance of counsel cannot be permitted to enjoy much or protracted advantage by reason of that circumstance." Yazdchi v. Am. Honda Fin. Corp., 217 F. App'x 299, 304 (5th Cir. 2007) (cleaned up).

Thomas did not make an offer of proof, and we cannot say that the substance of the state-court records was apparent from the context. While Thomas mentioned other exhibits with some level of specificity, he never mentioned the state-court documents by name or content. The closest he came was his request to enter "exhibits[ ] 1 through 22," which included the state-court records. But that request did not inform the district court of the Case: 24-30610 Document: 65-1 Page: 6 Date Filed: 11/13/2025

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nature or content of the state-court documents. Thus, Thomas did not preserve this claim of error, and we will not consider it.³ * * *

For these reasons, we AFFIRM the judgment of the district court. Thomas's motion for appointment of counsel on appeal is DENIED. _____________________