We invoke the power of a Court of equity to control the legal title, that it may be subservient to the equitable estate. In case a person purchases with notice of the legal or equitable title of other persons to the same property, he will not be permitted to protect himself against such claims; but his own title will be postponed to theirs, and in such cases Courts of equity will hold the purchaser a trustee for the benefit of persons whose rights he has sought to defeat. (Story's Eq. Juris., Vol. 1, Sec. 395.)
Lord Hardwicke sums up the ground of the doctrine thus: " That the taking of a legal estate after notice of a prior right makes a person a mala fide purchaser, and not that he is not a purchaser for a valuable consideration in every other respect. (Story's Eq. Juris., Sec. 397, et seq.)
The first question is, had defendant, True, such an interest in the property as would be sufficient to base a trust upon? We think so, for the reason that the law of 1863 (Suscol Act) defines and recognizes it.
Second--Was there an estoppel? There is no evidence or finding to support one.
Third--Does the issuance of the patent to plaintiffs preclude defendants? No. It was issued upon the application of plaintiffs, and defendant, True, was not a party to the record or proceedings. (Salmon v. Symonds , 30 Cal. 301; Meader et al. v. Norton, 11 Wallace, 442.)
Fourth--Does the fact that defendant, True, did not apply nor intervene in order to obtain a patent, destroy the trust? No. (See Wilson v. Castro , 31 Cal. 420.)
OPINION By the Court:
The equitable defense interposed by the defendant cannot be supported. The Act of Congress commonly called " the Suscol Act," afforded the defendant (as being a bona fide purchaser from General Vallejo, and in possession anterior to the rejection of the Vallejo claim,) a mere privilege of acquiring the title from the United States. This privilege, however, he rejected and utterly repudiated. He took no step whatever to acquire the title. Having under the terms of the Act the opportunity to unite with the plaintiffs in proceedings to acquire the title of the United States, he failed to do so, and being applied to by them to join as a coterminous proprietor in the application to the Federal Land Office to obtain the title, he refused to do so, and this was his attitude until after the patent for the entire tract had been passed to the plaintiffs, and so far as appears, until the latter commenced the present action to obtain the possession of the premises. There is no principle of equity known to us which would enable the defendant under these circumstances to convert the plaintiffs into trustees of the legal title for his benefit, or divest them of that title in his favor.
Judgment reversed and cause remanded, with directions to dismiss the equitable defense and to try the issues at law.